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ADDENDUM A 
APPLICABLE FOREIGN CASES 
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Ludvina ALMEIDA, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
George Thomas ALMEIDA, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 8651. 
Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii. 
Sept. 9. 1983. 
Suit was instituted to divest defendant of his interest in 
certain real property and to vest that interest in plaintiff 
as his joint tenant. The Second Circuit Court, Maui 
County, Kase Higa, J., entered judgment for plaintiff, 
and defendant appealed. The Intermediate Court of 
Appeals, Tanaka, J., held that: (1) denial of motion to 
dismiss complaint on grounds that plaintiff failed to 
join an indispensable party was not reversible error; 
(2) finding that plaintiffs deed to property was not a 
gift, but in consideration of defendant's agreement to 
care for her after his retirement from military service 
was supported by clear and convincing evidence; (3) 
defendant's agreement with plaintiff was not so lacking 
in reasonable certainty as to preclude its enforcement; 
(4) suit was filed within one month of time defendant 
breached agreement and, hence, was timely 
commenced within six-year period of limitations; (5) 
doctrine of laches did not apply in absence of a 
showing of extraordinary circumstances; (6) proper 
remedy was not an award of damages instead of 
divestiture on ground that defendant's oral promise to 
plaintiff was a covenant rather than a condition 
subsequent; (7) it was unnecessary to require 
cograntor to join in lawsuit; and (8) plaintiff did not 
have an adequate remedy at law so as to preclude the 
equitable remedy of divestiture. 
Affirmed. 
[1] PARTIES®^ 18 
287<§=> 18 
Rule regarding indispensable parties is founded on 
equitable considerations and is not jurisdictional. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 19, 19 note, 28 U.S.C.A.; 
Rules Civ.Proc.. Rules 19, 19(b). 
[1] PARTIES<®=> 29 
287<S^29 
Rule regarding indispensable parties is founded on 
equitable considerations and is not jurisdictional. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 19, 19 note, 28 U.S.C.A.; 
Rules Civ.Proc. Rules 19, 19(b). 
[2] PRETRIAL PROCEDURES 558 
307A<S=>558 
Even if an absent party is needed for just adjudication 
of a claim, a decision to dismiss must be based on the 
test of pragmatic equity and good cousciaice. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 19, 19 note, 28 U.S.CA.; 
Rules Civ.Proc. Rules 19, 19(b). 
{3] APPEAL AND E R R O R S 1061.2 
3 0 S 1061.2 
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss divestiture 
action, based on failure to join a cograntor as an 
indispensable party, was not reversible error, where 
defendant waited to file his motion until day of trial 
when plaintiff was in court ready to proceed, and since 
a decision on the merits would not be binding on the 
cograntor. it was unlikely that the cograntor would be 
adversely affected in a practical sense. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rules 19. 19 note, 28 U.S.C.A.; Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rules 19. 19(b). 
[4] GHTS<§=> 1 
191<§=>1 
A "gift" is a voluntary transfer of property by one 
person to another without any consideration or 
compensation therefor and contains as essential 
elements, a donative intent, delivery and acceptance. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[5] G I F T S ^ 47(1) 
191<§=>47(1) 
The burden of proving an alleged gift is generally on 
the donee, but in cases of close kinship, there is a 
presumption that a gift was intended, and the 
presumption must be rebutted by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
[6] EVIDENCED 596(1) 
157<§=>596(1) 
Evidence of a clear and convincing nature is such 
evidence as will produce in the mind of a reasonable 
person a firm belief as to the facts sought to be 
established. 
[7J EVIDENCED 596(1) 
157<®=> 596(1) 
(Cite as: 4 Haw.App. 51 
A conflict in evidence will not preclude the evidence 
from being clear and convincing since the trier of fact 
may resolve the conflict on the basis of the credibility 
of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence 
(8J GIFTS<®=> 49(4) 
191<S=>49(4) 
Finding that the deed by which plaintiff and her 
cograntor conveyed a joint interest in property7 to 
defendant was not executed as a gift, but w as executed 
in consideration of defendant's agreement to care for 
plaintiff after his retirement from military service was 
supported by clear and convincing evidence in action to 
divest defendant of his interest in property when he 
failed and refused to perform his part of agreement. 
[9] C O N T R A C T S ^ 9(1) 
95<&=>9(1) 
The law leans against the destruction of contracts for 
uncertainty and in favor of the determination that an 
agreement is sufficiently definite. 
[10] C O N T R A C T S ^ 9(2) 
95<®=>9(2) 
An agreement to support a person is not uncertain 
because a court or jury can determine in each case what 
performance is reasonably necessary for support. 
[11] CONTRACTS<@==> 9(2) 
95<§=*9(2) 
Agreement whereby defendant was to care for 
plaintiffs needs for remainder of her life upon his 
retirement from military service, in return for which 
she would deed to him certain real property, was not so 
lacking in reasonable certainty as to preclude its 
enforceability7. 
[12] LIMITATION OF ACTIONS«@=> 46(6) 
241<®^46(6) 
The statute of limitations does not generally begin to 
run on a contract until it is breached, but in the absence 
of a repudiation, the statute does not begin to run until 
the agreement is to be performed. HRS § 657-1. 
[13] LIMITATION OF ACTIONS<@=* 46(1) 
24I<®=>46(1) 
Suit to divest defendant of his interest in certain real 
property on ground of his failure to fulfill his 
agreement to care for plaintiffs needs upon his 
retirement from military service was commenced in 
October of 1980, only a short time after his retirement 
from military service in September of 1980. and was 
timely filed within applicable six-year period of 
limitations absent evidence that his refusal to reconvey 
his interest in property to plaintiff in 1970 was an 
anticipatory breach of his agreement HRS § 657-1 
[14] EQUI I YXe = => 67 
150<§=>67 
The laches doctrine is based on the maxim that equity 
aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. 
115] EQUITY<@==> 87(2) 
150<S^87(2) 
The doctrine of laches did not apply to pi eclude 
plaintiff from bringing an action to divest her son, the 
defendant, from certain real property' upon his failure to 
fulfill his agreement to care for the plaintiffs needs 
where the action was commenced witfnn a month of the 
time the applicable six-year period of limitations began 
to run. HRS §657-1. 
| IKiI C AHi Fill 11 A I il  11 s II! (Ml Il K I' Hit f* IN I V S = P 
J 
69<®=> 3 
Although the courts have decreed rescission and 
cancellation or reconveyance upon a breach of a 
promise to support when the promise is deemed to be a 
condition subsequent, the absence of a condition 
subsequent will not preclude a court from decreeing 
rescission and cancellation or other equitable remedy. 
[17] CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS<®=> 
14 
69<®=>14 
Where plaintiff', who was of advanced age, had 
property conveyed to herself and her son, the 
defendant, in consideration of defendants oral promise 
to support her, breached his agreement, there was a 
failure of consideration and, even assuming that 
defendant's promise to support was not a condition 
subsequent, trial court was authorized and was vested 
with discretion to grant plaintiff divestiture rather than 
to award damages. 
[17] CONTRACTS<@=> 83 
95<S^83 
Where plaintiff, who was of advanced age, had 
property conveyed to herself and her son, the 
defendant, in consideration of defendant's oral promise 
<citc as: 4 Haw.App. 513, 669 P.2d 174) 
to support her, breached his agreement, there was a 
failure of consideration and, even assuming that 
defendant's promise to support was not a condition 
subsequent, trial court was authorized and was vested 
with discretion to grant plaintiff divestiture rather than 
to award damages. 
[18J EQUITY<@=> 1 
150<£=>1 
The relief granted in equity is dictated by the equitable 
requirements of the situation at hand and must be 
adapted to the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case. 
[18] J U D G M E N T S 204 
228<®=>204 
The relief granted in equity is dictated by the equitable 
requirements of the situation at hand and must be 
adapted to the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case. 
[19] CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS^ 
35(1) 
69<®=>35(1) 
Where plaintiff had right to have her son's interest in 
property restored to her consensually or by judicial 
action, but did neither and, instead, caused her first son 
to convey property together with herself to the 
defendant, her second son, by deed, and defendant 
failed in his oral promise to support plaintiff which he 
gave as consideration for deed, trial court could 
properly mold its decree to divest defendant's interest 
in property and vest same in plaintiff, and it was 
unnecessary to require first son to join in lawsuit. 
[19] CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS<@=> 
56 
69<§=>56 
Where plaintiff had right to have her son's interest in 
property restored to her consensually or by judicial 
action, but did neither and, instead, caused her first son 
to convey property together with herself to the 
defendant, her second son, by deed, and defendant 
failed in his oral promise to support plaintiff which he 
gave as consideration for deed, trial court could 
properly mold its decree to divest defendant's interest 
in property and vest same in plaintiff, and it was 
unnecessary to require first son to join in lawsuit. 
[20] CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS<§=> 
3 
69<§=>3 
Where there has been a failure of consideration of 
support for a deed, equitable remedy of rescission and 
cancellation is proper, especially where grantor is aged. 
[21] CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS®^ 
10 
69<S=>10 
Although trial court concluded, in the alternative, that 
the property could remain in the names of the plaintiff 
and defendant as joint tenants, provided that plaintiff 
would have the beneficial interest of the property 
during her lifetime and that defendant would pay 
plaintiff $250 per month, where defendant represented 
that he was unable to pay $250 monthly, there was no 
adequate remedy at lawr and • trial court did not, 
therefore, err in ordering an equitable remedy of 
divestiture upon failure of consideration of support for 
a deed. 
**176 Syllabus by the Court 
1. *513 The rule regarding indispensable parties is 
founded on equitable considerations and is not 
jurisdictional. Even if an absent party is deemed 
needed for the just adjudication of a claim, a decision 
to dismiss must be based on the pragmatic "equity and 
good conscience" test of Rule 19(b), Hawaii Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
2. Where defendant delayed in making his motion to 
dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiff failed 
to join an indispensable party until the very morning of 
the trial and the absent party would not be adversely 
affected, the denial of the motion was not reversible 
error. 
3. A gift is a voluntary transfer of property by one 
person to another without any consideration or 
compensation and its essential elements are donative 
intent, delivery, and acceptance. 
4. The burden of proving an alleged gift is usually on 
the donee. However, in cases of close kinship between 
the donor and donee, there is a presumption that a gift 
was intended and the presumption must be rebutted by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
5. An agreement to support a person is not uncertain 
because a court or jury can determine in each case what 
(Cite as: 4 Haw.App. 513, *513, 669 P.2d 174, **176) 
performance is reasonably necessary for support. 
6. Generally, the statute of lunitations does not begin 
to run on a contract until it is breached. In the absence 
of repudiation, the limitations period does not begin to 
run until the contract is to be performed. 
7 *514 In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, 
a court of equity will usually grant or withhold relief in 
analogy to the statute of limitations relating to law 
actions of like character. 
8. Where the consideration for a deed is an agreement 
of support, the courts tend to be lenient toward the 
grantor, especially if the grantor is aged. The relief 
accorded such grantor may be rescission and 
cancellation of the deed or other equitable remedies. 
9. The relief granted in equity is dictated by the 
equitable requirements of the situation and must be 
adapted to the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case. 
*525 Edward S. Kushi, Jr., Wailuku, (Law Offices of 
Lawrence N.C. Ing, Crockett & Nakamura, Wailuku, 
of counsel), for defendant-appellant. 
Edward F. Mason, Wailuku (Mason and Scott, 
Wailuku, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee. 
Before *513 BURNS, C.J., and HEEN and 
TANAKA, JJ. 
TANAKA, Judge. 
Defendant George Thomas Almeida (George) appeals 
from the judgment divesting him of his interest in 
certain real property **177 and vesting it in his joint 
tenant, plaintiff Ludvina Almeida (Mrs. Almeida). We 
affirm. 
The action involves Lot 12-B, area 12,000 square feet, 
together with an undivided one-half interest in a 
roadway lot and two easements (the Property), located 
in Pukalani, Maui. Mrs. Almeida and her husband, 
Manuel Almeida (Mr. Almeida), acquired the Property 
in 1951. By deed dated December 26, 1961, Mr. and 
Mrs. Almeida conveyed the Property to their son 
George and his wife Mildred S. Almeida (Mildred). 
Upon the request of Mrs. Almeida, George and 
Mildred conveyed the Property to her by deed dated 
March 12, 1963. 
Shortly after Mr. Almeida died in 1964, Mrs. Almeida 
built a house on the Property where she has since 
resided. By deed dated March 19. 1965. Mrs. Almeida 
conveyed the Property' to herself and her son Ham 
Almeida (Harry), as joint tenants. By deed dated 
February 15. 1968 (1968 Deed), Mrs. Almeida and 
Harry conveyed the Property to Mrs Almeida and 
George, as joint tenants. 
On October 22. 1980, Mrs. Almeida filed a complaint 
alleging, inter alia, that (1) she and George agreed that 
upon his retirement from military service, George 
would return to Maui, reside with her. and care for her 
needs for the rest of her life and. in return, she would 
insure that he would become the *515 owner of the 
Property upon her death; (2) she fulfilled her end of 
the promise by the execution of the 1968 Deed; and 
(3) George failed and refused to perform his part of the 
agreement. She sought a decree divesting George of 
all right, title and interest in the Property7. 
George counterclaimed alleging joint ownership of the 
Property and seeking partition. 
After a bench trial, the trial court entered its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law on October 20, 1981 and 
its judgment on December 9, 1981. The judgment 
"divested" George of his "right, title and interest" in the 
Property, "vested" the same in Mrs. Almeida and 
dismissed George's counterclaim. George appeals. 
The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred 
(1) in denying George's motion to dismiss for want of 
an indispensable party, (2) in failing to find that the 
1968 Deed effected a gift of a joint interest in the 
Property to George, (3) in finding an agreement by 
George to care for Mrs. Almeida, (4) in ruling against 
George's affirmative defenses of statute of limitations 
and laches, and (5) in decreeing divestiture of George's 
interest in the Property. We find no reversible error. 
I. 
On the morning of September 8, 1981, when the trial 
commenced, George filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint. He contended, inter aha, that the complaint 
should be dismissed because, as a co-grantor in the 
(Cite as: 4 Haw.App. 513, *515, 669 P.2d 174, **177) 
1968 Deed, Harry was an indispensable party to the 
suit. On the same morning, the trial court orally denied 
the motion. [FN1J 
FN1. No written order denying the motion to dismiss 
was filed. 
[1][2] At the outset, we observe that Rule 19. Hawaii 
Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) (1981). [FN21 
regarding indispensable parties *516 **178 "is 
founded on equitable considerations, and is not 
jurisdictional." Midkiff v. Kobayashi, 54 Haw. 299, 
324, 507 P.2d 724, 739 (1973). Even if an absentee is 
deemed needed for the just adjudication of a claim, a 
decision to dismiss must be based on the pragmatic 
"equity and good conscience" test of Rule 19(b), 
HRCP. Therefore, after the conclusion of a trial on the 
merits, there is reluctance on the part of an appellate 
court to overturn the trial court's decision as to 
indispensable parties, unless there is real prejudice to 
the absentee. 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1609 (1972). 
FN2. The applicable provisions of Rule 19, Hawaii 
Rules of Civil Procedure (1981), provide: 
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is 
subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in 
the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims 
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence 
may (A) as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest or (B) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has 
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made 
a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do 
so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an 
involuntary plaintiff. 
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not 
Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (aXl)-
(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall 
determine whether in equity and good conscience the 
action should proceed among the parties before it, or 
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus 
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered 
by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment 
rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to 
him or those already parties; second, the extent to 
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the 
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be 
lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment 
rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; 
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate 
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
We are aware of the pronouncement of our supreme 
court that the "[ajbsence of indispensable parties can 
be raised at any time even by a reviewing court on its 
own motion." Haiku Plantations Ass'n v. Lono, 56 
Haw. 96, 103, 529 P.2d 1, 5 (1974) (quoting Filipino 
Federation of America v. Cubico, 46 Haw. 353, 369, 
380 P.2d 488,497 (1963)). 
We are also cognizant of the fact that Rule 19, HRCP, 
was amended in 1972 to conform to Rule 19, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as revised in 1966. The 
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in its Note on the 1966 Revision of Rule 19, 
quoted at 3A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Federal Practice 1j 
19.01[5.-4] (2ded. 1982). comments as follows. 
*517 [W]hen the moving party is seeking dismissal 
in order to protect himself against a later suit by the 
absent person ..., and is not seeking vacariously [sic] 
to protect the absent person against a prejudicial 
judgment ..., his undue delay in making the motion 
can properly be counted against him as a reason for 
denying the motion. 
In National Board of YWCA v YWCA of Charleston, 
S.C., 335 F.Supp. 615 (DSC.1971), defendant 
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
plaintiff failed to join an indispensable party. The 
court held that "defendants delay in making its motion 
until the very morning of trial would warrant its denial 
because of laches." Id. at 627. 
[3] George's primary complaint is that the absence of 
Harry may subject George to "multiple suits and result 
in inconsistent judicial decisions imposing undue 
hardship" on him. Reply Brief at 5. Applying the 
above principles, we believe that it was fatal for 
George to have waited to file his motion until the day 
of trial when Mrs. Almeida was in court ready to 
proceed. Furthermore, it appeared unlikely that Harry 
would be adversely affected in a practical sense. A 
decision on the merits would not have been binding on 
him. 
Consequently, we hold that the trial court's denial of 
George's motion to dismiss was not reversible error. 
(Cite as: 4 HawApp. 513, *517, 669 P.2d 174, *M78) 
II. 
[4] "A 'gift' is generally defined as a voluntary transfer 
of property by one person to another without any 
consideration or compensation therefor." Welton v. 
Gallagher. 2 HawApp. 242, 245.630 P.2d 1077, 1081 
(1982)? affM. 65 Haw. 528. 654 P.2d 1349 (1982). To 
constitute a gift, the essential elements are (1) donative 
intent, (2) delivery, and (3) acceptance. Estate of 
Lalakea, 26 Haw. 243 (1922); 38 Am.Jur.2d Gifts §§ 
17,20,34(1968). 
There is no dispute as to delivery and acceptance of 
the 1968 Deed in this case. The bone of contention is 
the element of donative intent. 
[5] Generally, the burden of proving an alleged gift is 
on the donee. Siko v. Seguirant, 51 Haw. 118, 452 
P.2d 447 (1969); Welton v. Gallagher, supra. 
However, in cases **179 of close kinship. *518 there 
is a presumption that a gift was intended and the 
presumption must be rebutted by clear and convincing 
evidence. Abies v. Abies, 39 Haw. 598 (1952); 
Welton v. Gallagher, 2 Haw.App. at 245 n. 1, 630 P.2d 
at 1081. 
Claiming that Mrs. Almeida failed by clear and 
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the 
1968 Deed conveying a joint interest in the Property to 
him was a gift, George contends that the trial court 
erred in not finding a gift. On the other hand, Mrs. 
Almeida argues that the evidence was clear and 
convincing that the conveyance was in consideration of 
George's agreement to care for her after his retirement 
from military service; therefore, no gift w as intended 
or involved. 
[6] [7] Clear and convincing evidence means such 
evidence as will produce "in the mind of a reasonable 
person a firm belief as to the facts sought to be 
established." Welton v. Gallagher, 2 Haw.App. at 246. 
630 P.2d at 1081. We do not believe that conflicting 
evidence per se precludes it from being clear and 
convincing. The trier of fact must resolve "the 
conflicting evidence based on the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence." Anders v. 
State, 60 Haw. 381, 392, 590 P.2d 564, 570 (1979). 
See also MPM Hawaiian, Inc. v. Amigos, Inc., 63 
Haw. 485, 630 P.2d 1075 (1981); Shinn v Edwin 
Yee, Ltd., 57 Haw. 215, 553 P.2d 733 (1976); Siko v 
Seguirant. supra 
George argues that because the 1968 Deed contained 
no covenant or condition of his promise to care for 
Mrs. Almeida, the evidence is not clear and convincing 
that there was no donative intent. The court below 
found that in consideration of the conveyance Cieorge 
promised Mrs. Almeida "that upon his retirement from 
the military service he would care for [her] needs for 
the remainder of her natural life." Finding of Fact No 
8. Mrs. Almeida, who was 78 years of age at the time 
of trial, testified unequivocally that George so 
promised. Her son Albert Almeida (Albert) testified 
that after 1968 George confirmed his promise to Mrs 
Almeida to take care of her. George's testimony was 
that he made no such promise to his mother. 
[8] We hold that (1) the trier of fact, the trial court in 
this case, resolved the conflicting evidence by finding 
the testimony of Mrs. Almeida and Albert to be 
credible and (2) as so resolved, *519 the evidence 
could reasonably produce in its mind a firm belief that 
George did make the promise in contention to Mrs 
Almeida, and no gift was intended. 
in. 
George asserts that the trial court erred in finding and 
concluding that there was a "contract" enforceable by 
Mrs. Almeida. He argues that his alleged promise to 
"care for" Mrs. Almeida lacked reasonable certainty 
We disagree. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33 (1981) 
provides in relevant part: 
(1) Even though a manifestation of intention is 
intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be 
accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of 
the contract are reasonably certain. 
(2) The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if 
they provide a basis for determining the existence of 
a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy. 
See Francone v. McClay, 41 Haw. 72 (1955); Clarkin 
v. Reimann, 2 HawApp. 618,638 P.2d 857 (1981) 
[9] We have announced the policy that "the law leans 
against the destruction of contracts for uncertainty" and 
that "[c]ourts favor the determination that an 
agreement is sufficiently definite." In re Sing Chong 
Co., Ltd., 1 HawApp. 236, 239, 617 P.2d 578, 581 
(Cite as: 4 Haw.App. 513, *519, 669 P.2d 174, **179) 
(1980). 
110] Professor Corbin states that an agreement "to 
support a person is not too indefinite" because a "court 
or jury can determine in each case what performance is 
reasonably necessary for support." 1 A. Corbin, 
Corbin on Contracts § 100, n. 56 (1963). An 
agreement to "care for" the grantor in a deed is broad 
enough to mean an obligation to provide support to 
him. Walton v. Walton, 113 Ga.App. 400, 148 S.E.2d 
331(1966). A written agreement in **180 the deed to 
provide "adequate care and maintenance of [the 
grantor] during the remainder of [her] lifetime" was 
not questioned as lacking reasonable certainty to 
preclude enforceability in Anderson v. Anderson, 620 
S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex.App.1981). See also Fisher v. 
Sellers. 214 Ark. 635, 217 S.W.2d 331 (1949); Cook 
v. Adams, 89 So.2d 6 (Fla.1956). 
*520 Our supreme court has stated that "an 
undertaking and promise of the grantee to provide for 
the grantors a comfortable and suitable support and 
maintenance during the remainder of their respective 
lives," together with love and affection and one dollar, 
constitute good and sufficient consideration. In re 
Kealiiahonui, 9 Haw. 1, 7 (1893). George's promise to 
"care for" Mrs. Almeida was equivalent to a promise to 
support her. 
[11] Thus, there was reasonable certainty and the trial 
court did not err in finding and concluding that 
George's promise to "care for" Mrs. Almeida 
constituted an enforceable agreement. 
IV. 
George claims that under the facts of the case, he 
should have prevailed on his affirmative defense of 
statute of limitations or laches. He argues that (1) his 
alleged agreement to care for Mrs. Almeida was made 
at or about the time of the execution of the 1968 Deed; 
(2) in 1970, Mrs. Almeida sought to have him convey 
his interest in the Property to her which he refused to 
do; (3) Mrs. Almeida filed her complaint on October 
22, 1980; (4) she "had knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances to bring her claim" in 1970 (Opening 
Brief at 27); and (4) thus, her action commenced in 
1980 was too late. George's claim is without merit. 
[12] Mrs. Almeida's claim was based on a breach of 
an agreement (jenerally, the statute of limitations does 
not begin to run on a contract until it is breached See 
Au v. Au, 63 Haw. 210, 626 P.2d 173 (1981). 
Furthermore, in the absence of a repudiation, the 
limitations period does not begm to run until the 
agreement is to be performed. 51 Am.Jur.2d 
Limitation of Actions § 126 (1970). 
[13] Here, Georges promise was to take care of Mrs. 
Almeida after his retirement from military service. He 
retired in September 1980, although he had returned to 
Maui earlier in Jury 1980. His breach of the agreement 
occurred in September 1980 after his retirement. 
Furthermore, the record is devoid of any evidence that 
his refusal to reconvey his interest to Mrs. Almeida in 
1970 was an anticipatory breach of his promise. The 
instant law suit was commencedin October 1980, only 
a *521 short tune after the six- year limitations period 
of HRS § 657-1 (1976 & Supp.1982) began running. 
[14] Mrs. Almeida's quest for equitable relief subjects 
her to the defense of laches. The laches doctrine is 
based on the maxim that "equity aids the vigilant, not 
those who slumber on their rights." Adair v. Hustace, 
64 Haw. 314, 320. 640 P.2d 294, 300 (1982) (quoting 
2 S. Symons, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 418 
(5th ed. 1941)). Although "[a] court of equity is not 
bound by the statute of limitations, ... in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances, it will usually grant or 
withhold relief in analogy to the statute of limitations 
relating to law actions of like character." Yokochi v. 
Yoshimoto, 44 Haw. 297, 300, 353 P.2d 820, 823 
(1960). 
[15] Mrs. Almeida commenced her action about a 
month after the analogous six-year limitations period 
began running Since George has failed to show any 
extraordinary circumstance in the case, the^doctrine of 
laches does not apply. 
V, 
Finally, George contends that the conclusion of law 
and judgment of the trial court divesting the joint 
interest of George in the Property and vesting it in Mrs. 
Almeida were erroneous for three reasons. First, since 
the 1968 Deed was absolute and unconditional, 
George's oral promise was a covenant rather than a 
condition subsequent, so the proper remedy was the 
award of damages and not divestiture. Second, 
(Cite as: 4 Haw.App. 513, *521, 669 P.2d 174, **180) 
inasmuch as Harry' was a co-grantor in the 1968 Deed, 
the trial court could not vest in Mrs. Almeida the 
interest George acquired from Ham Thud, since the 
trial court concluded, in the alternative, that the parties 
**181 may remain as joint tenants of the Property 
provided that (1) Mrs. Almeida shall have the 
beneficial use thereof until her death and (2) George 
shall pay her $250 per month commencing September 
1, 1980 (Conclusion of Law No. 7), there was an 
adequate remedy at law. We do not agree. 
A. 
Citing State v. Thorn, 58 Haw. 8. 563 P.2d 982 
(1977), George contends that the 1968 Deed must be 
construed in *522 accordance with the intention of the 
parties, as ascertained from the language of the deed. 
The 1968 Deed recites a consideration of one dollar 
and love and affection and conveys the Property to 
Mrs. Almeida and George, as joint tenants, absolutely 
and unconditionally. Therefore, George argues that his 
oral promise to support Mrs. Almeida is not a 
condition of conveyance but a covenant. For a breach 
of such covenant, Mrs. Almeida is entitled only to a 
money judgment 
State v. Thorn, supra, sets forth the general law 
regarding deeds of conveyance. However, the judicial 
treatment of deeds in consideration of support is unique 
and may be summarized as follows: 
Where a deed depends for its consideration upon a 
promise of support the courts have shown a great deal 
of leniency toward the grantor. Relief is granted in a 
variety of ways when the grantee does not fulfil his 
promise. The deed is sometimes treated as voidable 
at the option of the grantor, or the deed may be set 
aside for lack of consideration or the deed treated as 
conveying a fee upon a condition subsequent. 
6 G. Thompson, Real Property § 3117, at 906-07 
(1962). See also 26 CJ.S. Deeds § 21 (1956); 73 
Am.Jur.2d Support of Persons §§ 26, 36, 40 (1974). 
Courts have evinced their concern in this area and 
acted to grant equitable relief "particularly where the 
grantor is of advanced years." 26 CIS., supra, at 620. 
Upon the grantee's breach, courts have cancelled or 
voided a deed even where the promise to support was 
not specified in the deed itself but appeared in a 
separate writing, Shook v. Bergstrasser, 356 Pa. 167, 
51 A.2d 681 (1947), or was orally made by the 
grantee. Lewelling v McElroy. 148 Neb 309, 27 
N.W.2d 268 (1947); Frashcr v Frasher, 249 S.E.2d 
513 (W.Va.1978); Nadler v. Nadler. 242 Wis. 537, 8 
N.W.2d 306 (1943). 
[16] Where the promise to support is deemed to be a 
condition subsequent, the courts have decreed 
rescission and cancellation or reconveyance upon 
breach of the promise Nadler v Nadler, supra; 
Glocke v. Glocke, 113 Wis. 303. 89 N.W. 118 (1902). 
However, the absence of a condition subsequent has 
not precluded a court from decreeing rescission and 
cancellation or other equitable remedies. Finding 
failure of consideration *523 upon the grantee's 
breach, courts have cancelled the deed and restored the 
property to the grantor. Cook v. Adams, supra; 
Lewelling v. McElroy, supra; Shook v. Bergstrasser, 
supra; Johnson v. Riser, 216 Va 794. 223 S.E.2d 871 
(1976); Frasher v. Frasher, supra In some cases, the 
courts have utilized the remedy of constructive trust. 
Loschen v. Clark, 256 Iowa 413, 127 N.W.2d 600 
(1964); Dietz v. Dietz, 244 Minn. 330, 70 N.W.2d 
281(1955). 
[17] Here, Mrs. Almeida, who was of advanced age, 
had the Property conveyed to herself and George in 
consideration of George's oral promise to support her. 
George breached his agreement and Mrs. Almeida 
wanted the interest conveyed to George to be divested. 
Even assuming that George's promise to support was 
not a condition subsequent, there was a failure of 
consideration and, on the basis of the reported cases, 
the trial court had the authority and discretion to 
rescind and cancel the 1968 Deed. 
B. 
George then argues that the proper remedy^ was not the 
divestment of his interest and the vesting of it in Mrs. 
Almeida, but rescission and cancellation of the 1968 
Deed. Further, since Harry was a co-grantor, but a 
non-party in the case, even rescission and cancellation 
would not have been proper. See part I, supra. 
[18] In this case, Mrs Almeida sought the aid of a 
court of equity. A "court of equity has plenary power 
to mold its decrees **182 in such form as to conserve 
the equities of all parties * * *." Fleming v. Napili 
Kai, Ltd., 50 Haw. 66, 70, 430 P.2d 316, 319 (1967) 
(quoting Baker Sand & Gravel Co. v. Rogers P. & H. 
(Cite as: J Haw.App. 513, *523, 669 P.2d 174, **182 ) 
Co.. 228 Ma. 612, 619, 154 So. 591, 597, 102 A.L.R. 
346, 355 (1^34)). See Schrader v. Benton. 2 
Haw.App. 564, 635 P.2d 562 (1981). Also. "[t]he 
relief grafted in equity is dictated by the equitable 
requirements of the situation, and must be adapted to 
the facts and circumstances of the particular case." 
Shinn v. Edwin Yee, Ltd.. 57 Haw. at 235, 553 P.2d at 
746. 
In Finding of Fact No. 7 which is unchallenged, the 
trial court found: 
7. On March 19, 1965, Plaintiff conveyed Lot 12-B 
[the *524 Property] from herself as sole owner to 
herself and her son Harry Almeida as joint tenants. 
This conveyance was undertaken in exchange for the 
promise of Harry Almeida that he would care for 
Plaintiff for the remainder of her life, but it was not 
intended to pass any interest in the property to Harry 
until Plaintiffs death. Harry Almeida subsequently 
informed Plaintiff that he was not going to return to 
Maui. 
The consideration for the March 19. 1965 conveyance 
of a joint interest to Harry was his promise to support 
Mrs. Almeida. Finding of Fact No. 7 indicates a 
breach of the promise by Harry since his decision not 
to return to Maui would make it impractical for him to 
care for Mrs. Almeida. Thus, Mrs. Almeida had the 
right to have Harry's interest in the Property restored to 
her consensuaUy or by judicial action. She did neither. 
Instead, she caused Harry to convey the Property 
together with her to herself and George by the 1968 
Deed. 
[19] Under such circumstances, the trial court could 
and did mold its decree to divest George's interest in 
the Property and vest the same in Mrs. Almeida. It was 
unnecessary to require Harry to join in the law suit, 
decree the rescission and cancellation of the 1968 Deed 
and order Harry to convey his interest in the Property 
to Mrs. Abneida. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed 
on October 20, 1981, after concluding thai a judgment 
should be entered divesting George's interest in the 
Property and vesting the same in Mrs Almeida, the 
trial court, in the alternative, concluded that the 
Property should remain in the names of the parties as 
joint tenants provided that Mrs. Almeida would have 
the beneficial interest of the Property during her 
lifetime and that George would pay Mrs. Almeida $250 
per mouth from September 1, 1981 George asserts 
that this clearly shows that Mrs. Almeida had an 
adequate remedy at law and the equitable remedy of 
divestiture was improper. 
[20] At the hearing on George's motion for 
reconsideration of the judgment and for amendment of 
findings of fact and conclusions* *525 of law. the trial 
judge indicated that he had inserted the alternative 
conclusion of law for a practical purpose. He stated 
that Mrs. Almeida was aged and had "passed her life 
expectancy" and he was giving George "a chance to 
make Up with ... his mother." Transcript at 141. 
However, in his affidavit, George indicated that since 
his monthly net income totaled $1,700 and his monthly 
expenses approximated $1 ^ 615. he would be unable to 
make a monthly payment of $250 to Mrs Almeida. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Almeida rejected the court's 
alternative conclusion. The court's efforts were in vain. 
[21] As indicated in part V-A, supra, where there has 
been a failure of the consideration of support for a 
deed, the equitable remedy of rescission and 
cancellation is not uncommon, especially where the 
grantor is aged. A money judgment award to Mrs. 
Almeida, who was 78 years old, upon George's 
representation that he was unable to pay $250 monthly, 
would have been an inadequate remedy at law. The 
trial court did not err in ordering divestiture in the 
judgment. 
Affirmed. 
C. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
(Cite as: 26 Misc.2d 204, 205 N.Y.S.2d 581) 
Application of Claire SHIPLEX, mother and natural guardian on behalf of Gerald 
Henry, MatthewTfenryTQane^enry and Theodore Henry infants, and all of said 
Infants By their mother, joining in this Petition, asking for leave to change 
their names. 
Supreme Court, Special Term, Nassau County, Part I. 
Septa442#? 
Proceeding on application made by four infants by their mother for permission to change 
infants' surname to that of their stepfather. The Supreme Court, Bernard S. Meyer, J., held that 
where infants aged eighteen years and four months, fifteen years and eight months, thirteen years 
and eight months, an((eleveiTyears and twomonths^ere of sufficient understanding to sejectjheir. 
sumamgLand change in use of surname from that of their natural father to that of their stepfather had 
been made of their own volition, infants were competent to continueuse of stepfather's name without 
court order and each would be tree to return to the use of his natural father's surname whenever 
infant was satisfied that that was the proper course and father was not entitled to injunction to 
prevent infants using stepfather's name. 
Petition by father for restraining order denied and petition for change of name denied. 
[1] NAMES k20 
269k20 
Where application was made by four infants by their mother, for permission to change infants' 
surname to that of their stepfather and to drop first name of oldest infant who was named for his 
father, proceeding by petition and order to show cause requiring mother to cease and desist causing 
children to be known by any other surname than father's, to cause school and other records to be 
rectified, and to refrain from changing surname of any children except by order of court was correct 
way for father to bring on issues and two petitions would be considered together. Civil Rights Law, 
s 60 et seq. 
[2] NAMES k20 
269k20 
Where application was made by four infants by their mother to change infants' surname and father 
in his answering papers sought an order restraining mother and stepfather from interfering with his 
visitation rights as fixed in a separation agreement, but no separate motion or cross motion for that 
relief had been made by father nor was such relief requested in father's petition for other relief, 
question as to visitation rights was not properly before court and would not be ruled upon. Civil 
Rights Law, s 60 et seq. 
[3] NAMES k20 
269k20 
^HieSSSnfor change of an infant's name should be granted if there is no reasonable objection to the 
proposed change and the interests of the infant will be substantially promoted by the change. Civil 
Riehts Law. s 60 et sea. 
269k20 
Contentions that changing surname of children would create an impossible climate for visitation by 
father, would teach children deceit since they would be using a name not theirs in order to cover 
possible embarrassment, and that use of stepfather's name would be personally obnoxious to father 
were not sufficient basis to deny change if otherwise warranted. Civil Rights Law, s 60 et seq. 
[5] NAMES k20 
269k20 
Possible adverse effect on relationship between a father and his children is a valid ground of 
objection to changing surname of children where father has evidenced sustained interest in children 
by continuing support payments and visitation and he does not unreasonably delay in objecting to 
the change. Civil Rights Law, s 60 et seq. 
[6] NAMES k20 
269k20 
In determining whether surname of children should be changed from that of their natural father to 
that of their stepfather, after divorce and remarriage of mother, question was not which of the adults 
was right or wrong but what course would best serve the interests of the children. 
[7] NAMES k20 
269k20 
In proceeding on application made by four infants by their mother for permission to change infants' 
surname to that of their stepfather, evidence established that granting of petition would contribute 
to further estrangement of children from their natural father, that such estrangement was not in best 
interest of children, that present estrangement was not so completely the fault of father that he should 
be held to have forfeited his right to interpose objection and that children were using stepfather's 
name of their own volition. Civil Rights Law, s 60 et seq. 
[8] NAMES k20 
269k20 
A name change judicially effected cannot thereafter be changed except by like decree. 
[9] NAMES k20 
269k20 
The Civil Rights Law provisions establishing a judicial procedure for change of name are in addition 
to, and not in substitution for, the common-law methods of change. Civil Rights Law, s 60 et seq. 
[10] NAMES k20 
269k20 
Where parents are separated or divorced, any change in child's name brought to court's attention 
should be closely scrutinized to determine that it is actually the infant's own decision rather than that 
of the parent with whom he lives, but it is not required that common-law method of voluntary change 
be denied the infant. 
[11] INJUNCTION k94 
212k94 
Where infants, aged eighteen years and four months, fifteen years and eight months, thirteen years 
and eight months, and eleven years and two months, were of sufficient understanding to select their 
surname and change in use of surname from that of their natural father to that of their stepfather had 
been made of their own violation, infants were competent to continue use of stepfather's name 
without court order and each would be free to return to the use of his natural father's surname 
whenever infant was satisfied that that was the proper course and father was not entitled to injunction 
to prevent infants using stepfather's name. 
[11] NAMES k20 
269k20 
Where infants, aged eighteen years and four months, fifteen years and eight months, thirteen years 
and eight months, and eleven years and two months, were of sufficient understanding to select their 
surname and change in use of surname from that of their natural father to that of their stepfather had 
been made of their own violation, infants were competent to continue use of stepfather's name 
without court order and each would be free to return to the use of his natural father's surname 
whenever infant was satisfied that that was the proper course and father was not entitled to injunction 
to prevent infants using stepfather's name. 
[12] NAMES k9 
269k9 
Although hereditary surnames are customary, that custom has never amounted to a common-law 
legal right. 
[13] NAMES k20 
269k20 
In proceeding on application by four infants by their mother for permission to change infants' 
surname to that of their stepfather, there was a failure of proof of father's allegations that every effort 
was being made by mother to create impression that stepfather was natural father, that stepfather had 
instructed school authorities to see that children were known by his surname and that mother's action 
was part of a well-calculated plan to alienate the children from their father. Civil Rights Law, s 60 
et seq. 
**584 *205 Nathaniel Taylor, Mineola, for petitioners. 
Frank J. Faruolo, Jr., Brooklyn, for respondent. 
BERNARD S. MEYER, Justice. 
[1,2] This application, made by four infants by their mother and on notice to their father, 
seeks permission, pursuant to Civil Rights Law, Article 6, to change their surname to that of their 
stepfather, and in the case of the oldest infant, who is named for his father, but has used his *206 
middle rather than his first name, also to drop his first name and hereafter to use his middle name 
as his first name and his mother's maiden name as his middle name. The parents of the infants were 
married in 1941, separated in 1956 and were divorced in 1958 by a Nevada decree made in a 
proceeding brought by the mother and in which the father appeared. By order to show cause and 
petition, the father seeks an order requiring the mother to cease and desist causing the children to be 
known by any other surname than his, to cause school and other records to be rectified, and to refrain 
from changing the surname of any of the children except by order of court. While there was no 
matrimonial action in New York and there is no provision in Civil Rights Law, Article 6, authorizing 
consideration of such a petition in a change of name proceeding, it appears that proceeding by 
petition and order is the correct way to bring on the issues raised by the father, Finlay v. Finlay, 240 
N.Y. 429,433-434,148 N.E. 624, 626,40 A.L.R. 937; People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 246 App.Div. 
151, 155, 285 N.Y.S. 41, 44, reversed on other grounds 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660; Application 
of Ebenstein, Sup., 85 N.Y.S.2d 261, n. o. r.; see Galanter v. Galanter, Sup., 133 N.Y.S.2d 266, n. 
o. r.; People ex rel. Way v. Williams, Sup., 101 N.Y.S.2d 383, n. o. r.; Application of Bopp, Sup., 
58 N.Y.S.2d 190, 195, n. o. r., and that no reason exists why the two petitions should not be 
considered together. A hearing has, therefore, been held on both at which both sides were given full 
opportunity to adduce testimony. For the reasons hereafter stated, both the petition for change of 
name and the petition for a restraining order are denied. In the father's answering papers on the 
Article 6 application, he also seeks an order restraining the mother and stepfather from interfering 
with his visitation rights as fixed in a separation agreement. No separate motion or cross-motion for 
that relief has been made nor was such relief requested in the fathr's petition. The question is, 
therefore, not properly before the court and will not be ruled upon. 
[3,4] Under Civil Rights Law, s 63, a petition for the change of an infant's name should be 
granted if (1) there is no reasonable objection to the proposed change and (2) the interests of the 
infant will be substantially promoted by the change. The father objects to the change because it will 
adversely affect his relationship with the children, will create **585 an 'impossible climate' for 
visitation, teaches the children deceit since they will be using a name not theirs in order to cover 
possible embarrassment, and because use of the stepfather's name would be personally obnoxious 
-^him. The last three reasons require little consideration; the occasions for use of a surname during 
*207 visitation are so few and the practice of changing surnames so long standing and well 
recognized, particularly where children of a broken marriage are living with their mother who has 
remarried, that neither the second nor the third can be considered reasonable. Likewise, the fourth, 
which is purely personal is no sufficient basis to deny the change if otherwise warranted. 
[5] Possible adverse effect on the relationship between a father and his children is, however, 
a valid ground of objection, where the father has evidenced sustained interest in the children by 
continuing support payments and visitation and does not unreasonably delay in objecting to the 
change, Application of Wittlin, City Ct, 61 N.Y.S.2d 726, n. o. r.; Matter of Epstein, 121 Misc. 151, 
200 N.Y.S. 897; Nitzberg v. Board of Education, 200 Misc. 748, 104 N.Y.S.2d 421; Matter of Otis 
(Weiss), 204 Misc. 1073,126 N.Y.S.2d 651; Matter of Simon, 1 Misc.2d 177, 148 N.Y.S.2d 14; In 
re Schultz (Ortenberg), N.Y.LJ. 11/14/57, p. 7, col. 2; see Matter of Pollack (Zipper), 2 A.D.2d 756, 
1.53 N.Y.S.2d 282. The mother does not deny that support at the rate of $250 per month, as required 
by the separation agreement has been regularly paid, but says that, by his conduct prior to divorce 
and during visitation periods since, the father has himself alienated the children. She argues further 
that the relationship of the children to their stepfather is close, that he participates in school and other 
activities with them, that they voluntarily called him 'Dad1 and began using his surname, and have 
in the last two years shown marked improvement from the upset children (as evidenced by 
stammering, or bedwetting or nervousness) they were previously, that the use of the father's surname 
is a constant reminder of unpleasantness, that the status achieved by the children themselves in their 
school, church and other relationships should be continued, and that the emotionally wellbeing and 
security of the children will be promoted by the change to the stepfather's surname, thus creating a 
cohesive family unit. 
The conduct of the father alluded to is alcoholism and the constant involvement of the 
children in the emotional difficulties of the father. The court is satisfied from the evidence that the 
father's drinking was a major cause of the family breakup, that the attitudes and aptitudes of the 
children have been substantially improved by their new environment, and that they have a warm 
relationship with their stepfather and a strained relationship with their natural father. Since the warm 
relationship and improved environment will continue whether or not the petition is granted, it does 
not necessarily follow, however, that *208 the children's interest will be substantially promoted by 
the proposed change. 
**586 [6][7] [8] The court cannot say on the record before it that the natural father has not 
exhibited a desire to preserve the parental relationship. Nor can it ignore the effect on that 
relationship of the antipathy between father and stepfather, the greater material advantages which 
the stepfather with his vastly larger income freely gives, and the disadvantage at which the natural 
father is placed by his separation from and sporadic contact with the children. Much of the father's 
disadvantage is, it is evident from the testimony, and particularly from that of the children, of his 
own doing. The question, however^jsjiolwhich of the adults isjjgh^orm 
best serve thelnterests of the children. Since the granting of the petition in the circumstances of the 
Instant case will, in the court's opinion, contribute to the further estangement of the children from 
their natural father and such estrangement is, generally, not in the best interest of children; since the 
court is not convinced that the present estrangement is so completely the fault of the father that he 
should be held to have forfeited his right to interpose objection nor that the present estrangement is 
beyond conciliation given an intelligent and less emotional approach on the part of the adults, and 
particularly on the part of the father; since the children involved in this proceeding are of sufficient 
age and understanding to continue the use of the stepfather's surname through exercise of the 
common law right hereinafter referred to to change their names and, the court finds from their 
testimony, are doing so of their own volition; and since a name change judicially effected apparently 
cannot thereafter be changed except by like decree (Civil Rights Law, s 64; Smith v. United States 
Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947, 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 1167; Klein v. Steel, 186 Misc. 98, 60 
N.Y.S.2d 323, affirmed 270 App.Div. 806, 60 N.Y.S.2d 277; Application of Biegaj, City Ct, 25 
N.Y.S.2d 85, n. o. r.), the court concludes that the nterests of the children will not be substantially 
promoted by granting the requested order, see In re Rounick, 47 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 71. 
[9, 10] The Civil Rights Law provisions establishing judicial procedure for change of name 
are in addition to, and not in substitution for, the common law methods of change, Smith v. United 
States Casualty Co., supra. Surnames are said not to have been used in England until the Norman 
conquest, Fox-Davis, A Treatise on the Law Concerning Names and Change of Name (1906), 14; 
Dudgeon, A Short Introduction to the Origin of Surnames (1890), 2, and to have come into general 
use only toward the end of the fourteenth century, after Henry VIII established *209 regulations 
governing the recording of births, marriages and deaths. Petition of Snook, 2 Hilt. 566, 571; In re 
Romm, 77 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 481. About that time they became hereditary, Bardsley, English 
Surnames (1875), 3, but only by custom, Kay v. Bell, 95 Ohio App. 520, 121 N.E.2d 206; 
Encyclopedia Brittanica (1953), 64, and the custom has never ripened into a rule of law, Petition of 
Snook, supra, at page **587 572. The change could be accomplished by an Act of Parliament or by 
the King's license, Petition of Snook, supra, by deed-poll usually accompanied by an advertisement, 
Phillimore, The Law and Practice of Change of Name (1905), xxxii; 23 Halsbury's Laws of England 
(2d Ed.), 560, or 'as in the first instance they were arbitrarily assumed, so they could be changed at 
pleasure,' Halsbury, supra, at p. 556, and without legal formality, Smith v. United States Casualty 
Co., supra; Petition of Snook, supra. The right of a minor to change his name without legal 
formality was, moreover, recognized as early as 1822 in Doe dem. Luscombe v. Yates, 5 B. & Aid. 
544, 106 E.Rep. 1289 and has been recognized in California, In re Useldinger, 35 Cal.App.2d 723, 
96 P.2d 958; In New Jersey, Bruguier v. Bruguier, 12 NJ.Super. 350, 79 A.2d 497; in Mississippi, 
Marshall v. Marshall, 230 Miss. 719, 93 So.2d 822; In Ohio, Kay v. Kay, Ohio Com.Pl., 112 N.E.2d 
562; and in New York, Cooper v. Burr, 45 Barb. 9, 34; see 1953 Law Revision Commission Report, 
206-213. Only the Bruguier case involved the right of an infant to make the change over the 
objection of her father, but Doe dem. Luscombe v. Yates, supra, which involved compliance with 
the provision of a trust requiring a change of name held (5 B. & Aid. 544, 556) that: '* * * a name 
assumed by the voluntary act of a young man at his outset into life, adopted by all who know him, 
and by which he is continually called, becomes, for all purposes that occur to my mind, as much and 
effectually his name as if he had obtained an Act of Parliament to confer it upon him.' Whether 
public interest in the maintenance of family harmony and parental authority will necessitate deSi? 
of the right of change to an infant living with both parents or with a sole surviving parent, see 1953 
Law Revision Commission Report, 213, need not now be determined. Where the parents are 
separated or divorced, policy considerations suggest that any change brought to a court's attention 
be closely scrutinized to detemine that it is actually the infant's own decision rather than that of the 
parent with whom he lives, but do not require that the common law method of voluntary change be 
denied the infant, Note, 44 Cornell L.Q. 144, 149. 
[11] The Luscombe case does not indicate when the name change there involved occurred 
except that it was 'before he became of age'; the Bruguier case, only that the infant against whom 
*210 an injunction was sought was of high school age. The change recognized in the Useldinger 
case had been made at age 12, and that involved in Cooper v. Burr, supra, at 'the age of nine or ten 
years.' The Court of Appeals has, however, held that a child twelve years of age in the custody of 
one parent is, if his testimony reveals him to be old enough to testify intelligently and the evidence 
shows it to be in the infant's best interests to permit him to do so, competent, notwithstanding the 
provisions of an **588 earlier separation decree and the objection of the other parent, to select the 
religion he chooses to follow, Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d 812; see also Hehman 
v. Hehman, 13 Misc.2d 318,178 N.Y.S.2d 328; Booke v. Booke, 207 Misc. 999, 141 N.Y.S.2d 580. 
Further, in some change of name cases, the court, without specifying whether it meant legal age or 
only the mental capacity to make an intelligent choice, noted that the child could make the change 
when he 'reached a mature age', Matter of Pollack (Zipper), supra [2 A.D.2d 756,153 N. Y.S.2d 283]; 
or when 'capable of selecting a name for himself,' Matter of Epstein, supra [121 Misc. 151, 200 
N.Y.S. 898]; or when'competent to make a choice,'Matter of Cohn, 181 Misc. 1021, 50N.Y.S.2d 
278,279; or 'when he has attained a certain maturity in understanding the circumstances,' Matter of 
Baldini, 17 Misc.2d 195, 183 N.Y.S.2d 416,417; see also 1953 Law Revision Commission Report, 
208- 210, and in two change of name cases concerning children over 16, it has been recognized that 
the child's preference should normally be decisive, Application of Harris, Sup., 43 N.Y.S.2d 521, 
n. o. r. (boy of 18); Application of Horn, Sup., 21 N.Y.S.2d 453, n. o. r. (boy of 16); cf Application 
of Wittlin, supra. The infants involved in this proceeding are now 18 years and 4 months, 15 years 
and 8 months, 13 years and 8 months, and 11 years and 2 months of age, and the court is satisfied 
jfrom their testimony that they are of sufficient understanding and that the change has been made of 
their own volition. On analogy to the religion cases above referred to and on the basis of the name 
change cases cited, the court holds that the infants are competent to continue the use of the names 
referred to in their petition without court order. Each will also be free to return to the use of his 
father's surname whenever he is satisfied that this is the proper course. Were it not the law that the 
infants can exercise their own individual volitions in using the surname of either the ather or the 
stepfather, the court would be constrained to grant the order under Civil Rights Law, s 63. Since it 
is the law, clearly no injunction would issue against the children to prevent their so doing under the 
circumstances of this case. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider the further argument *211 
advanced on behalf of the children that their common law right, because constitutionally protected, 
cannot be enjoined. 
But, the father argues a number of cases have referred to the right of a father to have his child 
bear his surname, Schoenberg v. Schoenberg, Sup., 57 N. Y.S.2d 283, n. o. r., modified 269 App.Div. 
864, 1048, 56 N.Y.S.2d 47, 59 N.Y.S.2d 280, affirmed 296 N.Y. 583, 68 N.E.2d 874; In re Lyons, 
Sup., 19 N.Y.S.2d 839, n. o. r.; DeVorkin v. Foster, Sup., 66 N.Y.S.2d 54, n. o. r.; Young v. Board 
of Education, Sup., 114 N.Y.S.2d 693, n. o. r.; Steinbach v. Steinbach, Sup., 119 N.Y.S.2d 708. n. 
o. r.; Matter of Baty, N.Y.L.J. 8/3/56, p. 6, col. 7; Matter of Baldini, supra, and that right has been 
protected by restraining order directed against the mother, Schoenberg v. Schoenberg, supra; 
DeVorkin v. **589 Foster, supra; Application of Ebenstein, supra; Matter of Cohn, supra; Steinbach 
v. Steinbach, supra; Galanter v. Galanter, supra; In re Schultz (Ortenberg), supra, or against the 
Board of Education, Young v. Board of Education, supra; Nitzberg v. Board of Education, supra; 
Witover v. Board of Education, N. Y.L.J. 1/3/57, p. 10, col. 6. Therefore, it is argued an injunction 
order should issue in this case against the mother. 
[12] Only the Steinbach case refers to the legal right of the father; all of the others refer to 
a 'natural,1 'fundamental,1 'primary' or 'time honored' right. Without doubt hereditary surnames are 
customary, but as we have seen that custom as Jigver amounted to a common law legal right. Prior 
to the 1953 amendment of Civil Rights Law, Articfe^rthe consent of both parents toThe change of 
name of an infant under sixteen years of age was required, 1953 Law Revision Commission Report 
193-205, and see the annotation in 53 A.L.R.2d 914, 915. The restraining orders granted were 
predicated on that requirement, either explicitly, Schoenberg v. Schoenberg, supra, particularly 57 
N.Y.S.2d at page 284; Application of Ebenstein, supra; Steinbach v. Steinbach, supra; Galanter v. 
Galanter, supra; or implicitly, Matter of Cohn, supra; DeVorkin v. Foster, supra; Nitzberg v. Board 
of Education, supra; Young v. Board of Education, supra; In re Schultz, supra. In only two cases, 
In re Schultz, supra, and Witover v. Board of Education, supra, have restraining orders issued since 
the 1953 amendment. In the Schultz case the pre-1953 cases cited above were cited as authority 
without discussion; in the Witover case no authorities were cited, but enforcement of the order 
directed to the Board of Education was suspended to permit the mother to make formal *212 
application on notice to the father for change of the child's name. The court concludes that, because 
of the 1953 amendment, issuance of a restraining order against the mother cannot be predicated on 
the authorities cited. 
[13] Further doubt concerning the propriety of issuing such an order arises from the 
continued refusal of the Court of Appeals to recognize protection of a name as a proper subject for 
injunction in actions between a wife and her husband's paramour, Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N.Y. 
382, 165 N.E. 819; Somberg v. Somberg, 263 N.Y. 1, 188 N.E. 137; Lowe v. Lowe, 265 N.Y. 197, 
192 N.E. 291. Even if it be assumed that that court, when presented with the question, will 
distinguish wife-paramour cases and follow the apparent trend toward use of injunctive process 
between parents to prevent the unilateral change of a child's name, Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 
131 N.E.2d 758, 53 A.L.R.2d 908; Margolis v. Margolis, 338 Mass. 416, 155 N.E.2d 177; Reed v' 
Reed, OkL, 338 P.2d 350; Sobel v. Sobel, 46 N.J.Super. 284,134 A.2d 598; note 53 A.L.R.2d 914, 
there is no basis for issuance of such an injunction in the present case, Mark v. Kahn, supra. The 
father's proof **590 failed to substantiate the claim that the change of name was brought about by 
the mother rather than the children. In fact, on the whole proof, the court finds that the children are 
registered at school under the father's name, but through their own acts and choice are generally 
known in school, among their friends and in the environs of their present residence by the surname 
of the stepfather. Though the father's petition alleged that 'every effort was being made by 
Respondent' (the mother) to create the impression that the stepfather is the natural father (Par. 14) 
and that the stepfather had instructed the school authorities to see that the children were known by 
his surname (Par. 16) and that the mother's action 'is part of a well-calculated plan to alienate the 
children' from the father, there is a failure of proof to sustain these allegations. 
The petition by the father for a restraining order will, therefore, be denied; on the petition for 
change of name, the order to be entered denying the petition may recite as one of the reasons for such 
denial the finding of the court that the infants are of sufficient age and intelligence to make the 
requested change without judicial proceedings. No costs will be allowed in either proceeding. The 
disposition made will give the father the opportunity, with the help of church or psychiatric 
counseling, to re-establish his relationship with the children, see Application of Proman, City Ct., 
63 N.Y.S.2d 83, n. o. r. If he makes that effort, it will be incumbent upon the mother and stepfather, 
in the best interests of the children, to foster the relationship. The disposition is, however, without 
prejudice to such further application *213 as any of the parties, on a showing of changed 
circumstances, may see fit to make. 
To protect the interests of the infants, this decision will be published under fictitious names 
and the file will be ordered sealed. 
Settle order on notice. 
11 Fla. L. Weekly 2112 
(Cite as: 495 So.2d 277) 
Warren J. AZZARA, Jr., Appcllant/Cross-
Appellee, 
v. 
Jane WALLER, Appellee/Cross-Appcllant. 
No. 85-2934. 
District Court of Appeal of Florida. 
Second District. 
Oct. 3. 1986. 
Mother petitioned to change surname of child to that 
taken by mother upon remarriage, and natural father 
counterclaimed seeking injunction. The Circuit Court, 
Pasco Count}. Wayne L. Cobb, J., denied petition in 
counterclaim, and appeal and cross appeal were taken. 
The District Court of Appeal, Lehan, J., held that best 
interest of eight-year-old daughter had been served by 
mother, whose marriage with father had been 
dissolved, in allowing child unfettered discretion to use 
surname of either mother or father, and thus, no 
decision would be made as to whether child would bear 
surname of father or surname taken by mother upon 
mother's remarriage. 
Affirmed. 
D I V O R C E ® ^ 313.1 
134<&=*313.1 
Formerly 134k313 
Best interest of eight-year-old daughter had been 
served by mother, whose marriage with father had been 
dissolved, in allowing child unfettered discretion to use 
surname of either mother or father, and thus, no 
decision would be made as to whether child would bear 
surname of father or surname taken by mother upon 
mother's remarriage. 
*277 Paul F. Probst, Jr. of Larson, Conklin, Stanley, 
Probst & Gassman, P.A., Belleair Bluffs, for appellant/ 
cross-appellee. 
Charles D. Waller of Waller & Hersch, Dade City, for 
appellee/cross-appellant. 
LEHAN, Judge. 
This is an appeal and cross appeal from the trial 
court's decision not to decide at this time whether the 
eight-year-old daughter of a dissolved marriage should 
bear the surname of her natural father or the surname 
taken by the mother upon the mother's remarriage. 
The mother has primary custody of the child. The 
child lives with her mother and stepfather. 
The mother filed a petition to change the surname of 
the child to that taken by the *278 mother upon her 
remarriage. The natural father counterclaimed to 
enjoin the mother from allowing or encouraging the 
child to be known by any surname other than his The 
trial court's final judgment denied both the petition and 
the counterclaim. 
The natural father has appealed, and the mother has 
cross appealed Upon consideration of the extensive 
record, the well-presented arguments for both sides, 
and the trial judges findings and conclusions, we 
affirm. 
The final judgment reads as follows. 
Final Judgment 
This is an action brought by the mother of an eight 
year old girl to change the child's surname to that of the 
mother's husband. The child's father vigorously 
objects and demands that the Court enjoin the mother 
from requiring or encouraging the child to use the 
mother's surname. 
The subject of this action, Mary Beth, was bora on 
December 24, 1977. to Warren Joseph Azzara, Jr., and 
Jane Huckaby Azzara, his wife. Mr. and Mrs. Azzara 
were divorced on April 10, 1981, with Mrs. Azzara 
receiving primary custody of Mary Beth. On 
December 25, 1981. Mrs. Azzara married Charles 
Waller. Mr. Waller is a prominent attorney in Dade 
City. Mrs. Waller is a member of the very prominent 
Huckaby family of Dade City. Mr. Azzara currently 
lives in New York. 
The law by which this Court must be guided in 
deciding this case appears clear. The Court should 
order a change of a minor's surname over the objection 
of one parent only where the evidence affirmatively 
shows that such change is necessitated by the welfare 
of the child. Lazow v Lazow, 147 So.2d 12 (Fla. 3d 
D.C.A.1962) 
(Cite as: 78 Ohio App. 481, 64 N.E.2d 84) 
BILENKIN 
v. 
BFLENKIN. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Montgomery County. 
Nov. 26, 1945. 
[1] CONTEMPTS 30 
93<®=>30 
A court has inherent, as well as statutory power to 
punish for contempt in disobeying court's order, rule, 
judgment, or command. Gen.Code, § 12137. 
[2) DIVORCER 308 
134<S=>308 
The common pleas court had no authority to vacate its 
order for support of divorced parents' minor child by 
father, in absence of claim that order was made without 
jurisdiction or induced by fraud or mistake. 
[31 CONTEMPT<S=> 28(1) 
93<&=>28(1) 
A divorced husband's motion to vacate order for 
support of his minor child, on grounds that child's 
mother deliberately changed child's surname and 
violated court order requiring her to deliver child into 
father's possession, stated no defense to charge of 
father's contempt of court in disobeying support order. 
Gen.Code, §12137. 
[3] DIVORCER 311(2) 
134<®=>311(2) 
Formerly 134k311 
A divorced husband's motion to vacate order for 
support of his minor child, on grounds that child's 
mother deliberately changed child's surname and 
violated court order requiring her to deliver child into 
father's possession, stated no defense to charge of 
father's contempt of court in disobeying support order. 
Gen.Code, § 12137. 
[3] NAMES<@=> 20 
269<§=>20 
A divorced husband's motion to vacate order for 
support of his minor child, on grounds that child's 
mother deliberately changed child's surname and 
violated court order requiring her to deliver child into 
father's possession, stated no defense to charge of 
lather's contempt of court in disobeyuig support order. 
Gen.Code, § 12137 
[4j DIVORCER 313.1 
134<®=>313.1 
Formerly 134k313 
Under evidence denial of divorced husband's motion to 
restrain his former wife from registering their minor 
daughter in school, Sunday school, and other places 
under surname of wife's second husband, as she had 
done from time when she moved with child and such 
husband to their home hundreds of miles from that of 
child's father, was not error. 
[4] NAMES<@=> 20 
269<®=>20 
Under evidence denial of divorced husband's motion to 
restrain his former wife from registering their minor 
daughter in school. Sunday school and other places 
under surname of wife's second husband, as she had 
done from time when she moved with child and such 
husband to their home hundreds of miles from that of 
child's father, was not error. 
Proceeding by Beatrice L. Bilenkin against Gilbert 
Bilenkin for contempt in disobeying a court order to 
make monthly payments for the support of the parties' 
minor child. From an order finding defendant in 
contempt of court and overruling his motions to vacate 
the support order and restrain plaintiff from registering 
the child under a different surname than defendant's in 
school, Sunday school, and other places, defendant 
appeals.--[Editorial Statement] 
Affirmed. 
*481 **84 Landis, Ferguson, Bieser & Greer, of 
Dayton, for plaintiff- appellee. 
Jacobson & Durst, of Dayton, for defendant-
appellant. 
HORNBECK, Presiding Judge 
This is an appeal on questions of law from an order of 
the Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County, 
Division of Domestic Relations, which found that the 
defendant was in contempt of court for failure to 
observe a former order of the court requiring the 
payment of $50 a month for the support of his child, 
(Cite as: 78 Ohk) App. 481, *481, 64 N.E.2d 84, **84) 
Barhara Bilenkin, which arrearage at the time of the 
filing of the charge was in excess of $500. The order 
further recited the overruling of a motion *482 of the 
defendant to vacate the former order of the court 
relative to payments to be made by the defendant to the 
plaintiff for the support of Barbara Bilenkin. and a 
motion of defendant for an order restraining the 
plaintiff from registering Barbara Bilenkin under the 
name of Barbara Salesky in school, Sunday school or 
any other place, etc. 
The parties in this cause were formerly husband and 
wife and a decree of divorce was awarded to the 
plaintiff for the agression of the defendant The 
custody of the two minor children of the parties was 
awarded to the plaintiff and at the time of the entering 
of the decree of divorce the court approved and 
adopted an agreement wherein the defendant agreed to 
pay to the plaintiff for the support of each of the 
children, Barbara and Gilbert, Jr., the sum of $50 per 
month. Prior to the institution of the contempt 
proceedings, Gilbert, Jr., the son, having reached the 
age of ten years had elected to choose his father as his 
guardian and was living with his father. 
**85 The plaintiff remarried to Bernard L. Salesky, 
who with the plaintiff and Barbara were living at Elkins 
Park, Pennsylvania, a suburb of Philadelphia. 
The contempt charge asserted that the defendant was 
in arrears in payment of support money for Barbara in 
the sum of $500. 
The defendant did not orally or in writing enter any 
formal denial of the charge of contempt but at about the 
time of the hearing on the contempt charge filed two 
motions, the first of which was for vacation of the 
support order for two reasons, first, that 'plaintiff has 
deliberately changed the name of Barbara Bilenkin to 
Barbara Salesky' and, second, because the plaintiff has 
deliberately violated the court order requiring her to 
deliver the child into the possession of the defendant. 
The second motion, with which was incorporated an 
*483 affidavit supporting the second ground of the first 
motion, prayed the court for an order restraining 
plaintiff from registering said child, as Barbara 
Salesky, either in the school, Sunday school or at any 
other place. The court determined the contempt charge 
and the motions as heretofore stated and this action is 
made the subject of this appeal. 
[ 1 ] The inherent power of a court as well as statutory 
authority recognizes 'Disobedience of [an] * * *, order, 
rule, judgment, or command of a court' as contempt. 
G.C. § 12137. 
[2] The first motion was not a defense to the contempt 
charge unless the court should vacate the support order. 
This the court had no authority to do it not being 
claimed that the order was made without jurisdiction or 
induced by fraud or mistake. Tullis v. Tullis, 138 Ohio 
St. 187, 34 N.E.2d 212. 213. This case holds that 
where a contract for support for minor child entered 
into by the parties to a divorce proceeding 'is 
specifically approved by the court and made a part of 
the decree,' it 'may not. in the absence of fraud or 
mistake, be subsequently modified by the court so as to 
lessen the amount of support for such minor child.' A 
fortiori, if the court may not lessen the amount of such 
contract it may not determine the contract to be invalid. 
[3] Neither of the two grounds of the motion was a 
defense to the contempt charge because manifestly 
neither affected the material question involved, namely, 
whether or not the defendant had violated an order of 
the court. Nor was a citation requested because of the 
claimed violation of the visitation order. 
Of course, the fact that the court could not modify nor 
vacate the support decree because it was an 
embodiment of the contract between the parties, would 
not have prevented the finding that the defendant was 
not *484 in contempt because to support the charge the 
Court must have further found that the violation was 
wilful. But this element was not in dispute, nor is there 
anything to indicate that the defendant was unable to 
comply with the order. 
The two grounds of the first motion were not 
defenserve because the violation by the plaintiff of a 
court order, if true, afforded no justification for the 
defendant's violation of an order directed to him. The 
Court could, in determining the punishment of 
defendant by reason of his violation of the support 
order, have given consideration to the question whether 
or not the plaintiff also had violated an order, but the 
Court found that the plaintiff had not violated any 
order. Neither ground of the motion to vacate afforded 
any reason to support a modification or a vacation of 
the support order even though the Court had the power 
V^llC as: to vriuu A p p . 4 8 1 , *484, 04 fN.fc.2d 8 4 , **85) 
to vacate it. 
[4] 1 he second motion sought an order restraining the 
plaintiff from using the name of Barbara Salesky for 
Barbara Bilenkin, the child of the parties. The plaintiff, 
nor her husband, may not accomplish a change in the 
name of the child by their acts in registering her in 
school, Sunday school and other places as Barbara 
Salesky. Under the facts appearing we may not hold 
that the Court committed prejudicial error in refusing 
to grant the relief sought. 
Judge Nicholas in his written opinion which we have 
before us gives sufficient reasons, in our judgment, to 
support his refusal to compel the plaintiff to carry the 
child's name as Barbara Bilenkin in school, Sunday 
school and other places. The trial judge points out that 
this practice of registering the minor daughter of the 
parties in the name of Salesky had been followed from 
the time that the plaintiff had moved with her husband 
to their present residence. The home of the child is 
hundreds of miles removed from that of her father and 
it does not reasonably appear that he will *485 be 
materially affected, one way or the other, by reason of 
the fact that **86 his child there carries the name of 
Salesky. ()n the other hand, it may be very 
embarrassing and the source of some humiliation to the 
daughter if at this time the plaintiff should be required 
to no longer carry the daughter's name as heretofore 
known among her associates Had the request been 
made of the Court when the facts first came to the 
attention of the defendant, it would present a different 
and more difficult question. The ruling on the motion, 
when made, was not prejudicially erroneous. 
The order appealed from will be affirmed. 
MILLER, and WISEMAN. JJ., concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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BINFORD 
v. 
REID. 
No. 33183. 
Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1. 
Jan. 27, 1951. 
Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 1951. 
Proceeding by Dorothy Lowe Reid against 
H. A. Binford, Jr., to change the name of 
Henry Arthur Binford, IH, to George Lowe 
Reid. The Superior Court, Fulton County, 
Claude D. Shaw, J., rendered judgment 
granting the application and H. A. Binford, 
Jr., brought error. The Court of Appeals, 
Worrill, J., held that granting divorced 
mother's application to change name of child 
so that child's surname would be surname of 
motherJs subsequent husband was not abuse of 
discretion, where mother remarried when 
child was less than one year old, and child 
Tived with mother and subsequent husband 
and children born of subsequent marriage, "and 
child was known at home and school by 
surname of subsequent husband! 
Judgment affirmed. 
[1] NAMES < ^ 20 
269k20 
The action of Superior Court in granting or 
refusing a proper application to change the 
name of a person is based solely on sound 
legal discretion. Ga.Code Ann. § 79-501. 
[2] NAMES <S=> 20 
269k20 
Granting divorced mother's application to 
change name of child so that child's surname 
would be surname of mother's subsequent 
husband was not abuse of discretion, where 
mother remarried when child was less t han 
one year old, and child lived with mother and 
subsequent husband and children born of 
subsequent marriage, and child was known at 
home and school by surname of subsequent 
**345 *281 Alston, Foster, Sibley & Miller 
and Francis G. Jones, Jr., all of Atlanta, for 
plaintiff in error. 
Hugh Howell, Jr. and Heyman, Howell & 
Heyman, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error. 
**346 Syllabus Opinion by the Court. 
*280 WORRILL, Judge. 
[1, 2] The action of the Superior Court in 
granting or refusing a proper application to 
change the name of a person is based solely on 
a sound legal discretion, and where upon the 
hearing of the application of Dorothy Lowe 
Reid made under the provisions of Chap. 79-5 
of the Code, § 79-501, Ga/Code Ann.Supp., to 
change the name of the applicant's minor son 
from 'Harry Arthur Binford, HI,' to 'George 
Lowe Reid', it appears that the applicant is 
the divorced wife of the objector, Harry Arthur 
Binford, Jr., that Harry Arthur Binford, DI, 
was born ^o i iSep tember 18, 1945; that 
pg-Ht^rtfir KP.p^rntPfi i romlhe objector inTlMS^ 
obtained her divorce and in July of that year 
when the said Harry Arthur Binford, HI, was 
less t han one year old married William Archer 
Reid; that under the terms of the divorce 
decree granted the applicant she has_sole 
^custody of the child with the right of visitation 
in the obiectgr and that the objector p a y s $ 5 l P 
per month for the support of the said child and 
where the evidence showed that the said 
Harry Arthur Binford, EI has been called by 
his mother, step-father-and Mends, 1Bu3dy 
ReicTTsince before he was able to walk or talk, 
andj^281 goes by that name, is registered "5T 
kindergartp/p, pmH is Vnnwn tp fcjs playmates 
and acquaintances as 'Buddy Reid', and that 
the applicant feels thati t^vould be tor the best' 
interest of the childTto avoid embarrassment 
~^and contusion to change the name so that his 
Hsrarname would be the same as his mother's, 
and the s a m b a s his sister's and brother's 
surname, born of the second marriage; the 
tr ial judge did not abuse his discretion- i n 
granting the application and in changing the 
name of the child to 'George Lowe Reid', and 
in thereafter overruling the motion for a new 
t-rial n-n fhp a^npral crrrvnnHs 
(Cite as: 31 Ohio Misc. 195, 287 N.E.2d 833) 
In re Adoption of McCOY. 
In re Change of Name of McCoy. 
Nos. 24353,24354,24630 and 24631. 
Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Pickaway County, 
Probate Division. 
March 14, 1972. 
Proceeding by stepfather to adopt wife's children and 
proceeding for change of children's name. The 
Common Pleas Court of Pickaway Count}. Cline. J., 
held that where divorce decree between natural parents 
provided that mother would assume financial 
responsibility for the children and imposed no 
obligation upon father for their support, father's failure 
to pay support was not the wilful failure to perform a 
legal duty so long as mother was able to provide 
support, and adoption of children should not be granted 
without father's consent. The court also held that 
children's application to change their names to that of 
their stepfather in order to avoid social difficulties 
would be granted. 
Adoption denied and change of name granted. 
[1] A D O P T I O N S 7.4(4) 
17®^7.4(4) 
Where divorce decree between natural parents 
provided that mother would assume financial 
responsibility for the children and imposed no support 
obligation upon father, father's failure to pay support 
was not the wilful failure to perform a legal duty so 
long as mother was able to provide the required 
support, and adoption of children by stepfather could 
not be granted without consent of natural father. R. C. § 
3107.06(B)(4). 
[2] NAMES<©=> 20 
269<§=>20 
Where adoption of children by stepfather was denied 
by reason of natural father's refusal to consent to the 
adoption, and children were predominantly known in 
their personal activities by their stepfather's name, 
children's application to change name to that of the 
stepfather to avoid social difficulties would be granted. 
R.C. §2717.01. 
*195 **834 Richard W. Penn, Circleville, for 
petitioner. 
John A. Carnahan. Columbus, for Gene Lamar Lawler 
(father of child) 
CLINE. Judge 
ADOPTION PROCEEDING 
This case concerns the adoption of Michael Robert 
Lawter, Case No. 24353, and John Robert Lawler, 
Case No. 24354. wherein the petitioner is step-parent 
of said children by reason of his marriage to the natural 
mother. The natural mother. Mrs. Robert McCoy, 
signed a consent to the adoption of both boys by her 
husband Dr. McCoy. The adoption is contested by the 
father who denies having wilfufy failed to properly 
support the children for a period of more than two 
years immediately preceding the filing of the petition. 
*196 The evidence indicated that the natural father 
had made no payments for the support of the children 
and that he had adequate earnings to have contributed 
to their support had he elected to do so. 
Mr. Lawter, the father of the boys, stated that he had 
continued to carry medical insurance required by the 
Michigan Decree, and it was stipulated by all parties 
that no request for child support was made to the father 
by Mr. or Mrs. McCoy. 
The parties, Mr. Lawter and the new Mrs. McCoy, 
were divorced in 1962 in Michigan where the decree 
provided as follows: 
Tt is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the 
plaintiff, Jean Lawter, assume the financial 
responsibility for caring for the minor children of the 
parties hereto until such time as they attain the age of 
eighteen years or finish their high school education, 
whichever shall occur later. Further, that plaintiff, Jean 
Lawter, will carry Blue-Cross, Blue-Shield Insurance 
on the minor children so long as she is employed and 
able to carry said insurence on a group plan, then it is 
Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed that defendant will 
carry Blue-Cross, Blue-Shield Insurance on the minor 
children of the parties until such time as they attam the 
age of eighteen (18) years or finish their high school 
education, whichever shall be the later.' **835 (Case 
(Cite as: 31 Ohio Misc. 195, *196, 287 N.E.2d 833, **835) 
No. 73288. Circuit Court, (jenesee County, Michigan.) 
Both boys expressed a desire to be adopted. The 
father visited the children with short visitations on 
several occasions and visited 8 days in 1969 and an 
hourly visit in January of 1970, but wrote no letters or 
cards to the boys during 1971. The father purchased 
some limited clothes for the boys at Christmas time in 
prior years, but he gave the boys no birthday gifts. The 
father stated that he carried Blue-Cross Insurance, but 
offered no other evidence to substantiate this fact. The 
mother, Mrs. McCoy, stated she also has carried such 
insurance. The father remarried in 1964 and has two 
children by this marriage. It was further stipulated that 
the father had means to support said children with 
earnings of approximately $2000.00 a month. 
*197 The question presented is whether the step-
father may adopt the two sons of his wife over the 
objection of the natural father where the facts indicate 
that the Michigan divorce decree requires the mother to 
'assume the financial responsibility for caring for the 
minor children of the parties hereto until such time that 
they assume the age of 18 years or finish their high 
school education, whichever one occurs later,' and 
thereafter the father paid no support for the children, 
now residents of Ohio. The Ohio adoption statute 
provides: 
R.C. s 3107.06(B)(4) '* * * Proof of failure to 
properly support and maintain the child for a period of 
more than two years immediately preceding the filing 
of the petition shall be prima facie evidence of willful 
failure to properly support and maintain the child. The 
consent of a parent found by the court to have wilfully 
failed to property support and maintain the child for 
such period shall not be required.' 
The Ohio courts have not passed on this question 
directly, although several cases may be noted: 
1. 'Where a couple petition for adoption of their 
grandson, who has lived in their home during his 
mother's separation and divorce from his father, and in 
their custody since her death, claiming that the consent 
of the father is not required because of willful failure to 
support the child for more than two years immediately 
preceding filing the petition, as specified in Section 
3107.06, Revised Code, the burden of proving such 
wilful failure is not sustained by the evidence that the 
petitioners, financially able to support the child without 
hardship, had never requested any payment from the 
father, although he had told them on numerous 
occasions to call him if they needed any money for the 
boy's care, and he did maintain an interest otherwise in 
his sons welfare, even seeking to have the boy live in 
his own home.' In re Adoption of Wright. 15 Ohio 
Misc. 354. 240 N.E.2d 923, 44 0.0.2d 509. 
2. 'A parent may be found to have 'willfully failed' to 
support within the meaning of Section 3101.06. 
Revised Code, when such parent knowing of the duty 
and being able to provide such support voluntarily and 
intentionally fails to do so.' In *198 re Adoption of 
Lewis. 8 Ohio St.2d 25, 222 N.E.2d 628. approving In 
re Adoption of Biddle, 168 Ohio St. 209, 152 N.E.2d 
105. 
3. Consent and Wilful Failure to Support. Adoption 
by a great aunt who had had care of 10 year old child 
for 9 years is involved. The question was whether the 
payment of $320 over the two year period prior to 
hearing by a father who had total earnings of about 
$10,000 during that period, with a wife and mother of 
this child (had) deserted and her present whereabouts 
was unknown. Held: The above facts constitute wilful 
failure to support for the required period and the 
parents consent is not necessary. In re Adoption of 
Corey, Ohio Prob. 182 N.E.2d 75, 88 Ohio Law Abst. 
186. 
4. A petition for adoption was granted over the 
objection of the mother of the child. The evidence 
disclosed that no money **836 was ever offered for the 
support of the child by the appellant but the appellant 
had sent Christmas presents and had visited the child 
approximately a dozen times from 1946 to the date of 
the proceeding. Held: The Probate Court's judgment 
granting the adoption was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals, holding that where the parents had refused to 
support the child except for occasional Christmas gifts, 
such parents had 'willfully failed to properly support 
and maintain' such child and therefore the consent of 
such parent to the adoption was not required. In re 
Krisher Adoption, 107 Ohio App. 109, 157 N.E.2d 
123. 
5. 'In re Adoption of Wedl, Ohio Prob., 114 N.E.2d 
311.65 Ohio Law Abst. 231, the second paragraph of 
the headnotes read as follows: '2. 'Wilful' as used in 
(Cite as: 31 Ohio Misc. 195, * 198, 287 N.E.2d 833, **836) 
subparagraph (B)(4) of s 8004-6. General Code, in the 
phrase 'wilfully failed to properly support and maintain' 
means 'intentional,' or an 'intentional omission of a 
duty."' (Emphasis supplied.) 
The courts of other states have been confronted with 
this problem, but most of the statutes state 'abandon 
and or willfully fail to support.' They have said in 
many cases that 'wilfully fail to support' is 
abandonment. Some of the cases disposing of 
problems similar to the instant case are as follows: 
'In an adoption proceeding, consent of a parent not 
having custody is required when his right to custody 
was *199 not lost through a divorce decree within the 
meaning of Minn.St. 259.24, subd. 1(b), and the 
evidence of his parental conduct prior to and 
subsequent to an order modifying the decree relieving 
him of support and forbidding all visitation of or 
contact with his minor son is not sufficient to support 
an express or implied finding of parental unfitness 
justifying a termination of his parental rights.' Eggert 
v. Van De Weghe, 279 Minn. 31,155 N.W.2d 454. 
'Mother and stepfather filed a petition, which was 
opposed by father, for adoption of daughter. The 
County Court of Macon County, Daniel H. Dailey, J., 
entered judgment adverse to father, and he appealed. 
The Appellate Court, Reynolds, J., held that where 
mother obtained divorce from father and custody of 
their daughter, and divorce decree did not require 
father to contribute to support of daughter, and father 
was ordered by mother and stepfather to stay away 
from daughter, father was not guilty of 'abandonment' 
or 'desertion' of daughter within meaning of adoption 
statute, and mother and stepfather, whom the mother 
had married, were not entitled to adopt the daughter 
without father's consent.' Walpole v. Songer, 5 
Dl.App.2d 362, 125 N.E.2d 645. 
'* * * that mother did not ask him for support and that 
her present husband stated that he did not want father's 
support, was insufficient to sustain a finding that father 
wilfully failed to maintain * * *.' Nevelos v. Railston, 
65N.M.250.335P.2d573. 
'Adoption proceeding by remarried mother's new 
husband, wherein divorced father did not consent. The 
Circuit Court, First Circuit. City and County of 
Honolulu, Gerald R. Corbett. J., granted the adoption 
petition on ground that divorced father had abandoned 
the child for six months prior to filing of the petition, 
and the father appealed. The Supreme Court, Mizuka, 
J., held that the father, a New York City resident who 
was separated from his child because of Florida 
divorce decree granting custody to the mother without 
directing father to make support payments and who did 
not support the child but sent him various cards and 
gifts during the various holidays of each year *200 
throughout the separation, had not 'abandoned' the 
child within statute requiring written consent to 
adoption by each living legal parent who has not 
abandoned the child for a period of six months. 
Reversed with direction to dismiss petition.' In Matter 
of Adoption of a male minor child. 50 Haw, 255, 266. 
438 P.2d 398. 
**837 'Proceeding by stepfather to adopt daughter of 
his wife wherein natural father objected. The Circuit 
Court . . . entered order granting adoption and natural 
father appealed. The District Court of Appeal. . . held 
that where wealthy wife, under separation agreement, 
agreed to defray expense of daughter's support and 
maintenance and to save natural father, who was a 
medical student, harmless therefrom, father showed a 
desire to have daughter with him during summer as 
provided in agreement, father was visited by daughter 
for three years, and father sent letters, holiday cards, 
gifts, and photographs regularly to daughter, there was 
not an abandonment of daughter by father, even though 
he had not made any support payments, and stepfather 
was not entitled to adopt daughter.' Prangley v. 
Comerford, Fla.App., 122 So.2d 423. 
'Adoption proceedings by step-father. From judgment 
. . . granting leave to step-father to adopt minor child, 
natural father appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals . . 
. held that there natural father of child whose custody 
was awarded to mother by divorce decree was elderly, 
nearly blind and destitute, and was unable to earn 
money or a salary but had made a number of small 
contributions to the support of his child, trial court's 
findings that the natural father had failed to contribute 
to the support of his minor child for more than two 
years commensurate with his ability was so clearly 
against the great weight and preponderance of evidence 
as to be manifestly wrong and unjust. Judgment 
reversed and cause remanded' In re Adoption of 
Payne, Tex.Civ.App., 301 S W2d 194 Spraggins, 
La.App.,234So.2d462. 
(Cite as: 31 Ohio Misc. 195, *20<), 287 N.E.2d 833, **837) 
'Where divorce decree awarding custody of minor 
children to mother provided that father was to be 
relieved of any financial responsibility for support and 
maintenance *201 of the children, children could not 
be adopted by stepfather without father's consent even 
though father was non-resident and had not paid any 
child support in more than one year since custody was 
awarded to mother.' In re Spraggins, 234 So.2d p. 
462. 
[1] Since there was no legal obligation to support the 
children imposed by the Michigan divorce court, the 
failure to pay support was not the willful failure to 
perform a legal duty so long as the mother was able 
and willing to provide the required support, and the 
adoption cannot be granted without the consent of the 
father. The court finds that the applicant, Mr. McCoy, 
would be a very suitable and proper person to adopt 
Michael and John and that both boys desire the 
adoption. The court further finds that it would be to the 
best interest of said children for said adoption to be 
approved, but the court feels that said approval cannot 
be made over the objection of the father under the 
present statutory requirements. 
Adoption denied. 
CHANGE OF NAME PROCEEDING 
It was stipulated and agreed between the parties that 
the evidence offered in Case Nos. 24353 and 24354 
should be considered evidence in the above styled 
cases. 
The facts, therefore, are that the mother and father of 
applicants were divorced in Michigan in 1962, that the 
mother was given custody and assumed the obligation 
of support. The father was given visitation rights 
which were used to a limited degree. 
The father had means to pay support, but no being 
obligated to do so, elected not to pay any support 
[2] The applicants minors have had extensive 
difficulty in school and among their friends as to 
whether their names were Lawter or McCov Since 
their stepfather, **838 Dr. McCoy. *202 always 
accompanies them in their sports and personal 
activities, they are predominately known as McCoys 
The change of name statute is as follows: 
'A person desiring to change his name may file a 
petition in the probate court of the count}* in which he 
resides, setting forth that he has been a bona fide 
resident of such count)' for at least one year prior to the 
filing of the petition, the cause for which the change of 
name is sought, and the new name asked for Upon 
being satisfied by proof in open court, of the truth of 
the facts set forth in the petition, that there exists 
reasonable and proper cause for changing the name of 
the petitioner, and that notice of the intended 
application has been given by* one publication in a 
newspaper of general circulation in such county at least 
thirty days prior to the filing of the petition, the court 
may order such change of name. 
'When such application is made by or on behalf of a 
minor under the age of twenty-one years, the consent of 
both living, legal parents of said minor shall be filed or 
the matter shall be set for hearing on a day certain, and 
any such parent not consenting shall be given notice of 
the hearing upon such application in the manner 
provided by 2101.26 of the Revised Code.' (S. 83 Eff. 
9-24-63 R.C.s 2717.01.) 
It is the finding of the court that the applicants are 
residents of Pickway Count), Ohio, that all 
requirements as to notice and that statutes have been 
complied with; that this court has jurisdiction in said 
matter; that it would be for the best interests of the 
complainant applicants that their request to change 
their names to Michael Robert McCoy and John Robert 
McCoy be granted. 
Entries in compliance with this and the opinion in case 
Nos. 24353 and 24354 will be submitted 
Change of name granted. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
(Cite as: 112 lll.App.3d 725, 445 N.E.2d 951, 68 Ili.Dec. 307) 
In re the MARRIAGE OF Vicki OMELSON, Now Nichols, Petitioner, and Lori Omelson, 
Petitioner herein, by and through Vickie Nichols, her mother and next friend, 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
and 
Robert G. Omelson, Respondent-Appellant. 
No. 82-45. 
Appellate Court of Illinois, 
^ E e b J 8 , 1 9 8 3 J ^ 
Mother filed petition for change ot surname ot cEIIdfrom that of mother's ex- husband, who 
was father of child, to that of mother's new husband. The Circuit Court, St. Clair County, Dennis 
Jacobsen, J., found that best interests of child would be served by name change, and entered 
judgment accordingly. Father appealed. The Appellate Court, Jones, J., held that: (1) to extent that 
paternal right to have children bear father's surname recognizes father's interest in maintaining his 
relationship with his child for their mutual benefit, it is highly relevant in name change proceeding, 
and (2) where father maintained active interest in child, supported her and had committed no wrong 
toward her, best interest of child would be served by denying petition for name change, awaiting her 
maturity, and leaving name change decision to her. 
Reversed. 
Harrison, P.J., specially concurred and filed opinion. 
[1] NAMES k20 
269k20 
Best interest of child must govern determination whether or not to grant a change of name. S.H.A. 
ch. 96, P 1 et seq. 
[2] NAMES k20 
269k20 
Although petition for change of name was brought in name of minor child, where child was of such 
tender years that she could have no independent judgment in the matter and would be wholly subject 
to suggestion and desire of mother, Appellate Court would regard proceeding as instituted and 
prosecuted by mother. S.H.A. ch. 96, P 1 et seq. 
[3] INFANTS k77 
211k77 
There should be no conflicting interests between an infant and the party representing him. 
[4] NAMES k20 
269k20 
In determining whether change of name is in best interest of a child, it is well to consider whether 
interests of others are sought to be served by the proceeding. S.H.A. ch. 96, P 1 et seq. 
[5] DIVORCE k310 
134k310 
Even if change of name was granted to minor child, who lived with her mother and mother's new 
husband, child's father would be required to continue to support and educate child, extendmgihrough 
college. S.H.A. ch. 40, P 513. 
[6]NAMESk20 
269k20 
To extent that paternal right of father to have his children bear his surname recognizes father's 
interest in maintaining his relationship with his child for their mutual benefit, it becomes highly 
relevant in proceeding instituted by mother to change child's name. S.H.A. ch. 96, P 1 et seq. 
[7] NAMES k20 
269k20 
In light of evidence that divorced father maintained active interest in child born during now 
dissolved marriage, loved her, continued to support her and had committed no wrong toward her, 
and in absence of evidence that granting name change to child would further any purpose other than 
that of temporary, and superficial, expedient, best interest of child would be served by denying 
petition for change of name, awaiting her maturity and leaving name change decision to her. S.H.A. 
ch. 96, P 1 et seq. 
*725 **952 ***308 John R. Sprague, Sprague, Sprague & Ysursa, Belleville, for 
respondent-appellant. 
Robert E. Wells, Jr., Pessin, Baird & Wells, Belleville, for petitioner- appellee. 
JONES, Justice: 
Respondent father appeals from an order of the trial court which granted a petition to change 
the surname of his minor daughter to that of the new husband of his ex-wife, the mother of his child. 
We reverse. 
The respondent, Robert G. Omelson (father), and Vicki Omelson (mother) were married on 
May 5, 1972, in St. Clair County. One child, Lori, the petitioner, was born of the marriage on May 
6, 1975. A judgment of dissolution of marriage was granted to the mother in St. Clair County on 
February 5, 1980. The judgment of dissolution granted custody of Lori to the mother and conferred 
visitation rights upon the father, including every weekend from 5 p.m. Friday to 10 p.m. Sunday, 
certain holidays and four weeks during the summer months. The judgment directed the father to pay 
$35 per week for support of the child. 
*726 The mother married Michael Nichols on June 7, 1980, four months following the 
dissolution. The father remarried in April 1981. Following her remarriage, the mother and Lori 
became residents of Collinsville in Madison County. On July 21, 1980, the child, Lori Anne 
Omelson, by her mother as next friend, filed a petition in the circuit court of Madison County for 
an order changing her surname to Nichols. At the time this petition was filed, Lori Anne was barely 
five years old and had resided in the Nichols' home about seven weeks. As required by the 
applicable statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 96, par. 3), notice of the filing of the application for change 
of name was given by publication. The father was then living and working in Joliet, Illinois, and he 
learned of the name-change petition from a friend who had seen the publication notice. The father 
first filed an answer and an affirmative defense in the Madison County proceeding. Two weeks later, 
in the same St. Clair County case in which the parties had been granted a dissolution of their 
marriage, the father obtained an order of permanent **953 ***309 injunction which restrained the 
mother "from proceeding with her Petition for Change of Name in the Circuit Court for the Third 
Judicial Circuit, Madison County, Illinois, in Case No. 80-MR-214 until the further order of this 
Court." The order of permanent injunction was entered on September 11, 1980. 
On September 28, 1981, the daughter, Lori Omelson, by her mother and next friend, filed a 
second petition for change of her surname to Nichols. The second petition was filed in the same St. 
Clair County case in which her parents had obtained a dissolution of their marriage and in which the 
injunction against the Madison County name-change proceeding was obtained. Lori's petition 
alleged, in its substantive part, that she had "incorporated" into the Nichols household after her 
mother's marriage, that upon commencing school she has chosen to use the surname of Nichols and 
that it is in her best interest that her surname be changed to Nichols. Accompanying Lori's petition 
for change of name was a petition for the mother for an injunction against the father which prayed 
that he be enjoined from appearing at Lori's school, communicating with Lori's school, disrupting 
Lori's education, attempting to exercise his right of visitation without the required advance notice 
and removing Lori from the State of Illinois. 
The father filed a response to the petition for change of name in which he answered both the 
petition for change of name and the mother's petition for injunction. He asserted, in substance, that 
he wanted his daughter to continue the use of Omelson as her surname, that it was not in the best 
interest of Lori that her surname be *727 changed to Nichols and that the mother had been guilty of 
wilful and contumacious conduct in interfering with and denying him his rights of visitation. The 
father's response ended with a prayer that the petition for change of name be denied and that the 
mother be held in contempt of court. Hearing was held, followed by a judgment entered November 
9, 1981, in which the court found that "it is in the best interest of the parties' minor child that her 
surname be changed to Nichols; that Vicki Nichols has frustrated respondent's attempt to exercise 
his right of visitation with said minor child and is in contempt of court." The dispositional portion 
of the judgment (1) changed the name of the child to Lori Nichols and (2) sentenced the mother to 
two weeks in jail but stayed the jail sentence indefinitely with the proviso that the contempt would 
be purged by compliance with the terms of visitation until the child reaches the age of 18 years. 
Post-trial motions were denied, and the father appeals that portion of the judgment which granted 
the change in the surname of the child. 
This case is one of first impression in Illinois for we find no case in which the issue here has 
been directly presented. However, the issue has been alluded to in three cases. In Solomon v. 
Solomon (1955), 5 IU.App.2d 297, 125 N.E.2d 675, the court held that the matter of a change of 
name of a minor child of divorced parents is a matter incidental to the custody of the child and that 
the court which had jurisdiction of the divorce under the Divorce Act [not cited, but probably 
Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, ch. 40, par. 1, et seq.] could entertain a petition for injunction to enjoin the 
custodial parent from instituting any proceeding to change the name of a minor child of the parties. 
The court observed: "In determining whether or not any restraint should be put upon plaintiffs action 
in aiding the minor child to change his name, of course the first and most important consideration 
before the trial court should be the welfare of-thexhild. The matter is within the discretion of the 
court. The question of the propriety of the trial cuurt!s-or3er is not before us and upon it we express 
no opinion." (5 Ill.App.2d 297, 301-02, 125 N.E.2d 675, 678.) In Lawrence v. Lawrence (1980), 86 
Ill.App.3d 810, 41 Ill.Dec. 908, 408 N.E.2d 330, the court considered an appeal from the denial of 
a petition of a divorced mother for a finding that her ex-husband was not the father of a minor child 
born during wedlock. Part of the case before the trial court included a change of name of the minor 
**954 ***310 obtained in a separate proceeding brought by the mother without the knowledge of 
her ex-husband. The trial court entered an order which held that the mother *728 was estopped from 
challenging the paternity of the minor and directed the mother to change the minor's name back to 
that of her ex-husband. In affirming, the court gave full credence to the statement in the Solomon 
case that the most important consideration in a proceeding to procure a change of name for a minor 
is the best interest of the child. In Weinert v. Weinert (1982), 105 IU.App.3d 56, 60 IIl.Dec. 920,433 
N.E.2d 1158, the court considered an appeal from an order which dismissed, without an evidentiary 
hearing, a petition to modify a divorce decree. The basis of the ex-husband's petition was that there 
had been a change in the financial condition of both parties and that the ex-wife had remarried and 
was using the surname of her present husband as the surname of his children who, were in the 
custody of the ex-wife. The appellate court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, 
stating with regard to the name change: "Petitioner's further allegations that the children refused to 
visit with and acknowledge petitioner as their father, and the unfortunate possibility respondent may 
have interfered with petitioner's visitation rights so to keep the children and her new husband as a 
family unit to the exclusion of petitioner, may also establish substantial changes in circumstances 
warranting modification of petitioner's obligation. * * * We turn finally to the matter of the use by 
the children of their stepfather's surname. Respondent argues the children have a common law right 
to take any name they may choose, citing Reinken v. Reinken (1933), 351 111. 409, 184 N.E. 639. 
However, the court there noted this right is not absolute and must not interfere with the rights of 
others (351 111. 409, 413, 184 N.E. 639, 640). The interest of petitioner that his sons bear his 
surname would appear to qualify their right to use their stepfather's surname where the latter has not 
adopted them and is not legally burdened with an obligation of support. (See Solomon v. Solomon 
(1955), 5 Ill.App.2d 297,125 N.E2d 675; Hall v. Hall (1976), 30 Md.App. 214, 351 A.2d 917.) * 
* * While the trial court did find that the interests of the children would best be served by allowing 
them to use the stepfather's surname as they have for the past few years, that determination should 
be reached only after a hearing where evidence, rather than allegations, can be adduced by both 
parties. [Citations.] We do not intend by our comments to suggest that conclusion should be 
reached by the trial judge after a hearing." 105 Ill.App.3d 56, 60, 60 IIl.Dec. 920, 922-23, 433 
N.E.2d 1158, 1160-61. 
[1] There is no lack of cases from other jurisdictions that have considered *729 the issue 
presented. The common thread that runs through these cases is that4hgjbest interest of the child 
mus^govenra deiermination whether-oraoUx^gant a change of namg- (E.g. Sobel v. Sobel (1957), 
46 N.J.Super. 284, 134 A.2d 598; Degerberg v. McCormick (1963), 41 Del.Ch. 46, 187 A.2d 436; 
West v. Wright (1971), 263 Md. 297, 283 A.2d 401; see Annotation, "Rights and remedies of 
parents inter se with respect to their children," 53 A.L.R.2d 914 (1957).) Since the above-cited 
Illinois cases assert the same principle, it is the criterion by which this case must be decided. To 
state the issue briefly, is it in the best interest of Lori Omelson that her surname be changed to 
Nichols? 
The contexts in which the cases have considered whether the best interest of a child will be 
served by granting a change of name vary widely. Cases involve children who have been 
abandoned, abused, sexually molested, fathered by one convicted of a henious or notorious crime, 
born out of wedlock, and so forth. In such instances it is almost always held that a child's best 
interest would be served by granting a change of name. See West v. Wright. 
We consider in this case, however, the more ordinary circumstance of a dispute involving 
divorced parents, both of whom **955 ***311 have remarried and established separate households. 
Both parents love the child and both want the best for her. The father is current in his support 
payments and exercises his right of visitation with reasonable frequency, in view of the fact that he 
is now a resident of Crown Point, Indiana. The father very much wants Lori to continue to bear his 
surname. The mother had custody and is charged with the day-to-day guidance, care and nurture of 
the child. The mother's new husband has children by another marriage who occupy the same 
household and bear his surname of Nichols. The mother determined that Lori would be spared 
embarrassment, annoyance, derision and ridicule by her peers and would share a deeper sense of 
belonging to the newly-cast family if her name were changed to Nichols. Thus this proceeding. The 
background described has presented itself with some frequency in the cases, and from them general 
rules and guidelines have evolved which present what we feel is a well reasoned majority rule. 
[2][3][4] Initially we would comment that although the petition for change of name is 
brought in the name of Lori, she is of such tender years that she could have no independent judgment 
in the matter and would be wholly subject to the suggestion and desire of her mother. Accordingly, 
we regard the proceeding as instituted and prosecuted by the mother. (Degerberg v. McCormick; 
Lazow v. Lazow (Fla.App.1962), 147 So.2d 12; Mark v. Kahn 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758.) 
*730 Thus, further questions arise: whether the mother seeks to advance her own interest in bringing 
the petition and whether the mother's interest is also in the best interest of the child? Although the 
interests of mother and child will frequently coincide, they can frequently diverge. It is a generally 
accepted rule that there should be no conflicting interests between the infant and the party 
representing him. (Clarke v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1946), 393 111. 419, 66 N.E.2d 378; 
Millage v.Noble (1929), 334 111. 315,166N.E. 50.) The situation could present a conflict of interest 
and care must be taken, especially where the minor is of tender years, to assure that some purpose 
of the custodial parent does not taint the determination of the child's best interest. For instance, the 
mother may be prompted to petition for a name change in order to punish the ex-husband and father, 
to prove her enduring devotion to her new husband, to show her new husband that all ties to her 
former marriage are broken, to present to the community a facade of a unitary family, or to hide the 
fact that the mother had previously been through a divorce. Some credence for the last is found in 
a news account of the mother's remarriage which is in evidence. It gave the mother's maiden name 
and the name of the bride as Victoria Saul although that name had not been restored to her in the 
dissolution judgment. The same news item stated that Lori Anne Nichols served as flower girl but 
made no mention of the fact that Lori Anne was the daughter of the bride. The announcement was 
that of a marriage in a church on June 6, 1981. The mother had married Nichols in a civil ceremony 
on June 7, 1980. The judgment was entered changing Lori's surname to Nichols on November 9, 
1981. Such machinations serve to render suspect the mother's motives in seeking a change of name 
for Lori. Admittedly, none of these possible motives are necessarily suggested by the evidence, and 
we neither presume nor infer them. Nevertheless, in determining whther the change of name is in 
the best interest of a child, it is well to consider whether the interests of others are sought to be 
served by the proceeding. 
Tfie^ght" of a father to have his children bear his surname has not gone without attention 
in the change of name cases. The California case of In re Marriage of Schiffman (1980), 28 Cal.3d 
640, 169 Cal.Rptr. 918, 620 P.2d 579, notes that surnames have been used at least since the Norman 
Conquest and discusses the historical background and rationale for the custom which assigns the 
surname of the father to his children. (169 Cal.Rptr. 918, 620 P.2d 579, 581.) The notion that a 
natural father has a right to have his children bear his surname receives scant credence in the more 
**956 ***312 recent cases dealing with the subject. Rather, such *731 issues are considered more 
in the light of the best interest of the children rather than with regard to some right of the father. A 
discussion of the father's "right" to have his children bear his surname is found in the New Jersey 
case of Application of Lone (1975), 134 N.J.Super. 213, 338 A.2d 883, 887, where the court stated: 
"To the extent that the paternal 'right' represents a recognition of a father's interest in perpetuating 
his own name or in protecting his ego or in preserving his perceived male prerogatives, it may have 
little or no relevance to the best interests of the child or the propriety of a name change. But to the 
extent the 'right' recognizes the father's interest in maintaining his relationship with his child for their 
mutual benefit, it becomes highly relevant. Cases in other jurisdictions have expressed the father's 
'right' in just such terms. In Degerberg v. McCormick, supra, the court noted that authority 
'recognizes that a change of surname of a child of divorced parents may contribute to estrangement 
of the child from his father,' relying in part upon psychiatric testimony presented to that court that 
an attempted change of name 'created a "wedge"' in the child's relationship with his father, and that 
his continued use of the stepfather's name 'will have a serious, adverse effect upon the child's 
development in his formative years.' Similarly, in Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517. 131 N.E.2d 758, 
53 A.L.R.2d 908 (Sup.Jud.Ct.1956), the court expressed the view that The bond between a father 
and his children in circumstances like the present is tenuous at best and if their name is changed that 
bond may be weakened if not destroyed. * * * A change of name may not be in the child's best 
interest of the effect of such change is to contribute to the further estrangement of the child from a 
father who exhibits a desire to preserve the parental relationship. [131 N.E.2d at 762.] And in 
Robinson v. Hansel, [302] Minn. [34], 223 N.W.2d 138 (Sup.Ct. 1974), the same considerations were 
stated in th following language: * * * courts have traditionally tried to maintain and to encourage 
continuing parental relationships. The link between a father and child in circumstances such as these 
is uncertain at best, and a change of name could further weaken, if not sever, such a bond. [223 
N.W.2datl40]." 
We turn to the evidence in this case. In her testimony the mother gave as reasons for the 
name change Lori's wish for such, the probability *732 of stigma from living in a household where 
everyone but she would have the surname of Nichols, and the adverse peer pressure that would result 
from Lori's attendance at a small Catholic school where the divorce by her parents would be apparent 
because of the difference in names. The mother presented no evidence to suggest that the father had 
abandoned Lori, that there was a lack of interest in her on the part of the father, or that the father had 
been guilty of any misconduct toward Lori or others. 
The facts presented are very close to those in Application of Lone. There, the mother 
advanced three reasons why the change of name of the child should be granted, first, that to require 
him to live with a name different from his mother and brother would be to ask this child to carry a 
burden through his formative years that could very well have highly negative psychological 
implications; second, that Lone had abandoned his child; and third, that bureaucratic red tape would 
create chaos if formal recognition was not given to a name which the child might use informally. 
The court summarily dealt with the second and third reasons. As to the first reason, the court found 
that it implied essentially that growing up in the Dec family as the only Lone would set the child 
apart, at least in his own mind, and that among his peers his name would create confusion and 
embarrassment for him. In essence, that is the argument of the mother here. In language **957 
***313 appropriate to the case under consideration and, we think, expressive of a great majority of 
the cases of similar context, the court in the Lone case disposed of the foregoing argument as 
follows: "Whether using language of paternal 'right' or these more relevant terms relating to the 
child's well-being, the cases of other jurisdictions almost uniformly have rejected contentions that 
a child's psychological health requires that his name conform to that adopted by his mother on 
remarriage. See, e.g., Degerberg v. McCormick, supra; Mark v. Kahn, supra; Robinson v. Hansel, 
supra; West v. Wright, supra; Application of Trower [260 Cal.App.2d 75, 66 Cal.Rptr. 873], supra; 
Application of Shipley [26 Misc.2d 204, 205 N.Y.S.2d 581], supra; Application of Hinrichs [41 
Misc.2d 422, 246 N.Y.S.2d 25], supra; Marshall v. Marshall, 230 Miss. 719, 93 So.2d 822 
(Sup.Ct.1951); Reed v. Reed, 338 P.2d 350 (Okl.Sup.Ct.1959); contra, King v. Newman [421 
S.W.2d 149 (Tex.Civ.App.) ], supra; In re Adoption of McCoy, 31 Ohio Misc. 195, 60 Ohio Op.2d 
356, 287 N.E.2d 833 (C.C.P.1972). The apprehensions which reasonably arise as to the possible 
effects of a name change, like the contrary apprehensions expressed by plaintiff, are persuasive and 
serious. A change of name imposed upon a child could represent to him a rejection *733 by his 
father; or evidence that his father is deserving of rejection or contempt; or an attempt by his mother 
to deceive him as to his true identity; or a statement by his mother and stepfather that his true 
identity is a shame and embarrassment to them and others. Such consequences could be enormously 
harmful to the child. They are, of course, conjectural, but no less so than are the 'psychological 
implications' foreseen by plaintiff. The record thus generates only two conflicting groups of 
speculations as to the possible effects of a name change. No expert testimony has been offered, and 
no academic literature has been found, to assist in the weighing of these speculations. The realities 
are that the child's present name represents his identity, his paternity and a remaining bond with his 
father. There is no sound basis to conclude that any tampering with these realities would advance 
the best interests of the child." (Application of Lone (1975), 134 N.J.Super. 213, 338 A.2d 883, 
887-8.) Not cited in Lone but to the same effect is Lazow v. Lazow (Fla.App.1962), 147 S.2d 12, 
14, where the court stated: "To change the name of a minor son so that he no longer bears his father's 
name is a serious matter, and such action may be taken only where the record affirmatively shows 
that such change is required for the welfare of the minor. Society has a strong interest in the 
preservation of the parental relationship, Application of Shipley, 26 Misc.2d 204, 205 N.Y.S.2d 581 
(1960); Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758, 53 A.L.R.2d 908, and a possible adverse 
effect on the relationship between father and child is a valid ground for refusing to change the name 
of a 12 year old child. At this tender age a child is not capable of making an intelligent choice in the 
matter of his name. See Mark v. Kahn, supra; In re Epstein, 121 Misc. 151, 200 N.Y.S. 897 
(1923)." As pointed out in Robinson v. Hansel, cited in the Lone case, "Whatever the nature of the 
'harassment' of the children by their peers, it would sem that it was in this case surely no more severe 
than [that] faced by thousands of other similarly situated children in a day when broken homes have 
become commonplace." (Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138, 141.) This, too, is 
particularly appropriate here where the mother fears peer harassment at Lori's small Catholic school. 
We note, however, that the mother's fear rises no higher than apprehension; there is no evidence. 
*734 [5] The mother's new husband, Michael Nichols, is not required to support Lori and has 
no legal responsibility toward her. Even if the change of name is granted Lori, her father must 
continue to support and educate her, extending through college. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 40, par. 513; 
Greiman **958 ***314 v. Friedman (1980), 90 IU.App.3d 941, 46 Ill.Dec. 355, 414 N.E.2d 77.) 
The father would continue to have rights of visitation with Lori, including four weeks during the 
summer. What of her "embarrassment" before her peers when she visits with a father whose name 
differs from hers? What of Lori's new name if her mother's second marriage is ended by divorce and 
she marries again? And in the event of the mother's untimely death, custody of Lori would probably 
revert to her father. 
[6, 7] In view of the record before us, which shows a father who maintains an active interest 
in his daughter, loves her, continues to support her and has committed no wrong toward her, the 
granting of a name change to Lori would further no purpose other than that of a temporary, and 
superficial, expedient. The majority rule as expressed in the Lone case must be applied. The best 
interest of Lori will be served in this case by denying the change of name, awaiting her maturity and 
leaving the decision whether to change her name to her at a time when she will be aided by her own 
desires and perceptions. 
REVERSED. 
KASSERMAN, J., concurs. 
HARRISON, P.J., specially concurs. 
HARRISON, Presiding Judge, specially concurring: 
While I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion, I cannot concur in the discussion 
of possible motives of the mother which, as admitted by majority, are not necessarily suggested by 
the evidence. Nor can I concur in the conjecture regarding the mother's possible remarriage. This 
dicta is totally irrelevant to the resolution of the controlling issue in the case, which was properly 
decided by application of the best interest of the child standard. 
(Cite as: 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138) 
In re Application of Jeanine Hansel Robinson, Mother and Natural Guardian of 
Holly Hansel, et al., for Change of Their Names to Holly Hansel Robinson, et 
al. 
Jeanine Hansel ROBINSON, Respondent, 
v. 
Richard D. HANSEL, Appellant. 
No. 44724. 
SupremeXQUrtjoOvlinnesota. 
C__Nov. l7l974T^> 
Natural mother, who had beenawafded cusToHyof the four minor children on divorce and 
who had subsequently remarried, filed petition to change surnames of the four minor children by 
adding the surname of her present husband. The natural father opposed the petition. The District 
Court, Ramsey County, Hyam Segell, J., granted petition, and the natural father appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Peterson, J., held that -welfare-ofthexhi 1 dren must ^ ultimately be_the controlling 
consideration in any change in status, that a natural father has standing to object to a change FiT 
surname, that judicial discretion in ordering a change of a minor's surname against the objection of 
one parent should be exercised with great caution and only where the evidence is clear and 
compelling that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates such change and that evidence 
supporting instant petition was neither clear nor compelling. 
Reversed. 
[1] DIVORCE k313.1 
134k313.1 
SZiSillfof the child must ultimately be the controlling consideration in any change of status, such 
as change of a child's surname on remarriage of a mother who has been awarded custody oh divorce 
from the natural father. M.S.A. ss 259.10, 259.11. 
£2]N23^5Sk20 
269k20 
Natural father had standing to object to petition filed by natural mother for change in surname of the 
parties four natural children, custody of whom had been awarded to mother, and whose surname was 
sought to be changed by addition of surname of mother's present husband. 
[3] DIVORCE k298(l) 
134k298(l) 
Even though a divorce decree may terminate a marriage the courts have traditionally tried to 
maintain and to encourage continuing parental relationships. 
[4] NAMES k20 
269k20 
Judicial discretion in ordering a change of a minor's surname against the objection of one parent 
should be exercised with great caution and only where the evidence is clear and compelling that the 
substantial welfare of the child necessitates such change. M.S.A. ss 259.10, 259.11. 
[5]NAMESk20 
269k20 
Change in surname of minor children, custody of whom had been awarded to mother on divorce, by 
adding surname of mother's present husband was not warranted where natural father had exercised 
substantial amount of visitation rights granted him by divorce decree, whatever the nature of the 
"harassment" of the children by their peers it was no more severe than that faced by other similarly 
situated children and had not adversely affected their participation in school, notwithstanding that 
at least one of the children had developed a parent-child identification with petitioner's present 
husband. M.S.A. ss 259.10, 259.11. 
**139 Syllabus by the Court 
A change in surname of minor children from that of their divorced father to that of the new 
husband of their natural mother was not based upon clear and compelling evidence that the 
substantial welfare of the children necessitated such change. 
*34 Goff & Goff, Sydney W. Goff, and John H. Feldman, St. Paul, for appellant. 
Murnane, Murnane, Battis & Conlin and John R. Hoffman, St. Paul, for respondent. 
*35 Heard before SHERAN, C.J., and ROGOSHESKE, PETERSON, MacLAUGHLIN, and 
SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. 
PETERSON, Justice. 
This is a proceeding in which the petitioner seeks to change the surnames of four minor 
children in her custody. The petition was opposed by the children's natural father. From an order 
of the Ramsey County District Court granting the petition, the natural father appeals. We reverse. 
**140 Jeanine Hansel Robinson, petitioner, and Richard D. Hansel were divorced in 1969. 
Petitioner was awarded the custody of the four minor children of that marriage, namely, Holly Jean 
Hansel, now 17 years old; Kara Ann Hansel, 14; Heidi Marie Hansel, 10; and Brian Boycl Hansel, 
6. 
Petitioner remarried in 1970, and the four Hansel children have since been living with her 
and her new husband, Bruce Robinson. Robinson's natural children by a former marriage are living 
with his former wife. In October 1973 petitioner instituted an action, pursuant to Minn.St. 259.10 
and 259.11, to change the surnames of each of the four minor children by adding the surname of 
petitioner's present husband. Thus, the surname 'Hansel' would become the surname 'Hansel 
Robinson.' 
[1][2][3] The precise issue of whether a change in a child's name should be ordered over the 
objection of a natural parent is one of first impression in this court. There is no issue, however, that 
the welfare of the children must ultimately be the controlling consideration in any change of status. 
A change in surname, so that a child no longer bears his father's name, not only obviously is of 
inherent concern to the natural father, so that he should have standing to object, but is in a real sense 
a change in status having significant societal implications. Society has a strong interest in the 
preservation of the parental relationship. Even though a divorce decree may terminate a marriage, 
courts have traditionally tried to maintain and to encourage continuing parental relationships. The 
link between a father and child in circumstances *36 such as these is uncertain at best, and a change 
of name could further weaken, if not sever, such a bond. 
This consideration has been recognized in a number of jurisdictions. [FN 1 ] In Massachusetts, 
for example, the Supreme Judicial Court refused, in the case of Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 521, 
131 N.E.2d 758, 762, 53 A.L.R.2d 908, 913 (1956), to change the names of minor children, holding: 
FN1. See, generally, Annotation, 53 A.L.R.2d 914. 
!
* * * A change of name may not be in the child's best interest if the effect of such change 
is to contribute to the further estrangement of the child from a father who exhibits a desire to 
preserve the parental relationship.' In Ohio, the court held, in Kay v. Kay, Ohio Comp.Pl., 51 Ohio 
O. 434, 438, 112 N.E.2d 562, 567 (1953): '* * * Ordinarily a change of the name of a minor child 
of divorced parents should not be granted where it might contribute to the estrangement of the child 
from its father who has shown a desire to preserve the parental relationship, * * *.' Other courts have 
looked to the natural and appropriate desire of the father to have his children bear and perpetuate his 
name,[FN2] as well as to the desirability of the child knowing his own parentage. [FN3] 
FN2. Clinton v. Morrow, 220 Ark. 377, 247 S.W.2d 1015 (1952). 
FN3. Matter of Epstein, 121 Misc. 151, 200 N.Y.S. 897 (1923). 
[4] We are fully persuaded, for like reasons, that judicial discretion in ordering a change of 
a minor's surname against the objection of one parent should be exercised with great caution and 
only where the evidence is clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates 
such change. 
[5] The evidence supporting the petition for change of name is neither clear nor compelling. 
It is clear that the principal reason for the trial court's ordering a change of surname was that the 
made child, Brian, age 6, who was born after his natural parents *37 were separated, but several 
months before the divorce, 'looks upon Bruce Robinson, the petitioner's husband, as his father, and 
uses the name Robinson as his own name.' How it came to be that he does use the Robinson name 
is not stated in **141 the record, but it seems unlikely that it was encouraged by his natural father. 
It is clear that his natural father had exercised a substantial amount of visitation rights granted him 
by the divorce decree, demonstrating his effort to maintain a familial relationship with his son and 
daughters. [FN4] 
FN4. Petitioner contends that Richard Hansel, the father, had failed consistently to make 
support payments as ordered in the divorce decree. It is clear, however, that the trial court did not 
consider this as a reason for its order. Whatever the reason for these defaults, moreover, they are not 
of such character as to evince a total indifference or neglect of his children over a period of years. 
The trial court concluded that f(i)t would not be practical to change the name of Brian Hansel 
without changing the names of all of the children, and it would not be in the best interests of any of 
the children to change the name of one without changing the others.' As to these other older 
children, there was some evidence that they had experienced 'some difficulty in the way of 
harassment by schoolmates and friends, and difficulty has also been experienced in obtaining 
insurance coverage, and an application for scholarships to college.' The court did not treat this as 
compelling a change of name. The nature of the evidence demonstrated the difficulties to be both 
minor and transitory. The children's participation in school and school activities had not been 
adversely affected. Whatever the nature of the 'harassment' of the children by their peers, it would 
seem that it was in this case surely no more severe than faced by thousands of other similarly 
situated children in a day when broken homes have become commonplace. 
The petition for change of surname stems not alone from the divorce but from a custody 
status. Awarding permanent custody is impermanent to the extent that death or subsequent divorce 
*38 of a custodial parent may materially alter circumstances. This potential could well lead to 
restoration to the child of the natural father's surname or, if this change of name were sustained, to 
yet another name. We do not dismiss out of hand the finding that at least one of the children has 
developed a parent-child identification with one other than his father. If this matures into a strong 
and permanent identification, at maturity the time may well come when the child may cause an 
appropriate change of surname as his or her voluntary act. 
Reversed. 
(Cite as: 124 Ga.App. 603, 184 S.E.2d 696) 
Thomas R. JOHNSON 
v. 
Carole S. J. COGGINS. 
No. 46664. 
Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2. 
Oct. 15,1971. 
Proceeding on application to change surname of petitioner's children to that of petitioner and 
children's stepfather. The Superior Court, Elbert County, George B. Culpepper, III, J., granted 
application, and natural father appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jordan, P.J., held that granting of 
application with respect to eight and seven-year-old children, who were in custody of mother, who 
had amicable relationship with their father, who desired to have same surname as mother and 
stepfather, and one of whom assertedly suffered some emotional disturbance due to his surname, was 
not abuse of discretion. 
Judgment affirmed. 
[1] NAMES k20 
269k20 
Granting of application to change surname of eight and seven-year-old children, who were in 
custody of mother, who had amicable relationship with their natural father, who desired to have same 
surname as mother and stepfather, and one of whom assertedly suffered some emotional disturbance 
due to his surname, to that of stepfather was not abuse of discretion. Code, s 79-501 et seq. 
[2] NAMES k20 
269k20 
In determining application to change surname of children, it is appropriate to give paramount 
consideration to best interests, welfare and happiness of children. Code, s 79-501 et seq. 
**696 *604 Grant & Matthews, Carlton G. Matthews, Elberton, for appellant. 
Heard, Leverett & Adams, E. Freeman Leverett, Elberton, for appellee. 
Syllabus Opinion by the Court 
*603 JORDAN, Presiding Judge. 
The petition, Mrs. Coggins, sought to change the surname of her two minor children, then 
ages 8 and 7, to that of their stepfather, over the objections of their natural *604 father, her former 
husband. Under the terms of a divorce decree the petitioner has custody and control of the children, 
and their father has visitation rights and provides for their support. An amicable relationship exists 
between the children and their father, but both of the children desire to have the same surname as 
their mother and stepfather, with whom they reside. There is also medical testimony to the effect 
that the older child suffers from some emotional disturbance brought about by the fact that his name 
is not the same as that of his mother and stepfather. The father appeals from an order granting the 
change in name. Held: 
[1][2] We affirm. Under the provisions of Code, s 79-501 et seq., as amended, Ga.L.1961, 
pp. 129, 130, whether a judge of the superior court shall grant or refuse a proper application for a 
change in name, upon objection and after a hearing, involves the exercise of a sound legal discretion. 
Here, as in Binford v. Reid, 83 Ga.App. 280, 63 S.E.2d 345, decided under the former statute, the 
record and transcript reveal no abuse of this discretion. While the codal provisions set no standards 
for determination, the order of the trial judge reflects that he gave paramount consideration to the 
best interests, welfare, and happiness of the children as disclosed by the evidence. This is in accord 
with the established standards for determining custody of minor children, which we consider 
appropriate for application in determining a change in name. 
Judgment affirmed. 
QUILLIAN and EVANS, JJ., concur. 
(Citeas:421S.W.2dl49) 
William C KING, Jr., Appellant, 
v. 
Jan T. NEWMAN, Guardian of William C. King, 
III, et vir, Appellees . 
No. 14619. 
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. 
San Antonio. 
Oct. 11,1967. 
A divorced mother and her successor husband 
petitioned for change in name of minor child whose 
custody had been awarded mother in the divorce. The 
166th District Court, Bexar County, Peter Michael 
Curry. J., granted the application and the natural father 
appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals. Barrow, C.J., 
held that stepfather and mother were not proper next 
friends of child and trial court should have appointed 
guardian ad litem to represent interest of child in 
proceedings to change child's name. 
Reversed and remanded. 
11] NAMES<@=> 20 
269<§=>20 
Applicant who seeks to change minor's name has 
burden to establish by satisfactory evidence that change 
would be for benefit and interest of minor. Vernon's 
Ann.Civ.St. art. 5929. 
[2] NAMES<S==> 20 
269<§=>20 
Under statute which authorizes change of name of 
minor, reviewing court will not interfere with decision 
of trial court except upon showing of abuse of 
discretion Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 5929. 
[3] INFANTS<§=> 19.2(2) 
211^^19.2(2) 
In custody cases, best interest of child is main 
consideration regardless of relative rights of contesting 
parties 
[4] PARENT AND CHDLD<@=* 2(8) 
285<^=>2(8) 
Law presumes that natural parents are ones best 
qualified to serve best interests of minor child although 
third party can rebut such presumption by proving that 
natural parent is morally unlit to have custody or that, 
for other reasons best interest of child demands that his 
custody be awarded to third party. 
[51 NAMES<®=> 20 
269<®=>20 
In considering application of mother to have minor 
child's name changed, best interest of child rather than 
natural fathers right is primary consideration. Vernon's 
Ann.Civ.St. art. 5929. 
[6] NAMES<®=* 20 
269<§=>20 
Best interest of child is usually not served if change of 
name contributes to further estrangement from his 
father who desires to preserve parental relationship. 
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 5929. 
]7] INFANTS<®=> 78(1) 
211<®=>78(1) 
Stepfather and mother who was awarded custody of 
child in divorce proceeding were not proper next 
friends of child and trial court should have appointed 
guardian ad litem to represent interest of child in 
proceedings to change child's name. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 173; Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 5929. 
*149 Trueheart, McMillan, Russell & Hoffman, San 
Antonio, for appellant. 
Lang, Cross, Ladon, Oppenheimer & Rosenberg, San 
Antonio, for appellees. 
BARROW, Chief Justice. 
This is a suit brought by the mother and stepfather on 
behalf of a seven-year- old boy to change his name 
from William C. King, III, to John Tracy Newman. His 
natural father intervened and contested die change. 
After a non-jury trial, judgment was entered granting 
the application The trial court did order appellees to 
correct baptismal and other records to show appellant 
as the boy's father and provided specific visitation 
rights. The basic question *150 to be resolved is, 
under what circumstances, if any, may the trial court 
change a child's name over the objection of its natural 
father 
Appellant, William C. King, Jr., and appellee Jan 
Tinsley Newman were divorced on May 22, 1961, and 
the custody of their two-year-old son, who is referred to 
(Citeas:421S.W.2dl49,*150) 
herein as Trey' as he was called by all parties, was 
awarded to his mother, with appellant having the right 
to reasonable visitation. On August 22, 1961, Jan was 
married to appellee Harry E. Newman, and Trey has 
made his home with the Newmans continuously since 
that time. A daughter and a son were subsequently 
born to the Newmans. The record conclusively 
demonstrates that there is a very close family 
relationship among the Newmans and the three 
children living in the home, with no distinction 
whatsoever made between Trey and his half sister and 
half brother. Harry E. Newman has treated Trey as his 
son and the boy has reciprocated with love and respect. 
Furthermore, the parents of Harry have treated Trey as 
their grandchild, and have created a substantial trust for 
him along with their other grandchildren. 
On the other hand, the record establishes a desire on 
the part of appellant to preserve his parental 
relationship with his son. He has made the support 
payments as ordered by the trial court, including an 
increase granted in 1962, and has reasonably utilized 
the visitation rights granted him by the court. There is 
no finding of any misconduct or neglect on his part. 
Appellant's mother and other members of the family 
love Trey and are proud of him. Appellant's family 
name is well and favorably known in this community. 
It is apparent from the record and, in fact, the 
Newmans both testified that they desire the full 
responsibility of Trey to the total exclusion of his 
natural father. They testified that since their marriage 
Trey has been known under the surname of Newman. 
Obviously, a child of his tender years could not do this 
without the active assistance and encouragement of the 
Newmans. In 1963, Trey was baptized in the 
Episcopal Church under the name of 'John Tracy 
Newman,' with Harry E. Newman designated as the 
father. In 1964, he was enrolled in the kindergarten as 
'John Tracy Newman,' again with Harry listed as his 
father. In 1965 he was enrolled in the first grade in the 
same manner, and it was not until near the end of the 
school year that Trey's teacher knew of his natural 
father. His playmates refer to him as Trey Newman.' 
The records of Trey's doctor were changed by Mrs. Jan 
Newman to reflect the name 'Trey Newman.' All of 
this was done without the knowledge or consent of 
appellant or any court. 
In October. 1966. Mrs. Jan Newman contacted 
appellant with the request that he cousent[FNl] to the 
adoption of Trey by Harry. When appellant refused, 
she informed him of the above-mentioned changes in 
Trey's identity. Appellant munediately verified this 
with the Church and school, and requested the proper 
authorities in each instance to correct their records to 
show that he is the natural lather of Trey. Shortly 
thereafter appellees brought this suit on behalf of Trey 
and refused appellant his visitation rights. 
FN1. See Gunn \ Ca\anaugh. 391 S.W.2d 723 
(Tex.Sup.1965). 
The right of a custodial mother to change the surname 
of a minor after she remarries has been the subject of 
frequent judicial consideration throughout the United 
States. In 53 A.L.R.2d 914. is a comprehensive review 
of the authorities under the annotation 'Rights and 
remedies of parents inter se w ith respect to the names 
of their children.' The general rule is stated as follows: 
'The courts have generally recognized that the father, 
who is ordinarily the objecting part}', has a protectable 
interest in having his child bear the parental surname in 
accordance with the usual custom, *151 even though 
the mother may have been awarded custody of the 
child. So, a change of name will not be authorized 
against the father's objection, merely to save the 
mother and child minor inconvenience or 
embarrassment. However, where the child's 
substantial interests require a change of name, as where 
the father's misconduct has been such as to justify a 
forfeiture of his rights or where his name is positively 
deleterious to the child, the change may be permitted.' 
[1][2] Art. 5929, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., authorizes the 
district court to change the name of a minor upon 
application being made by the guardian or next friend 
'if the facts alleged and proven satisfy him that such 
change will be for the benefit and interest of the minor.' 
It has been held that the burden is on applicant under 
this statute to prove by evidence satisfactory to the 
court that the change would be for the benefit and 
interests of the minor Plass v Leithold, 381 S.W.2d 
580 (Tex.Civ.App --Dallas 1964, no writ); Ex parte 
Taylor, 322 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1959, 
no writ). Under these authorities, the action of the trial 
court should be upheld in the absence of a showing of 
an abuse of discretion 
The trial court held that although appellant has a 
(Cite as: 421 S.W.2d 149, *151) 
prolectible interest in having his child bear his name, 
this interest and his desire is secondary to the best 
interest of the child. The court concluded that upon full 
and satisfactory evidence the best interests of the child 
are served by granting the application changing his two 
given names as well as his surname. 
Under his first two points appellant urges that this 
conclusion was an abuse of discretion in that it was not 
in the best interests of the child to alienate him from his 
natural father. Further, it is urged, under his third 
point, that such action is in violation of his rights under 
the Constitution in that his tie with the child could only 
be forfeited by misconduct or unfitness. Under 
appellant's fourth point he urges that the boy's 
constitutional rights were violated by this action. 
Under the fifth point he urges that the trial court erred 
in changing the name because it amounted to a reward 
of appellees' actions in falsifying the name and 
parentage of the child so as to constitute a fraud on the 
child, appellant and the courts. 
[3] [4] These points are all somewhat interrelated and 
therefore will be considered together. The basic 
problem is related to the conflict between the 
protectible interest of the parent, or 'natural right rule,' 
and the 'best interest rule,' which is present in much 
child custody litigation. Insofar as custody is 
concerned, the Texas Supreme Court has adopted this 
position: The best interest of the child is the main 
consideration, regardless of the relative rights of the 
contesting parties. The law will presume that the 
natural parents are the ones best qualified to serve 
those interests, but the third part}7 can rebut this 
presumption by proving that the natural parent is 
morally unfit to have custody or that, for other reasons, 
the best interest of the child demands that his custody 
be awarded to the third party Herrera v. Herrera, 409 
S.W.2d 395 (Tex .Sup. 1966); Hendricks v. Curry, 401 
S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Sup.1966); Mumma v. Aguirre, 364 
S.W.2d 220 (Tex.Sup.1963); 19 Baylor Law Rev. 299. 
[5] [6] Inasmuch as this application for change of 
name of the minor presents somewhat the same 
problem involving the future of this young boy, the trial 
court properly considered the best interest of the child 
rather than the father's right as the primary 
consideration. This did not violate any of the father's 
constitutional rights. It should not be overlooked, 
however, that all courts considering the question have 
held that the best interest of a child is usually not 
served if the change of name contributes to a further 
estrangement from his father who desires to preserve 
the parental relationship. Plass v. Leithold, supra. 
Mark v. Kahn (Mass.), 131 N.E.2d 758, 53 A.L R.2d 
908; In re Shipley, 26 Misc.2d *152 204. 205 
N.Y.S.2d 581; Degerberg v. McCormick, 41 Del Ch 
46, 187 A.2d 436; Reed v. Reed (CM), 338 P.2d 350; 
Marshall v. Marshall, 230 Miss 719, 93 So.2d 822; 65 
C.J.S. Names s i 1(2) 
The trial court's conclusion that the best interests of 
the child are served by granting this application is 
based upon the finding of fact that the child has 
established his identity under the name of 'John Tracy 
Newman' and that it would be humiliating, 
embarrassing, confusing, and, in all reasonable 
probability, disruptive of harmony in his home life for 
him to go under a different name from the other 
members of his family, and, further, that in all 
reasonable medical probability the impact of changing 
his name now might have a detrimental effect on his 
personality as he grows older. 
At the time of the trial, Trey was about seven and a 
half years of age. For over five years, he had lived in 
and been identified as a member of the Newman family 
in a close relationship. All the testimony establishes 
that the Newman family is a very fine Christian family 
and that Trey has become an integral part of it. There is 
nothing in the record to show why his two given names 
were changed, other than to sever all identity with his 
natural father. In any event, the undisputed evidence is 
that all persons know him as Trey Newman' The 
pediatrician, who has treated Trey since birth, testified 
that it might be detrimental to 'change' his name back 
to King, since Trey has established his identity with 
this family unit. A clinical psychologist', who was 
employed by the Newmans in December, 1966, for the 
purpose of giving expert testimony in this case, 
expressed the same opinion. 
It is true, as urged by appellant, that this identity was 
built up largely as a result of the actions of the boy's 
mother in improperly identifying him at home, at 
school and even on his baptismal record. Yet, as was 
said in Mumma v. Aguirre, supra, 364 S.W.2d p. 221. 
'* * * our courts do not normally concern themselves 
with the righteousness of claims to custody of children; 
their paramount concern is with the best interests of the 
4Zi s.w.za JHV 
(Citcas:421S.W.2dl49,*152) 
children on behalf of said minor child 
[7] This action serves to demonstrate that the child's 
best interests required the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem to represent him He is not old enough to 
understand the serious consequences involved in this 
change of name. We cannot conceive a seven-year-old 
child telling his natural father that he did not want to go 
under his father's name, without receiving 
encouragement and suggestion from adults in a 
position of influence over him. Notwithstanding the 
sincerity and purpose of his mother and stepfather in 
bringing this suit, it is obvious that there is a possible 
conflict between the best interests of this child and that 
of the Newmans. They admittedly are interested in 
severing all ties between the child and his natural 
father. This is conclusively shown not only by their 
admissions at this trial but also by their action in 
changing even his given names without reason. 
Certainly, the child would have little to gain in a 
personal vendetta between his natural parents. Despite 
the testimony of the medical experts as to the 
desirability of severing all ties with a natural father 
who had not forfeited his rights, our law still presumes 
to the contrary. In this situation, the Newmans were 
not proper next friends for the minor plaintiff and the 
trial court should have appointed a guardian ad litem 
Rule 173, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that when a minor is represented by a next friend or 
guardian who appears to the court to have an interest 
adverse to such imnor, the court shall appoint a 
guardian ad litem for such minor This rule has been 
held to be mandatory King v. Payne, 156 Tex 105. 
292 S.W.2d 331, 335 (1956); Wallis v. Stuart, 92 Tex. 
568. 50 S.W. 567 (1899); Jaynes v. Lee. 306 S.W.2d 
182 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1957, no writ); 
McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, s 3.09.3. See also 'P' 
v. Dept. of Health. 200 Misc. *153 1090. 107 
N.Y.S.2d 586. In Cooper v. Liverman. 406 S.W.2d 
927. 931 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1966, no writ) the 
Court held that fathers of minors who had adverse 
interests to said minors were not proper next friends. 
In remanding the case, the Court said: 'We hold that 
under such circumstances, even though the matter was 
not called to the attention of the trial court, that 
nevertheless a guardian ad litem should have been 
appointed to represent the interests of said minors.' 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the 
cause remanded. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Alfred J. MARK 
v. 
Harold KAHN & another. 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Middlesex. 
Argued Dec. 7, 1955. 
Decided Feb. 3, 1956. 
Equity proceeding to enjoin former wife, who had 
been granted custody of children under divorce decree, 
and her current husband, from registering children in 
school under surname of wife's current husband, and 
from representing that surname of children was that of 
former wife's current husband. The Superior Court, 
O'Brien, J., entered a decree enjoining the defendants, 
and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Judicial 
Court, Spalding. J. held that under appropriate 
circumstances, upon application by former husband, 
equity7 will enjoin former wife, who has been granted 
custody of children in divorce decree, from informally 
changing surname of children to that of her current 
husband, or from representing that children's surname 
is different from that of their father, though, in instant 
case, absence of finding on controlling issue, whether 
use of surname of wife's current husband was for best 
welfare of children, required reversal of decree for 
husband, and warranted retrial. 
Decree reversed with directions. 
[1] C O U R T S S 24 
1 0 6 S 2 4 
Consent or waiver by the parties cannot confer 
jurisdiction over a cause where none exists. 
[2] APPEAL AND E R R O R S 23 
3 0 S 2 3 
Though question whether equity court would, upon 
application of former husband, enjoin former wife, 
who had been granted custody of children in divorce 
decree, from informally changing surname of children 
to that of her current husband, or from representing that 
children's surname was different from that of their 
father, was not raised in court below or on appeal, 
Supreme Judicial Court had duty to notice and decide 
issue upon its own motion. 
[3] I N J U N C T I O N S 94 
2 1 2 S 9 4 
Under appropriate circumstances, upon application by 
former husband, equity will enjoin former wife, who 
has been granted custody of children in divorce decree, 
from informally changing surname of children to that 
of current husband, or from representing that children's 
surname is different from that of then father 
[4] N A M E S S 20 
2 6 9 S 2 0 
At common law. a person could change his name at 
will, without resort to legal proceeding, by merely 
adopting another name, if this was done for an honest 
purpose. 
[5J N A M E S S 20 
2 6 9 S 2 0 
The statute regulating the changing of a person's name 
does not restrict a person's choice of name, but aids 
him in securing an official record which definitely and 
specifically establishes his change of name. 
G.L.(Ter.Ed.)c.210,§ 12. 
[6] I N J U N C T I O N S 130 
212S130 
Where a father supports a child, and manifests a 
continuing interest in his welfare, and, without 
unreasonable delay, objects to an attempted change of 
child's surname, the equity court, upon application of 
father to enjoin former wife from informally changing 
child's surname, must decide issue by determining what 
is for the child's best interest. 
[7] I N J U N C T I O N S 130 
2 1 2 S 1 3 0 
Upon application of former husband to enjoin former 
wife, who had been granted custody of children in 
divorce decree, from informally changing surname of 
children, in determining question whether change of 
name would be in child's best interest, such change is 
not in child's best interest if effect of change is to 
contribute further to estrangement of child from father, 
who exhibits desne to preserve parental relationship. 
[81 I N J U N C T I O N S 109 
2 1 2 S 1 0 9 
Where a father has completely abandoned his child, or 
is indifferent to child's welfare, or has, by his serious 
(Cite as: 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758) 
misconduct, caused the child embarrassment, the father 
may lose his right to enjoin former wife from 
informally changing child's surname 
(9] APPEAL AND E R R O R S 1178(2) 
30<$^> 1178(2) 
Where the facts on which the rights of the parties 
depend have not been ascertamed at the trial, it is 
within power of Supreme Judicial Court, in its 
discretion, and of its own motion, to recommit the 
cause for retrial. 
[10] APPEAL AND ERROR<§=> 1177(8) 
30®^1177(8) 
In equity proceeding to enjoin former wife, who had 
been granted custody of children under divorce decree, 
and her current husband, from registermg children in 
school under surname of wife's current husband, 
absence of finding on controlling issue, whether use of 
surname of wife's current husband was for best welfare 
of children, required reversal of decree for husband and 
warranted retrial. 
*517 **760 Samuel H. Cohen, Boston, for plaintiff. 
Phillip J. Nexon, Waltham, for defendants. 
Before QUA, C. J., and WILK1NS, SPALDING, 
WILLIAMS and WHITTEMORE, JJ. 
SPALDING, Justice. 
The plaintiff brings this bill in equity- to enjoin the 
defendant Anna R. Kahn, his former wife who has 
remarried, from registering their minor children at 
school under the surname Kahn, which is her present 
name, or from representing that their name is Kahn. 
Although her husband is also a defendant we shall, for 
convenience, refer to Anna R. Kahn sometimes 
hereinafter as the defendant. *518 The evidence is 
reported and the judge made findings of material facts. 
The relevant facts are these; Of the marriage of the 
plaintiff to the defendant two children, a son. Theodore 
K. Mark, and a daughter, Leslie R. Mark, were born. 
At the time of the hearing below then' ages were 
thirteen and ten respectively. In June of 1948 the 
defendant obtained a decree nisi of divorce from the 
plaintiff which became absolute on or about January 1, 
1949. Under the decree the defendant was awarded 
custody of the two children and the plaintiff was 
ordered to pay $120 weekly for the support of the 
defendant and the children There were additional 
provisions for the support and education of the children 
by agreement of the parties, but they need not concern 
us. This order was complied with until August 23. 
1953, when the defendant married Harold Kahn. 
Thereafter the support order was modified so as to 
provide for weekly payments of $60 for the support of 
the children. Kahn. the defendant's present husband, 
has three children by a prior marriage Thus there are 
at the present time five children in the Kahn household. 
Some of the Kahn children and the plaintiffs daughter 
Leslie attend the same grammar school Theodore is a 
student at a junior high school. In 1953 the defendant 
registered Theodore and Leslie in school under the 
surname Kahn. 
The plaintiff has remarried. The marriage took place 
in Elkton, Maryland, on March 31. 1949. three months 
after the divorce decree in this Commonwealth became 
absolute. Finding that the plaintiff's remarriage in 
Maryland was invalid in this Commonwealth 
(presumably by reason of G.L.(Ter.Ed) c 208, § 24, 
and c. 207, § 10), the judge further found that 'it does 
not cause embarrassment to the Mark children.' The 
judge stated that while he was mindful of the principles 
enunciated in Petition of Merolevitz, 320 Mass. 448, 
70 N.E.2d 249, and Petition of Buyarsky. 322 Mass. 
335, 77 N.E.2d 216, nevertheless, he was of opinion 
that the case at bar was not governed by them 'The 
use by the Mark children, at the insistence of the 
defendants, of the surname Kahn is not for *519 a 
fraudulent or other illegal purpose; it is however 
motivated by a spirit of hostility on the part of the 
defendants toward the plaintiff * * * rather than a 
desire to further the children's best interest.' He 
ordered the entry of a decree enjoining the defendants 
from registering Theodore and Leslie in school under 
the surname of Kahn or from representing that the 
surname of the children is Kahn From a decree 
entered accordingly the defendants appealed 
[1][2] Where a parent having custody of a minor 
child pursuant to a decree of divorce may change the 
surname of such child or cause him to be called by a 
different name in the face of opposition of the former 
spouse, is a question that has never been decided by 
this court. Such a question was presented in Lord v. 
Cummings, 303 Mass. 457, 22 N.E.2d 26, in a petition 
in equity brought in the Probate Court but the court 
(Cite as: 333 Mass. 517, *519, 131 N.E.2d 758, **760) 
refused to decide it because it was not a matter within 
the equity jurisdiction granted to the Probate Courts 
[FN 1 ] **761 The question whether the subject matter 
of the petition was within the general principles of 
equity jurisprudence was left open. In the present 
proceeding we are squarely faced with this question 
To be sure, the point was not raised in the court below 
and it has not been raised here. But consent or waiver 
by the parties cannot confer jurisdiction over a cause 
where none exists. Hence it is our duty to notice the 
point of our own motion. Baldwin v. Wilbraham. 140 
Mass. 459, 4 N.E. 829; Eaton v. Eaton, 233 Mass. 351. 
364, 124 N.E. 37, 5 A.L.R. 1426; Commonwealth v. 
Andler. 247 Mass. 580, 582, 142 N.E. 921. 
FN1. That was a petition by a father to enjoin his 
divorced wife, who was given custody of their minor 
child, from doing anything to effectuate a change of the 
child's name. 
The question presented not only is one of fust 
impression in this Commonwealth but from a careful 
search of the authorities does not appear to have been 
passed on elsewhere. There are several decisions 
dealing with the right of one spouse to change the 
surname of a minor child in the face of opposition of 
the other spouse, but these cases have arisen either 
under a statute expressly empowering the court to grant 
such relief or as incidental to divorce proceedings. 
*520 See Clinton v. Morrow, 220 Ark. 377. 247 
S.W.2d 1015; Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 114 A.2d 
203; Carnier v. Racivitch, 216 La. 241; Matter of 
Epstein. 121 Misc. 151, 200 N.Y.S. 897; Application 
of Wittlin, City Ct, 61 N.Y.S.2d 726; Matter of 
Almosmno, 204 Misc. 53, 122 N.Y.S.2d 277; Id., 204 
Misc. 57, 122 N.Y.S.2d 277; Kay v. Kay, Ohio 
Com.Pl., 112 N.E.2d 562; Rounick's Petition. Com.PL 
47 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 71. In some of these cases the 
petition to change the name of the minor child was 
granted and in others it was denied. But none is 
authority for the proposition that one spouse may 
invoke the aid of a court of equity to prevent the other 
from registering the child in school under a surname 
different from that of the complaining spouse or from 
representing that the child's name is different. 
[3] We are of opinion that the relief sought by the 
plaintiff here is one that a court of equity ought to grant 
in appropriate instances. The old notion that equity 
will protect only property rights, which stems from a 
dictum of Lord Eldon in Gee v Pritchard. 2 Swanst 
402. was repudiated by this court recently in Kenyou \ 
Chicopee, 320 Mass."528. 532. 70 N.E.2d 241. 175 
A.L.R 430. There it was said in 320 Mass. at page 
534. 70 N.E.2d at page 244. 'We believe the true rule 
to be that equity will protect personal rights by 
injunction upon the same conditions upon which it will 
protect property rights by injunction lu general, these 
conditions are. that unless relief is granted a substantial 
right of the plaintiff will be impaued to a material 
degree; that the remedy at law is inadequate; and that 
injunctive relief can be applied with practical success 
and without imposing an impossible burden on the 
court or bringing its processes into disrepute.' Tested 
by these principles the present case, we think, is one 
where the aid of a court of equity may properly be 
invoked. 
[4][5] Previously this court has said that at common 
law a person could change his name at will, without 
resort to legal proceedings, by merely adopting another 
name, provided that this was done for an honest 
purpose. Petitioner of Merolevitz, 320 Mass. 448, 450. 
70 N.E.2d 249. The statute regulating the changing of 
name. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 210, § 12. does not restrict 
*521 a person's choice of name but aids him in 
securing an official record which definitely and 
specifically establishes his change of name. Petitioner 
of Buyarsky, 322 Mass. 335, 338. 77 N.E.2d 216. 
In the present case no court action seeking to change 
the children's surname has been brought; rather then 
mother has attempted by her own act to have the 
children of her first marriage adopt the surname of 
then stepfather. It does not follow that because one 
may adopt any name he may choose, so long as such 
change is not made for fraudulent purposes. Petitioner 
of Merolevitz, 320 Mass. 448, 70 N.E.2d 249, a parent 
ma>' select for a child a name different from that b\ 
which such child is known. Kay v. Bell. 95 Ohio App 
520. 525, 121 N.E.2d 206. It does not appear here that 
the plaintiffs children have ever consented to being 
called Kahn. However, in view of their ages then 
consent would not necessarily be decisive. Until they 
reach an age **762 when they are capable of making 
an intelligent choice in the matter of their name they 
ought not to have another name foisted upon them 
which they may later reject. Prior to that time one in 
the plaintiffs position ought to have the right to be 
heard to prevent a change or use of a name different 
(Cite as: 333 Mass. 517, *521, 131 N.E.2d 758, **762) 
from that of their birth. The bond between a father and 
his children in circumstances like the present is tenuous 
at best and if their name is changed that bond may be 
weakened if not destroyed. We recognize (hat here the 
defendant niay not have effected an actual change of 
the children's name but by registering them at school 
under the name of Kahn she has gone far in that 
direction. We perceive no insuperable difficulties in 
enforcing decrees granting injunctive relief in cases of 
this sort. 
[6][7][8| In the cases cited above dealing with change 
of names of children either under statutes or as 
incidental to divorce proceedings the following factors 
have been deemed to be relevant. When a father 
supports a child, and manifests a continuing interest in 
his welfare, and without unreasonable delay objects to 
an attempted change of name, the court must decide the 
issue by determining what is for the child's best 
interest.' Kay v. Kay, Ohio Com.PL, 112 N.E.2d 562. 
A change of name may not be in the child's best *522 
interest if the effect of such change is to contribute to 
the further estrangement of the child from a father who 
exhibits a desire to preserve the parentai relationship. 
Rounick's Petition, Com.PL, 47 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 71. 
Undoubtedly there are instances when an informal 
change to the surname of a stepfather would be in the 
best interests of the child. A father who completely 
abandons a child, or is indifferent to a child's welfare or 
has by his serious misconduct caused the child 
embarrassment, can by his actions lose the right to 
successfully protest the child's change of name. See 
Rounick's Petition. Com.PL, 47 Pa.Dist. & Co. R. 71; 
Matter of Almosnino, 204 Misc. 53, 122 N.Y.S.2d 
277. Id., 204 Misc. 57, 122 N.Y.S.2d 277. There may 
be other factors, but these are the ones likely to be 
decisive in most cases. 
decision of the judge below He found that The use by 
the Mark children, at the insistence of the defendants, 
of the surname Kahn * * * [was] motivated by a spirit 
of hostility on (fie part of the defendants toward * * * 
[the father)' It is doubtful whether this finding is 
supported by the evidence |FN2] But be that as it 
may, there are lacking here sufficient findings to 
support the decree below. On the crucial and 
controlling issue whether the use of the name Kahn was 
for the best welfare of the children the findings tell us 
little. Conceivably the trial judge had that 
consideration in mind but his decision appears to have 
been based on the defendants' motive rather than what 
was best for the children. 'Where the facts on which 
the rights of the parties depend have not been 
ascertained at the trial it is witlnn the power of the 
count, in its discretion and of it own motion, to 
recommit the cause for retrial.' DeVeer v. Pierson, 222 
Mass. 167. *523 175, 110 NJE. 154, 157. Smith v. 
Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 585, 593-594, 121 N.E.2d 
707, and cases cited 
FN2. All that the evidence shows on this issue is that on 
two occasions the plaintiff talked to Mrs. Kahn over the 
telephone protesting her action. On the first occasion 
she told the plaintiff that he would have to discuss the 
matter with her husband. On the second occasion Mrs. 
Kahn broke off the conversation by hanging up the 
telephone. On another occasion the plaintiff had a 
telephone conversation with Mr. Kahn in which he told 
Kahn that he had no right to change the name of his 
children. Kahn said that his lawyer told him that he 
could and that ^hat is the way it was and that is the way 
it was going to continue.' 
Accordingly the decree must be reversed and the case 
is to be further heard in conformity with this opinion 
So ordered. 
[9][10] With these principles in mind we turn to the END OF DOCUMENT 
(Cite as: 230 Miss. 719, 93 So.2d 822) 
V.F.MARSHALL, Jr. 
v. 
Jerry Allen MARSHALL, a Minor, by Mother and 
Next Friend, Mrs. Juanita Reeves. 
No. 40451. 
Supreme Court of Mississippi. 
April 1, 1957. 
Proceeding on application of eleven year old minor by 
his mother as next friend to change his surname from 
that of his father from whom mother had been divorced 
to that of mother's husband in whose household minor 
lived. From a decree of the Chancery Court, Hinds 
Count}, S. V. Robertson, Jr., Chancellor, granting the 
change, father appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., 
held that it was error, under the circumstances, for 
chancellor to grant the change of name over objection 
of father who had shared custody of minor until he 
moved from state and who continued to make 
payments for support and to display his affection for 
the minor. 
Reversed and judgment rendered. 
[1J NAMES<®=> 20 
2 6 9 ^ 2 0 
At common law7, any person of mature years may 
voluntarily change his name, without necessity of 
statute, provided change is not for fraudulent purpose 
and does not interfere with rights of others. 
[2] NAMES<®=> 20 
269<S=>20 
In proceeding on application of 11 year old minor by 
his mother as next friend to change his surname from 
that of his father from whom mother had been divorced 
to that of mother's husband in whose household the 
minor lived, it was error, under the circumstances, for 
chancellor to grant the change of name over objection 
of father who had shared custody of minor until he had 
moved from state and who continued to make support 
payments and to display his affection for the minor. 
**823 *720 Colin" L. Stockdale, Jackson, for 
appellant. 
Paul G. Alexander, Jackson, for appellee. 
*721 HALL. Justice. 
Jerry Allen Marshall is a minor of the age of 11 years 
and is a son of the appellant and Mrs Juanita Reeves, 
who was formerly Mrs. Juanita Marshall The parents 
were divorced by decree of the Chancery Court of 
Hinds Count}, Mississippi, on December 3. 1947. at 
which time both parents were residing in Hinds 
Count}'. In the divorce decree provision was made 
dividing the custody of the minor child between the 
parents and directing the father to pay to the mother the 
sum of $25 per month for the support and maintenance 
of the child. In the decree the court retained jurisdiction 
pertaining to the custody and maintenance of the child. 
The decree was modified on May 27. 1950, to the 
extent that the mother was granted the custody of the 
child because the father had moved out of the State of 
Mississippi, but the decree continued in effect the 
amounts to be paid by the father for maintenance of the 
child, and gave to the father the right of reasonable 
visitation with the child. 
On July 15, 1950, the mother married William 
Maxwell Reeves and they have continued to reside in 
Hinds County. The father, because of his occupation, 
later moved to Newr Orleans, Louisiana, and about 
three years ago moved to Detroit, Michigan, where he 
is employed as a radio and television newscaster. He, 
too, has remarried and both the father and mother are 
shown by the evidence to be happily married and 
mamtaining homes in apparently good circumstances. 
On May 7, 1956, the mother, both individually and as 
next friend for the minor, filed a petition in the 
Chancery Court of Hinds Count} under Section 
1269-01, Code of 1942, asking that the minor's name 
be changed from *722 Jerry Allen Marshall to Jerry 
Allen Reeves. On the same day, without notice to the 
father of the child, the chancellor entered a decree 
granting this change, but, dunng the same term of 
court, the chancellor ten days later rescinded the said 
decree and directed the issuance of process by 
publication for the father of the child Upon receipt of 
this process the father employed an attorney and 
resisted the application for change of the child's name. 
The matter came on for hearing on August 10, 1956, 
on which date the chancellor entered a decree changing 
the child's name, and from that decree the father 
appeals. 
V.1 >0 . / a 7SLL 
(Cite as: 230 Miss. 719, *722, 93 So.2d 822, **823) 
At the hearing three witnesses testified in favor of the 
petition. The minor child said that he has lived with his 
mother all his life and with his stepfather ever since he 
and the mother were married. He said **824 that the 
only tune he has ever used the name Jerry Allen 
Reeves was on an occasion when he attended a 
Y.M.C.A. camp. He also said that he sees his father 
about twice a year, the father making trips from 
Michigan back to Mississippi in order to see and visit 
with his son. The child also said that as long as the 
father was living in Hinds County he came to see him 
regularly, and that since he has been in Michigan he 
writes to the child about once a week, and in addition 
occasionally calls him up and talks to him over long 
distance telephone. He also said that his father sends 
him presents and does all in his power to keep as 
closely in contact with him as he can. His testimony is 
that he loves both his father and his mother and his 
stepfather. 
Mrs. Reeves testified that for sometime after the 
divorce decree was entered the father did not contribute 
much to the support of the child, but she admitted that 
in order to catch up with the delinquencies the father 
has been sending her double payments each month 
since he became profitably employed. She also testified 
that the *723 father has been making trips to Hinds 
County to see and visit with the child and that she has 
never refused to let him see the child. She admitted 
that the father has regularly sent presents to the child 
and said that by so doing he has ruined two or three 
Christmases for her because the presents would arrive 
just before Christmas and the boy wouldn't then be 
interested in the Santa Claus which she was providing 
for him. She said that the commencement of this 
proceeding was at the instance of the child. 
Mr. Reeves testified that he was very much agreeable 
to the change in name and that he has not tried to 
influence the boy in the filing of the petition and further 
that he has never denied Mr. Marshall permission to 
see Jerry at any time; that there is no friction between 
them and that he has always tried to be kind to Mr 
Marshall. 
Mr. Marshall testified that he has been living in 
Michigan for about three years, immediately prior to 
which he was living in Louisiana, and before that time 
he was in Mississippi. He said that he has never 
abandoned his child or done anything to show an 
indifference toward his welfare; that after the divorce 
and as long as he remained in Mississippi he visited the 
child every few days and further that he also saw him 
when he was living in Louisiana I Ie mentioned that he 
has done what he could for the child from a monetary 
standpoint; that when he was living here he got behind 
with his payments and that he has been making double 
payments in order to catch up with them. He testified 
that when he was down here he tried to get the boy to 
visit hrm in Michigan but that his mother and stepfather 
said that he didn't want to. Mrs. Reeves herself said 
that she was unwilling for the boy to visit his father in 
Michigan and gave as her reason that it was too far 
away. Mr. Marshall also testified that before 
Christmas 1953 Mrs. Reeves wrote him not to send the 
boy anything because it *724 spoiled her Christmas, 
but he bought the presents any way and wrote her 
saying that he would be here Christmas to bring them 
and she wrote back that she was taking the boy out of 
town. He also testified that a number of times before 
he went to Michigan he would write and ask to see his 
son and that Mrs. Reeves would say it wasn't 
convenient. He said that he has been denied the right 
to see his son a number of times and also that he was 
denied this privilege one Christmas. 
The briefs in this case for both parties do not cite a 
single authority in point and evidently counsel did not 
cite anything to the court below. We have therefore 
had to make an investigation of the law ourselves. In 
65 C.J.S., under the subject of Names, § 1 1 , there is a 
subparagraph beginning near the bottom of page 21 
and continuing onto page 22 which discusses the 
question of a change in the name of an infant. That 
subparagraph says in part: 'Change of **825 name of 
infant. An application to change the name of an infant 
should be granted only where to do so is clearly in the 
best interest of the child. Ordinarily a change of the 
name of a minor child of divorced parents should not 
be granted where it might contribute to the 
estrangement of the child from its father who has 
shown a desire to preserve the parental relationship, 
but such an application has been granted where the 
father is shown to have been indiffemet to the son's 
material welfare over a period of years and he is, in 
reality, a stranger and unknown to him 
In the case of Kay v. Kay, Ohio Com.PL 112 N.E.2d 
562. 567, the court said: There are times when an 
informal change to the surname of the mother's second 
(Cite as: 230 Miss. 719, *724, 93 So.2d 822, **825) 
husband may be desirable, as when the child's father 
indulges in improper conduct, fails to support. 
abandons the child, is presently, and in the past has 
been, indifferent to its welfare, and does not raise a 
timely objection to the *725 change of name. On the 
other hand when the father is supporting the child, 
manifests an abiding interest in the child, and, without 
delay, by a proper pleading in court objects to a change 
of name, then the court must decide the issue with a 
view to what is the best interest of the child.' After 
stating the above rule on page 567, the court quoted the 
above quotation from 65 C.J.S., Names, §11, and then 
said: 
'Applying the above principles to the facts in this 
case, as brought out by the testimony, the court 
concludes that the welfare of the child at this time 
does not call for a change of name from that of his 
father to the surname of the mother's second husband 
in whose home the child is now being raised. He is 
too young to be capable of making a choice of name 
for himself. At the age of seven years, or in his 
youth, he is not likely to be embarrassed or bothered 
by the fact that his name is different from that of his 
mother and her husband. While he has been entered 
in school for one year under the surname 'Crawford', 
if he resumes his father's name 'Kay' at the beginning 
of the next school year the change will hardly be 
noticed and should cause no long-lasting confusion. If 
right attitudes are suggested by adults, and no 
stumbling blocks are placed in its way by those about 
them, a child develops normally and free from 
frustrations. So it should be on both sides of this 
child's family. 
'The child's father, while far removed from physical 
contact with his son because of his employment, is 
supporting the child regularly. There is no testimony 
that he is not interested in the child or that he does not 
have paternal affection for him. He has professed a 
strong desire to have the child bear his name, and 
without undue delay after the child had been 
registered in school under a different name he raised 
objection in this court. 
'From time immemorial it has been the custom for 
male children to bear the family name of their father 
*726 throughout life The paternity of a child cannot 
be changed. Under the circumstances here presented 
the Court cannot say that the name of the child should 
be changed. If, when the boy fully appreciates the 
circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for 
himself, he chooses to bear the surname of someone 
other than his father ho may do so. The Court is 
convinced that ui the meantime it would not 
contribute to the boy's welfare to permit interference 
with the usual custom of succession to the paternal 
surname, or to foster any unnatural barrier between 
the father and son ' 
In the case of Application of Wittlin, City Ct.. 61 
N.Y.S.2d 726, the Court said: 
'This is an application made by the mother of the 
infant, Arthur Christian Klevenz, for an order 
granting leave to the said infant to assume the name 
**826 of Arthur Klevenz Wittlin. The infant joins in 
the application. The boy is sixteen and a half years of 
age and resides with his mother, Sophie Wittlin, the 
petitioner herein That the rights of the infant might 
be properly safeguarded, the Court conducted a 
hearing and formal proof has been adduced with 
respect to the subject matter of this petition. 
The infant and his sister, Mildred, are the issue of the 
marriage of Arthur J Klevenz and the petitioner, 
Sophie Wittlin The sister is now married and 
residing with her mother and stepfather. The boy was 
born on August 10. 1929. The parents separated on 
June 7, 1933, when he was barely four years of age. 
Subsequently the mother sought a divorce in the State 
of New Jersey On March 31, 1942, in an 
uncontested proceeding, a decree of divorce was 
granted for abandonment. About a week later on 
April 6, 1942. the mother married her present 
husband, Solomon Wittlin. During the entire period 
of the separation and up to and including the present 
moment the father has continued to see the children 
and *727 has made some contribution to their 
support and maintenance. The family appears to 
have made an unusually favorable adjustment. The 
mother is happily remarried. The boy is, well taken 
care of in his present home. He evinces strong 
feeling of regard for his stepfather. He is completing 
his work in a high school and is looking forward to 
continuing his education with a view towards 
ultimately becoming a commercial artist. The Court 
is satisfied that his mother and stepfather, as well as 
his natural father, are desirous to, and will continue 
to, be of reasonable assistance in the furtherance of 
the boy's education and in making necessary 
provision for him Despite the long estangement of 
the parents and the remarriage on the part of the 
mother, the natural bonds of love and affection 
between the boy and his father survive. There are 
(Cite as: 230 Miss. 719, *727, 93 So.2d 822, **826) 
regular periods of visitation and the relations of the 
boy and the father show evidences of camaraderie. 
No rancor seems to exist between the father and the 
mother and it is obvious to the Court that all sides 
have made even' reasonable effort to salvage as much 
as possible of the remnants of the family relationship. 
This application is now made for permission to 
assume the name of the stepfather in place of that of 
the natural father. The sole basis for the application 
is the embarrassment flowing from the dual name in 
the household and the necessity of explanation 
therefor. This situation is the ordinary and 
foreseeable consequence of broken homes and the 
children as usual are the innocent victims of the strife. 
It does not, however, follow that in every case where 
there is divorce and remarriage that it is in the best 
interest of the children that the name of the mother's 
new husband be taken. Rather will it seem to be the 
duty of the Court to make such determination as will 
best serve the interest of the infant under all the 
surrounding circumstances. In this proceeding there 
*728 seems to be no factor creating undue or unusual 
embarrassment. The future welfare of the child in his 
relation to the present household will not be affected 
by a denial of this application. The stepfather does 
not urge nor has he inspired the application. The 
application has its origin primarily in the desire of the 
mother that her son assume the name of her present 
husband. It has been joined in by the son in his 
natural desire to please his mother and to save 
embarrassment for her and for himself. The natural 
father on the other hand is faced with the prospect of 
the abandonment of his name by his son despite 
**827 the fact that he has constantly maintained 
parental association and has been constant in making 
provision for support within his means, even though 
such contributions have been relatively meager. 
'In the opinion of the Court it would be most 
unfortunate to do anything to further impair the 
altogether too slender bonds which now hold this 
family together. This father has lost the guardianship 
of his children. It will be time enough for them to 
abandon his name when they are free to arrive at a 
determination uninfluenced by conflicting pressures. 
While an infant sixteen years of age or over has a 
right to petition the Court for change of name, the 
Court nevertheless stands in locus parentis with 
respect to such infant and may grant such application 
only where to do so would clearly be in the best 
interest of the child The child should not be 
subjected to the conflicting pressures of competitive 
loyalties where no real purpose will be served, and 
substantial harm may result of the satisfactory 
relations now enjoyed in even direction Where a 
parent has abandoned his children or fails to visit 
them for protracted periods of time or contribute to 
their support, where continued use of a name may 
bring shame and disgrace, where the physical welfare 
of the child may be adversely affected by a denial of 
the application or *729 substantial property rights are 
involved, the Court would have no difficulty in 
permitting the change of name in the best interest of 
the infant. In this case the application rests on most 
tenuous grounds and to grant it may destroy the 
relationship between this child and his natural father. 
This the Court feels is not justified by any of the 
existing circumstances. The application is 
accordingly denied' 
To the same effect are the cases of In re Epstein, 121 
Misc. 151, 200 N.Y.S. 897; and Petition of Rounick, 
47Pa.Dist.&Co.R.71. 
[1J[2] We fully realize and appreciate the fact that at 
common law any person of mature years can 
voluntarily change his name without the necessity of a 
statute such as we have in Mississippi, provided the 
change is not for a fraudulent purpose and does not 
interfere with the rights of others. That rule is 
recognized in the same section of C.J. S. from which we 
have quoted above and a full and interesting discussion 
thereof is found in the case of Smith v. Umted States 
Casualty Co., 197 NY. 420, 90 N.E. 947, 26 
L.R.A.,N.S., 1167, 18 Ann.Cas. 701. That case 
however has no application to the case at bar and it is 
our conclusion that the authorities which we have 
above cited conclusively establish the fact that the 
chancellor was not justified in changing this child's 
name from that of his father to that of his stepfather, 
and the decree of the lower court will therefore be 
reversed and a decree here entered to the effect that the 
child shall continue to be known as Jerry Allen 
Marshall. Of course when he reaches his majority 
there is no reason why he can not change his name to 
anything he desires. We are here dealing strictly with 
the change in the name of a minor. 
Reversed and judgment here. 
ROBERDS, P. J., and ARRINGTON, ETHRIDGE 
(Cite as: 230 Miss. 719, *729, 93 So.2d 822, **827) 
and GILLESPIE, JJ., concur. 
ENI) OF DOCUMENT 
(Cite as: 282 A.2d 539) 
Muriel Pressman NELLIS, Appellant, 
H '• '-* 
No. 5911. 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 
Argued Aug. 17, 1971 
Decided Oct. 20, 1971. 
Custody proceedings in which the Superior Court of 
the District of Columbia, Joseph M. F. Ryan, Jr., J., 
entered order enjoining the mother from causing the 
children to be known by any surname other than that of 
then father, and their mother appealed. The Court of 
Appeals. Gallagher, J., held that injunction should not 
issue to require divorced and remarried mother who 
had custody of 16-year-old boy and 13-year-old girl 
who for more than 5 years had been using the same 
surname as then remarried mother to take all available 
steps to cause children to be known in school and 
elsewhere by their father's surname, in view of the 
realities of the situation and the views of the children 
who had good relations with their father who had not 
raised serious objection as to use of remarried mother's 
new surname until the trial. 
Reversed with instructions to vacate injunction. 
Reilly. J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
D I V O R C E R 313.1 
134<®=>313.1 
Formerly 134k313 
Injunction should not issue to require divorced and 
remarried mother who had custody of 16-year-old boy 
and 13-year-old girl who for more than 5 years had 
been using the same surname as their remarried mother 
to take all available steps to cause children to be known 
in school and elsewhere by their father's surname, in 
view of the realities of the situation and the views of 
the children who had good relations with their father 
who had not raised serious objection as to use of 
remained mother's new surname until the trial. 
*539 Jean M. Boardman. Washington, D. C, for 
appellant 
Philip Shinberg, Washington D. C, for appellee. 
Before KERN. GALLAGHER and REILLY. 
Associate Judges. 
(iALLAGHER. Associate Judge: 
Appellant. Mrs. Muriel Pressman Nellis. seeks 
reversal of an injunction ordering her to refrain from 
causing her children. Amy and Adam, to be known by 
any surname other than then father's, Mr. Howard 
Pressman (appellee). The facts are length) and 
complicated and require a rather full recital. 
Mrs. Nellis was married to Mr. Pressman on March 
25. 1951 During this marriage, which ended in 
divorce on October 18. 1964, two children were bora. 
Adam is now 16 years old,[FNl] and his sister. Amy, 
is now about 13 and a half. [FN2] Shortly after the 
divorce, Mrs Nellis married her present husband, Mr. 
Joseph Nellis. and since then she and the children have 
resided with hini in the District of Columbia. The 
father. Mr. Pressman, resides in Chester, Pennsylvania. 
FN1. He was born on October 8, 1955. 
FN2. She was born on April 20, 1958. 
In the fall of 1965 or 1966, Mrs. Nellis, without 
notifying Mr. Pressman and because Adam often told 
her of discomfort because his name was different from 
the Nellis family, enrolled the children in school with 
Adams assent under her new surname. For the last 
five or six years Amy and Adam have continuously 
used the surname Nellis, except when visiting their 
natural father at his residence in Pennsylvania where 
they are known as Pressman. The earliest indication of 
an aw areness by Mr. Pressman of the change in name 
is a letter *540 he wrote to Mrs. Nellis' attorney is 
Pennsylvania on October 31, 1967, concerning 
visitation rights in which he complained about 
'changing my children's names in school to Nellis.' 
On June 20, 1968, Mr. Pressman filed a suit for 
custody of the children. Subsequently, his complaint 
was amended to withdraw the custody demand and to 
request rnerery a final settlement of visitation rights; 
but no claim concerning the proper surname of the 
children was raised until the complaint was orally 
amended to include the issue at the beginning of the 
trial in June of 1970. 
(Citcas:282A.2d539,*540) 
Neither child knew their name was an issue m the trial 
though both children participated in it and were 
questioned about the change in names. The court 
issued a judgment which, as well as fixing visitation 
rights, enjoined Mrs. Neliis from using, or allowing to 
be used, in any manner or circumstance whatsoever, 
any names for said minor children other than 'Adam 
Jay Pressman' for the male child and 'Amy Ellen 
Pressman' for the female child.' Mrs. Neliis received 
from the trial court a retrial on the issue of the 
children's surname, but applications by the children to 
intervene, filed by Mrs. Neliis as next friend, were 
denied. 
The retrial took place in April 1971, with all interested 
parties and three expert witnesses testifying. Much of 
the testimony at the retrial centered on Adam's reaction 
to the order requiring that his mother effect a return to 
the name Pressman. 
Since neither Adam nor Amy had been informed that 
their name was an issue at the original trial in June, 
Adam testified he was surprised as he read a copy of 
the trial court's opinion and order enjoining use of the 
name (he first saw the order on the weekend of his 15th 
birthday). His reaction was strongly adverse. During 
the next few days he had long telephone conversations 
with his father at his home in Pennsylvania concerning 
the injunction. They further discussed the question 
when Adam visited his father at Thanksgiving but did 
not arrive at any agreement. His opposition to a return 
to the name Pressman remained constant during the 
winter, and at the retrial he expressed an intense desire 
to retain his name as Neliis. 
Adam said he has a deep interest in retaining his name 
as it is while his name is of little tangible benefit or 
detriment to his father. He had lived as Neliis so many 
years that to revert now to the Pressman surname 
would present grave problems for him and would cause 
him 'pain and anguish.' It seemed to him that his father 
was asking for a sacrifice which w ould result in little of 
appreciable significance for his father. He said that 
prior to the court order his relations w ith his father had 
been good-he loved him and enjoyed visiting him-but 
now he felt differently. He was afraid that if forced to 
return to the name Pressman he would not be able to 
develop any relationship with his father, and that he 
'might just stop going to visit him [FN3] 
FN3. In an affidavit for Mrs Neliis on August 12 
accompanying a motion to stay it is stated that Adam 
has refused to visit his father this summer despite the 
court order granting Mr Pressman custody of the 
children for the months of July and August. Mr. 
Pressman declined to exercise his right and force Adam 
to visit him. 
A child psychiatrist appearing for appellant supported 
Adam's opinion that he would be harmed by returning 
to the name Pressman According to the expert 
testimony, Adam's motives for so strongly opposing 
Mr. Pressman go well beyond any mere inconvenience 
in explaining the change to friends Rather. Adam now 
feels himself to be a Neliis because for five or six years 
during the critical and formative development of the 
adolescent he has grown up in the community as Neliis. 
Due to good family training, 
* * * (the children) made the best of the situation they 
have been in * * *. This is what they know. This is 
what they have put into it They have made *541 
their adaptations, and this is Adam right now. So, 
that, when you try to change his name, in my opinion, 
it's symbolic of trying to break him. He's a mature 
boy for his age of 15 and he is further along in this 
process. 
If this happened in other years, earlier. I would say 
probably his feelings would be different. But, now, 
his feeling toward his father is very troubled, because 
he would like his father to know that this is him now, 
and he would hope his father would want the 
relationship, the affection and respect, above a name 
change, because to the boy this is tied up with who he 
is. (Tr. at 255- 56.) 
In opposing the children's return to the Pressman 
surname, Mrs. Neliis stressed the same factors of self-
identity and relations with others which were brought 
out in the psychiatrist's testimony. She especially 
feared the effect that 'dislocation' might have on Adam 
at a point in his life where he was 'trying very hard to 
find a real place for himself in society, and aspiring to 
be something and to be someone ' 
Although Amy was not as strenuously opposed to 
returning to the name Pressman as her brother, that is, 
she did not anticipate severing her relations with her 
father if she is required to use his surname, she did 
define her strong desire to retam her present status as 
Amy Neliis. She articulated her conviction that her 
best interest lay in maintaing the status quo and 
(Citeas:282A.2d539,*541) 
maintained this position during searching cross-
examination. 
Mr. Pressman testified that the children's use of his 
surname was critical to the maintenance of a sound and 
durable relationship between himself and his children 
He said it is not natural for children to earn' their 
mother's name, fie believed that the children were 
living in a 'dream world' in which they were or would 
in the future be embarrassed to even introduce then 
natural father to their friends. He felt that Adams 
present hostility toward him because of the court order 
requiring a change back to the name Pressman can be 
altered by the enforcement of the injunction, though 
this means 'compulsion.' 
In support of his position was a psychiatrist who 
testified children are better off, generally, in having 
their natural parent's name; that use of the surname 
Pressman was important to the children's relationship 
with their real father; that continued use of Nelks 
would, in effect, be a hiding from a reality which 
should be faced and dealt with; and that being an 
adolescent it is a good time to make the transition. 
The trial court issued an order which once again 
enjoined appellant from causing the children to be 
known by any surname other than their natural father's 
We may say at the outset it is difficult to avoid the 
comment that this is an issue which it would have been 
more desirable to resolve, or at least attempt to resolve, 
without injecting it into a judicial proceeding. It would 
have been better if the mother had consulted with the 
father about the problem brought to her by her son 
before causing the name changes to occur in the lives 
of the children. On the other hand, it would have been 
better if the father had tackled the problem directly 
when he first became aware of the name changes no 
later than October 31, 1967. Not only that, it would 
certainly have been better judgment on his part to have 
first discussed his objections with the children, and the 
mother, rather than raise it directly for the first tune 
five or more years later by way of an oral amendment 
to the complaint at the outset of the trial in this case 
Having said this, the fact remains that the issue is 
before us for resolution. We may say that in deciding 
this case we at no time give consideration to any error 
in judgment by either parent-which parent was right or 
wrong-lest this becloud the real issue of the true 
interests of the children Necessarily, though, the 
father's inaction for five years or more comes into play 
in assessing the fundamental issue, as we see it, but it is 
only in that context we consider it. We are aware of no 
appellate decision in *542 this jurisdiction on the 
problem involved, and counsel cite none. 
It may be well first to clear away some of the 
underbrush and say what this case is not about. It is 
not a case involving a petition to change the names of 
children under the statutory procedure and where no 
change has yet occurred in actuality. DC.Code 1967. 
ss 16-2501 to 16-2503 It is not a case where a name 
change in school records, etc.. has occurred and the 
father promptly upon learning it protests and seeks an 
injunction before the new name takes hold Mark v. 
Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956) Nor 
does it involve a name change of children of tender 
years who clearly are not in a position to understand the 
implications or to convey their wishes with the 
intelligence and comprehension necessary to give 
weight to their testimony Degerberg v. McCormick. 
41 Del.Ch. 46, 187 A.2d 436 (1963) And, 
importantly, as we will see, neither is it a case where it 
need be considered that if their names are changed 
away from the father's name 'the bond (with the father) 
may be weakened if not destroyed.' Mark v. Kahn, 
supra. 
The trial court posed the 'basic question' as being 
whether the 'substantial interest' of the children 
'require(s) a change of name or whether their 
complaints fall into the 'category of inconvenience or 
embarrassment." The ultimate findings of the court 
were that (a) the best interests of the children do not 
require that they be known by the name Nellis, and (b) 
their substantial interests do not require a change of 
name from that of their natural father as his haine is (1) 
'not positively deleterious' to the children and (2) the 
natural father has been guilty of uo misconduct 
justifying a forfeiture of his rights. 
The principal error of the trial court, and the one 
which we believe led to a misjudgment of what 
constituted the real issue in the case, was in viewing the 
fundamental question presented as whether there 
should be a name change from the fathers name 
(Pressman) to that of the stepfather and mother 
(Nellis). The actuality is that for all practical purposes 
the name changes took place at least five years ago. 
(Cite as: 282 A.2d 539, *542) 
realistically though not legally, and the problem here is 
whether another change back to the father's name 
should now take place It seems to us that in reaching a 
decision in the particular circumstances of this case it 
would be wrong not to recognize the reality that name 
changes previously occurred even though the statutory 
procedure (D.C.Code 1967, ss 16- 2501 to 16-2503) 
for change of name was not pursued and no court 
approval was obtained The fact is that in their daily 
lives then names have been Amy and Adam Nellis, and 
as the years went by this identity became more firmly 
imbedded in their minds and in the community where 
they live. 
In its opinion, the trial court relied upon Mark v. Kahn, 
333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956) and Ouellette 
v. Ouellette. 245 Or. 138. 420 P.2d 631 (1966). 
Mark, too. was a case of first impression and also 
involved an injunction sought by a natural father to 
prevent a divorced mother from registering their child 
in school in the name of the child's stepfather and 
mother. The court reversed an injunction and 
remanded the case for further proceedings because it 
concluded the trial court did not adequately consider 
the controlling issue of what was the best interest of the 
child but, rather, appeared to be unduly influenced by 
the motivation of the mother in seeking to effect the 
name change in school. [FN4] In so doing, the court 
laid down guidelines which we summarize: 
FN4. Similarly, we conclude the trial court here did not 
adequately consider what we find to be the controiing 
issues. We note that here, too, the trial court in its 
opinion evidenced some concern about the mother's 
motivation, though the best interests of the children are 
the real issue. 
(a) Children ought not to have another name foisted 
upon them until they reach an age when they are 
capable of making *543 an intelligent choice in the 
matter of a name. 
(b) The bond between a divorced father and his 
children is tenuous at best and if their name is 
changed the bond may be weakened if not destroyed; 
and the name under which a child is registered in 
school goes far to effect a name change. 
(c) When a father supports a child, manifests a 
continuing interest in him, is guilty of no serious 
misconduct and without unreasonable delay objects to 
an attempted change of name, the court should decide 
the issue by determining what is for the child's best 
interest 
(d) A change of name may not be in the child's best 
interest if the effect of such change is to contribute to 
a further estrangement of the child from a father who 
exhibits a desue to preserve the parental relationship 
Considered in then entirety', the court in Mark laid out 
essential tests going to 'the child's best interest' Mark 
v. Kahn, supra. 131 N.E.2d 758 at 762. 
We have no problem with those general guidelines 
But we do not read those considerations as requiring 
the issuance of the injunction here because of largely 
undisputed evidence in this case. Here, the boy 
(Adam) is 16 years old, is highly intelligent (upper 2 
percentile nationally), a member of the Key Club in his 
high school (civic and service organization) and has 
been invited to membership in Junior Achievement, a 
national arm of the Chamber of Commerce. His sister 
(Amy) is 13 years old and also very intelligent and 
mature for her age. She has been appointed to an 
Advisory and Film Evaluation Board on drug abuse as 
the only child representing her age group to that Board. 
Her function is to view films on drug abuse and from 
her age-group's standpoint evaluate them for the 
purposes of the relevance and credibility of the films 
for children. It would appear that in determining the 
best interests of the children, their views on their 
names are entitled to be weighed commensurately. 
Secondly, it is not seriously disputed that there was a 
good relationship between father and child during all 
the years of the name change and, more particularly as 
to the boy, until notified about the entry of the 
injunction in this proceeding. Additionally, the court in 
Mark recognized a significant problem if an 
unreasonable delay ensues before the father objects to 
the name change. 
The trial court also placed considerable reliance on 
Ouellette v. Ouellette, 245 Or. 138, 420 P.2d 631 
(1966). There, the trial court upon complaint of the 
divorced father issued a decree preventing the mother 
from changing the names of their three children (ages 
14, 13 and 9) from 'Ouellette' to 'O'Let/ On appeal, the 
court concluded appellant's position that (a) no change 
of name was involved but merely a change of spelling, 
(b) the new spelling was preferred by the children, and 
(c) the welfare of the children was furthered because 
(Cite as: 282 A.2d 539, *543) 
the new spelling was more convenient, was too lacking 
in substance to warrant consideration In so decidmg 
on those facts, the court stated that '(w)hcrc the father, 
as here, objects to a change in name and is guilt) of no 
inattention to the child or other misconduct so serious 
as to make it for the best interest of such child that his 
name be allowed to be altered, then the court should 
refuse to permit such change * * *.' Ouellette v. 
Ouellette, supra at 633. 
In the circumstances of Ouellette. we would agree with 
the court's decision but we do not read it as persuasive 
here due to material factual distinctions. The issue here 
is more complex if only because of the five or more 
year lapse without direct action by the father, during 
which the names of the two children became imbedded 
in their cornmunity as Nellis. 
On the other hand, in Bilenkin v. Bilenkin, 78 Ohio 
App. 481, 64 N.E.2d 84 (1945), *544 under 
circumstances quite similar to this case, the court 
declined to compel a mother to change a child's name 
on school rolls (and other places) back to the name of 
the divorced father. The court stated: 
The trial judge points out that this practice of 
registering the minor daughter of the parties in the 
name of Salesky had been followed from the time that 
the plaintiff had moved with her husband to then-
present residence. The home of the child is hundreds 
of miles removed from that of her father and it does 
not reasonably appear that he will be materially 
affected, one way or the other, by reason of the fact 
that his child there carries the name of Salesky. On 
the other hand, it may be very embarrassing and the 
source of some humiliation to the daughter if at this 
time the plaintiff should be required to no longer 
carry the daughter's name as heretofore known 
among her associates. Had the request been made of 
the Court when the facts first came to the attention of 
the defendant, it would present a different and more 
difficult question (78 Ohio App. at 484-485, 64 
N.E.2d at 85-86.) 
We do not consider Mark and Ouellette as being 
worthy of the weight apparently given them by the trial 
court. 
In our view. the issue is not as the trial court viewed it-
whether a name change to Nellis is required-because 
this is the name the} have been carrying for more than 
five years, and this without direct complaint by the 
father to the mother or children, and without 
meaningful action by him until the outset of the 
tnal.[FN5] 
FN5. In evaluating the evidence bearing upon the real 
issue, the views of the mother are also entitled to 
consideration. 
It is stated in the dissent that the father 'should not be 
blamed for the law's delay': and that the father should 
not be 'charged' with permitting the name Nellis to 
become imbedded because for four or live years he has 
been taking 'all feasible legal steps' to stop the practice. 
But, as we have said, this is not a case for blaming 
anyone. Otherwise, the true issue of the children's best 
interests could get lost and they might become pawns. 
The fact remains the only 'feasible legal step', that is. 
application for an injunction, was not taken until June 
of 1970 notwithstanding that the father learned of the 
usage of the name Nellis sometime before October 31, 
1967.[FN6] So there was no 'law's delay' actually 
involved. We do not take seriously in this context, as 
the dissent does, that the father at one time filed a 
complaint for custody of the children because (a) the 
father is the first to say the children have been very7 
well raised by the mother and stepfather, and (b) 
perhaps for this reason, the complaint for custody was 
withdrawn before trial. 
FN6. In his letter of October 31, 1967 to a coarbitrator 
selected by the father and mother to work out visitation 
rights, Mr. Pressman stated his views on the visitation 
problem and remarked in conclusion that changing his 
children's names in school was not in aid of a good 
relationship between the children and him. We do not 
view this as a 'feasible legal step ' 
We do not view this case as involving the traditional 
concept that the discretion of the trial court should not 
be disturbed unless an abuse of it is apparent. Rather, 
as we have said, the trial court has simply not evaluated 
the true problem in this novel case of first impression. 
In considering the real question posed, we believe that 
the record is sufficient to permit a final determination 
by this court of the issue rather than prolong this 
already protracted migafion.fFN7 J 
FN7. There have already been two trials and, especially 
in the second trial which solely concerned the name 
change, all parties have given complete testimony. In 
(Cite as: 282 A.2d 539, *544) 
addition, three expert witnesses ha\e testified. 
Under the special facts and circumstances of this case. 
we think an injunction should not be issued requrring 
the mother to take all available steps to cause the 
children to revert to the name Pressman. We say this 
because (a) the children have been known in this 
community for more than five *545 years as Nellis and 
had a good relationship with their father during those 
years, (b) their name and identity as Nellis have 
become imbedded in their own minds as well, (c) the 
likely impact on their lives of changing back again after 
all these years to the name Pressman, (d) the children's 
views are entitled to serious consideration because of 
their ages and level of intelligence, (e) the reality that 
the son is approaching the age (18) when he will be 
eligible to vote and, if necessary, serve in the armed 
forces and is therefore not far from the tune when his 
wishes on his name would be difficult to deny, (f) the 
effect the injunction has already had in their lives and 
on the relationship with their father, and (g) the father's 
physical remoteness from the communtiy where the 
children reside. 
We agree that, generally speaking, children should 
carry the name of their natural father unless there are 
countervailing considerations which outweigh this. If 
this were a case where an injunction had been issued 
before the name of Nellis had taken hold, we might 
well be disposed to a different result. But here the 
lapse of time was so long things had reached the stage 
where there was presented an individual social problem 
not adaptable to solution by an injunction Even 
though a court in equity may have jurisdiction, not 
every individual social problem presented to it should 
be considered subject to solution by judicial 
compulsion, and we think this is one now better left 
alone. We can only doubt that what the father 
apparently hoped to achieve by way of an injunction-
assurance of a good and lasting relationship with his 
children-is in the power of any court to give 
In vacating the injunction, we are hopeful that the 
father's forebodings on his future relationship with his 
children if he does not prevail will not prove true. It 
may well be that the father and children, having bared 
their souls, will have a warm reunion and become 
closer than ever. They all seem to have the character, 
feeling and intelligence to do so. 
Reversed with mstructions to vacate the injunction 
RBILLY, Associate Judge (dissenting). 
In my view, reversal of the trial court in this case 
cannot be reconciled with leadmg decisions of this 
court in domestic relations matters Until today, it had 
been our rule that unless the trial judge's findings of 
fact lacked evidentiary support or a clear abuse of 
discretion was shown, his decree should not be 
disturbed.[FN 1] Obviously this is not the situation 
here, for (1) the subsidiary factual findings of the trial 
judge are not challenged, and (2) the reasons for his 
ultimate conclusion are set forth in two learned and 
lucid opinions, amply supported by citations to judicial 
authority. 
FN1. Rutledge v. Harris, D.C.App.. 263 A.2d 256 
(1970), falls into the first category There, a decree 
awarding the custody of children to a father was based 
upon a finding that 'there is no evidence indicating that 
(he) is an unfit person.' That decree was indeed reversed 
by this court but on the ground that the record revealed 
'such factors as failure to support the children and 
previous parental indifference, possibly coupled with an 
ulterior motive to avoid support payments and gain the 
income from the social security payments * * *.' 
This court has repeatedly held that even on such major 
controversies as disputed custody of children, a trial 
judge's disposition of the competing claims of divorced 
parents should be permitted to stand even though a 
reviewing court, or other trial judges, on the same 
record might well have reached a different result 
Coles v. Coles, D.C.App., 204 A.2d 330 (1964). We 
strongly reaffirmed the principles enunciated m that 
opinion in a recent decision even though-in 
contradistinction to the case before us on appeal-no 
written findings were made by the trial judge. Dorsett 
v. Dorsett, D.C.App., 281 A.2d 290 (decided 
September 22, 1971.) 
Dorsett was also a case where the trial judge decided 
that the father should be the guardian of a child of 
tender years *546 despite a concession that the mother 
was not an unfit person and a general presumption that 
as between divorced parents the child is better off with 
the mother. In refusing to substitute our judgment for 
that of the trial court, we quoted with approval the 
observation of Chief Judge Hood in the Coles 
case.[FN2] 
(Cite as: 2X1 A,2d 539, *546) 
FN2 Id., 204 A.2d 330 at 331-332. 
Since what has been termed the classic decision on 
the subject, Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881). 
most jurisdictions, including this jurisdiction, have 
accepted Judge Brewer's pronouncement that in child 
custody cases: 'Above all things, the paramount 
consideration is, what will promote the welfare of the 
child9' This principle is easily stated but its 
application in a particular case presents one of the 
heaviest burdens that can be placed on a trial judge. 
Out of a maze of conflicting testimony, usually 
including what one court called 'a tolerable amount of 
perjury',' the judge must make a decision which will 
inevitably affect materially the future life of an 
innocent child. In making his decision the judge can 
obtain little help from precedents or general 
principles. Each case stands alone. After attempting 
to appraise and compare the personalities and 
capabilities of the two parents, the judge must 
endeavor to look into the future and decide that the 
child's best interests will be served if committed to 
the custody of the father or mother. He starts with the 
premise, as did the trial judge here, that the best 
interests of the child would be served by living in a 
united home with the affection, companionship and 
care of both father and mother, but that possibility 
has been eliminated before the case reaches judge. 
So, the question for him is what is best for the child 
within the limitations presented. When the judge 
makes his decision, he has no assurance that his 
decision is the right one. He can only hope that he is 
right. He realizes that another equally able and 
conscientious judge might have arrived at a different 
decision on the same evidence. (Footnote omitted.) 
In the instant case, the only matter raised on appeal 
concerns the surname to be used by children of 
divorced parents. Obviously such an issue pales in 
comparison with the problem posed to a trial judge by 
the selection of the particular divorced parent to whom 
the custody of a child should be entrusted. If the 
determination of such a question with all its serious and 
long range impact upon a child's future property rests 
at the discretion of the trial judge who has heard the 
testimony and appraised the character and personalities 
of the persons involved, it is difficult to justify the 
intrusion of an appellate body upon a trial judge's 
disposition of a relatively trivial question. 
Nevertheless, my colleagues hold that traditional 
deference in domestic relations cases to the judgment 
of the trial court is not warranted here because of an 
asserted failure on the part of the court below to 
evaluate the real issue This, we are told, is not the 
question of whether there should be a name change 
from Pressman (the father's name) to Nellis (the name 
of the second husband), but rather whether another 
change back to the father's name is requued. inasmuch 
as 'for all practical purposes' the children's surname 
was changed to Nellis at least live years ago 
Pointing to the leading case of Mark v. Kahn, 333 
Mass. 517. 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956) (where a divorced 
wife was being sued for registering her children at 
school under the name of her new husband), they say 
that the trial court erred in deeming this case a 
precedent because one of the guidelines laid down by 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court in that decision was 
that the father, who is supporting the child, is entitled to 
the kind of relief granted below if he 'without 
unreasonable delay objects to an attempted change of 
name' According to the majority, the guidelines of the 
Massachusetts case were disregarded *547 because the 
father here raised no timely objection until the name 
change had become 'embedded' by five years or more 
of usage. 
I cannot understand how this conclusion was reached 
for the record refutes any notion that appellee 
Pressman slept on his rights or was dilatory in any 
respect, once he learned the children were going under 
another name in Washington. Appellant never notified 
her former husband of the steps she had taken to bring 
about this situation and the record indicates that he was 
not aware of it until October 31, 1967. On that date he 
sent a letter to the lawyer who had negotiated the 
original custody agreement on behalf of the wife, 
w arning that he considered this action a breach of their 
agreement. [FN3] Not getting any satisfaction and 
being further aggrieved by what he deemed a denial of 
visitation rights, he then suspended making support 
payments directly to the wife, but deposited the money 
to the children's account in a Pnnsylvania bank. 
FN3. There can be little doubt that this letter was 
transmitted to the wife, for her own trial lawyer in this 
case produced it when the first husband was on the 
stand. 
(Cite as: 282 A.2d 539, *547) 
The impasse continued and on June 17. 1968 he 
brought an action in the Court of General Sessions 
asking that permanent custody of the children be 
awarded to him (R. 326. 334) In this posture of the 
case it was scarcely necessary to put the mother on 
notice again that he was protesting her discontinuance 
of the use of his name by the children, for if he had 
succeeded in obtaining custody of them he obviously 
would have remedied the matter himself. 
Thus it is incorrect to say that until the commencement 
of the trial on June 24. 1970 the surname issue was 
never directly raised. It was when the request for full 
custody was deleted from the complaint that the prayer 
was amended to request injunctive relief against the 
mother with respect to the name change. The lapse of 
an additional year and a half since that date has been 
entirely due to the success of the mother in obtaining a 
rehearing after the relief sought by the amended prayer 
was granted and the further tmie required to perfect her 
appeal. Except for a period of approximately a year 
when the application of the Nellis name to his children 
was unknown to him. the father, the mother has 
persisted in her course of action with full notice of her 
former husband's legal challenge to it. Obviously the 
father should not be blamed for the law's delay,[FN4] 
nor should he be charged with permitting the name 
Nellis to become embedded in the children's lives in 
the community for five years, when for four of those 
five years he has been taking all feasible legal steps to 
stop the practice. 
FN4. At oral argument, appellee's counsel said that it 
was through his own inadvertence and not Pressman's 
that injunctive relief against use of the Nellis name was 
not included in the 1968 complaint. But as the suit was 
one for custody, such a request would have been 
surplusage. 
Another guideline in Mark v Kahn, supra, is that the 
kind of father entitled to relief should be one 'who 
supports a child, manifests a continued interest in him, 
(and) is guilty of no serious misconduct * * * 
Certainly the plaintiff in this case meets these criteria. 
It is conceded that his standing in his own community 
is good and that since the divorce the children's 
holidays from school, and summer vacations, have 
been spent with him at his Pennsylvania home or his 
summer place in Atlantic City. So far as support is 
concerned, he has been more than generous. Having 
voluntarily entered into a post-divorce agreement to 
pay $100 a month per child, plus medical expenses, he 
has not appealed a decree of the lower court raising this 
amount to $400 monthly for the children and granting 
the wife $4,000 for legal expenses ui the custody suit 
The father is a man of moderate means; his total 
income before taxes being $20,600 in 1967, $15,600 
in 1968, and $25,600 in 1969 
*548 The majority opinion also seems to ignore 
another 'essential test going to the child's best interest' 
which was formulated in the Kahn case and 
summarized by the majority as follows:[FN5] 
FN5. Mark v. Kahn. supra at 762. 
Children ought not to have another name foisted upon 
them until they reach an age when they are capable of 
making an intelligent choice in the matter of a name. 
This is precisely what happened to the children here as 
a result of the mothers actions when they were only 
age ten and five, respectively. The record makes it 
clear that it was the divorced wife, and not the children, 
who conceived and carried out the program for letting 
the children be known to their Washington 
acquaintances as Nellis rather than as Pressman, 
despite her denials on cross-examination that she had 
encouraged the children to use their stepfather's 
name.[FN6] 
FN6. The trial court also found that 'she had caused the 
children to be enrolled in schools and camps and the son 
to receive his Bar Mitzvah in said surname'. R. 356. 
According to the son's testimony at the first hearing 
when he started to go to school in Washington (shortly 
after the mother's remarriage), his mother expressed 
resentment because schoolmates would call and say, 
'Mrs. Pressman, is Adam there?' She then suggested 
that he change his name to Adam Nellis,[FN7] thus 
avoiding the necessity of having to explain why his 
name and his mother's were different. Evidently the 
son was reluctant to go along, for he testified that the 
'first few times I said I didn't want to' and it was not 
until he 'thought about it a long time' that he 
acquiesced. | FN8] 
FN7. Excerpt from proceedings of June 25, 1970, 3-4. 
FN8. Id. 20. Obviously the ante litem motam testimony 
(Cite as: ZBZ A.ZQ ^JV, -^4») 
of the children at the first trial where neither was on 
notice of the surname controversy is a vastly more 
trustworthy guide to the facts and their attitudes than 
their subsequent testimony. 
In effectuating the daughter Amy's change of name, 
the mother's approach was eveu more direct. Amy's 
fust knowledge of the subject occurred when her 
teacher made such an announcement in the classroom 
of the school where Amy was a second grade pupil. 
She later learned that her mother had telephoned to say 
that she wanted her daughter's name changed. [FN9] 
Amy also testified that so far as she was personally 
concerned, the name by which she was called did not 
really matter. [FN 10] Also illustrative of the mother's 
attitude with respect to allowing the children to 
maintain ties with the father is the fact that on the eve 
of this litigation, Amy had to 'sneak out of the house' to 
post a letter to him.fFNll] On one occasion the 
mother attempted to find some pretext for cutting short 
the children's summer sojourn with him at Atlantic 
City, and on another occasion when the father was in 
Washington, she refused to let the children dine out 
with him.[FN 12] 
FN9. Id. 43^4. 
FN 10. As Amy's subsequent view of the matter is 
referred to in the opinion, the following excerpt from the 
transcript of the first trial is revealing (id. 44-45): 
Q Let me ask you this, Amy. If you had your own way 
about it and didn't have to do what somebody else told 
you to do, would you rather use the name Pressman than 
the name Nellis? 
A I dont really know. I don't think it really matters, but I 
dont think my name was changed legally. 
Q You don't think it was changed legally? 
A I don't know, but I don't remember anything 
happening. 
Q So you feel that your name is really still Pressman no 
matter what somebody might call you; is that right? 
q Yes. 
Q You don't mind it being Pressman? You dont mind 
being known as Pressman rather than Nellis? 
A No, sir. 
FN11. Id. 33-35, 53. 
FN12. Id. 2 4 - 2 5 , 4 6 , 26-28, 39. 
*549 Such incidents not only suggest an explanati< m 
of why Amy's attitude toward continued use of the 
Nellis surname shifted between the first and second 
trials, but also support the soundness of the trial court 
in applying to this case the Massachusetts doctrine that 
the 'bond between a father and his children in 
circumstances like the present is tenuous at best and if 
their name is changed that bond may be weakened if 
not destroyed*.[FN 13 ] 
FN13. Mark v. Kahn. supra at 762 
Moreover, some other aspects of the record persuade 
me that the trial judge's decision was correct. 
Disapproval of his decree places a premium upon the 
use of extra-legal methods with respect to name 
changes. For if the majority opinion is correct in 
stating that the name change of the children had already 
occurred (i. e., from Pressman to Nellis) before the 
case reached the lower court, it also follows that the 
person responsible for this fait accompli-the mother-
disregarded the only two methods prescribed by statute 
in this jurisdiction for acquiring a different surname. 
One method would have been for the mother as 
'parent, guardian or next friend' to have filed an 
application in the Superior Court on behalf of the 
infants involved setting forth the reasons for the desired 
name change as provided in DC.Code 1967, ss 
16-2501 to 16-2503 (Supp. IV, 1971). Another 
would have been for the stepfather, who is being held 
out in local circles as the natural father of the children, 
to have instituted adoption proceedings. DC.Code 
1967, s 16-301 ff., in which event the family name of 
the adoptees would have become that of the adopter 
under s 312(c) of that title. 
If either legal course of action had been followed, the 
real father would have been entitled to appear in 
opposition to such petitions. Thus the prospect of 
judicial approval for either type of petition might well 
have been slim. This does not strike me, however, as 
justifying a party before us to reap the reward of 
conduct which flies in the face of public policy as set 
forth in acts of Congress. 
Accordingly, I have some reservations about the 
majority insistence upon the total irrelevance to the 
issue of any consideration of which parent was at fault, 
although I agree with the view that in litigation of this 
sort, the welfare of the children is the paramount 
consideration. The written opinion of the trial judge, 
however, discloses that he was also guided by this very 
principle, for he expressly found that it was not 
necessary 'for the best interest of the children' that they 
should be allowed a different surname. 
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the only 
litigants in this case are the divorced husband and wife-
the children not being represented by a guardian ad 
litem or even a lawyer appointed to protect their 
interests. 
So far as the impact of the low er court's decision upon 
the children's interest is concerned, it is apparent that 
the finding that Amy 'would not be particularly 
disturbed should she be required to use her father's 
name' is fhlly supported by the record. It is true that 
the son, Adam, strong objects to the trial court's decree, 
but I am not persuaded that it is reversible error for a 
trial judge to reject the notion that the true interest of an 
adolescent of 15 is best served by letting him have his 
own way-particularly on an issue so important to 
proper filial attitudes as his present repudiation of the 
name of an affectionate father whose liberal financial 
support he seems quite willing to accept 
To be sure, his mother and the two professional 
witnesses retained by her predicted a calamitous effect 
on the boy unless the injunction were vacted. viz.. (1) 
that his relationship with his blood father would be 
jeopardized, and (2) that he would suffer a loss of 
identity which would cause him embarrassment among 
his contemporaries. *550 The sincerity of the first 
prediction-coming from the source it did-scarcely 
commands respect. Nor is the 'identity' consideration a 
compelling one. It assumes that it is desirable to 
continue letting the boy live in a world of illusion rather 
than accepting the real fact of his heredity 
END OF DOCUMENT 
(Cite as: 495 So.2d 277, *278) 
The evidence in this case is that the child's mother 
wants the child's surname changed but the child's father 
does not The father testified that he does not care 
what name the child uses of her own volition but 
doesn't want her forced or coerced to use the name 
"Waller". 
Mary Beth herself did not testify7 but several people 
testified about their discussions of this name-change 
with Mary Beth, including two very reputable and 
qualified psychologists. 
All of the evidence seems to indicate that Mary Beth is 
currently very disinterested (she said "bored") in all of 
the adult interest in her surname and somewhat puzzled 
by it. Apparently she uses the name "Waller" around 
Dade City and the name "Azzara" when she is with her 
father. It also appears clearly that she warmly loves 
her mother, her father and her step-father, and feels 
very secure in their love for her. She refers to both her 
father and her step-father as "Daddy" and when she 
feels it necessary to distinguish between them refers to 
her father as her "Daddy in New York" and her step-
father as her "Daddy here". 
One of the psychologists, Dr. Sidney Merin, testified 
that in his opinion the best interests of the child would 
be served by changing her name to "Waller". He also 
testified that it was his professional philosophy that all 
children should have the same name as the family they 
live with. He believes that children with a different 
name means something is wrong and therefore feel 
guilty. 
The other psychologist, Dr. Robert Kline, testified that 
in his opinion it would not be in the best interests of the 
child to change her name. In his opinion changing the 
child's name to Waller would cause estrangement from 
her natural father and would eliminate her current 
freedom to use either the name "Waller" or the name 
"Azzara" as she chooses. Dr. Kline believes that Mary 
Beth's discretion to use the surname of either "Waller" 
or "Azzara" should remain unfettered by either judicial 
pronouncement or parental pressure. In his opinion: 
"She knows that she has two names that represent the 
families she loves very much." 
Although not as authoritative as the pronouncement of 
the Third District Court of Appeal in Lazow, supra, the 
English playright [sic]. William Shakespeare more 
poetically discussed the value of a surname in his play 
Romeo and Juliet in scene two *279 of that play, he 
has Juliet Capulet say to Romeo Montague (Though 
she does not know that Romeo is listening): 
"() Romeo, Romeo' wherefore art thou Romeo9 
Deny thy father and refuse thy name; 
Or. if you wilt not. be but sworn my love. 
And I'll no longer be a Capulet 
"Tis but thy name that is my enemy: 
Thou art thyself, though not a Montague. 
What's Montague? It is nor hand, nor foot. 
Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part 
Belonging to a man O, be some other name! 
What's in a name? That which we call a rose 
By any other word would smell as sweet; 
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd. 
Retain that dear perfection which he owes 
Without that title, Romeo, doff thy name. 
And for thy name which is no part of thee 
Take all myself." 
However, although for young Man Beth and the 
fictional Juliet, surnames may be unimportant or even 
sometimes a nuisance, for adults surnames are an 
important part of identity. Dr. Merin seemed to believe 
that changing Mary Beth's surname now was of 
diminished importance because she is a girl and will 
change her name by marriage in a few years in any 
event. But Mrs. Waller belied the diminished 
importance of surnames to girls when she testified-
with justifiable pride-that her name is "Jane Huckaby 
Waller". Furthermore, not all modern girls adopt the 
name of their husband when they marry7. 
Therefore, after careful consideration of the evidence, 
this Court finds that the evidence does not establish that 
a change of Mary Beth's surname is necessitated by the 
welfare of the child. Nor does this Court find any 
justification to enjoin Mrs. Waller from requiring or 
persuading Mary Beth to use the surname "Waller" It 
appears that Mrs Waller wants Mary Beth to use the 
surname "Waller" and Mary Beth knows that, but 
except perhaps for that sign on her front door 
welcoming home "Mary Beth Waller" she has been 
very circumspect in expressing that desire to Man 
Beth. 
Furthermore, this court finds that it would be contrary 
to the best interests of Mary Beth for this Court to do 
anything at this time that would in any way fetter Man 
(Cite as: 4 ^ 5o.2d 277, *279) 
Bcth's freedom to use whichever surname with which 
she feels the most comfortable When her surname 
becomes important to her, she can decide this issue for 
herself and leave this Court to decisions with which it 
feels much more comfortable. 
It is therefore 
ADJUDGED that the Petition for the change of the 
surname of Man Beth Azzara and the Petition for an 
injunction prohibiting Mrs. Waller from requiring or 
encouraging Man Beth Azzara to use the surname 
"Waller" both are hereby denied and all parties may go 
hence without day 
Pasco Counts. Florida, this 22 day of November, 1985 
/s/ Wayne I, Cobb, 
Circuit Judge 
Implicit m the final judgment is a recognition that the 
child's best mterests have been served by her mother 
and stepfather We cannot disagree with the trial judge 
that this is a case in which justice presently is best 
sen'ed by not imposing a judicial solution to a dispute 
Affirmed. 
DANAHY. C.J.. and FRANK. J., concur 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Dade City, END OF DOCUMENT 
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SELECT UTAH CASES 
(Cite as: 799 P.2d 716) 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., Casper J. Breuer 
and William Harrison, Plaintiffs and 
Appellees, 
v. 
Keith and Evelyn COMBE, Defendants and 
Appellants 
and 
Robert E. Froerer, Attorneys1 Title Guaranty 
Fund, Inc., Clair C. Combe as 
Trustee for Philip Combe, Defendants and 
Appellees. 
Keith and Evelyn COMBE, Clair C. Combe as 
Trustee for Philip Combe, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
Casper J. BREUER and William M. Harrison, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees. 
No. 880353-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 24, 1990. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 15,1990. 
Real estate purchaser brought action against vendor 
for rescission, and vendor cross-claimed against title 
insurer for negligence. The Second District Court, 
Weber County, Ronald O. Hyde. J., entered judgment 
for purchaser and insurer, and appeal was taken. The 
Court of Appeals, Greenwood. J., held that: (1) 
vendors who could not convey unencumbered fee title 
to property as promised, upon discovery that water 
district had irremediable pipeline easement, were guilty 
of anticipatory breach of contract, thereby entitling 
purchasers to rescission, and (2) neither title insurer 
nor searching attorney could be held liable to vendor 
for negligence in failing to discover irremediable 
easement. 
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. 
Orme, J., concurred in part, dissented in part and filed 
opinion. 
[1] C O N T R A C T S ^ 313(1) 
95<§=>313(1) 
Action may be maintained for breach of contract based 
upon anticipatory repudiation by one of the parties to 
the contract. 
[2] VENDOR AND PURCHASER®^ 159 
400<®=>159 
Vendors who could not convey unencumbered fee title 
to property as promised, upon discovery that water 
district had irremediable pipeline easement, were guilty 
of anticipatory7 breach of contract, thereby entitlmg 
purchasers to rescission 
[3] VENDOR AND PURCHASER*®^ 159 
400<&=>159 
Purchaser's options upon vendor's anticipatory breach 
of contract are to treat entire contract as broken and sue 
for damages, treat contract as still binding and wait 
until time arrives for its performance and at such time 
bring action on contract, or rescind contract and sue for 
money paid or for value of services or property 
famished. 
14] VENDOR AND P U R C H A S E R ^ 138 
400<®^138 
Even if purchaser had knowledge or constructive notice 
of irremediable easement, vendor providing warranty 
deed would still be subject to statutory covenant 
against encumbrances. U.C.A.1953. 57-1-12, 57-3-2. 
[5] VENDOR AND P U R C H A S E R S 143 
400<§=* 143 
Real estate purchaser did not waive vendor's 
anticipatory repudiation by continuing to make 
payments and exploring development possibilities after 
learning of irremediable easement for five years before 
asserting right of rescission; complete impact of 
easement was not known until further engineering work 
was completed, with purchaser attempting to mitigate 
damages by looking for alternative ways of developing 
property. 
[6] VENDOR AND PURCHASER®^ 143 
400®^ 143 
Purchaser's five-year delay after learning of 
irremediable easement and seeking rescission of 
contract for vendor's anticipatory breach did not 
warrant finding of estoppel or laches absent evidence 
that purchaser made any admissions, statements or acts 
inconsistent with rescission claim it eventually 
asserted; delay was due to purchaser's efforts to 
mitigate damages and not because it was relinquishing 
later-asserted claim of rescission. 
(Cite as: 799 P.2d 716) 
|7J VENDOR AND PURCHASERS 145 
400<®^145 
Vendor's obligation under real estate contractor to 
provide deed with no encumbrances on property would 
not be obviated by use of special warrant}' deed 
[8] ATTORNEY AND C L I E N T S 105 
4 5 S 1 0 5 
Elements of legal malpractice action are establishment 
of attorney-client relationship, negligence on part of 
attorney, and damage to client proximately caused by 
such negligence. 
[9] ATTORNEY AND C L I E N T S 64 
4 5 S 6 4 
Existence of attorney-client relationship is proved by 
showing that party seeks and receives advice of lawyer 
in matters pertinent to lawyer's profession; intent and 
conduct of parties is critical to formation of attorney-
client relationship, and party's belief that relationship 
exists, unless reasonably induced by representations or 
conduct of attorney, is not sufficient to create 
confidential relationship. 
[10] ATTORNEY AND C L I E N T S 64 
4 5 S 6 4 
Payment of attorney fees does not by itself determine 
whether attorney-client relationship exists, but is only 
one indicia. 
[11] J U D G M E N T S 181(16) 
228S181(16) 
Issue of material fact as to whether attorney-client 
relationship existed between real estate vendor and 
attorney who prepared documents at request of 
purchaser precluded summary judgment for attorney in 
vendor's malpractice action; vendor thought attorney 
was acting as his attorney, attorney prepared 
documents consolidating title in vendor in preparation 
for transfer to buyer, and attorney's payment came 
from sale proceeds at closing. 
[12] I N S U R A N C E S 155.1 
217S155.1 
Determination of whether title insurance contract is 
ambiguous is question of law. 
[13] INSURANCES 146.1(2) 
217S146.1(2) 
Mere fact that parties disagree as to meaning of 
language contained in title policy is not sufficient to 
create ambiguity. 
[14] INSURANCES 426.1 
217S426.1 
Title policy, described throughout as "owners" policy, 
insured only purchaser, and not vendor, even though 
policy insured "estate" and was not explicitly limited to 
purchaser's equitable estate, which was created by real 
estate contract. 
[15] VENDOR AND PURCHASERS 54 
4 0 0 S 5 4 
Executory contract for sale of real property converts 
vendor's interest to personalty; purchaser acquires 
equitable interest in property at moment contract is 
created and is treated as owner of land. 
[16] ATTORNEY AND C L I E N T S 109 
4 5 S 1 0 9 
Neither title insurer nor searching attorney could be 
held liable to vendor for negligence in failing to 
discover irremediable easement where vendor did not 
know or even anticipate that title insurance would be 
issued until time of closing, and thus did not rely upon 
insurer's alleged representations. 
[16] INSURANCES 426.1 
217S426.1 
Neither title insurer nor searching attorney could be 
held liable to vendor for negligence in failing to 
discover irremediable easement where vendor did not 
know or even anticipate that title insurance would be 
issued until time of closing, and thus did not rely upon 
insurer's alleged representations. 
[17] T R I A L S 3(3) 
3 8 8 S 3 ( 3 ) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in bifurcating 
real estate purchaser's claims against vendor from 
vendor's cross claims against title insurer and ordermg 
separate trials; only issue to be tried on purchasers 
claim was amount of restitution to be paid as 
determined from fair market value of property, and 
vendor's cross claims against insurer were irrelevant to 
that issue. 
[18] CONTRACTSS 249 
9 5 S 2 4 9 
"Rescission" is restitutionary remedy which attempts to 
(Cite as: 799 P.2d 716) 
restore parties to status quo to extent possible or as 
demanded by equities in case. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[191 VENDOR AND PURCHASERS 123 
400<®=>123 
Fair rental value of property, which purchaser owed to 
vendor after rescinding contract for vendor's 
anticipatory breach, was properly calculated based 
upon determination that highest and best use of 
property' in its present condition was for agricultural 
purposes; interest on purchase price occurring during 
time purchaser had possession of property was 
inapplicable measurement in determining fair rental 
value in that it would not restore parties to then-
positions at time contract was executed and provide 
vendor with windfall. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[20] INTEREST®^ 39(2.30) 
219<®^39(2.30) 
Purchaser rescinding contract on ground of vendor's 
anticipator}7 breach was not precluded from obtaining 
prejudgment interest by delay in exercising rescission 
rights, where delay was reasonable. 
f21] INTERESTS 30(1) 
2 1 9 ^ 3 0 ( 1 ) 
Prejudgment interest awarded to purchaser upon 
rescission of real estate contract due to vendor's 
anticipatory breach should have accrued at statutory 
rate in effect at time contract was executed. 
U.C.A.1953, 15-1-1. 
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OPINION 
Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON and ORME, JJ. 
GREENWOOD. Judge: 
Appellants Keith and Evelyn Combe appeal the trial 
court's summary judgment for appellees. Breuer-
Harrison. Inc. (B-H), Casper J. Breuer, and William 
Harrison, against the Combes for anticipatory 
repudiation of a real estate contract entered into by the 
parties. The Combes also appeal the trial court's 
summary judgment dismissing the Combes' cross 
claims against appellees Attorneys' Title Guaranty 
Fund, Inc. (ATGF) and Robert Froerer. We affirm in 
part and reverse and remand in part. 
The property in question is an undeveloped parcel of 
approximately twenty7 acres located in south Ogden, 
Utah. It was originally part of a farm developed by 
Keith Combe's grandfather. In the early 1960s, the 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District (Weber 
Basin), by condemnation proceedings, obtained a 
thirty-foot wide easement on the property and 
constructed a water pipeline within the confines of the 
easement. Sometime in the 1970s, Keith Combe's 
mother divided the property' into four parcels, 
conveying a parcel each to Keith Combe and his three 
siblings. One of the parcels distributed to Keith 
Combe's siblings was held in a trust managed by First 
Security Bank (Bank). 
In 1979, Breuer and Harrison, the sole stockholders in 
B-H, a California corporation, became interested in 
purchasing property in Utah for development projects. 
They contacted Steve Keil, an Ogden real estate agent, 
who showed them several large parcels of property in 
the Ogden area One of the properties they examined 
was the property owned by Combe and his siblings. 
Keil, Breuer, and Harrison walked across the Combe 
property and examined the county plat maps and 
available demographic and economic data. 
Sometime in August 1979, Breuer and Harrison 
entered into an oral agreement with Keil, Bruce 
Nielson, who owned the real estate firm where Keil 
worked, and Duane Bruce, another agent for the firm. 
(Cite as: 799 P.2d 716, *719) 
They agreed that Keil. Nielson, and Bruce would have 
a twenty-five percent equity mterest in the Combe 
property after a proposed purchase. The three were to 
share with B-H the costs, expenses, and all required 
payments under the Combe contract. A "memorandum 
of understanding" outlining the terms of the agreement 
was drafted and signed by all five individuals sometime 
in December 1979. 
In August 1979, Keil contacted Jay Anderson, owner 
of an engineering firm. Great Basin Engineering 
(GBE), and asked Anderson to sketch some 
subdivision layouts of the Combe property. To assist 
B-H in determining the suitability of the Combe 
property as a residential subdivision, GBE 
subsequently performed, prior to B-H's purchase of the 
property, a variety of engineering tasks, including 
extensive soil testing, on-site ground water analysis, 
runoff flow analysis, and placement of road alignment. 
Anderson assigned the actual design sketch work to 
Charles Olsen, an engineer at GBE. Olsen first 
prepared a base sheet by tracing information from a 
Weber Count} topography map. The base sheet 
showed the property boundaries, surrounding 
subdivisions, streets, and a dotted line marked 
"Aqueduct," [FN1] crossing the property diagonally in 
a northwest direction. By placing tracing paper over 
the base sheet, Olsen prepared several different 
sketches. 
FN1. According to Anderson, the marking of 
"Aqueduct" on the base sheet was inappropriate since it 
was really an underground pipeline. Webster's defines 
"aqueduct" as a conduit or artificial channel for 
conveying water; one for carrying a large quantity of 
water which flows by gravitation. Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 108 (1986). Webster's defines 
"pipeline" as a line of pipe connected to pumps, valves, 
and control devices for conveying, in part, liquids. Id. at 
1722. 
*720 Because of the aqueduct marking, Olsen 
assumed there was an easement and asked Anderson 
the size of the easement, since Olsen typically included 
such information on a drawing. Olsen testified in 
deposition that Anderson told him the information was 
not available, to just go ahead and prepare the sketches. 
Olsen made no further attempt to determine the size of 
the easement. He did, however, make allowance for 
the aqueduct or pipeline, by putting a roadway over the 
top of it on the plat maps. He also testified that had he 
known of the thirty-foot easement, he would have 
plotted it on the base sheet. 
Anderson was aware of the pipeline since its 
installation on the Combe property in the early 1960s. 
He testified in deposition that the aqueduct marking 
was originally' put on Weber County aerial surveys in 
1963. At the tune Keil contacted him in 1979, 
Anderson believed there was probably a twenty' to 
thirty-foot easement that belonged to Weber Basin, but 
was unaware of the exact width .Anderson understood 
that a house could not be built on the pipeline but 
assumed that either a roadway or back lot line could be 
put on the pipeline. Prior to B-H's purchase of the 
Combe property, Anderson worked primarily with 
Keil. 
From exhaustive testimony, it is clear that in 
September 1979, Keil was aware of what he 
considered a small waterline which traversed the 
Combe property. It is also clear that Keil did not learn 
of the pipeline easement until 1983. Keil testified in 
deposition that his recollection of what he knew of the 
waterline in September 1979 was hazy due to it being a 
"nonissue." He testified that the biggest concerns in his 
discussions with Anderson in the fall of 1979 regarding 
the Combe property7 involved sewage and drainage 
problems. Although the exact time is uncertain, 
sometime in September 1979, Anderson apparently 
talked with Keil about the waterline or pipeline and 
putting a roadway over it. Keil viewed the waterline as 
a minor problem in the development plans, one that 
could easily be accomodated by building a road over it 
to insure profitability. According to Keil, in 1983 he 
first learned of an easement and aqueduct, which he did 
not relate to the waterline because in his mind there 
was a significant size difference between the two. 
Anderson testified in deposition that he told Keil that 
the pipeline was relatrveh small compared to usual 
Weber Basin standards. He also testified that there was 
no way Keil would have known of the thirty-foot 
easement in 1979. 
On September 19, 1979, a meeting was held with 
Breuer, Harrison, Keil. and Olsen in attendance. This 
was Breuer's and Harrison's first contact with GBE. 
The group reviewed Olsen's rough sketches and 
discussed the number of lots, location of road 
alignment, and water treatment, sewage, and drainage 
(Cite as: 799 P.2d 716, *720) 
problems. None of those in attendance at the meeting 
recall which sketches were analyzed. There is no 
evidence that the base sheet showing "Aqueduct" was 
shown to Breuer, Harrison, or Keil. Breuer and 
Harrison testified in deposition that an easement was 
not discussed at the meeting and that the first they 
heard of the pipeline and easement was in 1983. Olsen 
had no recollection of what was discussed at the 
meeting. Keil testified to having no independent 
recollection of ever talking with either Breuer or 
Harrison regarding a waterline or pipeline either at this 
meeting or at any time prior to 1983, but only 
conjectured that a waterline was probably a topic of 
conversation at some time. He specifically testified 
that he did not discuss with Breuer or Harrison an 
easement at any time prior to 1983. 
Sometime in the fall of 1979, Keil contacted Robert E. 
Froerer, an Ogden attorney, and asked him to do 
certain legal work in connection with a real estate 
transaction involving property in Ogden. Froerer 
prepared the necessary legal documents, deeds, and 
exchange agreements, that enabled a series of property 
trades between Keith Combe and his siblings so that 
Keith Combe and the Bank would end up with the 
entire property. Froerer also drafted a preliminary 
purchase agreement which was executed by B-H on 
approximately November 1, 1979. Froerer then 
prepared a real estate contract for the Combe property 
which established a sales price of $410,880 *721 and 
required a down payment of $75,000. Beginning on 
December 31, 1980, and continuing for the next three 
years, B-H was to make annual interest-only payments. 
The balance of the purchase price was due in lull on 
December 31,1983. 
Paragraph eight of the real estate contract required the 
Combes and the Bank to warrant title to the property, 
to furnish a title policy, and to convey the property by 
warranty deeds. The paragraph was nearly identical to 
paragraph fourteen in the preliminary purchase 
agreement. Paragraph eight of the contract reads as 
follows: 
Seller warrants that there are no hens or 
encumbrances on the property herein-above 
described and agrees to furnish to Buyer at Seller's 
expense a title policy showing good and marketable 
title in said property (said title policy to be furnished 
at the time of the receipt of down payment from 
Buyer). Further, Seller agrees to execute and deliver 
to Buyer, or assigns, good and sufficient warrant} 
deeds covering title to the above-described property 
when subdivided and as paid for in accordance with 
the terms hereinabove set out. 
Paragraph four required that an escrow account be set 
up, that the Combes convey title by warrant} deed to an 
escrow agent to be named later, and that this agent 
convey title to B-H by special warrant} deed as 
payments were made. Paragraph five, which 
disclaimed warranties, stated: "The Seller hereby 
expressly disclaims an}' and all warranties and 
representations, express or implied, as to the state of 
the property, its condition, quality, character, or 
suitability or fitness for any sue [sic], whether existing 
or contemplated, matters of zoning, or in other 
respect." 
Keil testified in deposition that on one occasion prior 
to the closing, he went with Keith Combe to the office 
of Combe's personal attorney, Paul Kunz. Kunz 
reviewed documents, including the preliminary 
purchase agreement, and made some changes. Keil 
further testified that Keith Combe was adamant about 
Kunz reviewing the documents prior to Keith signing 
anything. 
The sale closed on December 29, 1979. Froerer was 
not present at the closing, but later obtained B-H's 
signature on the real estate contract and the down 
payment, and forwarded funds to the Combes and the 
Bank. Froerer withdrew payment for his fees for 
drafting the contracts, and for fees for a title search and 
policy, from the sale proceeds. An escrow account was 
never established and no preliminary title report was 
requested or issued prior to the closing of the sale. 
Keith Combe, in deposition, testified that he first 
learned that Froerer was going to issue title insurance 
at the closing. According to Froerer, the title search 
was probably started before the closing. The title 
policy was, however, not issued until November 14, 
1980. The policy failed to make an exception for the 
pipeline easement. The underwriter on the policy 
issued by Froerer was ATGF At the time, Froerer 
owned stock in ATGF and regularly researched titles 
and wrote title insurance for the company 
After the real estate contract was signed. GBE added 
sewers and utilities to the subdivision layout GBE 
completed the final plat in January 1980. which placed 
(Citeas:799P.2d716,*721) 
a roadway over the pipeline. In 1980, after a proposed 
sale of the property to a third party failed to 
materialize, the developers continued to develop their 
plans for the property, which consisted primarily of 
obtaining governmental approval for the subdivision. 
Most of the development work was done by Nielson, 
Bruce, and Keil. 
On November 24, 1982. an amendment was executed 
by the parties, that gave the developers an additional 
two years to pay the principal balance of the purchase 
price. A second amendment was executed on January 
3, 1983. This amendment deferred for six months 
payment of one-half of the $35,000 interest payment 
which had been due at the end of 1982. 
In the spring of 1983, in the process of negotiating a 
concession for himself in the contract, Keith Combe 
visited Nielson's office, bringing a new title report with 
him. The report disclosed several easements that had 
not been disclosed on the title report issued by Froerer, 
including the *722 pipeline easement. Breuer, 
Harrison, Nielson, Brian, and Keil all testified that this 
was the first time they had heard of the pipeline 
easement. [FN2] 
FN2. The parties dispute as to when the Combes first 
learned of the pipeline easement. Breuer, Harrison, and 
Keil all testified that at their meeting with Keith Combe 
in August 1984, Keith Combe mentioned to them that he 
recalled his father telling him about the pipeline. Keith 
Combe testified in deposition, however, that he never 
knew there was a pipeline on the property prior to its 
disclosure in the 1983 title report. In trial, Keith Combe 
admitted recalling his father talking about the water 
conservancy district filing a condemnation action to take 
a portion of the property for an aqueduct easement. 
Anderson testified in deposition that after the 
disclosure of the pipeline easement on the Combe title 
report, he discovered and communicated to Nielson 
that Weber Basin was more rigorously enforcing its 
pipeline easements. Anderson further testified that had 
he known in 1979 of a thirty-foot easement and the 
restrictions that are now enforced, he would have 
advised Keil that the property would be difficult to 
develop, the cost would be high, and that Keil should 
look for another piece of ground. 
According to Anderson's testimony, the existence of 
the thirty -foot easement and its enforced restrictions 
prohibit developing the property. Apparently, Breuer 
and Harrison wanted to get out of the project after 
learning of the easement, but Nielson convinced them 
to continue developing ideas to work around the 
easement. Bingham Engineering explored and platted 
the concept of developing the property as a 
condominium project According to Breuer and 
Nielson, the placement of houses over the easement 
would create special problems if a developer wanted to 
cross the easement with utilities; hamper efforts in 
gaining approval to dig around the pipeline; place 
restrictions on the backfill over the pipeline; require 
the property owner to make repairs to the pipeline; 
render fifteen feet of the property- on either side of the 
pipeline unusable for anything except vegetation; and 
will likely require special bridging or a concrete cover 
to be placed over any portion of the pipeline that sits 
within a street. 
Following disclosure of the easement in the new title 
report, Harrison, Breuer, and Nielson contacted 
Froerer to determine what he and ATGF intended to do 
to resolve the problem. Nielson also met with Keith 
Combe several times following the pipeline easement 
disclosure. Although Keith Combe was generally 
aware of the problems the easement presented, he 
opined that it was Froerer's problem and not his. 
Nielson never told Keith that the development would 
not proceed because of the easement. 
In late 1983 or early 1984, the developers hired a new 
engineering firm, Bingham Engineering, to obtain 
"fresh ideas." The complete impact of the easement on 
the project was not known until Bingham Engineering 
had completed much of its work and the cost of 
continuing the project became prohibitive, particularly 
in light of disclosures about the width of the right-of-
way and the depth of the pipeline. 
Two additional amendments were executed between 
the parties in February 1984. The first stated that at 
least fifteen acres of the property would be developed 
as condominiums and partial payments would be made 
to the Combes as each unit was sold. Further, the 
Combes were required to subordinate their interest in 
part of the property so that the developers could obtain 
a construction loan. The second amendment further 
extended the final payment under the contract until 
December 31, 1988, if the developers had paid at least 
$ 120.000 in principal by the end of 1985. 
^ n e as: 799 P.Zd 716, *722) 
in August 1984, Brcucr and Harrison Hew to Utah and 
for the first tune personally met with Keith Combe and 
raised the option of rescinding the contract. Keith 
Combe refused to reduce the purchase price of the 
property to reflect its diminished value because of the 
easement. Shortly thereafter. B-H filed suit, seeking to 
rescind the contract and collect the money paid to the 
Combes on the contract 
The Combes filed cross claims against Froerer and 
ATGF. In then first cause of action, they sought 
damages against Froerer based upon his negligence as 
an attorney; *723 in their second cause of action, they 
sought damages against Froerer and ATGF based upon 
the issuance of the title insurance policy. 
The trial court granted B-H's summary judgment 
motion against the Combes, ruling that the Combes had 
committed anticipatory breach of the warranties of title 
in the real estate contract. The trial court later granted 
summary judgment against the Combes dismissing 
their claims against Froerer and ATGF. A trial was 
held but was limited to determining the amount of 
restitution to be received by B-H from the Combes. 
On the day before trial the trial court bifurcated B-H's 
claims against Froerer and ATGF, over the Combes' 
objection. The jury which was empanelled in an 
advisory capacity, was discharged, and the trial court in 
a directed verdict determined the restitutionary 
damages against the Combes. The Combes, including 
Keith's brother, Clair, were required to refund B-H 
$236,966.21, plus pay $133,192.64 in prejudgment 
interest. The court credited the Combes $7,500 for the 
fair rental value of the property as agricultural 
property. 
On appeal, the Combes argue that the trial court erred 
in (1) awarding B-H summary7 judgment on their 
rescission claims, (2) summarily disposing of the 
Combes' cross claims against Froerer and ATGF; (3) 
ordering that B-H's damage claims against Froerer and 
ATGF be severed from B-H's claims for restitutionary 
damages against the Combes; and (4) calculating 
restitutionary damages and offsets. 
The standard of review when considering a challenge 
to summary7 judgment is well settled. "A grant of 
summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ceco 
v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 l\2d 967, 969 (Utah 
1989); see also Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). We construe the 
facts and view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the losing party Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 
714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986); Whatcott v Whatcott, 
790 P.2d 578. 580 (Utah Ct.App.1990). Further, when 
reviewing conclusions of law on a challenge to 
summary judgment, we review those conclusions for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's 
legal conclusions. Ceco. 772 P.2d at 969. Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497. 499 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT: BREUER-HARRISON 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1990) specifies the effect 
of a warranty deed as follows: 
Such deed when executed as -required by law shall 
have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple ... with 
covenants from the grantor ... that the premises are 
free from all encumbrances... Any exceptions to 
such covenants may be briefly inserted in such deed 
following the description of the land. 
"An 'encumbrance.' as used in this section, is any right 
that a third party holds in land which constitutes a 
burden or limitation upon the rights of the fee title 
holder." Bergstrom v. Moore. 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 
(Utah 1984). The Combes concede that the pipeline 
easement is irremediable. "A defect which, by its 
nature cannot be removed by the seller as a practical 
matter is one 'of such a nature that the vendor neither 
has title nor in a practical sense any prospect of 
acquiring it/ " Neves v. Wnght, 638 P.2d 1195, 1199 
(Utah 1981) (quoting Davis v. Dean Vincent, Inc., 255 
Or. 233, 465 P.2d 702, 706 (1970)). Thus, there is no 
question that the pipeline easement in this case 
constitutes a substantial encumbrance on the fee title to 
the property' within the meaning of the statute. See 
Bergstrom, 677 P.2d at 1125 n. 1 (one of the three 
easements constituting encumbrances was a thirty-foot 
easement traversing the property in favor of the Weber 
Basin Water Conversancy District, beneath which lay a 
thirty-six inch water line); see also Thackeray v. 
Knight, 57 Utah 21. 192 P. 263, 265 (1920) (an 
easement for a pipeline over the premises is an 
encumbrance) 
[1][2][3] It is well settled that an action may be 
maintained for breach of contract based upon the 
anticipatory repudiation by one of the parties to the 
contract. Hurwitz *724 v. David K. Richards Co., 20 
(Cite as: 799 P.2d 716, *724 ) 
Utah 2d 232, 436 l\2d 794, 796 (1968). An 
anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an 
executor) contract manifests a positive and 
unequivocal intent to not render its promised 
performance when the time fixed for it in the contract 
arrives. Id. The trial court determined that because the 
Combes could not convey unencumbered fee title to the 
property to B-H as required by the real estate contract, 
the Combes were guilty of anticipator) breach of the 
contract. We agree. Notwithstanding that no breach of 
the covenant against encumbrances will occur until the 
deed is actually delivered, fFN3] it plainly appears that 
because of the pipeline easement the Combes would 
not be able to perform their contract, constituting an 
anticipatory repudiation of the real estate contract. 
FN3. Generally, a vendor is allowed a reasonable time to 
perfect title. Callister v. Millstream Assocs., Inc., 738 
P.2d 662, 664 n. 5 (Utah CtApp.1987). 
The trial court correctly determined that rescission was 
the appropriate remedy for B-H. The Utah Supreme 
Court has clearly established that where an unexcepted 
encumbrance on a seller's title is irremediable and, as a 
consequence, the seller will not be able to fulfill its 
contract to convey title as described in the warranty 
deed, rescission is an appropriate remedy. Bergstrom, 
677 P.2d at 1125; Neves, 638 P.*2d at 1199; 
Thackeray, 192 P. at 266. [FN4] 
FN4. Where there is an anticipatory repudiation, 
rescission of the contract is one of three options 
available to the non-breaching party in common law as 
well as under Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court has 
articulated these three options as follows: 
1. Treat the entire contract as broken and sue for 
damages. 
2. Treat the contract as still binding and wait until the 
time arrived for its performance and at such time bring 
an action on the contract. 
3. Rescind the contract and sue for money paid or for 
value of the services or property furnished. 
Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co., 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 
P.2d 794, 796 (1968). 
1. Waiver 
The Combes contend, however, that the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment since a key 
unresolved factual dispute in this case is when B-H 
learned of the pipeline and easement. The Combes 
argue that viewed in the light most favorable to them, 
the record establishes that B-H or their local partners, 
Keil, Nielson. and Brian, knew of the pipeline and 
easement before they executed the contract with the 
Combes, since the drawings prepared by B- H's 
engineers showed the pipeline and easement The 
Combes cite the trial court's acknowledgement in its 
order granting summary judgment that "ftjhere is a 
dispute of fact as to the exact date at which the buyers 
became aware of the existence of the easement and 
became aware of the existence of the aquaduct |sic|." 
The Combes conclude if B-H knew or had notice of the 
pipeline and easement prior to execution of the real 
estate contract, it waived any rights of rescission for 
anticipatory breach of contract. See generally Callister 
v. Millstream Assocs., Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 664 n 6 
(Utah Ct.App.1987); 77 Am.Jur 2d Vendor & 
Purchaser § 120 (1975) (the rule that a vendee's notice 
of encumbrances upon the property does not relieve the 
vendor of the duty of removing the encumbrance, 
where he or she contracts to convey free of all 
encumbrances. applies only to removable 
encumbrances, not to unremovable encumbrances, 
such as building restrictions or restrictions on the use 
of the property). 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
Combes, however, we find no genuine issue of material 
fact with regard to when Breuer and Harrison and their 
local partners learned of the pipeline and easement. 
The testimony of Breuer, Harrison, Nielson, and Bruce 
all clearly establish that they did not know of the 
pipeline or the easement until sometime in 1983 Keil 
was aware of what he termed a "waterhne" prior to the 
execution of the real estate contract, but considered it 
only a minor impediment to the development of the 
property for housing units. Keil testified that he never 
disclosed the waterline to Breuer or Harrison and that 
he also did not learn of the easement until 1983 Even 
*725 after exhaustive discovery and deposition 
testimony, the evidence does not contradict or cast any 
doubt on the developers' testimony. Breuer and 
Harrison walked across the property but, according to 
Anderson, neither the pipeline nor any physical 
manifestations of the pipeline were visible to the eye. 
Although "Aqueduct" was marked on the base sheet 
prepared by Olsen, there was no plat map or sketch 
created by GBE prior to 1983 that disclosed the 
existence of an easement. There is no evidence that 
prior to executing the contract, Breuer or Harrison saw 
vv.ni: «s: /vv r.zu 716, *725) 
the base sheet or any sketches traced from the base 
sheet showing the pipeline Anderson's and Olsen's 
testimony reinforce our conclusion that GBli did not 
fully appreciate the ramifications of the pipeline 
casement and never communicated to B-H the 
existence of a pipeline easement Admittedly, the trial 
court found in dispute the exact date that B-H learned 
of the pipeline easement. However, because B-H 
clearly did not learn of the easement until well after the 
execution of the contract, this dispute does not involve 
a material fact. Because there is no genuine issue of 
material fact that B-H lacked knowledge of the pipeline 
on or before December 31, 1979, we find that it did not 
waive any rights to title without encumbrances when it 
executed the contract with the Combes. 
[4] Even if B-H had knowledge of the irremediable 
easement or, as the dissent postulates, constructive 
notice under Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1990), the 
Combes would still be subject to the statutory covenant 
against encumbrances under section 57-1-12. In 
Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court noted that the unexcepted 
encumbrances on appellants' title, which included, as in 
this case, the Weber Basin waterline easement, which 
presumably was duly recorded, were irremediable. 
Although the supreme court found that it was 
undisputed that respondent had no knowledge or notice 
of at least one of the easements, the court stated that 
"[e]ven if respondent knew of some of the easements 
(as claimed by appellants), mere knowledge of 
encumbrances of this nature would not be sufficient to 
exclude them from the operation of the statutory 
covenant against encumbrances." Id. at 1125. 
[5] The Combes assert, however, that even if the 
developers did not learn of the pipeline and easement 
until 1983, their five-year delay in asserting rescission 
for the Combes' anticipatory breach raised additional 
factual issues of waiver that could not be resolved by 
summary judgment. The Combes contend that during 
this five-year period, B-H reaffirmed its commitment 
to the contract by (1) paying annual interest payments, 
(2) hiring a new engineering firm to explore fresh ideas 
of developing the property, and (3) Nielson telling 
Keith Combe that B-H would hold only ATGF and 
Froerer liable for the breach and would honor the terms 
of the contract. 
An original feature of the English doctrine of 
anticipatory breach was that a party continuing 
performance in the face of an anticipator) repudiation 
thereby waives the repudiation and can only sue on a 
subsequent breach, if any, occurring at the time when 
performance is due. 4 Corbin on Contracts § 981 
(1951) The modern rule, however, "is that an 
innocent part), confronted with an anticipatory 
repudiation, may continue to treat the contract as 
operable and urge perforniance by the repudiating 
party without waiving any right to sue for that 
repudiation." United California Bank v Prudential Ins. 
Co., Etc.. 140 Ariz. 238, 681 P.2d 390, 433 
(Ct.App.1983); see, e.g., Upland Indus. Corp. v. 
Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 643 
(Utah 1984); see also 4 Corbin § 981 at 938-39. 
The basis for the modern rule, as the Combes point out 
in their reply brief, is to give the breaching party the 
opportunity to cure the breach before the time for 
performance is due. A party that has received a 
definite repudiation from the breaching party to the 
contract should not be penalized for its efforts to 
encourage the breaching party to perform its end of the 
bargain. United California Bank, 681 P.2d at 433. The 
repudiating party has a power of retraction as long as 
there has been no substantial *726 change of position 
by the injured party and the nonbreaching party's 
continuing to urge performance may be property held 
to keep this power of retraction alive. 4 Corbin § 981 
at 939. 
The Combes contend that the rationale for the modern 
approach to anticipatory breach of contracts is 
inapplicable to the rescission remedy as used in this 
case. Because the easement is incurable and they are 
unable to perform their end of the bargain, the Combes 
assert that there was no legal or rational basis to allow 
B-H to stall in rescinding the contract until the contract 
became unprofitable. In sum, the Combes argue that 
the executory real estate contract became no different 
than one on which performance had become due at the 
moment that B-H discovered the easement. At that 
point, B-H should have made an election, which they in 
effect did, argue the Combes, by affirming the contract 
The Combes' argument that the nonbreaching party, in 
appropriate circumstances, ought to rescind without 
delay, in order to be able to mitigate damages, is 
admittedly persuasive. See University Club v. Invesco 
Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 504 P.2d 29, 30 (1972) 
(Citeas:799P.2d716,*726) 
("where one party definitely indicates that he cannot or 
will not perform a condition of a contract, the other is 
not required to uselessly abide time, but may act upon 
the breached condition. Indeed in appropriate 
circumstances he ought to do so to mitigate 
damages.'1). However, even though the pipeline 
easement was incurable, the circumstances in this case 
did not demand immediate rescission of the contract by 
B-H. The complete impact of the pipeline easement 
was not known until further engineering work was 
completed and the development cost of the property 
became prohibitive in light of the pipeline easement. 
Further, although a plummeting real estate market may 
have precipitated B-H's decision to rescind the 
contract, contrary to the Combes' representations, the 
record is clear that B-H did not just sit on its rights 
following the disclosure of the easement. B-H, through 
the efforts of Nielson, appropriately sought ways to 
mitigate the damage caused by the pipeline by 
attempting to develop the property in other ways. 
Although in hindsight, B-H would have saved both 
parties considerable expense had it rescinded the 
contract immediately upon disclosure of the easement, 
it is sound policy to not blindly require a non-breaching 
party to rescind immediately upon discovering the 
anticipatory breach. Even where the breach cannot be 
repaired, a non-breaching party may appropriately 
attempt in good faith to mitigate damages by 
attempting to honor the contract and work around 
problems presented by the breach. 
2. Estoppel/Laches 
[6] The Combes also contend that B-H's delay in 
exercising its rescission rights raised material factual 
issues of estoppel and laches not properly resolved by 
summary judgment. The Combes assert that only 
when real estate values plummeted in 1987, did B-H 
seek rescission. This delay, posit the Combes, 
precluded them from reselling the property, prior to the 
decline in property values, for an amount that would 
have made all parties whole. 
We have stated that 
fb]efore equitable estoppel may be applied, three 
elements must be present: 1) an admission, statement, 
or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted; 
2) action by the other party on the faith of such 
admission, statement, or act; and 3) injury to such 
part> resulting from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or 
act. Successful assertion of laches requires defendant 
to establish that plaintiff unreasonably delayed in 
bringing an action and that defendant was prejudiced 
by that delay 
Utah Dep't of Transp v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc., 751 P2d 270. 271 (Utah Ct App.1988) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added) 
We find that the Combes failed to demonstrate a 
factual dispute regarding the first element of estoppel: 
i.e., an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with 
the claim afterwards asserted Contrary to *727 the 
Combes' representation, we do not find anything in the 
record of the summary judgment proceeding 
suggesting that Nielson told Keith Combe that they 
would look only to the title company and Froerer for 
any liability7 for the pipeline and that B- H would honor 
the terms of the contract even with the easement. As 
we have stated. B-H's delay in exercising its rescission 
rights was due to its efforts to mitigate damages due to 
the pipeline and easement, not because they were 
relinquishing their later-asserted claim of rescission. 
Further, since the delay was a reasonable attempt to 
work around the easement, we reject the Combes' 
laches claim. 
3. Contractual ambiguities 
[7] The Combes also argue that the trial court 
improperly resolved factual issues created by 
ambiguities in the real estate contract concerning the 
scope of warranties of title given by the Combes. The 
Combes assert that if the unnamed escrow7 agent, in 
accordance with paragraph four of the real estate 
contract, was to convey title by special warranty deed 
to B-H, such would not cover the pipeline easement 
created before the Combes took title. This argument is 
meritless since the Combes are clearly obligated under 
the real estate contract to provide a deed with no 
encumbrances on the property and a special warranty 
deed could not obviate that requirement. The Combes 
also contend that the warranties of title in paragraph 
eight conflict with the disclaimer of all warranties in 
paragraph five We find, however, that the "as is" 
provisions contained in paragraph five relate to the 
physical condition of the property and have nothing to 
do with warranties of title as set forth in paragraph 
eight of the real estate contract. 
(Cite as: 799 P.2d 716, *727) 
SUMMARY JinXiMKNT: MALPRACTICE 
CLAIM AGAINST FROKRER 
We next turn to the Combes' argument that factual 
issues also barred the summary judgment dismissing 
the Combes' cross claims against Frocrer. The 
Combes contend that Froercr committed legal 
malpractice by 1) failing to complete the title work 
prior to the real estate closing; 2) withholding material 
information from the Combes; and 3) by 
simultaneously representing another client with 
conflicting interests. 
[8] Traditionally, in a legal malpractice action, the 
threshold question is whether an attorney-client 
relationship was established. Bergman v. New 
England Ins. Co., 872 1 2d 672, 674 (5th Cir.1989); 
Guillebeau v. Jenkins. 182 Ga.App. 225, 355 S.E.2d 
453, 456 (1987). Once this relationship is proven, the 
client has the burden of showing two additional 
elements. 1) negligence on the part of the attorney, and 
2) that such negligence was the proximate cause of 
damage to the client. See, e.g., Dunn v. McKay, 
Burton, McMurray & Thurman. 584 P.2d 894, 896 
(Utah 1978); see also Bergman, 872 F.2d at 674; 
Guillebeau, 355 S.E.2d at 456. 
[9] In general, except where an attorney is appointed 
by a court, the attorney-client relationship is created by 
contract. Franko v. Mitchell, 158 Ariz. 391. 762 P.2d 
1345, 1351 (Ct.App.1988); Fox v. Pollack, 181 
Cal.App.3d 954, 226 Cal.Rptr. 532, 534 (1986). The 
contract may be express or implied from the conduct of 
the parties. Margulies by Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 
P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). The relationship is 
proved by showing that the party seeks and receives the 
advice of the lawyer in matters pertinent to the lawyer's 
profession. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510, 517 
(Colo. 1986) (en banc); Steinbach v. Meyer, 412 
N.W.2d 917, 918 (Iowa Ct.App.1987). Such a 
showing is subjective in that a factor in evaluating the 
relationship is whether the client thought an attorney-
client relationship existed. Matter of Lieber. 442 A.2d 
153, 156 (D.C.1982); Matter of Petrie, 154 Ariz. 295, 
742 P.2d 796, 801 (1987) (en banc); Louisiana State 
Bar Ass'nv. Bosworth, 481 So.2d 567, 571 (La.1986). 
However, a party's belief that an attorney-client 
relationship exists, unless reasonably induced by 
representations or conduct of the attorney, is not 
sufficient to create a confidential attorney-client 
relationship. Fox, 226 Cal.Rptr at 535; sec also 
Guillebeau, 355 S.E.2d at 458 ("An *728 attomey-
client relationship cannot be created unilaterally in the 
mind of a would-be client; a reasonable belief is 
required."). In sum, M[i]t is the intent and conduct of 
the parties which is critical to the formation of the 
attorney-client relationship." Hecht v. Superior Court. 
192 Cal.App.3d 560, 237 Cal.Rptr. 528. 53 1 (1987). 
The Combes assert that Froercr understood that he had 
been hired by them to perform several tasks, including 
1) the drafting of all documents for the transfer of 
parcels among the Combe siblings, 2) the drafting of 
preliminary and final real estate contracts with B-H. 3) 
conducting a title search, and 4) procuring the title 
insurance policy. Keith Combe testified in deposition 
that he always assumed Froerer was his attorney since 
he was going to be paying him money Froerer did in 
fact pay his fees from the funds delivered to him in 
payment of the purchase price due to the Combes 
Froerer claims, however, that he represented the 
buyers solely, not the Combes He counters that 
merely because he was paid out of the proceeds of the 
sale does not establish an attorney-client relationship. 
He argues that such practice is common in real estate 
transactions and that the argument could be made that 
the sale proceeds were actually paid by B-H since they 
were the ones who deposited the monev for closing. 
[FN5] 
FN5. Froerer also claims that the Combes' claims 
against him are barred by the four year statute of 
limitations under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1987) 
Since this issue was not presented first to the trial court 
for its consideration and resolution, we will not consider 
it. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65. 71 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). Further, we note that a cause of action 
for legal malpractice accrues, and th*e tour-year 
limitation commences to run, when the act complained 
of is discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
should have been discovered. Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 
P.2d 16, 19 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) 
[10] Although payment for legal services may be 
persuasive evidence that an attorney-client relationship 
was established. Foulke v. Knuck. 162 Ariz 517, 784 
P.2d 723, 726 (Ct.App. 1989), there are exceptions. 
See, e.g., Guillebeau, 355 S.E.2d at 457 (where party 
obligated herself to pay closing costs before anyone 
contacted attorney, she did not pay attorney's fee in the 
(Cite as: 7VV P.Zd 716, *728) 
furtherance of a contract of legal employment and. 
therefore, no attorney- client relationship existed). 
However, the payment of attorney fees does not by 
itself determine whether an attorney-client relationship 
exists, but is only one indicia. Hecht, 237 Cal.Rptr. at 
530; see also Huddleston v. State, 259 Ga. 45. 376 
S.E.2d 683. 684 (1989) (although the general test of 
employment is the fee, the basic question with regard 
to an attorney-client relationship is whether advice or 
assistance of the attorney is both sought and received). 
[ 11 ] In reviewing summary judgment, we must view 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the Combes, 
the party opposing summary judgment. Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988). Evidence presented to the court on this 
issue consisted mostly of deposition testimony. Keith 
Combe testified in deposition that he perceived the 
transaction of property trades between himself and his 
siblings as part of the sale to B-H and that he was not 
aware that Froerer was going to issue title insurance 
until at the closing when he learned that Froerer would 
perform the task at the request of Keil. The record 
further shows that the Combes had no prior contact 
with Froerer, they at no time sought Froerer's legal 
advice either before or after the closing, and Froerer 
was not present at the closing. Also, Keith Combe 
requested that another attorney, Kunz, review and 
make necessary changes in the preliminary documents 
that Froerer drafted. Evidence supporting existence of 
an attorney-client relationship consists of Keith 
Combe's testimony that he thought Froerer was acting 
as his attorney, the type of documents prepared, 
including the transfers among the Combe siblings; and 
Froerer's payment from the sale proceeds at closing. 
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the 
Combes, we cannot say that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact entitling Froerer to summary judgment. It 
is only necessary for the nonmoving party to show 
*729 "facts" controverting the "facts" asserted by the 
moving party. Id. We, therefore, reverse and remand 
on the factual issue of whether an attorney-client 
relationship existed between Froerer and the Combes. 
When that fundamental factual issue is determined, the 
trial court can proceed accordingly with respect to this 
transaction. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT: CONTRACTUAL & 
ABSTRACTOR NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS AGAINST 
FROERER &ATGF 
The Combes next argue that schedule A of the title 
insurance policy insures their interests as well as those 
of B-H, or was at least ambiguous on this point, 
rendering the intent of the parties a question of material 
fact. Schedule A states, in pertinent part: 
1. The estate or interest in the land described herein 
and which is covered by this policy is: An interest 
pursuant to that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated January 9. 1980, by and between KEITH P. 
COMBE and EVELYN, his wife, and FIRST 
SECURITY BANK N.A., Trustee, as Seller, and 
CASPER J. BREUER. and WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON, as Buyer. 
2. The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date 
of Policy vested in: 
Parcels # 1 thru # 4: Keith P. Combe and Evelyn 
Combe 
Parcel # 5: First Security Bank N.A.. Trustee, and 
Keith P. Combe and Evelyn. 
The Combes contend that paragraph one refers to the 
Combes' interest, as well as to B-H's interest, since the 
Combes retained legal title to the property. If the policy 
were intended to insure only B-H, argue the Combes, 
paragraph one should have referred only to the 
"equitable estate" created by the real estate contract. 
The Combes also assert that the language in paragraph 
two, "estate or interest referred to herein" includes the 
Combes and fails to clearly state that B-H's interest 
only was insured. 
[12] [13] "Title insurance is a contract to indemnify 
the insured against loss through defects in the insured 
title or against hens or encumbrances that may affect 
the insured title at the time the policy is issued." 
Malinak v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 203 Mont. 
69, 661 P.2d 12, 14 (1983). The determination of 
whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. 
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert 784 P.2d 
1210, 1213 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Thus, as we 
previously noted, we accord the trial court's 
interpretation no particular weight, reviewing its 
interpretation under a correction-of-error standard. 
The mere fact that the parties disagree as to the 
meaning of the language contained in the policy is not 
sufficient to create an ambiguity. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. 
Vinyitech Corp., 711 F.Supp. 1513, 1517 
(D.Ariz. 1989). The first step in our review is to 
examine the document in its entirety and in accordance 
V^iic as; IJJ r .xu / 1 0 , KV2V) 
with its purpose, givmg cflect to all of its parts. 
Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Prods. Co., 614 P.2d 160. 163 
(Utah 1980); Regional Sales Agency, Inc., 784 P.2d at 
1213. 
[14][15] Following careful review of the title 
insurance policy issued by ATGF, we determine that 
the Combes' assertions are without merit. The policy 
clearly insures solely B-H, not the Combes. The title 
insurance policy is described throughout as the 
"owners" policy. An executory contract of sale 
converts the interest of the vendor of the real property 
to personalty. Willson v. State Tax Comm'n, 28 Utah 
2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1972); Cannefax v. 
Clement, 786 P.2d 1377, 1379-80 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). The vendee acquires the equitable 
interest in the property at the moment the contract is 
created and is treated as the owner of the land. 
Cannefax, 786 P.2d at 1380; Lach v. Deseret Bank, 
746 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah Ct.App.1987). Thus, 
viewing the policy in its entirety, we find the 
document's purpose clear: to provide title insurance 
for the owners of the property7, Breuer and Harrison. 
Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment for ATGF and Froerer on the Combes' claim 
under the title policy. 
The Combes also contend that factual issues precluded 
summary judgment of their claim against Froerer and 
ATGF for *730 abstractor's negligence. Some 
jurisdictions have held that a title insurance company 
has the liability of an abstractor of title when it inspects 
records and prepares title reports. Culp Construction 
Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650, 653 n. 3 (Utah 
1990); Moore v. Title Ins. Co. of Minnesota, 148 Ariz. 
408, 714 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Ct.App.1985); see, e.g., 
White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal.3d 870, 221 
Cal.Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309, 315 (1985); Malinak v. 
Safeco Title Ins Co. of Idaho, 203 Mont. 69, 661 P.2d 
12, 14-15 (1983); but see Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 
103 Idaho 875. 655 P.2d 82 (1982). However, the 
Utah Supreme Court recently adopted the "better-
reasoned approach" which views preliminary title 
reports and title insurance commitments as " 'no more 
than a statement of the terms and conditions upon 
which the insurer is willing to issue its title policy....' " 
Culp Constr., 795 P.2d at 653 (quoting Lawrence v. 
Chicago Title Ins. Co., 192 Cal.App.3d 70, 237 
Cal.Rptr. 264, 268 (1987)). 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not directly 
addressed the issue of tort liability for abstractor 
negligence, but cf Culp Constr. at 654-655; Bush v. 
Coult, 594 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1979) (title insurance 
is in the nature of a warranty), the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation against thud parties to a real estate 
transaction is clearly recognized by the court. See 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 
P.2d 302. 305 (Utah 1983). In Christenson. the 
supreme court defined negligent misrepresentation as 
follows 
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest in a 
transaction. (2) is in a superior position to know 
material facts, and (3) carelessly or negligently makes 
a false representation concerning them, (4) expecting 
the other party to rely and act thereon, and (5) the 
other parn reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in 
that transaction, the representor can be held 
responsible if the other elements of fraud are also 
present. 
Id. [FN6] (quoting Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 
Utah 2d 378. 423 P.2d 659,662 (1967)). 
FN6. The Utah Supreme Court in Christenson 
determined that a title insurance company's 
acknowledgment of a document that incorrectly 
indicated that certain properties held in escrow had 
unencumbered equity values available as security for 
plaintiff amounted to negligent misrepresentation. This 
case is distinguishable from Christenson. ATGF does 
not purport to act as anything other than a title insurance 
company, whereas the title insurance company in 
Christenson had assumed additional duties as an escrow 
agent. 
[16] In Culp Construction, the supreme court held that 
a title insurance policy does not constitute a 
representation of title, but only acts to insure the 
described title. Since in this case no preliminary report 
was requested or issued and the title policy was not 
issued until after closing, the Combes did not rely upon 
ATGF's alleged representations. The Combes counter 
that Froerer's actions led the Combes to believe that he 
had already conducted the title search and issued the 
title policy, and that they had clear, marketable title to 
the property This representation, however, is 
unsupported by the record. Following careful review, 
we find that since the Combes did not know or even 
anticipate that Froerer and ATGF were going to issue 
title insurance until the time of closing, they did not 
rely on any representation by Froerer or ATGF that a 
(Citeas:799P.2d716,*730) 
preliminary report had been issued 
BIFURCATION OF TRIM. 
117] The Combes next contend that because the 
bifurcation of the trial was prejudicial to them, it was 
an abuse of discretion. "Severance is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and. absent abuse of such 
discretion, will not be upset on appeal." King v. 
Barron. 770 P.2d 975, 976 (Utah 1988); see also Utah 
R.Civ.P. 21, 42(b). The parties stipulated to the 
amount paid by B-H and the trial court received the 
stipulation as binding upon the parties. Consequently, 
there was only one issue left to be tried: the amount of 
restitution to be paid as determined from the fair 
market value of the property. Since the Combes' 
claims against Froerer and ATGF were irrelevant to 
the issue of the fair market rental value of the property, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in bifurcating 
*731 the claims and cross-claims between the 
appellees and ordering separate trials. 
CALCULATION OF RESTITUTIONARY 
DAMAGES 
We next address the court's verdict on restitutionary 
damages. The Combes claim the trial court erred in 
concluding that the fair rental value of the property had 
no relationship to its fair market value at its highest and 
best use. The trial court determined that the highest 
and best use of the property in its then present 
condition was for agricultural purposes and, therefore, 
credited the Combes with yearly rent of $ 1500. Citing 
Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 562 (Utah 1985), 
the Combes insist that, as a matter of law, fair rental 
value equals a reasonable return on the market value of 
the property as established by the contract price, and is 
calculated as the annual interest due on the unpaid 
balance of the contract, at the contract rale. According 
to the Combes' expert witness testimony, such 
calculation would bring a reasonable rate of return of 
$49,350 per year. 
[18] The supreme court in Warner was addressing the 
trial court's determination of seller's damages for 
buyer's breach of an installment contract, as measured, 
in part, by the fair rental value of the property during 
the period of occupancy. The goal in Warner in 
awarding the seller damages for loss of use of the 
property was to grant a reasonable return on the 
investment. Id. This case, in contrast to Warner, 
involves the buyer's election of rescission for seller's 
breach of a land purchase contract Rescission is a 
restitutionary remedy which attempts to restore the 
parties to the status quo to the extent possible or as 
demanded by the equities in the case Dugan v. Jones, 
724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986); sec also Potter v 
Oster. 426 N.W.2d 148. 151 (Iowa 1988) "In the case 
of a rescission, the buyers are entitled to be returned to 
the status quo and to recover the payments made on the 
contract, less the fair rental value of the premises for 
the time they had possession thereof" Dugan, 724 
P.2d at 957." 
[19] We find that the trial court correctly determined 
that the expected rate of return on an investment was an 
inapplicable measurement in determinuig the fair rental 
value of the property for the tune B-H had possession. 
That methodology would preclude restoring the parties 
to their positions at the time the contract was executed 
and would provide the Combes with a windfall. We 
also find that since the use of the property for 
residential purposes is prohibited by the pipeline 
easement problems and it was not so used during the 
contract term, the trial court reasonably determined that 
the highest and best use of the property in question in 
its then present condition was for agricultural purposes. 
That determination was amply supported by the 
evidence and testimony of B-H's expert witness. 
[20] We also reject the Combes' argument that the 
award of prejudgment interest is improper because B-
H delayed in exercising its rescission rights. See 
Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293. 1297 (Utah 1982) 
(a prevailing party who delays proceedings may not be 
awarded prejudgment interest) As we have previously 
noted, any delay was not unreasonable 
[21] Finally, we agree with the Combes' assertion that 
the trial court miscalculated the rate of prejudgment 
interest at ten per cent, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 15-1-1 (1986). [FN7] The contract was executed 
prior to 1981 and therefore, prejudgment interest 
should accrue at six per cent per annum, not ten per 
cent. SCM Land Co. v Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 
105, 109 *732 (Utah 1986). B-H has provided us with 
no arguments to the contrary Therefore, we remand 
for a determination of the prejudgment interest amount. 
FN7. Section 15-1-1 states in pertinent part: 
(Cite as: 799 P.2d 716, *732) 
(I) Except when parlies to a lawful contract agree on a 
specified rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the 
loan or forebearance of any money, goods, or chose in 
action shall be 10°o per annum. Nothing in this section 
may be construed to in any way affect any penalty or 
interest charge which by law applies to delinquent or 
other taxes or to any contract or obligations made before 
May 14, 1981. 
The Combes point out that the statutory interest rate in 
effect at the time the contract was executed was at six 
percent. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1953). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment to B-H on its rescission claim 
against the Combes. We also affirm the trial court's 
determination of the fair market rental value of the 
property and the propriety of awarding prejudgment 
interest. However, we reverse and remand for 
recalculation of the prejudgment interest amount at six 
per cent per annum instead of ten per cent. We also 
reverse and remand on the issue of whether an 
attorney-client relationship existed between Froerer 
and the Combes. If such a relationship is found, the 
Combes may proceed with their legal malpractice 
claim. We affirm the trial court's summary judgment 
for Froerer and ATGF on the contractual and 
abstractor negligence claims and the court's bifurcation 
of claims against Froerer and ATGF. [FN8] 
FN8. We have considered appellees' suggestion of 
mootness and find it without merit. 
JACKSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, Judge (concurring in the result in part, 
dissenting in part, and concurring in part): 
B-H apparently lacked actual notice at least of the 
extent of the waterline easement until well after the 
purchase agreement was entered into. Nonetheless, the 
easement appeared of record and thus B-H "is properly 
charged with constructive notice" of the easement. 
Callister v. Millstream Assocs., Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 
663 n. 3 (Utah Ct.App.1987); Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-
2(1) (1990). 
In Callister, which concerned a similar contractual 
provision to the effect that title would be conveyed free 
of all hens and encumbrances, with no provision made 
to exempt easements of record or particular classes ol 
easements, we held that the buyer's constructive 
knowledge of the encumbrance was essentially 
irrelevant since it nonetheless "had a contractual right 
to conveyance of title free and clear of all hens... " 738 
P.2d at 663. Come closing, the seller was unable to 
clear a 60-unit restrictive covenant although it 
succeeded in substituting for it a more advantageous 
75-unit restriction. Id at 664. This was not enough 
"A 75-unit encumbrance failed to meet the 
requirements of the contract and provided grounds for 
rescission, just as the 60-unit encumbrance would have 
done." Id. We accordingly affirmed the judgment 
granting rescission. 
In Callister, we were urged to reverse in view of the 
doctrine "that if the purchaser has notice of 
encumbrances upon the property, and the encumbrance 
is of such a nature that it could not be removed by the 
vendor ... then the purchaser takes possession subject 
to the encumbrances." Id. at 664 n. 6. We held that the 
authorities relied on by the vendor in Callister were 
distinguishable and did not consider the doctrine 
further. See id. It is noteworthy, however, that the 
restrictive covenant in Cailister was not actually "of 
such a nature that it could not be removed by the 
vendor." On the contrary, it was removed, albeit only 
on the condition that a different restriction be 
substituted. But there is nothing to suggest that it could 
not have been removed altogether, given more 
successful negotiations with adjacent property owners 
or others who had to consent to the change. 
The Combes raise a similar argument here and it is 
undisputed—apparently in view of the gross 
unfeasibility financially and otherwise of rerouting a 
water district's deeply buried water line and 
accompanying easement around the subject* property--
that the easement in question cannot be removed by the 
Combes. Although somewhat lukewarm to the general 
notion when I authored Callister, see 738 P.2d at 664 
n. 6, I am now persuaded it makes good sense If a 
purchaser has knowledge of an encumbrance that 
cannot be removed, and enters into a contract calling 
for conveyance free and clear, the entire contract is an 
exercise in futility unless the operative provision be 
taken to exclude such an encumbrance. Otherwise, the 
purchaser *733 has entered into a contract requiring 
the vendor to do the impossible, which would be 
nonsensical. 
(Cite as "99 1 • J • ," -, I) 
As a matter of vendor-vendee law. the general 
principle seems to be settled. Sec 77 Aiii.Jur.2d 
Vendor & Purchaser § 120 (1975) However, the rule 
is otherwise in Utah where a warranty deed has actually 
been given and the question about an irremediable 
encumbrance arises in the conie\. ol whether the 
warranty provided m Utah Code Ann $ ^-.>-2 H990) 
has been breached. See Bergstrom v Moore, 677 P.2d 
1123, 1125 (Utah 1984). For the narrow reason dial 
the contract in this case called for deliver) of an 
unrestricted warranty deed, and it is appropriate to lead 
the statutory warrant)7 into the ke\ contractual 
provision, [FN lj ! concur that tlu Combes cannot 
prevail under , u •• **'-*:me**!-?1 m^r^H-mer 
argument. 
INi. StatcJ iuuiiiit! rw! ; •, vumbes would have 
breached their agreement to deliver an unrestricted 
warranty deed upon conveying title subject to the 
easement and it follows they were in anticipator)' breach 
of the contract's requirement toi • w;irrann deod n-
reason of the easement'-- ^ *>.***,. 
Noneih^cvs 1 would reverse the summary judgment 
in favor ol B-H. I believe the five-year delay in 
asserting a rescission right, during which time 
payments were made and the contract was twice 
amended, necessarily poses a material question of fact: 
Even if some time to assess the situation and explore 
possibilities of mitigation was available to B-H after 
"discovery" of the easement, was five years more than 
the "reasonable time" the law would permit in which to 
do so? On the record before us, I cannot conclude that 
five years was not an unreasonable delay. 
j
 c o n c u r m the court"s disposition of who is insured 
under the title policy, but base my conclusion not so 
much on the characterization, of'the term "owner" as on 
\lu f :^ ill <: die purchase agreement anticipated the 
•-c iM.v.unng insurance for U-11 and the tunher 
.... tiuii ui'Ui i'tiih \endoi and purchasei undei a ica! 
estate conn.ui .u- intended lo :>e nisiued under .i :i:: 
1
 \ . both arc elearls idenlihcd as insureds n ,-.„ ;•... 
•he phrase "as then uileiesls ma\ appe;:-
1 eonem in me coun s opinion nisoiai a- -K.ai^  \h, 
"abstractor's negligence" J aims, ttu alionici 
malpractice claim, di. "I\K , anon ISMK an.: U;.. 
list C l o t 1SMK 
i main e\en assuming tiK : augment of iesci>sioi: 
"Id otherwise be alliniK \ i disagree with the 
N view ol how to eakalate die otKei against 
ayments made ioi B-H's possession ol tlu propern 
IOI the \ears between execution of the eoniraet and 
assertion of a right to rescind, which m my mind leaves 
with a substantial wmdfal I agree with Prolessor 
ns. who suggests that m the usual teal estate 
ution case the buyer's claim to interest on UK 
tents it gets back, and the seller's claun to the tan 
. I value oi the propern while it was detained. 
,ld be considered a "w, di ' See I) Dobbs, 
'v- modies § 12.9 at 846 (1973 * '1 his approach wouK: 
w oi K a much fairer result in this case than valuing B-
H's use of the property at agricultural rental rates, not 
onh because the parties' contract fixes a icliable 
measure of its total value (and thus of an imputed rental 
value) at a much higher rate, but also because B-H kept 
the propern tied up for so man vears during winch the 
Combes were precluded from marketing the property 
ii- • iher buvers The restitution decreed in this case 
*•• i..> -neiej'. nakc b - : • v- Ac H gn c- a a he in 
; ^ i t . 
1 \ b ( ) J IXK CMHNT 
(Cite as: 769 P.2d 273) 
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Action was brought for divorce. The Fourth District Court, Utah County, Ray M. Harding, 
J., entered judgment, and wife appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that finding that 
two of wife's three children bear surname of father rather than her surname was not supported by 
evidence. 
Reversed and remanded. 
*274 Priscilla Ruth MacDougall (argued), Kathleen Hamby, Madison, Wis., Mary C. 
Corporon, Kellie F. Williams, Corporon and Williams, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Lynn D. Wardle (argued), Orem, Richard M. Taylor, Spanish Fork, for defendant and 
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Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Kathleen Han\by (Hamby) appeals from the trial court's order that two of her children bear 
the surname of their father, from whom Hamby is divorced, rather than her surname. We reverse. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Kathleen Hamby and Gail Jacobson are the natural parents of two children, both born out of 
wedlock. Their first child, named Kelly Lynn Hamby on his birth certificate, was born in June 1983. 
In November 1983, Hamby married Gail Jacobson (Jacobson) and assumed Jacobson as her 
surname. After the parties married, they agreed to change Kelly's surname to Jacobson. Although 
Hamby signed forms changing Kelly's name, the papers were never filed with the State of Utah. 
Hamby also had a son from a previous marriage who bore the surname Hamby, the surname of 
Hamby's prior husband. 
During their marriage, Hamby became pregnant with the parties' second child. Shortly 
thereafter, Hamby filed for divorce from Jacobson. The parties executed a stipulation which 
provided, among other things, that Hamby be awarded custody of the parties' two children and that 
she resume her pre- marriage name of Hamby. The only issue remaining was whether Kelly and the 
unborn child should use Jacobson or Hamby as their surname. 
On March 14, 1985, Judge J. Robert Bullock held a trial regarding the children's surnames. 
Jacobson was unable to attend the hearing because of his job. Hamby appeared and testified that 
Jacobson was verbally and physically abusive to Kelly during the marriage, drunk more often than 
sober and unwilling to work. Hamby also stated that Jacobson had a reputation in their small town 
as a fighter and a drinker. In addition, Hamby testified that Jacobson had hit Kelly with a board, 
causing loss of upward motion in his left eye and that no treatment was available for Kelly's eye. 
Hamby further testified that Jacobson had not seen Kelly sinee the parties had separated in October 
1984 
\\ hen asked wh> the children should bear the surname Hamby, Hamby testiiied that it all 
family members had the same last name, the family members would be closer and more secure. 
Hamby also said she was raised in a home where the family members had different last names and 
the name differences adverseh alfected famih seeunt) A school ps\ehologist, Mr I)o\\ne\, 
testified that generally, different surnames in a family disrupt the children's identity with themselves 
and their family, divide famih unity, adverse!) affect seeunt) and could hinder development. 
However, *275 Mr. Downey also testified that some children in lamihes with multiple surnames are 
not adversely affected, and the surname issue should be examined on a case-b) -case basis. 
I he court granted the parties' divorce on April 1 1, 19X5, restored Kathleen Jacobson to her 
former name of Hamby, permitted Kelh to retain Hamby as his surname, and ordered that the 
unborn child bear the surname Jacobson. The court stated that either party could file a petition to 
change Kelly's or the unborn child's name within thirty days of the expected child's birth II) • 
younger child, Kevin, was born on April 13, 1985, two days after the divorce was granted. 
After Kevin's birth, Hamby filed a petition to change his surname to Hamby. She relied on 
her testimony before Judge Bullock to support her claim that Kevin should use the Hamby surname 
Jacobson filed a reply and petition, claiming that both Kelly and Kevin should bear his surname 
because he was their father. On October 24, 1985, Judge Ray Harding, newly assigned to the case, 
held an informal conference in chambers. Judge Harding stated that the best way to proceed with 
the case would be by proffers of evidence and that the principal issue was a matter of law. Hamby's 
attorney proffered that Hamby would testify as follows, that she and her eleven-year-old son used 
the name Hamby, her name from a prior marriage; that her two-year-old son, Kelly, was named 
11 nnby on his birth certificate and continued to use Hamby; that although Hamby and Jacobson 
Ji mussed changing Kelly's name to Jacobson, the change was never made; and that she followed 
the court's prior order that Kevin be given the surname Jacobson. Further, Hamby's attorney 
proffered that Hamby believed all her children should have the same last name and that it would he 
in Kelly and Kevin's best interests to bear the name Hamby. Hamb> also proffered that Jacobson 
was unfit and bearing his name might create problems for Kelly and Kevin. Jacobson's attorney 
proffered that Jacobson would testify that he was not a saint, but his behavior was not so terrible as 
to require taking his name from the children and further, that Hamby's character and behavior wen* 
also negative. 
Vtter taking the parties' proffers, the court directed both parties to file memoranda. Attached 
to Hamby's memorandum was a letter from Richard Parks, the Educational Coordinator of The 
Spafford School, stating that it is important to all children fh.il they know they are part of a famih' 
in all possible ways, both actual and symbolic. 
Subsequently, the court i tiled that "it is in the best interest of the parties minor children, Kelly 
Lynn and Kevin D , to be known by the surname Jacobsoii" I lie ruling stated as follows. The court 
bases this ruling on the following reasons: 1) the lather-child relationship will be strengthened by 
the children bearing the name Jacobson while not harming the mother-child relationship, 2) there 
is no embarrassment or inconvenience associated with an explanation of why their mother's surname 
is different since divorce is a common occurrence, 3) the children are too young to be accustomed 
to the surname Hamby, 4) Hamby is not the mother's maiden name, 5) there is no embarrassment 
because of defendant's alleged bad reputation, and 6) the children will always be identified with at 
least one natural parent by being known as Jacobson The i ourl finds unpersuasive plaintiffs 
arguments that it would be beneficial for Kevin and Kelly to be known by Hamby as their mother 
and step [brother]. Were custody to change, Kevin and Kelly would be faced with the same situation 
plaintiff now seeks to avoid. Furthermore, were plaintiff to remarry [,] Kevin and Kelly would again 
have a surname other than of at least one of their custodial parents. Of paramount concern to the 
court is the fact that Kevin and Kelly should both bear the same name to avoid any implications of 
illegitimacy which might arise if asked why *276 brothers of the same natural father have different 
last names. Finally, the court notes that the law provides that the children may petition for a name 
change if they so desire when they are old enough to make an intelligent decision. 
On appeal, Hamby claims that (1) the court erred in utilizing the standard of the children's 
best interests; and (2) even if that standard is legally correct, the evidence does not support the 
court's conclusion that use of the surname Jacobson is in the best interests of the children. 
APPROPRIATE TEST FOR CHILD'S NAME CHANGE 
Traditionally, legitimate children in the United States have borne their father's surname. In 
re Schiffinan, 28 Cal.3d 640, 169 Cal.Rptr. 918, 920- 21, 620 P.2d 579, 581-82 (1980); Note, The 
Controversy over Children's Surnames: Familial Autonomy, Equal Protection and the Child's Best 
Interests, 1979 Utah L.Rev. 303, 306 (hereinafter Utah Note). However, this tradition has been 
eroded in more recent times, as parents have chosen other methods of naming their children, both 
legitimate and illegitimate. Simultaneously, women have, with increasing frequency, opted to retain 
their birth names after marriage, or select a surname other than their husband's. Utah Note, 1979 
Utah L.Rev. at 306. Most states, including Utah, have no statutes which dictate a child's surname, 
and parents may, therefore, select any one of several possible surnames, including the maternal 
surname, the paternal surname, a combination of the maternal and paternal surnames or a surname 
unrelated to either parent. [FN 1] Id. 
FN1. The Utah Department of Health, however, has promulgated rules in connection with 
the issuance of birth certificates and vital statistics, which recognize the parents' right to choose a 
child's surname and state that if the mother is married, the child usually receives, but is not required 
to receive, the paternal surname. "Guidelines for Reporting Name of Father and Surname of Child 
on the Birth Certificate" (revised October 5, 1981); Utah Code Ann. s 26-1-5 (1984). According 
to the rule, when parents disagree, the sole consideration should be the best interests of the child. 
However, when a child's mother is not married, she has considerable latitude in determining her 
child's surname. Even if she names the father on the birth certificate, she can give the child a 
surname different from the father's. The Utah Department of Health amended the rule in 1988 to 
provide that "[i]f the parents disagree on the child's name and they have never married each other 
or are separated or divorced, the custodial parent shall determine the child's name." Thus, the rule 
mandates consideration of the child's best interests when the parents are married, but allows a 
custodial preference in instances of no marriage, separation or divorce. 
In the trial court proceedings, Jacobson argued that there should be a presumption that the 
paternal surname be used. Indeed, some courts in the past followed the view that a father has a 
protectible or primary interest in having his children bear his surname, unless he has forfeited that 
right by misconduct or neglect. In re Spate, 199 Neb. 332, 258 N.W.2d 814, 815 (1977); In re 
Harris, 160 W.Va. 422, 236 S.E.2d 426, 428-29 (1977). The Harris court relied on the 
"long-standing social convention" that the child bears the father's surname. Harris, 236 S.E.2d at 
429. That social convention evolved from the common law view that a married woman had "little 
ICLM identity apart from hei 1 msband's." Schiffman, 16(> Ca! Rptr. at 9_0, o2u P.2d at 581. 
I lo\\e\er. our society no longer adheres to the notion that the husband is the sole legal representative 
of the family, its property and children, and therefore able to unilaterally determine the surname of 
the couple's children. Id. On appeal, however, Jacobsor. ". " -.:- * ^ 'ha' the Hal court applied the 
appropriate test of the children's best interests. 
Hamby, on the other hand, argues that \ :iah .should adopt -i rebuttable presumption that the 
custodial parent's choice of a imame governs That position \va propouiuii 1 h> Justice Mosk o\ 
the California Supreme Coui* \\\ a concurring opinion in Schiffman. Mosk reasoned that the 
custodial parent normally makes decisions regarding such matters as children's health, education and 
religious upbringing, and that choice of a surname should be similarly handled. Id. 169 Cal.Rptr. 
at 923-24, *277 620 P.2d at 584-85. However, most recent court decisions have both rejected the 
notion that there is a preieren, ;-r the paternal name and failed to adopt a preference lor custodial 
parent choice, preferring to ioiso\\ the rule that a name change request should be granted onl> if the 
court finds the name change is in the best interests of the child. Laks v. I.aks. J5 Ariz. Apr. 58. 540 
P.2d 1277, 1280 (1975); Schiffman. 169 Cal.Rptr. at 922, 620 P.2d at 583: Hamman %. County 
Court, 753 P.2d 743, 749 (Colo. 1988); Sullivan v. McGaw, 134 Ill.App.3d 455, 89 Ill.Dec. 540, 
547; 480 N.E.2d 1283, 1291 (1985); Aitken County Family Serv. Agency v. Girard, 390 N.W.2d 
906, 908-09 (Minn.App.1986); Bobo v. Jewell 38 Ohio St.3d 330, 528 N.E.2d 180, 184 (1988); 
Daves v. Nastos, 105 Wash.2d 24, 711 P.2d 314, 318 (1985) "I he issue has not been specifically 
decided by the Utah appellate courts. 
In Schiffman, the court addressed the issue by first noting that the long-standing rule in 
custody disputes that the mother is the preferred custodian of young children had been abolished in 
order to equalize the rights of parents. Similarly,, laws had been promulgated to eliminate legal 
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children. I aws eliminating such distinctions mean 
that "[t]he Legislature clearly has articulated the policy that irrational, sex-based differences in 
marital and parental rights should end and that parental disputes about children should be resolved 
in accordance with each child's best interest." Schiffman, 169 Cal.Rptr. at 921, 620 P.2d at 582. In 
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 11 7 ( I Jtah 1986), the I Jtah Supreme Court similarly rejected the 
maternalistic or tender years presumption in ch ild custody cases. The Court: noted that tbe'niaternal 
preference violates article IV, section 1 of the Utah Constitution's gender bias prohibition, and also 
"perpetuates outdated stereotypes." Id. at 120. Because the maternal presumption is not based on 
present day reality, the Court found it fails to truly evaluate the child's best interests. Accordingly, 
the Court held that instead of arbitrarily applying a maternal presumption, child custody should be 
determined with resort: to factors focusing on the best interests of the child Id 
i 1] We find that under the rationale of Pusey, a paternal preference for a child's surname is 
improper, just as would be a preference for the maternal surname. However, we are unwilling to 
adopt a presumption in favor ol the choice of the custodial parent, finding that the best interests of 
the child test can appropriate!} include consideration of the custodial situation of the child, as well 
as other relevant factors See Schiffman, 169 Cal.Rptr. at 922, 620 P.2d at 58> W • therefore. boK; 
that the best interests of the cimd is the paramount consideration in determining whether a chikf 
nameshould be changed. Id. h-H al.Rptr. at 920,.620P.2dat581; Sullivan, 8" Ill.Dec. at 54~.4X' 
N.E.2d at 1291 • Robo. 528 N.L2d at 184-85. 
APPLICATION OF BEST INTERESTS LES'l 
[2J In determinint' a child's best interests, courts have considered factors incr.Muh- 1 > tin, 
child's preference in \\MW ->f tlu: child's age and experience, Daves, " : ; P. \ i at MS; .": • the efleci o\ 
a name change on the development and preservation of the child's relationship with each parent, Id.; 
3) the length of time a child has used a name, Daves, 711 P.2d at 318; Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A.2d 
539 (D.C.1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 975, 92 S.Ct. 1196, 31 L.Ed.2d 249 (1972); 4) the 
difficulties, harrassment or embarrassment a child may experience from bearing the present or 
proposed name, Schiffman, 169 Cal.Rptr. at 922, 620 P.2d at 583; In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 
301 (Minn. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034, 102 S.Ct. 1737, 72 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982); 5) the 
possibility that a different name may cause insecurity and lack of identity, In re Spatz, 258 N.W.2d 
at 815; and 6) the motive or interests of the custodial parent, In re Omelson, 112 Ill.App.3d 725, 68 
Ill.Dec. 307, 311,445 N.E.2d 951, 955 (1983). We believe that these factors and perhaps others may 
be relevant, but that courts should apply only those factors present in the particular circumstances 
of each case. Bobo, 528 N.E.2d at 185. Further, because the *278 child's best interests is dependent 
upon the particular facts in a case, the court should enter findings of fact which state the reasons for 
granting or denying the application to change the child's name. See Daves, 711 P.2d at 318. 
We also point out that lip-service to the best interests of the child should not be used as a 
subterfuge to nevertheless perpetuate the paternal preference. See Utah Note, 1979 Utah L.Rev. at 
327. That possibility was particularized in Bobo v. Jewell, 528 N.E.2d at 184-85, as follows: We 
caution the courts, however, to refrain from defining the best-interest- of-the-child test as purporting 
to give primary or greater weight to the father's interest in having the child bear the paternal 
surname. While it may be a custom to name a child after the father, giving greater weight to the 
father's interest fails to consider that, where the parents have never been married, the mother has at 
least an equal interest in having the child bear the maternal surname. In these times of parental 
equality, arguing that the child of unmarried parents should bear the paternal surname based on 
custom is another way of arguing that it is permissible to discriminate because the discrimination 
has endured for many years. [FN2] 
FN2. While this quotation refers to unmarried parents, we think it applies equally to children 
born to a married couple. We would hope, however naively, that disputes about children's names 
between spouses in an ongoing marriage would be handled outside of the courtroom. 
[3] In addition, we observe that ascertaining the best interests of a child is a factual, not a 
legal, determination. This notion has been intimated in Utah decisions involving the best interests 
of a child in custody and visitation disputes. For example, in Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 425 
(Utah 1986), the Court stated: Because the proper adjudication of custody matters "is highly 
dependent upon personal equations which the trial court is in an advantaged position to appraise," 
this Court will not overturn a trial court's custody determination on appeal unless the evidence 
clearly shows that the custody determination was not in the best interests of the child or that the trial 
court misapplied applicable principles of law. Similarly, in Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 
223 (Utah 1987), the Court noted that "the task of determining the best interests of the child in a 
custody dispute is for the trial judge, who has the opportunity to personally observe and evaluate the 
witnesses." See Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (visitation dispute). 
Determination of the child's best interests is the ultimate factual conclusion in a custody case or one 
involving a child's surname. Traditional appellate principles afford the trial judge great deference 
in making factual determinations, based in large part on his/her opportunity to observe witnesses. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
In this case, unfortunately, there was scant live testimony, and most of it occurred before 
Judge Bullock, w\\o ,hu not . innately decide me issue Moil; parlies stipulated to proffers o\ 
testimony in from ol judge Harding, who encouraged the stipulate : i>\ im remark that the principal 
issue was a question of law. not tact. This was error, as the only legal issue before the court was the 
appropriate test to apph in th - matter The court correcth determined that the test was the best 
interests of the children, but incorrect:} implied that application of the test to the facts was an 
exercise designed to arrive at a legal conclusion. As stated in Fullmer v. Hillmer. 761 P.2d g42. l>45 
(I Jtah Ct.App. 1988 K when the evidence consists only of proffers w :ae trui COUM. the appellate court 
is "in as good a position to review the proffer as was the trial court, as no assessment of witness 
credibility occurred below 1 lierefore, we review the facts and draw our own legal conclusions 
therefrom." We also note that in cases involving the best interests of a child and competing claims 
by parents of the child, demeanor and credibility of witnesses is particular!) critical, and use of 
proffers should be discourager " at w-* '' 
*279 FINDING THAT CHILDREN'S BHST INTERESTS REQIIIRED PATERNAL 
Si KVWfF 
S l a i i u c i i v i \tl 1\L V k \* 
We now examine the ti; ti court's ultimate finding thai
 t: v : ;u ine children's best interests 
to bear the surname •acobso- We re\ :cw th. uial court' rndings under a clearly erroneous 
standard and will not disturb th^se findings unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence. 
or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conuetion that a mistake ha** beer, 
made State v " ^ P - ~^P \} ! 91, 193 (Utah 1987». 
Sufficiency of Evidence 
[4] The court fused :;.-. ^ -\ interests finding on several enumerated factors First, the trial 
court examined the eflect ol i-i; name change on the children s r -sanon^hip \ ith their lather and 
mother. The court found thai the children's use of the Jacobson surname would strengthen the 
father-child relationship and not harm the mother-child relationship Howe\ er. the record contains 
no evidence that use of Jacobson would strengthen the father-child relationship. Further, Mr. 
Downey's testimony established that use of the Jacobson surname may divide family unity, thus 
harming the mother-child relationship. Therefore, the evidence indicates that use of Jacobson would 
adversely affect the mother-child relationship and the court's finding to the contrary is clearly 
erroneous. 
Second, the court found 'that the children would not suffer embarra^nk; n or nnum I-IIIL-HU-
if their surname were different from their mother's since divorce is a common occurrence However. 
there is no support for this proposition in the record. Contrary to the finding, Hamby testified that 
in her experience, different surnames within a family adversely affect security and family closeness. 
A A
 Downey stated that different surnames in a family usually disrupt children's identity with 
^^ase lves and the family, divide family unity, adversely affect security and could hinder 
development. Mr. Parks's letter, which was attached to Hamby's memorandum, states that it is 
important for children, to know that they are part of a family~both symbolically and actual!\ 
Therefore, the clear weight of the evidence is contrary to the court's finding and supports a finding 
t' ' the children would suffer embarrassment, insecurity, identity problems and have less tamily 
I if they used surnames different from other family members. 
Third, the court found that the children were too young to be acvA^iomeu u» the surname 
Hamby. Although no evidence was submitted regarding whether changing the children's names at 
their young age would have am Tfect upon then •• ^ lairly i.lm.u; mat the children wouio not be 
especially accustomed TO tneir imame-. In an\ e\ent. in this case the length of time \\:v eirldien 
have used their surnames appears to be of little assistance in determining the children's best interests. 
The court's fourth reason for ordering the children to bear the name Jacobson was because 
Hamby is not the mother's maiden name. Although the court correctly stated that Hamby is not the 
mother's maiden name, the court did not intimate why that fact was relevant to the children's best 
interests. Therefore, the finding does not support the ultimate conclusion. 
The court also found that the children would not be embarrassed to bear the Jacobson 
surname due to Jacobson's alleged bad reputation. That finding is not only unsupported by the 
evidence but also against the clear weight of the evidence. Hamby testified that Jacobson has a 
reputation as a drinker and a fighter, was verbally and physically abusive towards Kelly, and drunk 
more often than sober. Hamby also testified that Jacobson hit Kelly with a board causing Kelly to 
lose upward motion in his eye. Jacobson's proffered testimony was that he was not a saint, but his 
behavior was not so terrible as to justify taking his name from the children. Accordingly, the clear 
weight of the evidence supports the opposite finding, namely that Jacobson had a reputation that may 
embarrass children bearing his surname. 
*280 The court's sixth finding was that the children, by bearing the name Jacobson, would 
always be identified with at least one natural parent. The uncontroverted evidence indicated that 
Hamby did not intend to change her surname even if she remarried. Therefore, although it is logical 
that the children's use of Jacobson would always identify them with one natural parent, it is also true 
that use of Hamby as their surname would yield the same result. 
The court also found that the children would not benefit from having the same last name as 
their mother and stepbrother. However, Hamby, Mr. Downey and Mr. Parks testified to the contrary 
that the children would benefit from having the same surname as the rest of the family, and there was 
no evidence to the opposite effect. Therefore, that finding is clearly erroneous. 
The court also stated that "were plaintiff to remarry Kevin and Kelly would again have a 
surname other than at least one of their custodial parents." However, because the unrefuted evidence 
established that Hamby would not change her name upon remarriage, by bearing the Hamby 
surname, the children would always bear the same name as one custodial parent. On the contrary, 
if the children bore the name Jacobson, they would have a name different from either custodial 
parent and their stepbrother. 
Finally, the court found that Kelly and Kevin should have the same surname to avoid 
implications of illegitimacy since they have the same father. Again, there is no evidence to support 
that finding, and it is equally true that if all family members bear the Hamby surname, implications 
of illegitimacy would be unlikely. 
Conclusion 
Based on our analysis of the evidence, we find that there was insufficient evidence, as a 
matter of law, to support the court's order that the children bear the surname Jacobson, and that the 
clear weight of the evidence established that it is in the best interests of Kelly and Kevin that they 
bear the surname Hamby. 
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order in accordance with this opinion. 
BENCH and DAVIDSON, JJ., concur. 
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COLORADO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 1. SCOPE OF RULES, ONE FORM OF ACTION, COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION, 
SERVICE OF PROCESS, PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND ORDERS 
Copr. ©West 1996. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through July 1. 1996 
RULE 4. PROCESS 
(a) To What Applicable. This Rule applies to all process except as otherwise provided by these rules. 
(b) Issuance of Summons by Attorney or Clerk. The summons may be signed and issued by the clerk, under the 
seal of the court, or it may be signed and issued by the attorney for the plaintiff. Separate additional or amended 
summons may issue against any defendant at any time. All other process shall be issued by the clerk, except as 
otherwise provided in these rules. 
(c) Contents of Summons. The summons shall contain the name of the court, the county in which the action is 
brought, the names or designation of the parties, shall be directed to the defendant, shall state the time within which the 
defendant is required to appear and defend against the claims of the complaint, and shall notify him that in case of his 
failure to do so, judgment by default may be rendered against him. If the summons is served by publication, the 
summons shall briefly state the sum of money or other relief demanded. The summons shall in the signature element 
thereof, contain the name, address, and registration number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and if not, the address of 
the plaintiff. Except in case of service by publication under Rule 4(h) or when otherwise ordered by the court, the 
complaint shall be served with the summons, and in all other cases service of a summons alone after the effective date of 
this amended rule shall not constitute service of process. In any case, where by special order personal service of 
summons is allowed without the complaint, a copy of the order shall be served with the summons. 
(d) By Whom Served. Process may be served: 
(1) Within the state, by the sheriff of the county where the service is made, or by his deputy, or by any other person over 
the age of eighteen years, not a party to the action; 
(2) At any other place by a sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, deputy constable, bailiff, deputy bailiff, or other officer 
having like powers and duties of the political subdivision in which the service is made or an officer authorized by the 
laws of this state to take acknowledgements in such political subdivision to deeds conveying real estate situate in this 
state or an attorney, counselor at law, solicitor, advocate, barrister duly qualified to practice law in such political 
subdivision or a person specially commissioned to serve process by the court in which the action is pending. 
(e) Personal Service in State. Personal service within the state shall be as follows: 
(1) Upon a natural person over the age of eighteen years by delivering a copy or copies thereof to him personally, or by 
leaving a copy or copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode, with some member of his family over the 
age of eighteen years, or at his usual place of business, with his stenographer, bookkeeper, or chief clerk; or by 
delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process; 
' >., , j,,j!i::.j'peiM-: ? ,M . . .
 til^ . . t • •,.. s..en wai.. and -iuiiu^ii years, by 'delivering a copy thereof to such 
pci son and another eop\ uiueoi !o i . *aihei Miciiiu. or guardian, or if there be none in the state, then by delivering a 
copy liiereol to any person in whose care or control he may be; or with whom he resides, or in whose service he is 
employed; and upon a natural person under the age of thirteen years by delivering a copy to his lather, mother, or 
guardian; 
(3) I Ipon a person for whom a conservator has K er. appon-t.-.i ! • -:eli\ c? mi: .< •; - nu *^i to such conservator. 
(4) Upon a partnership, or other unincorporated associate u u\ ennr .1 ui, IKIU •. > one or more of the partners 
or associates, or a managing or general agent thereof; 
(5) Upon a private corporation, by delivering a copy thereof to any officer, manager, general agent, or registered agent. 
If no such officer or agent can be found in the county in which the action is brought, such copy may be delivered to any 
stockholder, agent, member, or principal employee found in such count}. If such service is upon a person other than an 
executive officer, the secretary, general agent, or registered agent, then the clerk sh.il! m;-.d a copy thereof to the 
corporation at its last known address, at least twenty days before default is entered; 
(6) Upon a municipal coi poration 1: ] ; del i\ ei nig a copy thei eol to the mayor or clerk or deputy elei k of" such 
corporation; 
(7) I Jpon a count\*, 1: y deli /e 1 ing a cop\ thereof to the county clerk or his chief deputy; 
(8) Upon a school district, by delivering a copy thereol to the clerk 01 om- of irn directors of such school district; 
(9) "I Jpon ,the state by delivermg a eop\ thereof to the attorney general, oi u> ar empU>\<.-e in his office designated by 
hull to accept service of process; 
(10)(A) Upon .an officer, agent, or employee of the state, acting in his official capacity, by delivering a cop> thereof to 
the officer, agent, or employee, and by delivering a. copy to the attorney general, 01 to any employee in his office 
designated by him to accept service of process. 
(B) Upon a department or agency of the state, subject to suit, by delivering a copy thereof to the principal officer, chief 
clerk, or other executive employee thereof, and by delivering a copy to the attorney general or any employee 111 his 
office designated by him to accept sen ice of process 
(C) For all purposes the date of service upon the officei, agem, employee, department, or agency -nan ^on 1101. except 
that failure to serve copies upon the attorney general within three days of service upon the officer, agent, employee. 
department, or agency shall extend the tune within which the officer, agent, employee, departm..:nt. >r acer.c\ must hie a 
responsive pleading for sixty' days beyon-ri the imic otherwise provided bv these Rules. 
(f) Personal Service Outside the State. Personal sen ice outside the stale im\ he made 
(1) In any action, upon a natural person over the age oi eighteen \ea?s ul»-- -\ resident ui tlu> siaK. •• ^iu- i> a 
nonresident of this state and who has sub m itied to t M has become sub 1 ex i in ia^ • i tie j u 11 auction of the v ou rt -^ >; 
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registered agent, or when the registered agent appointed cannot be found at the registered office; 
(D) Nonresidents of the state; persons who have departed from the state without intention of returning; persons who 
conceal themselves to avoid service of process; or persons whose whereabouts are unknown and who cannot be served 
by personal service in the state. 
(h) Publication. The party desiring service of process by publication shall file a motion verified by the oath of such 
party or of someone in his behalf for an order of publication. It shall state the facts authorizing such service, and shall 
show the efforts, if any, that have been made to obtain personal service within this state and shall give the address, or 
last known address, of each person to be served or shall state that his address and last known address are unknown. The 
court shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied that due diligence has been used to obtain personal service within 
this state or that efforts to obtain the same would have been to no avail shall order publication of the process in a 
newspaper published in the county in which the action is pending. Such publication shall be made for four weeks. 
Within fifteen days after the order the clerk shall mail a copy of the process to each person whose address or last known 
address has been stated in the motion. Service shall be complete on the day of the last publication. If 
CR-CP. Rule 304 
WESTS COLORADO REVISED STATUTES ANNOTATED 
WEST'S COLORADO COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
COLORADO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 25. RULES OF COUNTY COURT CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Copr. © West 1996. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through July 1, 1996 
RULE 304. SERVICE OF PROCESS 
(a) To What Applicable. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, all process shall be served in the same manner 
as service of a summons and complaint. 
(b) Initial Process. Except in cases of service by publication under Rule 304(E), the complaint and a blank copy of the 
answer form shall be served with the summons, and in all other cases service of a summons alone after the effective date 
of this amended rule shall not constitute service of process. 
(c) By Whom Served. The summons and complaint may be served inside or outside this state, by the sheriff of the 
county where the service is made, or by the sheriffs deputy, or by any other person over the age of eighteen years, not a 
parts' to the action. 
(d) Personal Service. Personal service of the summons and complaint shall be as follows: 
(1) Upon a natural person over the age of eighteen years, by dehvering a copy thereof to the person, or leaving a copy at 
the person's usual place of abode, with any person over the age of eighteen years who is a member of the person's family 
, or at the person's usual place of business, with the person's secretary, bookkeeper, or chief clerk; or by delivering a 
copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. 
(2) Upon a natural person under the age of eighteen years, by delivering a copy thereof to the person and a copy thereof 
to the person's father, mother, or guardian, or if there be none in the state, then by dehvering a copy thereof to any 
person in whose care or control the person may be, or with whom the person resides, or in whose service the person is 
employed 
(3) Upon a person for whom a conservator has been appointed, by dehvering a copy thereof to such conservator. 
(4) Upon a partnership, or other unincorporated association, by dehvering a copy thereof to one or more of the partners 
or associates, or a managing or general agent thereof. 
(5) Upon a private corporation, by delivering a copy thereof to any officer, manager, general agent, or agent for 
process. If no such office or agent can be found in the county in which the action is brought, such copy may be 
delivered to any stockholder, agent, member or principal employee found in such county. If such service be upon a 
person other than an executive officer, the secretary, general agent, or agent for process, then the clerk shall mail a copy 
thereof to the corporation at its last known address, at least fifteen days before default is entered. 
(6) Upon a municipal corporation, by delivering a copy thereof to the mayor or clerk of such corporation. 
(7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy thereof to the county clerk and recorder or chief deputy. 
(8) Upon a school district, by delivering a copy thereof to the clerk or one of the directors of such school district. 
(9) Upon a department or agency of the state, subject to suit, by delivering a copy thereof to the principal officer, chief 
clerk, or other executive employee thereof. 
(e) Other Service. Service by mail or publication shall be allowed only in actions affecting specific property or status 
or other proceedmgs in rem. When service is by publication, the complaint need not be published with the summons. 
The party desiring sen ice of process by mail or publication shall file a motion verified by the oath of such part} or of 
someone in the parry's behalf for an order of service by mail or publication. It shall state the facts authorizing such 
service, and shall show the efforts, if any, that have been made to obtain personal service and shall give the address, or 
last known address, of each person to be served or shall state that this address and last known address are unknown 
The court shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied that due diligence has been used to obtain personal service or 
that efforts to obtain the same would have been to no avail, shall: 
(1) Order the clerk to send by registered or certified mail a copy of the summons and a copy of the complaint, 
addressed to such person at such address, requesting a return receipt signed by addressee only Such service shall be 
complete on the date of the filing of the clerk's proof thereof, together with such return receipt attached thereto signed by 
such addressee, or 
(2) Order publication of the summons in a newspaper published in the county in which the action is pending. Such 
publication shall be made for four weeks. Within fifteen days after the order the clerk shall mail a copy of the summons 
and complaint to each person whose address or last known address has been stated in the motion. Service shall be 
completed on the day of the last publication. If no newspaper be published in the county, the court shall designate one 
in some adjoining count} 
(3), (4) Deleted effective January 1. 1994. 
(f) Manner of Proof. 
(1) If served in a state or territory of the United States by a sheriff or United States marshal, or a deputy, by such 
persons's certificate with a statement as to date, place and manner of service. 
(2) If by any other person, by the person's affidavit thereof, with the same statement. 
(I) to (IV) Deleted effective January 1, 1994. 
(3) If by mail, by the certificate of the clerk showing the date of the mailing, and the date the clerk received the return 
receipt. 
(4) If by publication, by the affidavit of publication, together with the certificate of the clerk as to the mailing of copy of 
the summons where required. 
(5) By the written admission or waiver of service by the person to be served, duly acknowledged 
(g) Amendment. At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any summons 
or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial 
rights of the party against whom the summons issued. 
(h) Refusal of Copy. If a person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the summons and complaint, service shall be 
sufficient if the person serving the documents knows or has reason to identify the person who refuses to be served, 
identifies the documents being served as a summons and complaint, and offers to deliver a copy of the documents to the 
person who refuses to be served. 
(i), (j) Deleted eflecti\e Januan 1. 1994 
CRH)II(S) 
1996 Electronic Pocket Part Update 
Amended effective January 1. 1994 
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CROSS REFERENCES 
1990 Main Volume 
Power to issue process, see § 13-6-307 
Related rules of practice, 
Civil practice generally, see Civil Procedure Rule 4 
Small claims courts, see Civil Procedure Rule 504 
Service of process upon persons subject to state court jurisdiction, see § 13- 1-125 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
1990 Maui Volume 
Corporations'®^ 507(1) to (15), 668(1) to (16) 
Process<®==> 8 to 150, 154, 162 to 165 
WESTLAW Topics Nos 101,313 
C J S Corporations §§ 1306 to 1322, 1937 to 1949 
C J S Process §§ 2 to 92, 101 to 105 
Colorado Crvil Tnal Practice. Vol 6(1986) DeMuro §§ 104, 110, 112, 113, 
116,117 
Colorado Methods of Practice, Rev.3d Ed, Vol 1A (1989). Krendl, §§ 752, 812, 
848 
Rules Civ Proc , County Court Rule 304 
CO ST CTY CT RCP Rule 304 
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Juvenile Procedure Rule 6.1 
WEST'S COLORADO REVISED STATUTES ANNOTATED 
TITLE 19. CHILDREN'S CODE 
APPENDIX 
CHAPTER 28. COLORADO RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE 
PART SIX. ADOPTION AND RELINQUISHMENT 
Copr. C1 West 1996. All rights reserved 
Current with amendments received through July 1. 1996 
RULE 6.1. SERVICE BY PUBLICATION 
Affidavits in support of motions for service by publication shall be governed by C.R.C.P. 4(h). and shall include a 
detailed statement of the specific efforts made to locate an absent parent. A single publication is sufficient. 
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LIBRARY REFERENCES 
1990 Main Volume 
Adoption*©^ 12. 
WESTLAW Topic No. 17. 
C I S . Adoption of Persons §§ 78 to 86. 
Juvenile Procedure Rule 6.1 
COSTJUVPRule6.1 
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Juvenile Procedure Rule 6.3 
WEST'S COLORADO REVISED STATUTES ANNOTATED 
TITLE 19. CHILDREN'S CODE 
APPENDIX 
CHAPTER 28. COLORADO RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE 
PART SIX. ADOPTION AND RELINQUISHMENT 
Copr €< West 1996. All rights reserved 
Current with amendments received through July 1, 1996 
RULE 6.3. RELINQUISHMENT 
(1) Even7 petition in relinquishment shall contain the following: 
(a) All information required by Section 19-5-103, C.R.S.; 
(b) A statement as to venue being proper; and 
(c) A statement if the relmquishment is part of a designated adoption, with particular details as to the designation and 
whether any fees or costs are being paid by the prospective adoptive parent(s). 
(2) Prior to the hearing on relmquishment. a copy of a report shall be filed with the court by a count} department of 
social services or licensed child placement agency detailing the counseling provided to the petitioneds). 
(3) Any motion for service by publication of an absent parent shall be governed by C.R.C.P. 4(h). and an affidavit must 
accompany the motion detailing what steps have been taken to determine the whereabouts of the absent parent. A single 
publication is sufficient. 
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LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
1990 Main Volume 
Representing the Mentally Retarded or Disabled Parent. 11 Coio.Law. 693 (March 1982) 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
1990 Main Volume 
Infants<®^ 19.4 
WESTLAW Topic No. 211. 
C I S . Adoption of Persons §§ 10 to 12. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Burden of proof 2 
Findings 3 1. Service of papers 
Rehearing 4 
Service of papers 1 "Paper," within purview of rule requiring party who 
files "paper" to serve copy of such "paper" on adverse service requirements of rule applied to motion for 
party not later than 48 hours alter filing, was not termination of parental rights, in view of fact that 
limited to discovery papers and it encompassed types Juvenile Procedure Rule was silent as to tune period 
of paper listed as well as similar paper; therefore. within which motion to terminate parental rights should 
be served People in interest of MM., 1986, 726P.2d 1108. 
2. Burden of proof 
Burden of proof in proceeding to terminate parental rights is by preponderance of evidence, not by clear and convuicuig 
proof People in Interest of B. J. D . App.1981. 626 P.2d 727. 
3. Findings 
Evidence supported trial court's findings of mistake and excusable neglect on the part of the parents, who had filed a 
petition to relinquish all their rights and obligations with respect to their child, and the findings that the parents were 
developmentally disabled, mentally retarded, and did not understand the finality of relinquishment. Petition of J. B. P.. 
App.1980. 608P.2d847, 44 Colo.App. 95. 
4. Rehearing 
Colorado rule of juvenile procedure, requiring that a motion for new trial or rehearing be made within ten days of entry 
of the order or decree, was inapphcable where the court did not inform the parents, who were not represented by counsel 
in proceeding on petition to relinquish their parental rights and obhgations with respect to their child, that a motion for 
new trial or rehearing had to be made within ten days; accordingly, the parents' new trial motion was governed by. and 
timely under, rule of civil procedure allowing such a motion to be filed not later than 15 days after entry of judgment. 
Petition of J. B. P., App.1980,608 P.2d 847, 44 Colo.App. 95. 
Juvenile Procedure Rule 6.3 
CO ST JUV P Rule 6.3 
END OF DOCUMENT 
ADDENDUM D 
DOCUMENTS FROM TRIAL RECORD AND FILE 
Mark K. Stringer, #4418 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
37 East Center, Second Floor 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATTIE S. CHRISTENSEN, nka ] 
PATTI BRUBAKER ] 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
DANIEL R. CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
i MEMORANDUM ON 
| NAME CHANGE FOR A | MINOR CHILD 
1 Civil No. 88-400 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, by and through counsel, and as and for 
a Memorandum on the matter of the name change for the minor 
child, submits the following: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Petitioner is the Plaintiff in his matter, and is aware 
of no other proceeding in any other jurisdiction concerning the 
matters addressed by this Petition. 
2. The parties were divorced 17 May, 1990, in this 
jurisdiction. That Decree was amended by Stipulation, nunc pro 
tunc, to reflect the date of June 26, 1989. 
3. Since the February, 1988, separation of the parties, the 
child, born in August, 1987, has resided exclusively with the 
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Plaintiff, who has provided all of the parental care and 
supervision, through the date of the plaintiff's marriage to Mr. 
Brubaker. 
4. Plaintiff and her present husband have been married since 
October, 1989, and the minor child has resided with them as their 
child. The child was the age of 2 at this time. 
5. In or about July, 1991, the Plaintiff filed in Colorado 
20th District Court in Boulder, Colorado, Case No. 91C3447-10, a 
Motion for the change of the child's name to that of Brubaker, to 
allow the child to legally feel associated with the family with 
whom she was living, and to cement the relationship of father and 
daughter that had developed between the child and her step 
father. 
6. As the Defendant had been absent from the child's J.ife 
for some time, had not paid child support or made attempts for 
visitation, and his whereabouts could not be ascertained, and 
attempts at personal service had failed, the Colorado Court 
permitted service by publication. 
7. The Defendant failed to respond or appear for the Motion 
on the name change, and Plaintiff believed that the Motion would 
be granted summarily. 
8. Until this matter was brought to a head at the Pe Trial 
recently, the Plaintiff and the Defendant both believed that the 
Motion had been granted by default. 
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9. In checking with the Court Clerk in Boulder, it was 
discovered that the Motion was never granted, and was dismissed 
by the Court's Motion in July, 1995. 
10. In the meantime, with the knowledge and implicit 
acquiescence of the Defendant father, the child has been using 
and has been known at school, church, and in the family 
(specifically sharing this name with her brother) and community, 
by the name of "Brubaker", for nearly seven years. 
11. The child and her family reside in Utah; Mr. Christensen 
resides in the state of Washington. 
12. Mr. Christensen's contact with Stephanie has been 
minimal. He typically exercises visitation once or twice a year 
and calls her five or six times a year. 
ARGUMENT 
THE CHILD HAS USED THIS NAME, AND 
DEVELOPED A SENSE OF IDENTITY WITH 
FAMILY AND COMMUNITY, AND SHOULD 
BE ALLOWED TO KEEP THIS NAME 
The child has used the last name of Brubaker for more than' 
five years. She is accustomed to that name. She is known in her 
community by that name. She shares the last name with the 
members of her domestic family, including her brother, with whom 
she is very close. Mr. Christensen has waited six and one half 
years to address this issue. According to the Hammy test and the 
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Nellis test, it is in the best interests of the child to maintain 
the status quo. 
The child was born in August, 1987, and has not lived with 
the Defendant since the parties separation in February, 1988. In 
October, 1989, Ms. Christensen married Joseph W. Brubaker, and 
the child has resided with him as her other parent since then. 
Stephanie developed a very close relationship with Mr. 
Brubaker. She refers to him as "dad". Additionally, in July 
1990, Mrs. Brubaker gave birth to Chad Michael Brubaker. 
Stephanie has become very close to her brother. Shortly after 
Chad's birth, she began to refer to herself as Stephanie 
Brubaker. 
In the summer of 1991, in preparation for Stephanie's 
entrance into public school, legal action commenced to have the 
child's name legally changed to Brubaker. Efforts were made to 
serve Mr. Christensen with notice of the action. However, Mr. 
Christensen's phone was disconnected and the sheriff for Pierce 
County Was unable to serve Mr. Christensen. The sheriff went so 
far as to note on the service that Mr. Christensen may have been 
avoiding service. In accordance with Colorado law# notice was 
made via publication in the county in which the action was 
commenced. 
The Defendant failed to respond or appear for the Motion on 
the name change, and Plaintiff believed that the Motion would be 
granted summarily. Until this matter was brought to a head at the 
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Pe Trial recently, the Plaintiff and the Defendant both believed 
that the Motion had been granted by default. In checking with the 
Court Clerk in Boulder, it was discovered that the Motion was 
never granted, and was dismissed by the Court's Motion in July, 
1995. 
In the meantime, with the knowledge and implicit 
acquiescence of the Defendant father, the child has been using 
and has been known at school, church, and in the family 
(specifically sharing this name with her brother) and community, 
by the name of "Brubaker", for nearly seven years. 
Upon resuming contact with the minor child, Mr. Christensen 
became aware of Stephanie's desire to be called Brubaker. He did 
not object to this. 
Mr. Christensen's contact with Stephanie has been minimal. 
He typically exercises visitation once or twice a year and calls 
her five or six times a year. 
The child has been known as Stephanie Brubaker throughout 
her schooling; she is now in the fourth grade. The child has 
been known as Brubaker in her church for the past 6 \ years. The 
child has medical and dental insurance, provided by Joseph 
Brubaker, in the name of Stephanie Brubaker. The child shares 
the name of Brubaker with her brother Chad who attends the same 
school as she. The child receives various mailings under the 
name of Brubaker. The child is known by her friends and 
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community as Brubaker. The child is very close to Joseph 
Brubaker, her mother, and her brother. 
THE HAMMY CASE 
The leading case in Utah on this issue is Hammv v. Jacobson. 
769 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989). In this case, the Court of Appeals of 
Utah overturned the trial court1 s order that the minor children 
bear the surname of the father rather than the mother's surname. 
The factors that the Court of Appeals listed in determining the 
decision are: 
i. the child's preference in light of the child's age and 
experience; 
ii. the effect of a name change on the development and 
preservation of the child' s relationship with each parent;, 
iii. the length of time a child has used a name; 
iv* the difficulties, harassment or embarrassment a child 
may experience from bearing the present or proposed name; 
v. the possibility that a different name may cause 
insecurity and lack of identity; 
vi. the motive or interests of the custodial parent. 
Additionally, this case repeatedly referred to Nellis v. 
Pressman, 282 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1971)- In Nellis, the court also 
listed the factors it used in determining not to require the 
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children to change their surnames back to their father's. These 
factors were: 
a) the children have been known in the community for more 
than five years and had a good relationship with their father 
during those years, 
b) their name and identity have become imbedded in their 
minds, 
c) the likely impact of changing their names back again 
after all these years, 
d) the children' s views are entitled to serious 
consideration because of their ages and level of intelligence, .. 
g) the father1 s physical remoteness from the community where 
the children reside. 
The child' s preference 
Stephanie Brubaker has been known as such for six and one 
half years. She requests that her name not be changed now as she 
is used to her signature of Brubaker. She also wants to have the 
same last name as her brother who attends the same school as she. 
Stephanie is currently eight and one half years old. She is very 
mature and intelligent for her age. She is in fourth grade with 
a ninth grade reading and comprehension level. 
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The effect on the parent-child relationship 
The relationship of Stephanie and Daniel Christensen has 
existed for the past six and one half years without any adverse 
affects caused by the name change. Mr. Christensen -failed to 
respond to the initial Motion to change the name, and has been 
aware of the name change for at least five years, without taking 
action. Stephanie has always referred to Mr. Christensen as 
"Sweetie Pie/ and thus her new last name did not affect how she 
addressed Mr. Christensen. 
The length of time name used 
Stephanie Brubaker has been known as such for six and one 
half years. This is a substantial amount of time. It is 
significant that it has been Mr. Christensen's delay in bringing 
this matter to the Court's attention that has created the length 
of time the child has used the name to develop her present 
identity. Both she and those who know her are used to that name. 
Her entire schooling has been done under the name of Brubaker. 
Her health insurance has been carried in the name of Brubaker. 
Difficulties, harassment or embarrassment 
Changing Stephanie* s name at this time would be difficult 
for her at school. Her peers know her as Stephanie Brubaker and 
may tease or harass her about a name change. It may also cause 
difficulties at school with her relationship with her brother, 
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Chad Brubaker. The name change may also cause confusion as she 
will be expected to answer to a name other than that to which she 
is accustomed. 
Insecurity and lack of identity 
Changing Stephanie1 s name at this time may cause some 
insecurity on her part. She has expressed concern about a lack 
of identity in that all of her other family members are known as 
Brubaker and she would feel left out of this important family 
bond. Also, Brubaker is a unique name which allows for greater 
self-identity whereas Christensen is an extremely common name in 
this locale. 
Motive or interest of custodial parent 
Mrs, Brubaker has full custody of the minor child. She 
would like to see the name remain as Brubaker to prevent any 
deterioration between the siblings. Additionally, as the child 
spends about 350 days a year in the Brubaker home and 15 days 
with Mr. Christensen, keeping the name as Brubaker would allow 
the child greater stability. 
Father*s physical remoteness 
Mr. Christensen is a domiciliary of Tacoma, Washington. 
Stephanie and the Brubaker family are domiciled in Sandy, Utah. 
Changing the child1 s name to Christensen would not alter these 
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facts. The father' s physical distance, and lack of contact with 
the child, compel the child' s name to remain as Brubaker. 
CONCLUSION 
It is in the minor child' s best interest to have her name 
remain as Brubaker. She has used this name for six and one half 
years. She is recognized, and recognizes herself, as Stephanie 
Ann Brubaker. Stephanie' s schooling and medical insurance are 
listed under the name Brubaker. Brubaker is the name she shares 
with her sibling who attends the same school as she. The Hammy 
and Nellis tests are clearly satisfied and compel the child' s 
name to remain Stephanie Ann Brubaker. 
DATED this day of '^"^f/Q , 1996. 
K. STRINGER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
On the day of ^/A^UKJUA^J , 19^ %> ,- a copy of the foregoing 
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F: 
Fc 
of 
Lz2±Sk. .5Ki 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATTIE CHRISTENSEN, 
vs. 
DANIEL CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant,. 
CASE NO. 884400400 DA 
DATE: JANUARY 24, 1996 
MINUTE ENTRY 
STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE 
TAPE: 967016 #6160-END 
967017 #1-END 
; 967018 #1-301 
CLERK: SKF 
TRIAL - MATTER TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT 
This matter came before the Court for trial on the Petition to Modify with Mark 
Stringer representing the plaintiff and Lorie Fowlke appearing for the defendant. Both 
parties were present. 
As Ms. Fowlke had no objection, the Court granted Mr. Stringer's request to 
verbally modify the Petition to Modify the Decree regarding the child's name change. Patty 
Christensen Bnibaker was sworn and testified* Daniel Christensen was sworn and testified. 
Pattie Bnibaker was recalled to the stand in rebuttal. Joseph Bnibaker was sworn and 
testified. The Court took the matter under advisement. Counsel are to submit Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Counsel will also submit affidavits regarding 
attorney fees 
Mark K. Stringer, #4418 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
37 East Center, Second Floor 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATTIE S. CHRISTENSEN, nka ] 
PATTI BRUBAKER ] 
Plaintiff/Petitioner/ ] 
vs. ] 
DANIEL R. CHRISTENSEN, " 
Defendant/Respondent. 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS AND 
I CONCLUSIONS ON | NAME CHANGE 
1 Civil No. 88-400 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, by and through counsel, and as and for 
proposed findings and conclusions on the matter of the name 
change of the minor child, submits the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner is the Plaintiff in his matter. 
2. The parties agreed at Trial, that the Petitioner could 
orally amend the Petition to include a request that the child's 
name be changed to "Brubaker". 
3. There is no other proceeding in any other jurisdiction 
concerning the matters addressed by this Petition, 
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4. The Parties were married at the time of the July, 1987 
birth of the child. 
5. The Parties separated in or about February, 1988, and the 
child remained with the Plaintiff. 
6. The parties were divorced 17 May, 1990, in this 
jurisdiction. That Decree was amended by Stipulation, nunc pro 
tunc, to reflect the date of June 26, 1989. 
7. Under the terms of paragraph 2 of the Decree
 t reached by 
stipulation between counsel and the parties, the Plaintiff 
retained custody, and the Defendant was granted the following 
visitation: 
Twelve days of visitation every three months, 
plus one half of the Summer school vacation. 
This visitation schedule provided for at least 3 6 days of school 
period visitation, and at least 30-45 days of the summer. 
8. In the Decree, the Defendant was ordered to pay a regular 
monthly child support, half by the 5th and half by the 20th. 
9. In October, 1989, the Plaintiff carried Joseph Brubaker. 
10. At the time of the marriage to Mr. Brubaker, the child 
was age 2, and had lived about four months with the Defendant, 
and the balance of her life with the Plaintiff. 
11. Since the marriage of the Plaintiff to Mr. Brubaker, Mr. 
Brubaker has performed the role of father to the child: attending 
school conferences and functions, providing for and accompanying 
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the child to medical visits and services, and attending church 
and related functions with the child. 
12. Since the birth of the child, the Defendant has neither 
attended school functions nor requested records, has neither 
attended medical services with the child nor requested records, 
has attended some church with the child, but has not requested 
records. 
13. In August, 1995, the child was baptized into the LDS 
faith. She was baptized by Mr. Brubaker. 
14. The Defendant was given advance notice of this event in 
a telecon with the child, but did not attend or object to the 
fact that Mr. Brubaker was the person performing what is 
traditionally the right of the father. 
15. The Defendant considers himself to be a member of the 
LDS faith, but does not consider himself to be active. 
16. The Defendant has exercised visitation generally about 
three times a year, for a couple of days per visit, with the 
exception that he had summer visitation of a week to a few weeks, 
gradually as the child got older. This is less than his allotted 
visitation: both that initially ordered in the Decree, and that 
expanded to more Christmas and Easter and Summer visitation in 
the 1992 Modification). The Defendant explains his lack of 
visitation as generally a function of the distance between 
residences, and the associated costs. 
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17. The Court takes judicial notice that it is difficult for 
a small child to develop or maintain a parent-child bond with 
intermittent visitation every few months for a few days at a 
time. 
18. The Decree has been modified, and the parties have been 
in court on temporary orders, orders for contempt regarding 
visitation and child support, or modification on numerous 
occasions: 
a. February, 1991, judgment for unpaid financial 
obligations, including at least $2000 in delinquent child 
support. 
b. March, 1991, visitation and child support issues 
c. November, 1991, visitation and child support issues 
d. August, 1992, Modification of Decree, child support 
and visitation, 
e. August, 1993, visitation matters 
f. April, 1994, Petition to Modify 
g. May, 1994, judgment for $3 996.62 for unpaid child 
support. 
h. September, 1994, unpaid child support and other 
financial obligations 
i. December, 1995, OSC regarding visitation and name 
change. 
j. January, 1996, judgment for $3,000 in unpaid child 
support and related financial obligations. 
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19. In responding to questions concerning child support 
delinquencies, the Defendant seemed to allege that he had 
remained current, and was unsure why the various judgments had 
been ordered. Defendant was less than candid with the Court. 
20. Defendant admits being aware of the defacto name change 
of the child to "Brubaker" first when the child was age three or 
four, in about 1991, when the child was practicing writing her 
name. 
21. The Defendant admits being aware of the defacto name 
change of the child to "Brubaker", and discussing this with the. 
Plaintiff periodically over the years. 
22. The Defendant admits being aware of the defacto name 
change of the child, as early as the 1992-1993 matter in Court, 
and alleges that he included the issue in his pleadings. 
23. The Defendant admits that he neither brought the matter 
before the Court, nor filed subsequent action by way of appeal, 
motion, contempt, or modification for the Court's failure to act 
on the issues of the name change at the earlier dates. 
24. In or about July, 1991, the Plaintiff filed in Colorado 
20th District Court in Boulder, Colorado, Case No. 91C3447-10, a 
Motion for the change of the child's name to that of Brubaker, to 
allow the child to legally feel associated with the family with 
whom she was living, and to cement the relationship of father and 
daughter that had developed between the child and her step 
father. 
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26. At this time, the Defendant had been absent from the 
child's life for some time, had not remained current on child 
support or exercised all of the visitation awarded to him. 
27. The Plaintiff attempted to personally serve the 
Defendant, but he had changed addresses and phone number, and 
his whereabouts could not be ascertained, and attempts at 
personal service had failed, so the Colorado Court permitted 
service by publication. 
28. The Defendant failed to respond or appear for the Motion 
on the name change, and Plaintiff believed that the Motion would 
be granted summarily, 
29. Until this matter was brought to a head at the PreTrial 
recently, the Plaintiff and the Defendant both believed that the 
Motion had been granted by default. 
30. In checking with the Court Clerk in Boulder, it was 
discovered that the Motion was never granted, and was dismissed 
by the Court's Motion in July, 1995. 
31'. In the meantime, with the knowledge and implicit 
acquiescence of the Defendant father, the child has been using 
and has been known at school, church, and in the family and 
community, by the name of "Brubaker", for nearly seven years. 
32, The child has developed a very close relationship with 
Mr- Brubaker. She refers to him as "dad". 
33. In July 1990, Mrs. Brubaker gave birth to Chad Michael 
Brubaker. Stephanie has become very close to her brother. 
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Shortly after Chad's birth, she began to refer to herself as 
Stephanie Brubaker. 
34. The child has been known as Stephanie Brubaker 
throughout her schooling; she is now in the fourth grade'. The 
child has been known as Brubaker in her church for the past 6 \ 
years. 
35. If the child is not allowed to retain the name she has 
used for nearly seven years, she will be the only member of her 
family with a different name. 
36. The child and her family reside in Utah; Mr. Christensen 
resides in the state of Washington. 
37. Applying the tests set down in HAMBY, the Court 
considers: 
i. the child's preference in light of the child's aqe 
and experience; 
ii. the effect of a name change on the development and 
preservation of the child's relationship with each parent; 
iii. the length of time a child has used a name; 
iv. the difficulties, harassment or embarrassment a 
child may experience from bearing the present or proposed name; 
v. the possibility that a different name may cause 
insecurity and lack of identity; 
vi. the motive or interests of the custodial parent. 
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Additionally, the Court considered the factors from the related 
case of Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1971), referred to 
in HAMBY: 
a) the children have been known in the community for 
more than five years and had a good relationship with their 
father during those years, 
b) their name and identity have become imbedded in 
their minds, 
c) the likely impact of changing their names back again 
after all these years, 
d) the children1 s views are entitled to serious 
consideration because of their ages and level of intelligence, .. 
g) the father' s physical remoteness from the community 
where the children reside. 
38. The child' s preference. Stephanie has used the name of 
Brubaker in school church, and community for six and one half 
years. She has herself expressed a desire to use this name. She 
refers to Mr. Brubaker as "dad11. 
39. The effect on the parent-child relationship. The 
relationship of Stephanie and Daniel Christensen has existed for 
the past six and one half years without any adverse affects 
caused by the name change. Mr. Christensen testified that, given 
the lack of regular contact and visitation, he enjoyed a close 
relationship with the child. Her choice of last name during the 
past years, has not eliminated her recognition of him as her 
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father. Mr. Christensen failed to respond to the initial Motion 
to change the name, and has been aware of the name change for at 
least five years, without taking action. If there has been a 
detrimental effect by the use of the different last name, the 
delay has been at least in part a result of Mr. Christensen's 
failure to act when the issue first came up. Stephanie has 
always referred to Mr. Christensen as "Sweetie Pie/ and thus her 
new last name did not affect how she addressed Mr. Christensen. 
40. The length of time name used. Stephanie Brubaker has 
been known as such for six and one half years. This is a 
substantial amount of time. It is significant that it has been 
Mr. Christensen's delay in bringing this matter to the Court's 
attention that has, at least in part, created the length of time 
the child has used the name to develop her present identity. 
Both she and those who know her are used to that name. Her 
entire schooling has been done under the name of Brubaker. Her 
health insurance has been carried in the name of Brubaker. Her 
church affiliation , and her recent baptism have used the name 
Brubaker. 
41. Difficulties, harassment or embarrassment. Changing 
Stephanie1 s name at this time would be difficult for her at 
school, church, and in the community. Her peers and siblings 
know her as Stephanie Brubaker and may tease or harass her about 
a name change. It may also cause difficulties at school with her 
relationship with her brother, Chad Brubaker. The name change 
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may also cause confusion as she will be expected to answer to a 
name other than that to which she is accustomed. 
42. Insecurity and lack of identity. Changing Stephanie's 
name at this time may cause some insecurity on her part. She has 
experienced concern and anxiety if at this point she is forced to 
assume a lack of identity with her other family members known as 
Brubaker, and she may feel left out of this important family 
bond. 
42. Motive or interest of custodial parent. Mrs. Brubaker 
has full custody of the minor child, and except for brief periods 
of visitation, has provided (with her present husband) 
essentially all of the parenting. While there has been some 
discussion as to her motives for the name change, and while her 
motives may be suspect to some degree, it is significant to note 
that she waited until the child was entering school, and had a 
sibling with the last name of Brubaker, to make the formal 
Petition in Colorado. She states that she would like to see the 
name remain as Brubaker to prevent any deterioration between the 
siblings, and to support Stephanie's own sense of identity. 
43. Father* s physical remoteness, Mr. Christensen is a 
resident of Washington state. Stephanie and the Brubaker family 
are domiciled in Sandy, Utah. Changing the child' s name to 
Christensen would not alter these facts. The father' s physical 
distance, and his own admission that more freguent contact is 
unlikely, support the child retaining the name of Brubaker. 
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44. The NELLIS factors of a) the child's identity in the 
community, b) the child's own sense of identity and choice of 
last name, c) the likely [negative] impact of changing the name 
back again after all these years, d) consideration Of the child's 
ages and level of intelligence, and g) the father' s physical 
remoteness from the community where the child resides, have been 
considered, and while not controlling, are persuasive in 
considering the name change. 
45. The Plaintiff does not appear to have acted in bad faith 
in supporting the child's defacto name change prior to 1991, and 
appears to have honestly, albeit mistakenly, believed that the 
Colorado name change was completed. 
46. While the Plaintiff may appear to harbor some ill will 
toward her ex husband, and may in small part be seeking the name 
change to distance herself and the child from Defendant, she 
appears also to be honestly concerned most with the child's sense 
of identity, and association with the rest of the combined 
family. 
47. In seeking the Court's review of the defacto name change 
at this late date, despite having known of the matter years ago, 
and at the time of several post-divorce proceedings where the 
matter might have been addressed more timely, the Defendant has 
created much of the problem he seeks to remedy. 
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BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter of the name 
change of the child from Christensen to Brubaker. 
2. Based upon the HAMBY test factors, a review of the 
procedural history of this case, the intermittent nature of the 
visitation, the child's present family circumstances, and the 
defacto name change of the child for over 6 1/2 years, the 
child's best interests will be met by allowing her to retain the 
name she has chosen and used: Stephanie Brubaker, 
3. The fact that the Defendant had known of the defacto name 
change for years, and specifically at times when both parties 
returned to Court for Orders and modifications, may be reason to 
impose the doctrine of Res Judicata. The Defendant may be 
estopped from now raising an issue he should have and could have 
brought to the Court's attention on a more timely basis. However, 
because the name change is supported by other factors, and the 
Court is most concerned with addressing the merits of the name 
change, the Court declines to render a final opinion on this 
issue. 
4. While the Defendant has created substantial delay in 
failing to bring this matter earlier, and while the Plaintiff may 
be operating in some part out of self-interest to distance 
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herself from the Defendant, it does not appear that either party 
has acted in bad faith, and therefore no fees or costs should be 
awarded, 
5. The Court should issue an Order changing the name of the 
child, nunc pro tunc to the date the matter was to have been 
decided by the Colorado Court, July, 1991. The nunc pro tunc 
aspect of the Order is to support legally what has happened as a 
matter of fact, and to validate to the extent necessary, the 
various records which exist in the child's last name of Brubaker. 
DATED this day of , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
STEVEN HANSEN, JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
On the day of , 19 , a copy of the foregoing 
Order was faxed to Lorie Fowlke at 373-8878. 
{ J A H 
PA J TIE S CHRi:>I! 
nka PATTI BRUBAK! 
vs. 
DANIEL R. CT-- - '!-NS:;NT, 
Det\. '.dant/Respondent 
DA 11: Ma r : : I 'W 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
I In- milti-i i .line Iti-liiu' ilii ' mil -n linii;ir» »'•!, I'J" IIM healing on Plaintiffs Petition 
to Modify the decree of divorce to change tin: surname of the parties' minor child from 
Christen^ * P r •<•>" ->• ' iei heaur !• * -
husband .,
 : . . . . - court too- i,, n.^u..• u.,.. .; . -eir-eM and uroeied each parts' 
to submit IM. : sed Finding'- of I ,u* an;i Co: • l K i . t r " (>* • . . . • • c r ^ -0|y,->rt p- •de-ed 
,.r;,_, ^: i u^  u-.w v - n d ^ u nr 
oi i.a^ 
FINDING 
1. The issue oi the .^  ^ -*..uu.. ; ,,.• anor child wa,s brought to the Cor:" 
attention bv Defendant's 0 . lei tr Sh<m O v r ^ f»l^ d with t^< r our : rn ^ecn ibe r 1, 1.995, in 
• UTivn and to pay her 
share of travel costs That Order to Show Cause asks the Court to order that the parties1 minor 
child be designated t 
2. As all other issues in Defendant's Order to Show Cause were resolved by 
stipulation, and Defendant desired prompt resolution of the name change issue, he agreed at a 
hearing on the name change issue that Plaintiff could orally amend her Petition to Modify to 
include a request that the child's name be changed. 
3. All other issues raised by Plaintiffs Petition to Modify have also been resolved 
by stipulation. 
4. There is no other proceeding in any other jurisdiction concerning the matters 
addressed by this Petition. 
5. These parties were married on January 16, 1987 in Springville, Utah, and their 
minor child, Stephanie Ann Christensen, was born July 20, 1987. 
6. The above-named parties were divorced on May 17, 1990. Plaintiff married Joseph 
Brubaker in October, 1989. On May 24, 1990, Plaintiff moved the Court to grant the divorce 
nunc pro tunc to June 26, 1989, a date before the date of her marriage to Joseph Brubaker. 
7. At the time of the divorce, the daughter of the parties, Stephanie Ann Christensen, 
was nearly two (2) years old. 
8. Since the time of the separation of the parties, Plaintiff has had custody of the 
minor child subject to Defendant's right to reasonable visitation. There is no provision in the 
Divorce Decree allowing Plaintiff to change the surname of the parties' minor child. 
9. Since the marriage of the Plaintiff to Joseph Brubaker, Mr. Brubaker has attempted 
to be an appropriate step-father, and Defendant expressed his appreciation for that fact. 
10. Chad Michael Brubaker, the son of Plaintiff and her husband Joseph Brubaker, was 
born July 12, 1990, and presently bears, the surname Brubaker. 
11. Stephanie and Chad have enjoyed a healthy and loving sibling relationship. 
12. Defendant moved to the State of Washington shortly after the time of the parties 
divorce and has only changed apartments in the same apartment complex since that time. 
1 Pin;nt:rVha mo\t\i o: •' \**-m *^ ' • : • "* -vcasior h - •: - ' \ / 
C i rj>.•:::.> esuo.. . .:.. 
1 Mn:e tnc p- ties' divorce, Defemia;" ha^  MM* : the child apt ;^\;ma: *i\ thre^ to 
five time:' pe* \ e:i' ^ " ic Uie Unv "* : 
a time .*. ..- . . ..ic ( T m u m - ; ; JU.A n.^ie inoepeiiuei.i i , frequenc\ am: iem:: «-: 
Detendants \isits nave ,r e^ :ed. 
1 . : ici:^:~:\\:~. • '.. ;. . :• . .^mr h ^ 
visitation in;:;::, vv:n tin* p. :;-;s' mm-^ t i11: = oo - ' : . * * * ; distanLe between the rames and 
;r. -.-ail to Plaintiffs r v ; u moveu .• 
Dear some of th^ tra,, . ,^ ^
 3 ? ordw; .- *:> .;n: v ^ . . . 
Defendant has frequently had to bring legal proceedings to protect anc • i 
vi •. r s. 
"92. D- "e nlant filed a petition to modify seeking a reducp'- r* hio child 
r
" August u. . * o . Deienuant obtainec a judgment agamsi °lamtifi fcr Plaintiffs 
contempt in p:e\e::ung De^ndan*^ v - i t ^ i o " v--t;> " ^ parties minor c 
. j iua^uw * ;4e summer whi^.i v\di v,;.\ o;n ii week, 
a:n* v, pa% '..-/ita: ;: vov and attorney's fees. Defendant exercised his visitation for that 
remainm." -v - *r-
• ekriuant's °rder t~ Show Cause filed on December 1, 1995 also claimed that 
Plaint-it had aeam K^usec ^ make the child a \ H ~ H - * 
J-. Taniiarv I ..^ Mil,,, ^upuiuieu nai Defendant should 
have make-up visitation this Easter, 1996. 
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20. The Modified Divorce Decree indicates Defendant is entitled to one-half of 
Christmas vacation, Easter vacation in odd numbered years, and one-half of summer vacation 
with transportation costs to be split equally between the parties. 
21. Until credit for travel was given as part of a recent settlement, Plaintiff had never 
reimbursed Defendant for travel costs incurred in exercising visitation with the minor child. 
22. When asked about her resistance to Defendant's exercising his visitation, Plaintiff 
responded that visitation "is not really exercised anyway, so I don't pay much mind to it." 
23. Plaintiff has failed to apprise Defendant of important events in the child's life about 
which the natural father should have been informed. 
24. As Plaintiff testified, she and her immediate family refer to Defendant as "Sweetie-
pie" instead of as Stephanie's father. 
25. Defendant only recently became aware that in July of 1991 Plaintiff had retained 
counsel in Colorado in an unsuccessful attempt to change Stephanie's legal name to Brubaker. 
Plaintiffs attorney filed the name change action in Colorado, and Plaintiff claimed by affidavit 
that she was unable to locate Defendant 
26. On cross-examination, Plaintiff testified that at the time she filed in Colorado, the 
parties were "continually" involved in litigation in the State of Utah. The record indicates that 
each party had one or more Order to Show Cause pending at that time. 
27. In her Colorado petition, Plaintiff alleged that the natural father could not be 
located, had failed to pay child support, had not responded to Plaintiffs efforts to collect that 
support, and that Plaintiff had remarried, and that she and her new husband desired the child to 
share their last name. 
28. According to Plaintiffs testimony at hearing, she never approached Defendant's 
counsel in Utah about accepting service or contacting the Defendant concerning the name change 
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issue, nor did she specificalh \A\ her at:or:ve\ m Colorado ti..: " Paap^- ^ as pending in another 
jurisdiction She K- ; s -vever P.a; ner attorn ' ' h 
vvuo ai^o aware ti.at Defendant iiaJ lap :\ P: I-PIP. \r.p \\.PP!L! MIOU P -^  
to con tat: 
arvwhr!,: ci>' i rcierence *^  trie cnangi. ^ f tae sap -n.t ot UP panics m aor child Dcf rv.ar;: 
f; - .-iin^-1 * j me uoioradu action da ** *! : . 2 , 
: — , . *o a conversation wi iv.:np:i ^ inai 
. aintii: clai ..> that Defeadai ' * : i «• M > ^ »-•* • s-rp- - • v - • •: a 
'... . . . . . aupoap; Pa ; a.c 
in,- Jiild support reL'u»dii\ r-.e the HUP ot s:v: ui\out ar.«i ' a: ai judgments entered P *•• 
case are for ^ - - ^ 4 - : :ms\ ; * 
, . . . i . : ; . ^ ,. ^ i.,. amounts acciueu ciunng the pendenc\ or Defendant's 
Petition to Modify., plus interest. 
32. ] -**- ' • . . ..agments enterec P P •; -a^e had beer raid 
by the funds heiu in *asuov .-rn tin .s.ii • -^ ti :• marital KPPC, as aai) PiaiPtifi had access to Uic 
escrow account. 
33. . ...ipuuuj^n entered into by the parties in Januan, IQQr represent the -liiId 
•-.u;n':oi t arrearage at ;pie - n v v^- t.ii.c the Defendant''- P r v ^ r , re M ''. • •*•*•- ~ .is 
ii i w iirrlrl in •.-;„- expenses am. ^u-./ney's fees awarded tu him in previous 
actions. 
34 Defendant wa avvaic lliiil ih' ininni i I i ill ill nl iilln pailit i IIIMHII Itpuind in write her 
name aa Stephanie AnnBrabaker" pursuant t. t:p-- a' action ot Plaintiff when caused Defendant 
to express his conce;i: and di^rp-'ovai to PlamUii "< -• : s. 
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35. Defendant has never given his permission for the surname of the minor child to 
be changed from "Christensen" to "Brubaker" and has, in fact, mentioned to Plaintiff on several 
occasions his disapproval of such change 
36. Defendant admits being aware of the Plaintiffs de facto name change of the child 
to "Brubaker" first when the child was age three or four, in about 1991, when the child was 
practicing writing her name, inquired about it, and objected to the change ^  
37. No Petition had been filed by either party in the State of Utah to change the 
surname of the parties' minor child prior to this action. 
38. Defendant always buys plane tickets for the parties' minor child in the name of 
"Stephanie Christensen." 
39. Defendant had no knowledge of any school records or church records being 
changed to the name of Brubaker prior to this trial, though he had never requested such records. 
40. Defendant is employed as a respiratory therapist at a hospital in the State of 
Washington, and there is nothing in his personal or professional life which would cause 
embarrassment, harassment, or other difficulty to the minor child if she were to retain the 
surname Christensen. 
41. The minor child has paternal relatives in the State of Utah, many of whom bear 
the surname Christensen. The minor child of the parties knows these individuals and associates 
with them during her time with her father, the Defendant. 
42. The parties1 minor child has attended home school until this last year,, beginning 
Fall of 1995. 
43. Plaintiff wishes to change the surname of the parties' minor child to that of her 
current husband. She has both physically and emotionally distanced Stephanie from Defendant 
in an effort to include her in Plaintiffs present family unit to the exclusion of Defendant. 
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£4 ^lair.tiff*- h .l-.inci, J--1 .-pi*. Rruhake: ha* n*i adopted the parties' r.::n<_: Ji . ic and 
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~
!
.
J
 Although Plaintiff has represented to the Court thai th ;*:.d deques n •*- n,* ^ - K --
name Brubaker, the f r< s\r 
- .^ i - i^ >. ^ v.. . .;. i,.v_- dta. u. -.- ;^ik..e ui" en : o; ^ ^ tender \ ears that f^v 
ha^ utile independent nidgn.ent m thi-* *"•'.:*' r. 
1
 'n r«|)cil kM mum ui leadeniit Iite.uia,, m^ ... v itered regarding any possible 
effects of a name change. 
Having made the i* s\ •• ? - -'- •*-• • ]
 t. .\ • *»• 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. I he x'owi m nTisdiction to hear this matter as raised !i\ ni^frMnhint's Oirln 1 
2. i."- uL.ig ^uindard of law states thai , ,i interest* o-' :;i - •'"' • • s mc 
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. - . ^ , j i i i e i c i > i s . 
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4. Some of the factors a Court should consider in light of the circumstances of each 
case were recognized in Hamby and include: 
(1) The child's preference in light of the child's age and experience; 
(2) The effect of a name change on the development and preservation of the 
child's relationship with each parent; 
(3) The length of time a child has used the name; 
(4) The difficulties, harassment or embarrassment a child may experience from 
bearing the present or proposed name; 
(5) The possibility that a different name may cause insecurity and lack of 
identity; and 
(6) The motive or interest of the custodial parent. 
5. While the Court accepts the legal standards outlined in Hamby and has considered 
the factors listed above, the Court distinguishes the facts in Hamby from those in the present 
case. The children whose names were at issue in Hamby had been born out of wedlock. One 
child had been known by his mother's surname since birth, and the surname of the second had 
been in dispute since its birth. The reputation of the natural father in Hamby was likely to cause 
embarrassment to the children, and other factors indicated it was in the best interests of the 
children to go by their mother's surname. 
In the case at bar, however, the child whose name is at issue was born to the parties at 
the time they were legally married. At that time, both Plaintiff and Defendant went by 
Christensen, and the child was given the surname Christensen, by which she was known while 
the parties were married, at the time of divorce, and until about the time the Brubaker's son was 
born. Sometime following the birth of the Brubaker's son Chad, Plaintiff and her new husband 
began referring to the parties' child as Stephanie Brubaker, a practice that Stephanie has accepted. 
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choice of surname should govern However -i-i— r^ ; 1 
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surname should be granted only when the chang;-" " -.m 
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1
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8 . COM - ::•/• - ! !
 :. : 
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AP- _-!!!--.- i---^ <** ' '-^ v.,.nw: Robinson v Hansel. 223 N..W.2d ! *N iMinn 
1974). . 
9. **-'* . .. ., , . . . . \ ,-,.;.. _ ; ii.crease visitation, 
and has made reasonable eiiorts to e x c i s e - • • -v.t.o'* \-h , os^hie ideating a concerted 
effort on his part lu eta 1 • 
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10. Other jurisdictions, almost uniformly, have rejected contentions that a child's 
psychological health requires that his name conform to that adopted by his mother on remarriage. 
Omelson, 445 N.E.2d at 957, citing Application of Lone. 338 A.2d 883 (N.J. 1975). See, e.g, 
Degerberg v. McCormick. 187 A.2d 436 (Del. 1963); Mark v. Kahn, 131 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 
1956); Robinson v. Hansel. 223 N.W.2d 138 (Minn. 1974), West v. Wright. 283 A.2d 401 (Md. 
1957); Application of Trower. [260 California App.2d 75,67 California Reporter 873]; 
Application of Shipley. 205 N.Y.S.2d 581; Application of Hinnch. 246 N.Y.S.2d 25; Marshall 
v. Marshall. 93 So.2d 822 (Miss. 1951); Reid v. Reid. 838 P.2d 350 (Okl. 1959); Contra King 
v. Newman. 421 SW.2d 149 (Tex. Civil App.) In Re Adoption of McCoy. 287 N.E.2d 833 (Ohio 
1972). 
Child's Preference 
11. The Hambv case indicates that a child's preference may be considered "in light of 
the child's age and experience." The children involved in Hambv were six (6) years old and the 
Court held that they were "too young to be accustomed" to their surname. 
The Hamby Court cites to Daves v. Nastos. 711 P.2d 314 (Wash. 1985) in presenting this 
factor as relevant for consideration in determining a child's best interest. In Daves, the Court was 
considering an out-of-wedlock paternity action in which the children were under two (2) years 
of age, and it only lists that factor without application to that case. In In Re Marriage of 
Omelson. 445 N.E.2d 951 (111. App. 1983), also cited in Hamby, the child was almost eight (8) 
years old. The Court gave no weight to the minor child's desires and cited to Mark v. Kahn. 
supra, in which the Court held that a child of the age of twelve (12) was not capable of making 
an intelligent choice in the matter of his*name. In Omelson. the Court denied the request for 
name change and indicated that a child should await her maturity and leave the decision to a time 
when she would be aided by her own desires and perceptions and not subject to the suggestion 
and desires of her mother. Id. at 958. 
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continue - ' • - ^ . ^ ' Q ^ r e 
mature, loving, aiiu y a i v men ia,r: : \ relationships ird : * . •- _ s : ^epr.ame be secui- m 
hex l u e m n -<»"..' r - t i ^ r - h . ^ with them oiiu n c * ' r. 
a name change at : ..jn i. . negatively impact Defendant's 
relationship with n. laughter, wh.^'r r pu- i t iw *mt difficr < : a n : - n p<->- tr • r r v v a ! 
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* ' *\ r-1* ~n> • - argue, a derogatory reference m Iiiiiiii i \u-
: these CMC -.-.-dances a "change of name* [»sj **ot be in the cr*1 I '^ * r* .-est" 
"f "** 4r ^stran^em**™* ' . • , . a 
father who exhibirs a aesr t \<* preserve the parental relationship " ln_Re Marriage of Omelson, 
445 N.E.2d r. ^ ' - c - n * N!^rLv„_Ka: :. 
"[CJourts have traditionally tried to maintain and, to encourage continiiiiig parental, relationships., 
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The link between a father and a child in circumstances such as these is uncertain at best and a 
change of name would further weaken if not sever such a bond." 445 N.E.2d at 956, citing 
Robinson v. Hansel. 223 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Minn. 1974). 
The Court considers the fostering of a loving and respectful bond between Stephanie and 
the Defendant to be a compelling reason to deny Plaintiffs motion for a name change. 
Length of Time Name Used 
15. The evidence is unclear as to how long the Plaintiff has been using the name 
"Stephanie Brubaker" for the minor child of the parties, Stephanie Ann Christensen. Plaintiff 
claims the church and school records are in the name of "Stephanie Brubaker." However, the 
parties' minor child has been in private school until six (6) months ago when the parties moved 
back to Utah. 
16. For the initial years of the Stephanie's young life she went by Christensen. 
17. Defendant has always referred to the child as "Stephanie Christensen" and has 
conducted all business for the child in that name. 
18. The Plaintiff has moved at least four (4) times in the years since the divorce and 
has only been in the present community since the Summer of 1995. Therefore, even if the 
Plaintiff has been using the name of "Stephanie Brubaker," it is only relevant in this community 
since the Summer of 1995. 
19. Testimony indicated that Stephanie is not likely to be detrimentally affected if her 
peers or others were to comment on her use of her legal surname. 
Difficulties, Harassment or Embarrassment from the Present or Proposed Name. 
20. Plaintiff has claimed that it would be inconvenient to change records for the minor 
child of the parties if she retains the legal name of "Stephanie Christensen" as she has been using 
the name of "Stephanie Brubaker" and she may be teased or harassed about a name change. The 
12 
Court is unconvinced that significant harassment is likely to occur if Stephanie retains the legal 
name of "Christensen." 
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22. Testimony and reasonable inferences therefrom strongly indicate that retention of 
the surname "Christensen" will assist the child in recognizing the Defendant as her natural father 
and developing a secure and loving relationship with him. 
23. As no evidence has been presented which indicates the parties' minor child shall 
suffer any insecurity or lack of identity by retaining the name of "Christensen," this is not 
sufficient grounds to grant Plaintiffs request. 
Motives or Interest of Custodial Parent 
24. In determining whether a change of name is in the best interests of a child it is 
well to consider whether the interests of others are sought to be served by the proceeding. In Re 
Marriage of Omelson, 445 N.E.2d at 955. Although the interest of a mother and child will 
frequently coincide, they can frequently diverge. When a name change is at issue the custodial 
mother's interest is potentially adverse to the best interest of the child. Care must be taken to 
assure that the mother's interests do not dictate the termination of the child's best interest. Daves. 
711 P.2d at 318-319; Omelson, 445 N.E.2d at 955. (Special care is required when the minor is 
of tender years to assure that some purpose of the custodial parent does not taint the 
determination of the child's best interest.) 
25. Several actions by Plaintiff cast suspicion on her motives in seeking a name 
change for her child at this time: 
A. Plaintiff has moved frequently, but has not promptly provided Defendant 
her phone number and address, which has interfered with Defendant's visitation with his daughter. 
Plaintiff has been held in contempt by previous judges in this case for interference with 
Defendant's visitation. 
B. Plaintiff has not, until recently, reimbursed Defendant for her half of the 
costs of travel for visitation that she was ordered to bear. 
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C. ™a! :iff has attempted to change the name of the child without due notice 
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The court concludes that Plaintiff, in filing the petition to change the child's surname, has 
been motivated by her own interests and has not considered, foremost, what would ultimately be 
in the best interests of her daughter. 
26. Based upon the factors detailed in Hambv v. Jacobson, the court rules that the best 
interests of the child shall be served by the minor child retaining her current name, "Stephanie 
Ann Christensen." 
27. Plaintiffs petition to change the name of the parties' minor child is denied, and 
Plaintiff is ordered to notify the custodians of Stephanie's school, church, and social records of 
her legal name. 
28. Regarding attorney's fees, §30-3-5 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, as amended, provides 
that if a Petition for Modification is made and denied, the court shall order the Petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action if the court 
determines that the Petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in bad faith. 
While Plaintiff has, in the past, attempted to manipulate or circumvent the legal system 
by unilaterally changing the name of the parties' child, the Court determines that the present 
action to determine whether a name change is proper has been brought by agreement of both 
parties, that Plaintiff has not shown bad faith or lack of candor in the present action, and 
therefore each party is ordered to bear his or her own costs and attorney's fees. 
Counsel for the Defendant is ordered to prepare an Order consistent with the terms of 
these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and submit it to counsel for the plaintiff prior to 
submission to the Court for signature. 
DATED and signed this / 2 ^ f a v of March, 1996. 
ansen 
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Lone D. Fowlke (6875) 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801)373-8848 
Facsimile: (801)373-8878 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATTIE S. CHRISTENSEN, nka 
PATTI BRUBAKER, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
DANIEL R. CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendan t\Responden t. 
This matter came before the Court on January 24, 1996, for a hearing on Plaintiffs 
Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce to change the surname of the parties' minor child from 
"Christensen" to "Brubaker." After hearing testimony, taking the matter under advisement, and 
entering its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby, 
ORDERS, DECREES, and ADJUDGES as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Petition to change the surname of the parties' minor child is denied, 
and Plaintiff is ordered to notify the custodians of Stephanie's school, church and social records 
of her legal name. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 88-400 
2. Each party is ordered to bear his or her own attorney's costs and tees in this 
matter. 
DATED and signed th i so# day of March, 1996. 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Approved as to form: 
Mark Stringer 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATTIE S. CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
TRIAL 
Petition to Modify 
Dist. No. 884400400DA 
APPEAL # 
DANIEL R. CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant. 
Hon. Steven Hansen 
COPY 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 24th day of 
January, 1996 this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court. 
WHEREUPON, all parties appearing and 
represented by Counsel, the following proceedings 
were held: 
A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S 
FOR PLAINTIFF: 
MARK K. STRINGER, ESQ. 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER, P.A, 
37 EAST CENTER, 2ND FLOOR 
PROVO, UT 84606 
FOR DEFENDANT: 
LORIE FOWLKE, ESQ. 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 NORTH 100 EAST 
PROVO, UT 84 6 06 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - LIC. 2 2-102811-7801 
10445 SOUTH 600 EAST, SALEM UT 84653 
PHONE: 423-1009 
I-N-D-E-X 
PAGE REF 
WITNESSES FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
PATTI CHRISTENSEN BRUBAKER 
DIRECT BY MR. STRINGER 8 
CROSS BY MS. FOWLKE 19 
REDIRECT BY MR. STRINGER. . . . . . 33 
RECROSS BY MS. FOWLKE 35 
DANIEL R. CHRISTENSEN 
DIRECT BY MR. STRINGER 37 
CROSS BY MS. FOWLKE 58 
REDIRECT BY MR. STRINGER 85 
RECROSS BY MS. FOWLKE 89 
REBUTTAL WITNESS FOR PLAINTIFF 
PATTI CHRISTENSEN BRUBAKER 
DIRECT BY MR. STRINGER 93 
CROSS BY MS. FOWLKE 95 
JOSEPH W. BRUBAKER 
DIRECT BY MR. STRINGER 96 
PLAINTIFF RESTS 100 
DEFENSE RESTS 100 
MATTER TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT 104 
E-X-H-I-B-I-T-S 
EXHIBIT # PAGE ADMITTED 
NONE 
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THE COURT: If you feel prejudiced and 
you need more time then I'll require him to do 
that. Otherwise, I'll let him amend now and we'll 
proceed in the trial under the petition to modify 
the decree on the name change. That's your 
call. 
MS. FOWLKE: I've spoke to my client 
regarding that. I, I think I wrote that in the 
memorandum just to clarify where I understood that 
we were procedurally. We do not have any objection 
on going ahead--
THE COURT: Do you waive that objection 
then? 
- rather than have him come 
You will? All right. 
My client is ready t-o 
MS. FOWLKE: 
back. I am, yes . 
THE COURT: 
MS. FOWLKE: 
proceed on the trial. 
THE COURT: Mr. Stringer, you may amend 
your petition— 
MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: -- to conform to the 
allegations for the evidence that you intend to 
present. We'll proceed under the Petition to 
Modify the decree to change the name. And, 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
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1 therefore, you have the burden of proceeding. 
2 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Your Honor. A 
3 brief statement for the Court before we begin. 
4 Principally our position was at the time 
5 of the last hearing that this name change had been 
6 appropriately done in the State of Colorado. 
7 However, we have found out since the last hearing 
8 that in the Colorado court that matter was never 
9 completed. Although service was completed, at the 
10 hearing on the motion no one appeared, inexplicably 
11 actually. And the Court waited then until last 
12 year, which was about a five year hiatus, to 
13 dismiss the matter on its own Order to Show 
14 Cause. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
16 MR. STRINGER: So that was never 
17 accomplish there. And so our basis for requesting 
18 the name change this morning is basically on the 
19 points enumerated in Hamby — 
20 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating 
2 1 affirmatively). 
22 MR. STRINGER: -- with regard to the 
23 child's sense of identity and, and her family 
24 circumstances. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you, I've read both 
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1 (sic) birth you were married to the Defendant, 
2 Daniel Christensen? 
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. All right. And he is the natural father? 
5 A. Correct. 
6 Q. Now, at what time did you, at what date do 
7 you recall separating from Mr. Christensen? 
8 A. It would be January or February. Late 
9 January, 1988. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. When Stephanie was just a few months old. 
12 Q. So the child was a few months old? 
13 A. Right. 
14 Q. Okay. And then you were subsequently 
15 divorced in, at what time? 
16 A. There was a nonprotunct order so it gets 
17 kind of confusing. But in 1989, July I think is 
18 when I had the hearing, so I think that's when they 
19 nonprotunct it back to. 
20 Q. Okay. And since your separation in 
21 January of '88 has the child resided with you? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. All right. Then you married Mr. Brubaker 
24 II in October of '89? 
25 II A. Correct. 
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Q.. And the child was about two at that time? 
A. Just, yes, she turned two in July. 
Q . Thank you. 
A. So a little over two. 
Q. Now since the, the time of your marriage 
to Mr. Brubaker to the present has the child 
resided with you and Mr. Brubaker? 
A. Correct . 
Q. Okay. Have there been any other children 
born to your relationship with Mr. Brubaker? 
A. Yes, Chad Michael Brubaker born July 12th, 
1990. Natural child of Joe and myself. 
Q. All right. And he bears the last name 
of? 
A. 
Q. 
Brubaker. 
Okay. Now, in or about July of '91 did 
you take an action to change the name of your 
daughter to Brubaker? 
A. That's correct. 
Okay. Did you hire counsel to do that? 
That is correct. 
Did you pay her a fee to do that? 
Yes, I paid her in advance. 
What did you pay her? 
Q. 
A . 
Q. 
A . 
Q. 
A . $ 2 5 0 . 
PENNY C . ABBOTT, CSR 
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1 Q. All right. And to the best of your 
2 knowledge— 
3 THE COURT: What year was this? Did you 
4 say '9 1? 
5 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (indicating 
6 affirmatively). 
7 MR. STRINGER: Yes, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you. 
9 MR. STRINGER: '91. To the best of your 
10 knowledge did that petition get filed? 
11 A. Yes. In fact, she sent a letter to me to 
12 give to the school to show that this had been done. 
13 Q« Okay. And to the best of your knowledge 
14 the petition was granted in or about that time? 
15 A. To the best of my knowledge. 
16 Q. Okay. When did you first find out that 
17 the petition had not been granted? 
18 A. This morning at 9:30. 
19 Q. Okay. Now, back in the ,91- ,92 time 
20 frame did you therefore, thereafter change the name 
21 of your child to Brubaker? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. Okay. And she has been going by that 
2 4 name since? 
25 A. Correct. 
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1 Q. Is she registered in school that way? 
2 A. She has been for, she's in 4th grade now 
3 and she has been for all grades including 
4 kindergarten. 
5 Q. Okay. Is she registered in her church 
6 that way? 
7 A. That is correct. 
8 Q. Okay. And to the best of your knowledge 
9 is she known in all respects both legally and 
10 socially by that name? 
11 A. That is correct. 
12 Q. Okay. Now, at or about the time that the 
13 name change was taking place, that's the July, '91 
14 time frame. 
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. Did you know where Mr. Christensen was? 
17 A. We had reason to believe he was in*, 
18 outside the Seattle area. But he was behind on his 
19 child support and the phone had been 
20 disconnected. We tried to have him served and the 
21 Sheriff wrote on there that he thought he was 
22 avoiding service. 
23 Q. Okay. Had you been receiving regular 
24 child support until then? 
25 A. No, no. This was, you'll notice by some 
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1 of the actions it was really past due. And when 
2 we did receive, or if we, when we did receive 
3 anything it was based on a Springville bank 
4 account. So it was really hard to tell. 
5 Q. Okay. And had he been arranging for 
6 visitation between the child's birth and that 
7 July, '91 time frame? 
8 A. A few times he would but he was evasive 
9 about it. He would say maybe I'll be there, maybe 
10 I won't. At one time we went to the airport to 
11 pick him up and he did not show. Some other times 
12 he'd say maybe I'll be there, maybe I won't. But 
13 he would never come exactly when he said he was 
14 going to. Because we had, at one point we had 
15 some, someone there to serve him on a, on a 
16 different matter than this and, but he didn't 
17 show. He came like a day later. 
18 Q. Okay. Now the July, '91 makes the child 
19 essentially four years old at that time. During 
20 that time, from birth to age four — 
2 1 A. Correct. 
22 Q. — how many visitations would you say 
23 Mr. Bru-- Mr. Christensen had? 
24 A. Over six. I don't know. When I lived 
25 here in, in Utah sometimes I would bring her down. 
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1 But when I hired on with the Federal Government in 
2 '89 he came once to Oklahoma, so that would be 
3 one. And then in Col-- When I moved to Colorado 
4 1 know my husband and I came out here once and 
5 brought her but he had requested that visitation to 
6 be cut short. 
7 Q. Okay. How many days total do you recall 
8 that those five or six visits would have 
9 accumulated? 
10 A. No more than a month total. And that's 
11 being very generous. 
12 Q. Okay. Has he remained current on his 
13 child support since that time? 
14 A. No. I have to bring actions. 
15 Q. Okay. And you, and you have obtained 
16 judgments for unpaid child support? 
17 A. That is correct. 
18 Q. When do you recall was the first date on 
19 which Mr. Christensen was made aware of the child 
20 using the name Brubaker? 
21 A. Okay. It would have been-- She'd pretty 
22 much called herself that from when Joe and I met. 
23 And so he would have known about it, I know he 
24 specifically said something about it when she was 
25 in kindergarten and--
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1 Q. What year would that have been? 
2 A. The '91 time frame. 
3 Q. '91-'92? 
4 A. Yeah. 
5 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively)? 
6 A. Somewhere in there he had said something 
7 about it and said I understand that Joe will be, 
8 that Joe is her dad and I accept it, that type of a 
9 statement. And so I know he knew about it at 
10 least at the very latest '91. 
11 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). Did 
12 you ever send him or do you know if he ever 
13 obtained any school records that would have the 
14 name Brubaker on them? 
15 A. I don't, I don't know. 
16 Q. Do you know if she ever sent him a letter 
17 i n d i e — and signing it, or a card, with the* name 
18 Brubaker? 
19 A. Their contact is so minimal I couldn't say 
20 for sure. She would know. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. She'd prob-- They don't communicate that 
23 often so I don't know if it would have, if she 
24 would have. 
25 Q. Okay. But you recall in the ,91- ,92 time 
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1 frame that you let him know. 
2 A. Well, he said that Stephanie was with him 
3 and he wanted her to go by Christensen and she 
4 refused. 
5 Q. Okay. So you discussed it at that time? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Now to the best of your knowledge has he 
8 brought any action before this action to get the 
9 name enforced as Christensen? 
10 A. Not to my knowledge. 
11 Q. Okay. Do you know whether there became a 
12 time when he became aware of the Colorado action? 
13 A. I would assume so since — 
14 Q. But you don't know? 
15 A. I, I can't say for sure because this has 
16 been so long ago. But he's made statements about 
17 it so I would assume such. 
18 Q. What has he said about it? 
19 A. That--
20 MS. FOWLKE: Objection. Could I have 
2 1 some foundation when? 
22 THE COURT: Sustained. 
23 MR. STRINGER: When, when did you discuss 
24 with him the fact of the Colorado action? 
25 THE WITNESS: Most recently in our last 
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1 visit here at the courthouse. 
2 Q. Okay. But before that? 
3 A. I can't say for sure. 
4 Q• Okay. Now over the last, let's see, 
5 since the July '91-'92 time frame has 
6 Mr. Christensen's visitation habits increased, 
7 decreased, remained the same? 
8 A. Pretty much the same, once or twice a year 
9 visitation. 
10 Q- Okay. And about how many days per year 
11 would you recall that that accumulated? 
12 A. Two or three weeks a year at the most. 
13 Again, sometimes it would just be for a weekend. 
14 But just recently within the last few years he's 
15 been doing a little bit longer. Now that she's 
16 older and more independent he takes her for a 
17 little bit longer. 
18 Q. Okay. How does Stephanie refer to 
19 Mr. Brubaker? 
20 A. Dad. 
21 Q- How long has that been going on? 
22 A. Since July of '89 when I first met him. 
23 Q. Why did you take the action in '91 to 
24 II change her name legally from Christensen to 
25 II Brubaker? 
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A. Because Chad was born and they would be 
going to school together and it was important to 
keep the children's identities the same in that 
regard. She had, she called herself Brubaker and 
it was my desire to make it legal. 
Q. How does, excuse me. How does Stephanie 
refer to Mr. Christensen? 
A . Sweety Pie. 
Q. Okay. She developed that on her own? 
A. Yes. That's what we all call him 
including my son. That's just something that she 
started calling him when he resumed visitation. 
Q. Is Stephanie aware that there is some 
discussion concerning chang--, changing her name 
back to Christensen? 
A. She is aware. She listened in on a 
conversation between Joseph and myself. 
Q. Do you know whether she's addressed that 
to her dad? 
A. To — 
Q. To Mr. Christensen? 
A. I am not aware o f — She might have said 
something, I don't know. 
Q. Okay. What is your feeling about her 
reaction to the possibility? 
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1 A. She will not be very pleased. She, she 
2 comes at this kind o f — At first she's just like 
3 please don't make them change my name because I 
4 don't know how to spell it and I don't know how to 
5 write it. And she worried about what the other 
6 kids in school will think. And s i n c e — 
7 MS. FOWLKE: I think I'm going to 
8 object. I think it's getting into some--
9 THE COURT: Sustained. 
10 MS. FOWLKE: -- pretty big hearsay. 
11 THE COURT: Sustained. 
12 MR. STRINGER: Yes. Just answer my 
13 question --
14 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
15 Q. -- with regard to what is your perception 
16 of how she feels about getting her name changed 
17 back. 
18 A. She does not want to and she's pretty 
19 strong about it. 
20 Q. Okay. No further direct, Your Honor. 
21 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. FOWLKE. 
22 MS. FOWLKE: Isn't it correct that you've 
23 asked Mr. Christensen on at least one or more 
24 occasions that you'd like to have Joseph adopt this 
25 child? 
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1 A. That is true. 
2 Q. And what has been his response? 
3 A. No. No, actually we've said you're so 
4 far behind in your child . support and you're 
5 complaining about the judgments, if you'd prefer 
6 Joe would be more than willing to adopt and then 
7 that gets rid of the child support obligation. 
8 Q. And his response was still no? 
9 A. Yeah. 
10 Q. Always? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q* When you filed this petition for the name 
13 change and you also indicated that you wanted 
14 service by publication because you didn't know 
15 where he w a s — 
16 A* No. We attempted service regularly. 
17 The Sheriff had some s e r v — There was a, a 
18 Sheriff in, the name of the County up there had 
19 attempted to serve• 
20 Q. Okay. If you'll just answer my 
21 question. Can I approach the witness, please? 
22 THE COURT: You may. 
23 MS. FOWLKE: This is a petition. 
24 MR. STRINGER: Yes, 
25 MS, FOWLKE: Could you please identify 
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1 that document for the Court? 
2 A. Okay. This is the one that the, my 
3 attorney had put before the court after they had 
4 tried to serve him. 
5 Q. And can you read paragraph #4? 
6 A» "The Petitioner desires a change 
7 of name because the marriage of th.e 
8 minor child's natural parents, Pattie 
9 and, and Daniel, was dissolved by Order 
10 of the District Court in and for the 
11 State of Utah. 
12 The minor child is in custody 
13 of the natural mother and guardian who 
14 has remarried and whose name now is 
15 Pattie S. Brubaker. 
16 The minors child, minor child's 
17 natural father, Daniel R. Christensen, 
18 cannot be located. He has failed to pay 
19 child support since the time of the 
20 divorce and efforts to locate him and 
2 1 II collect such child support have been 
22 || unsuccessful. His last known 
23 || residence was in Pearce County, State 
24 || of Washington. A copy of the return of 
25 service--" 
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1 This is the one where the return of 
2 service— 
3 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). 
4 A. — that said that they couldn't find 
5 him, 
6 "Is attached hereto to EXHIBIT A". 
7 I don't know if you've got the exhibit but 
8 you'll see the Sheriff's handwritten on there 
9 thinking that he's avoiding service. 
10 Q. So this petition was written by your 
11 attorney, I assume, Ms. Renthrow? 
12 A. Ms. Renthrow. Correct. 
13 Q. And pursuant to your direction? 
14 A. Over the phone, yes. 
15 Q. And so you told Ms. Renthrow that you were 
16 unable to locate the natural father and you had--
17 A. Yes. We had just gotten that service— 
18 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). 
19 A. — that said that they could not find him. 
20 Q. Right. 
21 A. And so I said I am not sure that that's 
22 where he is but I believe him to be in Pearce 
2 3 County. 
24 Q. And this was in 1991, 1992, in that area? 
25 A. Somewhere in there. Again, this has been 
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1 Q. And did you ever consider contacting, 
2 having your counsel contact him in order to be in 
3 touch with him? 
4 A. Well, no. Dean Ellis doesn't usually— 
5 Any times that we've contacted him for anything 
6 he's been less than receptive to comply. 
7 Q« You didn't ask your attorney to contact 
8 Mr. Ellis regarding this petition? 
9 A. Regarding this, the name change matter? 
10 Q* Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. We did not• 
14 Q. You never checked back with Ms. Renthrow 
15 to see if an order had been filed in this matter 
16 or, or concluded? 
17 A. When I talked to her she was going- to the 
18 courthouse on this matter. I was employed at the 
19 Federal Government, sensitive position, could not 
20 be released. The Court was aware of that--
21 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). 
22 A. — to my knowledge. 
23 Q. So you never followed up with Ms. Renthrow 
24 on whether the order had been filed? 
25 A. Because she sent me that piece of paper 
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for the school and the school accepted it and 
everyone--
Q. Right. 
A. — and the insurance (inaudible, two 
speakers). 
Q. But this is a petition. Do you 
understand the difference between a petition and an 
order? 
A. Not at that time I did not. 
Q. Do you now? 
A. At this time I probably do. 
Q. Isn't it true that in 1992 the Order was 
finally provided on Mr, Christensen's Petition for 
Modification and the child support was reduced? 
A. I'll have to take your word for that. I 
don't have anything in front of me but t h a t ' s — 
Q. Do you recall that an Order of chi\Ld — 
A. When he got his child support reduced 
down? 
Q. Right. That Order on his Petition to 
Modify--
A. I remember that. 
Q. — it was about and do you recall it 
being in about 1992 when the Order finally was 
released? 
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A. I recall sometimes the Defendant didn't 
show up for some of them. 
Q. If you'd answer my question. Do you 
recall that some of the continuances had anything 
to do with the fact that the correct amounts of 
child support or whatever figures were involved had 
to be calculated? 
A. I think the most recent one was that was 
part of the concern. 
Q. Okay. You, you talked about registering 
your child at school. Hasn't your child gone to 
home school a good deal of the time? 
A. Two years worth of her schooling was home 
school 
Q . 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
When was that? 
Second and third. 
Second and third grade? 
Right. So kindergarten and first were 
Second and third were home public school, 
school. 
Q. And kindergarten and first, was that in 
Colorado? 
A. Yes, that was in Colorado. 
Q. And where was the home school? 
A. In--
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1 Q. Where were you living at that time in home 
2 school? 
3 A. I was living in Florida. 
4 Q. Florida? 
5 A. The p u — The school is actually-- She's 
6 technically not home school because it is an 
7 official school, Christian Liberty Academy--
8 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). 
9 A. -- outside of Chicago, Illinois. And she 
10 is just treated as a satellite student. 
11 Q. And you taught her at home? 
12 A. Correct. They would send me the 
13 materials. 
14 Q. For second and third grade. And fourth 
15 grade was when you moved here? 
16 A. Correct. 
17 Q. Okay. Thank you. I don't think I have 
18 anything else. I don't think I have (inaudible, 
19 whispering). 
20 MR. STRINGER: Redirect if you please, 
21 Your Honor. 
22 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. STRINGER. 
23 Q. At the time that you filed the Petition 
24 and the Motion for Alternative Service in the 
25 Colorado matter back in July of '91, did Mr. Ellis 
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1 who was the attorney for your ex-husband in Utah, 
2 did he ever tell you that he was authorized to 
3 accept service or process? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Did you believe that you could a c c u — , you 
6 could validly serve a Utah attorney for a Colorado 
7 matter? 
8 A. I was not aware of such a thing. 
9 Q. Okay. Now you have, you have gotten over 
10 the course of the, of the post-divorce matters more 
11 than one judgment for back child support against 
12 Mr. Christensen. Is that correct? 
13 A* Correct, right. 
14 Q. And those have totalled variously two or 
15 three thousand dollars apiece; haven't they? 
16 A. That's correct. 
17 Q. Has he ever voluntarily paid one? 
18 A. Of those? 
19 Q. Yes. 
20 A. No, no. They've all-- He didn't pay 
21 them and a lien was put on some property which he 
22 sold and the title insurance people, the title guys 
23 called me and told me it was there and it 
2 4 eventually came to me. 
25 Q. Okay. Thank you. 
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1 Q. Okay. And over what number of months? 
2 Would you recall that? 
3 A. That litigation it seemed like it was 
4 between one and two years so... 
5 Q. Okay. So let's say an 18 month period or 
6 so — 
7 A. Could be, yeah. 
8 Q. — you had four or five visitations. For 
9 how many days total? 
10 A. Oh probably, if it was four visitations 
11 say, each one probably was three days apiece 
12 average. So 12 days. 
13 Q. Okay. Then from the time of the divorce 
14 until now --
15 A, Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). 
16 Q. — how many visitations have you averaged 
17 during the course of a calendar year? 
18 A. Three. 
19 Q. And what has been the accumulation of time 
20 on the average for those three visits during a 
21 calendar year? 
22 A. Oh. They're different. Some of them 
23 are one, I don't know, maybe not as low as one but 
24 maybe two or three days. The longest I've had was 
2 5 about a month. 
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1 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). Now, 
2 when do you recall first becoming aware that your 
3 daughter was using the name of Brubaker? 
4 A. Well I, I knew that when she was learning 
5 to write about when she was either three or four 
6 years old. When I had visitation with her we would 
7 be practicing writing and she would be practicing 
8 writing the name Brubaker as her last name, 
9 Stephanie Brubaker. I said, how come you're using 
10 that last name? Well, Mommy told me to. I said 
11 well that's not your last name. 
12 MR. STRINGER: Move to strike, Your 
13 Honor. That's hearsay. 
14 THE COURT: Overruled. You asked him the 
15 question how he knew that. He's being responsive 
16 to the question. 
17 MR. STRINGER: No. I asked him 'the 
18 question when he first became aware. Not how he 
19 knew. 
20 THE COURT: I don't recall except-- Do 
21 you have any objection or any comments? 
22 MS. FOWLKE: I think itfs the same 
23 question that was asked to her. I mean I can, I 
24 II can ask it . 
25 THE COURT: I'll, I'll strike his last 
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1 answer and allow you to rephrase it. 
2 MR- STRINGER: Thank you. Now, that 
3 would have been age three or four you think? 
4 A. What would have been age three or four? 
5 Q. When you first became aware she was using 
6 the name Brubaker. 
7 A. Well, just because I saw her .practicing 
8 the name Brubaker, I didn't know she was 
9 officially calling herself or her mother officially 
10 calling herself that. 
11 Q. Okay. But you knew that she was at least 
12 using it some, in some form? 
13 A. I knew she was trying to learn to spell 
14 that — 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 A. — instead of her real last name. 
17 Q. All right. When did you become aware 
18 that she was using that name other than just trying 
19 to spell it? 
20 A. I don't know. Probably sometime between 
21 then and now. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 A. I never had her officially use any name. 
24 I mean, I don't have her enrolled in school or 
25 anything where I call her a certain name. So 
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anything I hear is just more or less hearsay either 
from her or from her, her mother. 
Q. Well let's, let's get to the discussions 
with her mother. You've heard her mother testify 
that she had a discussion with you concerning this 
name change and that you were made aware that she 
was using the name Brubaker as her last name. Do 
you recall that testimony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Are you saying now that 
conversation never took place? 
A. You mean a week ago when we were in court 
here ? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No, I m e a n — 
That's when it took place. 
back several years ago. 
No, not several years ago. A week ago, 
the first time I heard she had ever petitioned any 
court for any name change. 
Q. Not petitioning. Just that the child was 
using the name in school or church or in family. 
A. I knew she was using it in her family 
because her mother was teaching her to write that 
name . 
Q. All right. So when do you recall having 
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1 known that first? 
2 A. When she was learning to write — 
3 Q. All right. That's the age--
4 A. — between three and four years old. 
5 Q. — three or four event we talked about. 
6 Okay. Now, since that-- That would have been in 
7 '90 or '91 if she was age three or four. 
8 Now, since that time there have been 
9 actions in this matter before the court. In April 
10 of '91--
11 A. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). 
12 Q. -- did you bring up the concerns about 
13 the name change then? 
14 A. Oh, yes I did. 
15 Q. You brought it to the Court's attention? 
16 A. Oh, yes and it's written in one of the 
17 court documents. 
18 Q. What is written? 
19 A. And you were her lawyer t o o — 
20 Q. In 19--
21 A. — so you should have seen that. 
22 Q. -- '91? 
23 A. I don't remember. It's been one of the 
24 previous times we've been to court when Dean Ellis 
25 was my lawyer. I can go dig it out of, of the--
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1 Q. Okay. And what is your recollection of 
2 the Court's Order at that time? 
3 A. They didn't make any Order of it. 
4 Q. Okay. So it was brought to the Court ' s 
5 attention but no Order resulted? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. All right. Now, did you thr.ough 
8 Mr. Ellis or on your own bring to the Court's 
9 attention at that time that they missed the issue 
10 of the name change? 
11 A. As far as missing the issue, I don't, I 
12 don't know. We didn't-- No, I don't think it 
13 was, it wasn't anything heard or judged upon that 
14 issue. 
15 Q» Okay. And you didn't file a pleading 
16 asking the Court to enforce a name of Christensen 
17 at that time? 
18 MS. FOWLKE: I think it's asked and 
19 answered, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Sustained. It is. 
21 MR. STRINGER: Okay. How about in 
22 August of '92 there was a modification made. Did 
23 you raise the issue of the name being enforced at 
2 4 that time? 
25 II A* I believe that may have been the time. 
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1 Q. Okay. But there was no Order that issued 
2 from there? 
3 A. That's the time I just talked to you 
4 about. 
5 Q. Okay. And so there was n o — 
6 A. So I told you everything I know about that 
7 time, 
8 Q. All right. So that was, that was the 
9 August '92 modification, not the April '91 matter? 
10 A. I'm not positive but I believe that's the 
11 time. 
12 Q. Okay. Now in August '93 there was 
13 another period, piece of litigation concerning 
14 visitation issues and the child. Did you raise 
15 the name change at that time? 
16 A. I'm not sure. 
17 Q. But you don't recall having filed *a 
18 petition? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Or a motion of any kind? 
2 1 A. No. 
22 MS. FOWLKE: Your Honor, if he could 
23 clarify for the witness what Order he's talking 
24 about. I think it's unrealistic to expect him to 
25 know by a date three years ago what Order he's 
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1 talking about with the history of this case. 
2 THE COURT: Is that objection as to 
3 foundation? 
4 MS. FOWLKE: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Sustained. 
6 MR. STRINGER: Okay. Let's see, you're 
7 the one that addressed the Order initially. You 
8 showed it to Pattie. Yes, that's it. 
9 There was an Order issued 18 August, 
10 1993. There's an Order on an Order to Show Cause 
11 brought by your, your attorney for you. Did you 
12 at that time bring an action before the court on 
13 the name, enforcement of the name Christensen? 
14 A. I don't know. 
15 Q« You don't recall having done it? 
16 A. All I can tell you is at least once in 
17 some of the Orders we've filed I brought it up 
18 written in the legal documents that we've filed 
19 with the courts. And I don't know what it was 
20 called and I don't know, exactly know when it 
21 was. But I know at least once. It's in one of 
22 those papers. 
23 Q. Okay. 
24 A. I've read it. 
25 II Q. Again, in the May and June time frame of 
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1994 there was an Order to Show Cause before this 
judge in this court concerning child support 
matters. Do you recall that? 
A. I guess, yeah. 
Q. Well, do you recall having a judgment 
entered against you for $3996.62? 
A. When? 
Q. In May and June of '94. 
A. Was that when I had that money in escrow? 
Q. That was where the money, that judgment 
was used to re--, to restrict the money in escrow, 
yes . 
A. I believe it was all during that time of 
the same deal is when he, he brought it up. 
Q. Okay. At that time do you recall having 
filed anything to enforce the name? 
MS. FOWLKE: Your Honor, objection. 
Asked and answered again* 
MR. STRINGER: Well, I didn't ask him 
about June, '94 yet. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MS. FOWLKE: He fs--
THE COURT: Overruled. I don't believe 
he did. 
THE WITNESS: A, I didn't,-- I 
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don't know. I mean if, if I knew that she had 
officially supposedly changed her name I would have 
been filing one every week. But I didn't so I 
brought it up when I could. And there was a lot of 
other stuff in those documents that were, seemed to 
take precedence with whoever was arguing. They 
seemed to didn't care about that too much. 
MR. STRINGER: Are you current on your 
child support right now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Wasn't there just a stipulated agreement 
for $3,000 in child support arrearages? 
A. Yes. 
Have you paid that? 
No. 
Well then, then you're not current, are 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
you . 
A. I guess not if that's part of my child 
support. 
Q. Okay. Well, let me make sure I 
understand. Are you saying that your 
understanding of that judgment is that it is not 
for child support? 
A. I don't know exactly what it's for. 
There's a lot of stuff in there that seems like, 
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1 location. 
2 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). 
3 A. Same area. Salt Lake or — 
4 Q. Have you ever talked to Stephanie about 
5 that? 
6 A. No. Well, maybe, yeah. I've, I've said 
7 that, pretty much that same thing to her. I've 
8 said, you know, I wish we, we lived closer so we 
9 could see each other better. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. But I didn't like ask her if she wanted to 
12 move. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 A. I, I--
15 Q. No, that's not what I asking. 
16 A. Okay. 
17 Q. Thanks. Mr. Stringer was asking you 
18 regarding when you first knew that Stephanie had 
19 any affiliation with the name of Brubaker and you 
20 described her writing this name for you. 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Did you talk to her about why she was 
23 writing her name that way? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 II Q. And how did you know what she was writing, 
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1 Q. And did Mrs. Brubaker ever say anything to 
2 you about that? 
3 A, No. 
4 Q. Has that ever been an issue? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Have you ever given your permission to 
7 Mrs. Brubaker to change this child's name? 
8 A, No. 
9 Q, Have you ever had a discussion with her 
10 regarding her use of that name? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. What-- Do you remember that conversation? 
13 A* Well, I remember mainly the one we had 
14 here two weeks ago when we were here in court. 
15 That's the main one that I really remember. 
16 Q. Anything prior to that? 
17 A. Yeah. I, I've mentioned to her on the 
18 phone, I said stuff like, you know, she shouldn't 
19 be using that name and all the, you know. Yeah I, 
20 II I've mentioned things to her before. 
21 || Q. And what, and what did you tell her about 
22 || it? Was it okay? Did you tell her it's okay? 
23 || A. I said no, it's not okay. And she would, 
24 || you know, she'd say that's too bad, I can tell 
25 II her--. 
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1 shouldn't be telling her he's her father. 
2 Q. Do you recall specifically telling 
3 Mrs. Brubaker that she should not use the name 
4 Brubaker for Stephanie? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And how long ago? 
7 A. I think I've told her-- I don.'t know. 
8 Q. On more than one occasion? 
9 A. Off and on. You know, I tell her, I 
10 bring it up at certain times when we--. 
11 Q. On more than one occasion? 
12 A. I think so, yes. 
13 Q. Did you have any notice or have any 
14 awareness of this pending action in Colorado? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Had you moved prior to that action? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Prior to the time they claimed they tried 
19 to affect service? 
20 A. No. The only thing I can think of is I 
21 lived in an apartment building. I moved from 
22 apartment number seven to apartment number nine, 
23 next door. 
24 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). 
25 A. And I changed, my phone number changed at 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Days early. 
A. I don't, I don't recall that. 
Q. Okay. What's the name by which your 
parents are known, the last name? 
A. Truman. 
Q. So they don't share your last name? 
A. No. Well, my father has my .last name. 
Q. You, are you concerned about your child's 
schooling and medical and all of that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you ever requested her school 
records? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever requested her medical 
records ? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever requested her church* 
records? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you aware of whether or not she's 
active in a church? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What church? 
A. LDS. 
Q. Does she share that with you? 
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1 If you could clarify that for the Court. 
2 A, My mother, my mother's last name is Truman 
3 because she's married to a man named Truman. 
4 Stephanie called him Grandpa too. 
5 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively). 
6 A. And my mother, Grandma. 
7 Q. And you're--
8 A. My real father is, last name is 
9 Christensen. He lives in St. George so she doesn't 
10 see him very often. She's saw him just a couple of 
11 times. 
12 Q. Does she know him as Grandfather? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And just a follow-up on his reference to 
15 the strength of the bond between you and 
16 Stephanie. Is that bond what you would like it to 
17 be? 
18 A. I'd like it to be closer. 
19 Q. Is there anything you feel like you could 
20 do to make that closer? 
21 A. Yeah. Part of it I'm doing it right now. 
22 Q. Anything else? 
23 A. Fight for visitation when it's, when it's 
24 ordered. 
25 Q. Do you have any reasons to believe that, 
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1 why the bond is not as close as you would like? 
2 Have there been any--
3 A. The distance between us. The difficulty 
4 in visitation because of that distance. 
5 Q. Okay. That's all I have. Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: You may step down. 
7 THE WITNESS: Thanks. 
8 THE COURT: All right. Any other 
9 witnesses ? 
10 MR. STRINGER: Yes, Your Honor. I'd like 
11 to call Joseph Brubaker. And I would like to 
12 recall Pattie Brubaker for a very short rebuttal to 
13 the testimony. 
14 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to 
15 recess until 1:30. I've kept this very efficient, 
16 patient court staff into the night and over the 
17 lunch and after court on the last three cashes and I 
18 don't intend to do it today s o — 
19 MS. FOWLKE: Your Honor--
20 THE COURT: We're going to recess until 
21 1:30 and then I'll allow you to continue to present 
22 any evidence you'd like. 
23 MR. STRINGER: All right, Your Honor. 
24 MS. FOWLKE: Could I just let the Court 
25 II be aware that my client has a 3:30 plane to catch 
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1 WHEREUPON, 
2 PATTIE SUZANNE CHRISTENSEN BRUBAKER 
3 having been previously placed under oath by the 
4 clerk of the court and sworn to testify truthfully 
5 in this matter, retook the stand and upon 
6 examination testified as follows: 
7 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. STRINGER. 
8 MR. STRINGER: To the best of your 
9 recollection have you received from Mr. Brubaker, 
10 or from Mr. Christensen the Court Order amount of 
11 child support every month? 
12 A. No, I have not. 
13 Q. All right. 
14 A. And the check date and the receival date 
15 are sometimes up to (inaudible, two speakers 
16 {4 to 5? 45?}) days. 
17 Q. But even, even putting aside the dates, 
18 has the amount been the Court Ordered amount every 
19 month? 
20 A. No. Months get missed. 
21 Q. All right. On the matter of the school, 
22 medical and church records that I asked him about, 
23 has he ever asked you for any of those records? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. On the matter of the church baptism, when 
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was your daughter baptized? 
A. She was baptized August, it was a Saturday 
so it would be August I think 4th of this past 
year, 19 95. 
Q. Of '95? Where? 
A. In Sandy, Utah. 
Q. Okay. And did you notify or, or do you 
know whether or not Mr. Christensen was aware of 
that baptismal date? 
A. I know he was aware of the baptism, yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Stephanie told him and I was there. 
Q. And did he come? 
A. No. 
Q. Oh, last summer's visitation, did 
Mr. Christensen keep Stephanie for the full amount 
of the visitation? 
A. No. 
Q. What happened? 
A. Stephanie called me and said she would 
like to come home and he brought her home. 
Q. Okay. About how much early did he bring 
her home? 
A. Well, he only had her for three days. I 
don't know how long he'd planned on having her 
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1 because he didn't say. 
2 Q* Okay. How long could he have had her? 
3 A. The rest of the entire month at, at the 
4 very least. 
5 Q. Okay. No further on rebuttal, Your 
6 Honor. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. FOWLKE. 
9 MS. FOWLKE: You did not notify 
10 Mr. Christensen regarding the baptism; is that 
11 correct? 
12 A* Stephanie told him. 
13 Q. Is it correct that you did not notify him? 
14 A, Personally me? 
15 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively)? 
16 A. No, because she did. 
17 Q. How do you know she did? 
18 A. Because I was there. 
19 Q* Stephanie notified him in your presence? 
20 A. Yes, over the phone. She, I think he 
21 must have asked her was she getting baptized 
22 because she told him about the baptism. 
23 J! Q. Do you typically rely on Stephanie to 
24 || relay information that you feel is important? 
25 || A. No. But if she already does it then I 
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1 you? 
2 A. Dad, Daddy. 
3 Q. And during the time that she has been 
4 living with you have you participated in her 
5 schooling or school conferences? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Okay. And have you participated in her 
8 medical care? 
9 A. Yes. I've provided for it totally. 
10 Q. Okay. And if she has needed medical care 
11 have you gone with her on occasion? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And as far as her church involvement, she 
14 is a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
15 Latter-Day Saints. Is that correct? 
16 A. That is correct. 
17 Q. Are you also a member? 
18 A. Yes, I am. 
19 Q. And is, to the best of your knowledge is 
20 Pattie a member? 
21 A. Yes, she is. 
22 Q. And do you guys attend church regularly? 
23 A. Yes, we do. 
24 Q. And do you take Stephanie with you? 
25 A. Yes, she does. 
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Q. And do you participate with Stephanie in 
parent-child or father-daughter kinds of things at 
that church? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Okay. Now Stephanie, Stephanie was 
baptized in August of '95. Is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And who baptized her? 
A. I did. 
Q. Okay. And under what name was she 
baptized? 
A. Stephanie Brubaker. 
Q. Under what name is she known at school? 
A. Stephanie Brubaker. 
Q. And under what name is her medical care 
and medical records listed? 
A. Stephanie Brubaker. 
Q. Okay. Now you also have a son? 
A. Yes . 
Q. And your son was born when? 
A. July 12th, 1990. 
Q. Put you on the hot seat, didn't I. 
A. Yes, you did. 
Q. I understand that. We're all dads. 
Now, since that time to the best of your 
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1 ability to observe, has Stephanie exhibited a 
2 sibling relationship with Chad? 
3 A. They're extremely close. 
4 Q. Okay. And Chad goes by the last name of 
5 Brubaker? 
6 A. Yes, he does. 
7 Q. Okay. What is your feeling about 
8 Stephanie? 
9 A. That she is my daughter and I treat her as 
10 such. I treat her equally as I do Chad and I love 
11 her the same. Chad is my son. 
12 Q. No further direct questions, Your Honor. 
13 MS. FOWLKE: I have no questions. 
14 THE COURT: No cross? 
15 MS. FOWLKE: No. 
16 THE COURT: You may step down. Thank 
17 you. 
18 MR. STRINGER: That's all we have, Your 
19 Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Anything further 
21 from either party? 
22 MS. FOWLKE: We could do closing argument 
23 but I think you know what we'd have to say. I 
24 don't know that we have anything new. 
25 THE COURT: I'm going to ask you both to 
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Counsel's approved the form of that Order. We'd 
like to submit that to the Court now. 
THE COURT: All right, you may. 
MR. STRINGER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Now you've marked some prior 
court pleadings as EXHIBIT A and B. They're part 
of the record anyway--
MS. FOWLKE: I think those were, the 
exhibits are part of the-- They were exhibits as 
part of the trial brief, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. They're part of 
the record — 
MS. FOWLKE: And they are part--
MR. STRINGER: They're already part of 
the record. 
MS. FOWLKE: They are part of the record 
obviously. 
THE COURT: Part of the documents. 
MR. STRINGER: They were never offered 
for--
MS. FOWLKE: Yeah. 
MR. STRINGER: -- evidence at the time 
but--
THE COURT: She never offered them. She 
marked them as part of her trial brief. 
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long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally di-
vided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. 
on the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 
p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) extended visitation with the noncustodial parent 
may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the 
noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the 
noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to 
visitation for the custodial parent consistent with 
these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two 
week period of uninterrupted time during the children's 
summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the 
noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be ¥z of 
the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided 
the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation 
weeks with the child shall be provided at least 30 days in 
advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours. 
1993 
30-3-36. Special c i rcumstances , 
(1) When visitation has not taken place for an extended 
period of time and the child lacks an appropriate bond with 
the noncustodial parent, both parents shall consider the 
possible adverse effects upon the child and gradually reintro-
duce an appropriate visitation plan for the noncustodial par-
ent. 
(2) For emergency purposes, whenever the child travels 
with either parent, all of the following will be provided to the 
other parent: 
(a) an itinerary of travel dates; 
(b) destinations; 
(c) places where the child or traveling parent can be 
reached; and 
(d) the name and telephone number of an available 
third person who would be knowledgeable of the child's 
location. 
(3) Unchaperoned travel of a child under the age of five 
years is not recommended. 1993 
30-3-37. Relocat ion. 
(1) When either parent decides to move from the state of 
Utah or 150 miles or more from the residence specified in the 
court's decree, that parent shall provide reasonable advance 
written notice of the intended relocation to the other parent. 
(2) The court may, upon motion of any party or upon the 
court's own motion, schedule a hearing with notice to review 
the visitation schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 and 
make appropriate orders regarding the visitation and costs for 
visitation transportation. 
(3) In determining the visitation schedule and allocating 
the transportation costs, the court shall consider: 
(a) the reason for the parent's relocation; 
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both parents in 
exercising visitation; 
(c) the economic resources of both parents; and 
(d) other factors the court considers necessary and 
relevant. 
(4) Upon the motion of any party, the court may order the 
parent intending to move to pay the costs of transportation for: 
(a) at least one visit per year with the other parent; and 
(b) any number of additional visits as determined eq-
uitable by the court. 
(5) Upon the motion of any party, the court may order 
uninterrupted visitation with the noncustodial parent for a 
minimum of 30 days during extended visitation, except if the 
court finds it is not in the best interests of the child. 1993 
30-3-38. Pi lot P rog ram for Exped i t ed Vis i ta t ion En-
forcement . 
(1) There is established an Expedited Visitation Enforce-
ment Pilot Program in the third judicial district to be admin-
istered by the Administrative Office of the Courts from July 1, 
1996, to July 1, 1997. 
(2) This pilot program is to resolve visitation problems on 
an expedited basis by enabling a parent who alleges that his 
court-ordered visitation rights have been violated to file a 
request for enforcement of the order, have a conference sched-
uled with the other parent and a private mediator to address 
visitation issues within 15 days of filing the request, and have 
the private mediator assess the situation, facilitate an agree-
ment on visitation between the parties, and make an appro-
priate recommendation to the court on a timely basis. Within 
15 days, an agreement on visitation shall become a temporary 
order under the signature of the court. 
(3) The Judicial Council shall make rules to implement and 
administer this pilot program. 
(4) The parties to a proceeding initiated in the third district 
court to enforce the terms of a visitation order shall partici-
pate in this pilot program, unless one of the parties: 
(a) makes an allegation of child sexual abuse implicat-
ing the other party, in which case, the mediator shall refer 
the matter to the court and report the allegation to the 
Division of Family Services consistent with Title 62A, 
Chapter 4a, Part 4, Child Abuse or Neglect Reporting 
Requirements; or 
(b) is unwilling to participate in the program, in which 
case, the matter shall be referred to the court. 
(5) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall adopt a 
program to evaluate the effectiveness of this pilot program. 
Progress reports shall be provided to the Judiciary Interim 
Committee in August 1996 and as requested thereafter by the 
committee. At least once during this pilot program, the Ad-
ministrative Office of the Courts shall present to the commit-
tee the results of a survey that measures the effectiveness of 
the program in terms of increased compliance with visitation 
orders and the responses of interested persons. 
(6) (a) The Department of Human Services shall apply for 
federal funds designated for visitation, if such funds are 
available. The department shall contract any federal 
funds received under this application to the Administra-
tive Office of the Courts for the administration of this pilot 
program. 
(b) This pilot program shall be funded through funds 
received under Subsection (a), the Children's Legal De-
fense Account as established in Section 63-63a-8, or other 
available funding. Without funding, the pilot program 
may not proceed. 1996 
CHAPTER 4 
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE 
Section 
30-4-1. Action by spouse — Grounds. 
30-4-2. Procedure — Venue. 
30-4-3. Custody and maintenance of children — Property 
and debt division — Support payments. 
30-4-4. Restraining disposal of property. 
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the child is participating or being honored, and the 
noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and par-
ticipate fully; 
(11) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly 
to all school reports including preschool and daycare 
reports and medical records and shall be notified imme-
diately by the custodial parent in the event of a medical 
emergency; 
(12) each parent shall provide the other with his cur-
rent address and telephone number within 24 hours of 
any change; 
(13) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal 
telephone contact during reasonable hours and uncen-
sored mail privileges with the child; 
(14) parental care shall be presumed to be better care 
for the child than surrogate care and the court shall 
encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the non-
custodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child care; 
(15) each parent shall provide all surrogate care pro-
viders with the name, current address, and telephone 
number of the other parent and shall provide the noncus-
todial parent with the name, current address, and tele-
phone number of all surrogate care providers unless the 
court for good cause orders otherwise; and 
(16) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of 
major religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and 
the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the 
other parent does not celebrate shall have the right to be 
together with the child on the religious holiday 1993 
30-3-34, Best interests — Rebuttable presumption. 
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a visitation sched-
ule, the court may estabUsh a visitation schedule consistent 
with the best interests of the child. 
(2) The advisory guildelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 
and the visitation schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 
shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the child. The 
visitation schedule shall be considered the minimum visita-
tion to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be 
entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. The presumption may be rebutted 
based upon a finding of the court including any of the following 
criteria: 
(a) visitation would endanger the child's physical 
health; 
(b) visitation would significantly impair the child's 
emotional development; 
(c) a substantiated allegation of child abuse exists; 
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills; 
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to 
provide adequate food and shelter for the child during 
periods of visitation; 
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines 
the child to be of sufficient maturity; 
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a 
county jail, secure youth corrections facility, or an adult 
corrections facility; and 
(h) any other criteria the court determines relevant to 
the best interests of the child. 
(3) Once the visitation schedule has been established, the 
parties may not alter the schedule except by mutual consent of 
the parties or a court order. 1993 
30-3-35. Minimum schedule for visitation. 
(1) The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age chil-
dren, ages 5-18, beginning with kindergarten. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, the 
following schedule shall be considered the minimum visitation 
to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be 
entitled; 
(a) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncus-
todial parent or the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m; 
(b) alternating weekends beginning on the first week* 
end after the entry of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday 
until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visita-
tion, and changes shall not be made to the regular 
rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school 
day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the 
child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or 
Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that 
time so that the child is free from school and the parent is 
free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled 
to this lengthier holiday period; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial 
parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the 
actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at 
the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may 
take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for 
a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial 
parent is completely entitled; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for 
a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial 
parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before 
the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vaca-
tion as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so 
long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncusto-
dial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning 
at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the 
noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along 
for the birthday; 
(ii) New Year's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(v) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial 
parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly 
known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on 
Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vii) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(viii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday 
at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(ix) the second portion of the Christmas school 
vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus 
Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so 
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submitted to the court. Any reviewing attorney or guardian ad 
litem shall certify in writing that he has reviewed the agree-
ment and shall comment on the agreement based on the best 
interests of the child or children. 
(2) The court may approve or reject the mediation agree-
ment based on the best interests of the child or children. The 
court shall state its reasons for rejecting all or any part of the 
mediation agreement. If the court approves the mediated 
agreement, its terms shall be incorporated in the court's final 
order. 
(3) (a) If after mediation under this section the parties do 
not reach agreement on child custody or visitation, the 
mediator shall notify the court of that result. 
(b) The court shall, if appropriate, refer the matter for 
a legal custody or visitation evaluation. If the parties 
come to agreement on legal custody or visitation after the 
matter has been referred for an evaluation, the study 
shall be terminated. 
(c) The parties may return to mediation at any time 
before any trial or final hearing on permanent legal 
custody or visitation. 
(4) Every final order implementing a mediated agreement 
shall contain: 
(a) a provision for child support; and 
(b) a statement that each parent shall have access to 
records and information pertaining to a minor child, 
including medical, dental, and school records, whether or 
not the child resides with the parent, unless that access is 
found by the court not to be in the best interest of the child 
or that access is found by the court to be sought for the 
purpose of causing detriment to the other parent. If access 
to the records under this subsection is not ordered, the 
court shall state in the order its reasons for denying tha t 
access. 
(5) The court may not apply a preference for one parent 
over the other in determining parental rights and responsi-
bilities because of the parent's gender or the child's age or 
gender. 1992 
30-3-30. Appropriation to pilot program to cover costs 
of impecunious parties. 
Each party who is unable to pay the costs of mediation may 
attend mediation without payment upon a prima facie show-
ing of impecuniosity as evidenced by an affidavit of impecuni-
osity filed in the district court. In those instances, the inde-
pendent contractor shall be reimbursed for its costs from the 
appropriations for the "Domestic Relations Mandatory Media-
tion Pilot Program." Before a decree of divorce shall be 
entered, the court shall make a final review and determina-
tion of impecuniosity and may order the payment of the costs 
if so determined. 1992 
30-3-31. Review of pilot program. 
(1) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall adopt a 
program to evaluate the effectiveness of the mandatory me-
diation pilot program. Progress reports shall be provided 
semi-annually on the date of implementation of this section 
and on the results beginning July 1,1994. The results shall be 
reported to the Judiciary Interim Committee on a bi-annual 
basis. 
(2) The Administrative Office of the Courts may make 
recommendations to the Judiciary Interim Committee on 
methods to make the program fiscally solvent, if necessary, 
including the increase in marriage license fees, divorce filing 
fees, or mediation fees. 1992 
30-3-32. Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definitions. 
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote visitation 
at a level consistent with all parties , interests. 
(2) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real 
harm or substantiated potential harm to the child: 
(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, 
divorced, or adjudicated parents to have frequent, mean-
ingful, and continuing access to each parent following 
separation or divorce; 
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is 
entitled to and responsible for frequent, meaningful, and 
continuing access with his child consistent with the child's 
best interests; and 
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have both 
parents actively involved in parenting the child. 
(3) For purposes~of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37: 
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divorcing, 
separating, or adjudicated parents. 
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time period 
beginning on the evening the child gets out of school for 
the Christmas school break until the evening before the 
child returns to school, except for Christmas Eve, Christ-
mas Day, and New Year's Day. 
(c) "Extended visitation" means a period of visitation 
other than a weekend, holiday as provided in Subsections 
30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays as provided in 
Subsections 30-3-33(4) and (16), and "Christmas school 
vacation." 1993 
30-3-33. Advisory guidelines. 
In addition to the visitation schedule provided in Section 
30-3-35, advisory guidelines are suggested to govern all visi-
tation arrangements between parents. These advisory guide-
lines include: 
(1) visitation schedules mutually agreed upon by both 
parents are preferable to a court-imposed solution; 
(2) the visitation schedule shall be utilized to maximize 
the continuity and stability of the child's life; 
(3) the court may alter this schedule to make shorter 
visits of greater frequency or other arrangements consis-
tent with the child's best interests for children under age 
5; otherwise the visitation schedule as provided in Section 
30-3-35 shall apply; 
(4) special consideration shall be given by each parent 
to make the child available to attend family functions 
including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious 
holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant 
events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent 
which may inadvertently conflict with the visitation 
schedule; 
(5) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at 
the times specified and return the child at the times 
specified, and the child's regular school hours shall not be 
interrupted; 
(6) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for 
visitation at the time he is to be picked up and shall be 
present at the custodial home or shall make reasonable 
alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time he 
is returned; 
(7) the court may make alterations in the visitation 
schedule to reasonably accommodate the work schedule of 
both parents and may increase the visitation allowed to 
the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the stan-
dardized visitation provided in Section 30-3-35; 
(8) the court may make alterations in the visitation 
schedule to reasonably accommodate the distance be-
tween the parties and the expense of exercising visitation; 
(9) neither visitation nor child support is to be withheld 
due to either parent's failure to comply with a court-
ordered visitation schedule; 
(10) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial 
parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of all significant 
school, social, sports, and community functions in which 
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(3) If the mediator determines at the initial session that 
continued mediation is inappropriate and so informs the court 
in writing, the court may hold a trial of or a final hearing on 
permanent legal custody or visitation. 
(4) Not sooner that 45 days after the initial mediation 
session is held, the court may, on its own motion or on motion 
by one of the parties, consider whether a continued stay of any 
trial or final hearing on permanent legal custody or visitation 
is warranted pending the outcome of mediation. In making 
this determination, the court shall consider, but need not 
follow, the opinion of the mediator. If the court concludes that 
a further stay of proceedings is not warranted, it may proceed 
to final resolution of the matter. 1992 
30-3-24. Mediation and compl iance wi th requirement. 
(1) (a) Following the initial mediation session, the parties 
shall participate in at least one additional mediation 
session. Participation in these two mediation sessions 
shall constitute compliance with the mandatory media-
tion requirement imposed by this chapter even if a medi-
ated agreement may not have been reached. 
(b) Upon completion of the mediation process and the 
reaching of an agreement, or upon completion of the two 
required sessions without reaching an agreement, the 
mediator shall certify in writing to the court: 
(i) the process followed was the one prescribed by 
law; 
(iij the agreement reached, if any, and presented to 
the attorney reflects the actual results of the media-
tion process; and 
(iii) the mediator used his best efforts to effect a 
settlement of the custody or visitation dispute. 
(2) The written certification by the mediator shall consti-
tute evidence of compliance by the parties with the mandatory 
mediation requirement. Upon receipt of evidence of compli-
ance, the district court may then proceed with a trial or final 
hearing on permanent legal custody or visitation. 1992 
30-3-25. Prohibited issues in media t ion . 
Any issue relating to property division may be considered 
during the mediation unless: 
(1) the property division issue is unrelated to the legal 
custody or visitation issue; and 
(2) the parties agree in writing not to consider the 
property division issue as part of their mediation. 1992 
30-3-26. Creation of mandatory mediation program — 
Duties of director — Courts. 
(1) There is created in the Administrative Office of the 
Courts a mandatory mediation program. The Administrative 
Office of the Courts shall designate the director of mandatory 
mediation services in the fourth judicial district under the 
pilot program. 
(2) The director of the mandatory mediation program shall 
have the following qualifications and duties and is subject to 
approval by the Judicial Council. The director shall: 
(a) meet the qualifications as provided in Section 30-3-
27; and 
(b) supervise mediation and evaluate the quality of any 
such mediation or study. 
(3) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall: 
(a) contract with the mediators to perform mediation, 
who meet the qualifications of Section 30-3-27, arrange 
and monitor mediator training, and assign and monitor 
case load; 
(b) contract under Subsection (3) with a person or 
public or private entity to perform mediation pursuant to 
Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code; and 
(c) administer and manage the appropriations for "Do-
mestic Relations Mandatory Mediation Pilot Program" as 
provided in Section 30-3-30 in the judicial districts where 
the pilot program occurs. 
(4) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules: 
(a) to implement this mediation pilot program; 
(b) to compile and maintain a list of qualified media-
tors; and 
(c) to respond to requests for a change of mediators. 
1992 
30-3-27. Mediator qualif ications. 
A mediator who performs mandatory mediation in contested 
child custody or visitation matters under Sections 30-3-10 
through 30-3-10.6 or Section 30-4-3 shall have the following 
minimum qualifications: 
(1) (a) a license to engage in the practice of psychology 
under Title 58, Chapter 25a, Psychologists' Licensing 
Act, an advanced degree in psychology from an ac-
credited institution of higher education, or a license 
in social work, under Title 58, Chapter 35, or a license 
in marriage and family therapy, under Title 58, 
Chapter 39, and successfully completed not less than 
40 hours of mediation training; or 
(b) a license to practice law in the state of Utah 
and successfully completed not less than 40 hours of 
mediation training; 
(2) (a) knowledge of the court system and the proce-
dures used in contested child custody or visitation 
matters; 
(b) knowledge of resources in the community to 
which the parties to contested child custody or visi-
tation matters can be referred for assistance; and 
(c) knowledge of child development, clinical issues 
relating to children, the effects of divorce on children, 
and child custody research. 1992 
30-3-28. Mediation proceedings closed — Information 
confidential — Records closed. 
(1) All mandatory mediation proceedings under Sections 
30-3-23 and 30-3-24 shall be held in private, and all persons 
other than mediation services personnel, the parties, their 
counsel, and children of the parties shall be excluded unless 
the parties agree otherwise. 
(2) All communications, verbal or written, made in media-
tion proceedings are confidential. A party or any other indi-
vidual present during mediation proceedings may not be 
examined in any civil or criminal action as to such communi-
cations and such communications may not be used in any civil 
or criminal action without the consent of the parties to the 
mediation. 
(3) All records of the court with respect to mediation pro-
ceedings shall be classified private and disclosed only pursu-
ant to Section 63-2-202. 
(4) (a) However, a person providing mediation is subject to 
the child abuse reporting requirements of Section 62A-4a-
403 and the criminal penalty for failure to report under 
Section 62A-4a-411. The confidentiality provisions of Sec-
tion 62A-4a-412 apply to reports made under this subsec-
tion. 
(b) If the mediator determines a participant in the 
procedure has made an immediate threat of physical 
violence against a readily identifiable victim or against 
the mediator, communications involving the threat are 
not confidential. 1994 
30-3-29. Mediation agreement — Order. 
(1) Any agreement which resolves issues of permanent 
legal custody or visitation between the parties reached as a 
result of mediation under this section shall be prepared in 
writing, reviewed by the attorney for each party and by any 
appointed guardian ad litem for the child, if any, and then 
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specialists or scientific expert, or the pastor, bishop or presid-
ing officer of any religious denomination to which the parties 
may belong. The power and jurisdiction granted by this act 
shall be in addition to that presently exercised by the district 
courts and shall not be in limitation thereof. 1969 
30-3-17.1. P roceed ings deemed confidential — Written 
evaluation by counselor. 
The petition for conciliation and all communications, verbal 
or written, from the parties to the domestic relations counsel-
ors or other personnel of the conciliation department in 
counseling or conciliation proceedings shall be deemed to be 
made in official confidence within the meaning of Section 
78-24-8 and shall not be admissible or usable for any purpose 
in any divorce hearing or other proceeding. However, the 
marriage counselor may submit to the appropriate court a 
written evaluation of the prospects or prognosis of a particular 
marriage without divulging facts or revealing confidential 
disclosures. 1969 
30-3-18. Waiting period for hearing after filing for 
divorce — Exemption — Use of counsel ing 
and education services not to be construed as 
condonation or promotion. 
(1) Unless the court, for good cause shown and set forth in 
the findings, otherwise orders, no hearing for decree of divorce 
shall be held by the court until 90 days shall have elapsed 
from the filing of the complaint, provided the court may make 
such interim orders as may be just and equitable. 
(2) The 90-day period as provided in Subsection (1) shall 
not apply in any case where both parties have completed the 
mandatory educational course for divorcing parents as pro-
vided in Section 30-3-11.3 or the mediation requirement as 
provided in Section 30-3-21. 
(3) The use of counseling, mediation, and education ser-
vices provided under this chapter may not be construed as 
condoning the acts that may constitute grounds for divorce on 
the part of either spouse nor of promoting divorce. 1993 
30-3-19. Purpose. 
The Legislature declares as public policy that encouraging 
mediated resolutions of disputes over child custody or visita-
tion between parents is in the best interests of children. 1992 
30-3-20. Definitions. 
As used in Sections 30-3-20 through 30-3-31: 
(1) "Court" means the district court of the fourth judi-
cial district which participates in the mandatory media-
tion pilot program. 
(2) "Mediation" means a cooperative process by which 
the parties are assisted in formulating an agreement by a 
mediator who applies communication and dispute resolu-
tion skills to resolve a dispute concerning child custody or 
visitation that arises from a domestic relations matter 
with the best interest of the child as the paramount 
consideration. 
(3) "Mediator" means a person with special skills and 
training in domestic relations dispute resolution as estab-
lished in Section 30-3-27. 
(4) "Pilot program" means a mandatory mediation pro-
gram designed to implement divorce mediation where 
issues of child custody or visitation are in dispute estab-
lished in Section 30-3-30. 1992 
30-3-21. When referral to mediation is required. 
(1) (a) There is established a mandatory mediation pilot 
program in the fourth judicial district to be administered 
by the Administrative Office of the Courts after January 
1,1993, and before March 1,1995. The pilot program may 
be expanded to include the third judicial district after 
July 1, 1993. 
(b) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules to implement 
and administer this pilot program. 
(2) If it appears to the court on the face of the complaint or 
at any time during the divorce proceedings prior to the entry 
of the initial divorce decree that issues of custody or visitation 
of a child or children are contested, the court shall refer the 
matter for mediation of the contested issues prior to or 
concurrent with the setting of the matter for hearing. 
(3) This pilot program shall not include petitions for modi-
fication of an existing divorce decree. 
(4) (a) At the initial appearance, the court shall determine 
whether: 
(i) either or both issues of child custody and visi-
tation are in dispute; and 
(ii) the attitudes of the parties and the nature of 
the dispute are amenable to successful mediation, 
(b) The court may direct the parties to mediation and 
still make necessary interim orders including protective 
orders under Section 30-3-5.5, ex parte protective orders 
or protective orders under Title 30, Chapter 6, temporary 
orders under Title 30, Chapter 4, nunc pro tunc orders 
under Section 30-4a-l, and appointment of a guardian ad 
litem under Title 78, Chapter 3a. 
(5) The mediation proceeding shall be used to reduce acri-
mony between the parties, to avoid litigation, and to develop 
an agreement assuring the child's or children's close and 
continuing contact with both parents after the marriage is 
dissolved. 1992 
30-3-22. Waiver of mandatory mediation requirement. 
(1) The parties shall attend the mediation unless one party 
objects and the district court finds that attendance at a 
mediation session would cause undue hardship to or threaten 
the mental or physical health or safety of either of the parties 
or the child or children of the parties. 
(2) In making its determination of whether attendance at 
the mediation session would endanger the health or safety of 
either of the parties or the child or children the court shall 
consider evidence of any of the following: 
(a) that a party has engaged in abuse of the child or 
children; 
(b) that a party has engaged or been victimized in 
interspousal domestic violence; 
(c) that a party has a significant problem with alcohol 
or drug abuse; or 
(d) any other evidence indicates that a party's or his 
child's or children's health or safety will be endangered by 
attending the session. 
(3) In making its determination of whether attendance at 
the mediation session would cause undue hardship to either of 
the parties or the child or children of the parties, the court 
shall consider evidence of any of the following: 
(a) that a party is mentally ill or is incompetent; 
(b) that a party cannot complete mediation due to 
military service or extraordinary job requirements; or 
(c) any other evidence indicates that a party or his 
child or children will face undue hardship by attending 
the session. 1992 
30-3-23. Initial mediat ion session. 
(1) The initial mediation session shall inform the parties 
about mediation, evaluate whether mediation is appropriate, 
and determine whether both parties are willing to participate 
in mediation in good faith. 
(2) If the mediator detennines at the initial session that 
continued mediation is appropriate and makes a written 
recommendation to the court, the court shall not hold a trial or 
a final hearing on permanent legal custody or visitation until 
after mediation is completed or terminated under Subsection 
(4). 
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division the district court judge or judges may, and in each 
county having a population of more than 300,000 and in which 
the district court has established a family court division the 
district court judges shall, by an order filed in the office of the 
clerk on or before July 1 of each year, appoint one or more 
domestic relations counselors, an attorney of recognized abil-
ity and standing at the bar as family court commissioner, and 
such other persons as assistants and clerks as may be neces-
sary, to serve during the pleasure of the appointing power. 
1969 
30-3-15.2. Repealed. 1992 
30-3-15.3. Commiss ioners — Powers . 
Commissioners shall: 
(1) secure compliance with court orders; 
(2) require completion of mandatory mediation as pro-
vided in Sections 30-3-21 and 30-3-24; 
(3) require attendance at the mandatory course as 
provided in Section 30-3-11.3; 
(4) serve as judge pro tempore, master or referee on: 
(a) assignment of the court; and 
(b) with the written consent of the parties: 
(i) orders to show cause where no contempt is 
alleged; 
(ii) default divorces where the parties have 
had marriage counseling but there has been no 
reconciliation; 
(iii) uncontested actions under the Uniform 
Act on Paternity; 
(iv) actions under the Uniform Civil Liability 
for Support Act; and 
(v) actions under the Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Support Act; and 
(5) represent the interest of children in divorce or 
annulment actions, and the parties in appropriate cases. 
1992 
30-3-15.4. Salaries and expenses . 
Salaries of persons appointed under the foregoing sections 
shall be fixed by the county legislative body of the .county in 
which they serve. Office space, furnishings, equipment, and 
supplies for family court commissioners and conciliation staff 
shall be provided by the county. The expenses and salaries of 
family court commissioners and conciliation staff shall be paid 
from county funds. 1996 
30-3-16. Repealed. 1961 
30-3-16.1. Jurisdiction of family court divis ion — Pow-
ers. 
Whenever any controversy exists between spouses which 
may, unless a reconciliation is achieved, result in the dissolu-
tion or annulment of the marriage or in the disruption of the 
household, and there is a child of the spouses or either of them 
under the age of 17 years whose welfare might be affected, the 
family court division of the district court shall have jurisdic-
tion over the controversy, over the parties and over all persons 
having any relation to the controversy and may compel 
attendance before the court or a domestic relations counselor 
of the parties or other persons related to the controversy. The 
court may make orders in divorce or conciliation proceeding as 
it deems necessary for the protection of the family interests. 
1969 
30-3-16.2. Petit ion for conciliation. 
Prior to the filing of any action for divorce, annulment, or 
separate maintenance, either spouse or both spouses may file 
a petition for conciliation in the family court division invoking 
the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of preserving the 
marriage by effecting a reconciliation between the parties or 
an amicable settlement of the controversy between them so as 
to avoid litigation over the issues involved. 1969 
30-3-16.3. Contents of petition. 
The petition for conciliation shaJJ state: 
( D A controversy exists between the spouses and re-
quest the aid of the court to effect a reconciliation or an 
amicable settlement of the controversy. 
(2) The name and age of each child under the age of 17 
years whose welfare may be affected by the controversy. 
(3) The name and address of the petitioner or the 
names and addresses of the petitioners. 
(4) If the petition is filed by one spouse only, the name 
and address of the other spouse as a respondent. 
(5) The name, as a respondent, of any other person who 
has any relation to the controversy and, if known to the 
petitioners, the address of such person. 
(6) Such other information as the court may by rule 
require. i»69 
30-3-16.4. Procedure upon filing of petition. 
When a petition for conciliation is filed in the family court 
division of the district court, the court shall refer the matter to 
the domestic relations counselor or counselors and shall cause 
notice to be given to the spouses, by mail or in a form 
prescribed by the court, of the filing of the petition and of the 
time and place of any hearing, conference or other proceeding 
scheduled by the court or domestic relations counselors under 
this act. 1969 
30-3-16.5. Fees. 
The court may fix fees to be charged for filing a petition for 
conciliation and for use of the courts' counseling services. 
1969 
30-3-16.6. Information not available to public. 
Neither the names of petitioners nor respondents, nor the 
contents of petitions for conciliation filed under this act, shall 
be available or open to public inquiry, except that an attorney 
for a person seeking to file an action for divorce, annulment or 
separate maintenance may determine from the clerk of the 
court if the other spouse has filed a petition for conciliation. 
1969 
30-3-16.7. Effect of petition — Pendency of action. 
The filing of a petition for conciliation under this act shall, 
for a period of 60 days thereafter, act as a bar to the filing by 
either spouse of an action for divorce, annulment of marriage 
or separate maintenance unless the court otherwise orders. 
The pendency of an action for divorce, annulment of marriage 
or separate maintenance shall not prevent either party to the 
action from filing a petition for conciliation under this act, 
either on his own or at the request and direction of the court 
as authorized by Section 30-3-17; and the filing of a petition for 
conciliation shall stay for a period of 60 days, unless the court 
otherwise orders, any trial or default hearing upon the com-
plaint. However, when the judge of the family court division is 
advised in writing by a marriage counselor to whom a petition 
for conciliation has been referred that a reconciliation of the 
parties cannot be effected, the bar to filing an action or the 
stay of trial or default hearing shall be removed. 1969 
30-3-17. Power and ju r i sd ic t ion of judge. 
The judge of a district court may counsel either spouse or 
both and may in his discretion require one or both of them to 
appear before him and, in those counties where a domestic 
relations counselor has been appointed pursuant to this act, 
require them to file a petition for conciliation and to appear 
before such counselor, or may recommend the aid of a physi-
cian, psychiatrist, psychologist, social service worker or other 
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States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico. 
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be 
effective and enforceable as a lien against the real property 
interest of any third party relying on the public record, shall 
be docketed in the district court in accordance with Sections 
78-22-1 and 62A-11-311. 1989 
30-3-11. Repealed. 1961 
30-3-ll«l- Family Court Act — Purpose. 
It is the public policy of the state of Utah to strengthen the 
family life foundation of our society and reduce the social and 
economic costs to the state resulting from broken homes and to 
take reasonable measures to preserve marriages, particularly 
where minor children are involved. The purposes of this act 
are to protect the rights of children and to promote the public 
welfare by preserving and protecting family life and the 
institution of matrimony by providing the courts with further 
assistance for family counseling, the reconciliation of spouses 
and the amicable settlement of domestic and family contro-
versies. 1969 
30-3-11.2. Appointment of counsel for child. 
If, in any action before any court of this state involving the 
custody or support of a child, it shall appear in the best 
interests of the child to have a separate exposition of the 
issues and personal representation for the child, the court may 
appoint counsel to represent the child throughout the action, 
and the attorney's fee for such representation may be taxed as 
a cost of the action. 1969 
30-3-11.3. Mandatory educational course for divorcing 
parents — Purpose — Curriculum — Excep-
tions. 
(1) There is established a mandatory course for divorcing 
parents as a pilot program in the third and fourth judicial 
districts to be administered by the Administrative Office of the 
Courts from July 1,1992, to June 30,1994. On July 1,1994, an 
approved course shall be implemented in all judicial districts. 
The mandatory course is designed to educate and sensitize 
divorcing parties to their children's needs both during and 
after the divorce process. 
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules to implement and 
administer this program. 
(3) As a prerequisite to receiving a divorce decree, both 
parties are required to attend a mandatory course on their 
children's needs after filing a complaint for divorce and receiv-
ing a docket number, unless waived under Section 30-3-4. If 
that requirement is waived, the court may permit the divorce 
action to proceed. 
(4) The mandatory course shall instruct both parties about 
divorce and its impacts on: 
(a) their child or children; 
(b) their family relationship; and 
(c) their financial responsibilities for their child or 
children. 
(5) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall administer 
the course pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procure-
ment Code, through private or public contracts and organize 
the program in each of Utah's judicial districts. The contracts 
shall provide for the recoupment of administrative expenses 
through the costs charged to individual parties, pursuant to 
Subsection (7). 
(6) A certificate of completion constitutes evidence to the 
court of course completion by the parties. 
(7) (a) Each party shall pay the costs of the course to the 
independent contractor providing the course at the time 
and place of the course. A fee of $8 shall be collected, as 
part of the course fee paid by each participant, and 
deposited in the Children's Legal Defense Account, de-
scribed in Section 63-63a-8. 
(b) Each party who is unable to pay the costs of the 
course may attend the course without payment upon a 
prima facie showing of impecuniosity as evidenced by an 
affidavit of impecuniosity filed in the district court. In 
those situations, the independent contractor shall be 
reimbursed for its costs from the appropriation to the 
Administrative Office of the Courts for "Mandatory Edu-
cational Course for Divorcing Parents Program." Before a 
decree of divorce may be entered, the court shall make a 
final review and determination of impecuniosity and may 
order the payment of the costs if so determined. 
(8) Appropriations from the General Fund to the Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts for the "Mandatory Educational 
Course for Divorcing Parents Program" shall be used to pay 
the costs of an indigent parent who makes a showing as 
provided in Subsection (7)(b). 
(9) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall adopt a 
program to evaluate the effectiveness of the mandatory edu-
cational course. Progress reports shall be provided annually to 
the Judiciary Interim Committee. 1994 
30-3-12. Courts to exercise family counseling powers. 
Each district court of the respective judicial districts, while 
sitting in matters of divorce, annulment, separate mainte-
nance, child custody, alimony and support in connection there-
with, child custody in habeas corpus proceedings, and adop-
tions, shall exercise the family counseling powers conferred by 
this act. 1969 
30-3-13. Repealed. 1961 
30-3-13.1. Establishment of family court division of 
district court. 
A family court division of the district court may be estab-
lished with the consent of the county legislative body in a 
county in which the district court determines that the social 
conditions in the county and the number of domestic relations 
cases in the courts require use of the procedures provided for 
in this act in order to give full and proper consideration to such 
cases and to effectuate the purposes of this act. The determi-
nation shall be made annually by the judge of the district court 
in counties having only one judge, and by a majority of the 
judges of the district court in counties having more than one 
judge. 1993 
30-3-14. Repealed. 1961 
30-3-14.1. Designation of judges — Terms. 
In a county within a judicial district having more than one 
judge of the district court but having a population of less than 
300,000 and in which the district court has established a 
family court division, the presiding judge of such court shall 
annually, in the month of September, designate at least one 
judge to hear all cases under this act. In a county within a 
judicial district having more than one judge of the district 
court and having a population of more than 300,000 and in 
which the district court has established a family court divi-
sion, the presiding judge of such court shall annually, in the 
month of September, designate at least two judges to hear all 
cases under this act, and shall designate one of such judges as 
the presiding judge of such family court division. Such judge or 
judges shall serve on the family court division not less than 
one year and devote their time primarily to divorce and other 
domestic relations cases. 1969 
30-3-15. Repealed. 1961 
30-3-15.1. Appointment of domestic relations counsel-
ors, family court commissioner, and assis-
tants and clerks. 
In each county having a population of less than 300,000 and 
in which the district court has established a family court 
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(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal custody; 
or 
(b) both parents appear capable of implementing joint 
legal custody. 
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a child will 
be served by ordering joint custody, the court shall consider 
the following factors: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional 
needs and development of the child will benefit from joint 
legal custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the 
welfare of the child and reach shared decisions in the 
child's best interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and 
accepting a positive relationship between the child and 
the other parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the 
child before the divorce; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the 
parents; 
(f) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient 
age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent 
preference as to joint legal custody; 
(g) the maturity of the parents and their willingness 
and ability to protect the child from conflict that may arise 
between the parents; and 
(h) any other factors the court finds relevant. 
(3) The determination of the best interest of the child shall 
be by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(4) The court shall inform both parties that an order for 
joint custody may preclude eligibility for public assistance in 
the form of aid to families with dependent children, and that 
if public assistance is required for the support of children of 
the parties at any time subsequent to an order of joint legal 
custody, the order may be terminated under Section 30-3-10.4. 
(5) The court may order that where possible the parties 
attempt to settle future disputes by a dispute resolution 
method before seeking enforcement or modification of the 
terms and conditions of the order of joint legal custody 
through litigation, except in emergency situations requiring 
ex parte orders to protect the child. 1990 
30-3-10.3. Terms of jo in t legal custody order. 
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, before a final order of 
joint legal custody is entered both parties shall attend the 
mandatory course for divorcing parents, as provided in Section 
30-3-11.3, and present a certificate of completion from the 
course to the court. 
(2) An order of joint legal custody shall provide terms the 
court determines appropriate, which may include specifying: 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, until 
altered by further order of the court, or the custodian who 
has the sole legal right to determine the residence of the 
child; 
(b) that the parents shall exchange information con-
cerning the health, education, and welfare of the child, 
and where possible, confer before making decisions con-
cerning any of these areas; 
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regarding the 
child's present and future physical care, support, and 
education; 
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the child's 
attendance at school and other activities, his daily rou-
tine, and his association with friends; and 
(e) as necessary, the remaining parental rights, privi-
leges, duties, and powers to be exercised by the parents 
solely, concurrently, or jointly. 
(3) The court shall, where possible, include in the order the 
terms agreed to between the parties. 
(4) Any parental rights not specifically addressed by the 
court order may be exercised by the parent having physical 
custody of the child the majority of the time. 
(5) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians does not 
impair or limit the authority of the court to order support 
of the child, including payments by one custodian to the 
other. 
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is not 
grounds for modifying a support order. 
(c) The agreement may contain a dispute resolution 
procedure the parties agree to use before seeking enforce-
ment or modification of the terms and conditions of the 
order of joint legal custody through litigation, except in 
emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to protect 
the child. 1994 
30-3-10.4. Modification or termination of order. 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal custodians 
the court may, after a hearing, modify an order that estab-
lished joint legal custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both custo-
dians have materially and substantially changed since 
the entry of the order to be modified, or the order has 
become unworkable or inappropriate under existing cir-
cumstances; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the 
decree would be an improvement for and in the best 
interest of the child. 
(2) The order of joint legal custody shall be terminated by 
order of the court if both parents file a motion for termination. 
At the time of entry of an order terminating joint legal custody, 
the court shall enter an order of sole legal custody under 
Section 30-3-10. All related issues, including visitation and 
child support, shall also be determined and ordered by the 
court. 
(3) If the court finds that an action under this section is 
filed or answered frivolously and in a manner designed to 
harass the other party, the court shall assess attorney's fees as 
costs against the offending party. 1990 
30-3-10.5. Payments of support, maintenance, and ali-
mony. 
Unless the order or decree providing for support, mainte-
nance, or alimony under this chapter or Title 30, Chapter 4, 
provides a different time for payment, all monthly payments 
of support, maintenance, or alimony provided for in the order 
or decree shall be due one-half by the 5th day of each month, 
and the remaining one-half by the 20th day of that month. 
1985 
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order — Judg-
ment. 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support 
under any child support order, as defined by Subsection 
62A-11-40K3), is, on and after the date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of 
any judgment of a district court, except as provided in 
Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in 
this and in any other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any 
other jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child 
support order may be modified with respect to any period 
during which a petition for modification is pending, but only 
from the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee, 
if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is 
the petitioner. 
(3) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" means a state 
or political subdivision, a territory or possession of the United 
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(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short 
duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage, the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders regarding ali-
mony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not forseeable at the time of the di-
vorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a 
new order for alimony to address needs of the recipi-
ent that did not exist at the time the decree was 
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any 
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be consid-
ered, except as provided in this subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent 
spouse's financial ability to share living ex-
penses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a 
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that consider-
ation. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer 
than the number of years that the marriage existed 
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides other-
wise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage 
of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled 
and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall 
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the 
action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party 
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with 
another person. 1995 
30-3-5.1. Provision for income withholding in child 
support order. 
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, it shall 
include in the order a provision for withholding income as a 
means of collecting child support as provided in Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Part 4, Income Withholding. 1996 
30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual 
abuse — Investigation. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for 
modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or 
child sexual abuse is made, implicating either party, the court 
shall order that an investigation be conducted by the Division 
of Child and Family Services within the Department of 
Human Services in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 4a. A 
final award of custody or visitation may not be rendered until 
a report on that investigation is received by the court. That 
investigation shall be conducted by the Division of Child and 
Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and 
request for an investigation. In reviewing this report, the 
court shall comply with Section 78-7-9. 1996 
30-3-5.5,30-3-6. Repealed. 1991,1993 
30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute. 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute: 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by 
the clerk in the register of actions if both the parties who 
have a child or children have completed attendance at the 
mandatory course for divorcing parents as provided in 
Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court waives the require-
ment, on its own motion or on the motion of one of the 
parties, upon determination that course attendance and 
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties; 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may 
specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceed-
ings for review are pending; or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute, 
for sufficient cause otherwise orders. 
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for 
good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a designated 
period of time before the decree becomes absolute, but not to 
exceed six months from the signing and entry of the decree. 
1994 
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful. 
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their 
marriage by decree may marry any person other than the 
spouse from whom the divorce was granted until it becomes 
absolute. If an appeal is taken, the divorce is not absolute until 
after affirmance of the decree. 1988 
30-3-9. Repealed. 1969 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or 
divorce — Custody consideration. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are sepa-
rated, or their marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court 
shall make an order for the future care and custody of the 
minor children as it considers appropriate. In determining 
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child 
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of 
each of the parties. The court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the 
future custody, but the expressed desires are not controlling 
and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among 
other factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most 
likely to act in the best interests of the child, including 
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the 
noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody 
of the child, or has attempted to permanently relinquish 
custody to a third party, it shall take that evidence into 
consideration in determining whether to award custody to the 
other parent. 1993 
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined. 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody": 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, 
and powers of a parent by both parents, where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive authority by the 
court to one parent to make specific decisions; 
(3) does not affect the physical custody of the child 
except as specified in the order of joint legal custody; 
(4) is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal 
periods of physical custody of and access to the child to 
each of the parents, as the best interest of the child often 
requires that a primary physical residence for the child be 
designated; and 
(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying one 
parent as the primary caretaker and one home as the 
primary residence of the child. 1988 
30-3-10.2. Joint legal custody order — Factors for 
court determination — Public a s s i s t ance . 
(1) The court may order joint legal custody if it determines 
that joint legal custody is in the best interest of the child and: 
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(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a child or 
children and the plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial 
district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the pilot 
program shall be administered, a decree of divorce may 
not be granted until both parties have attended a man-
datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and have 
presented a certificate of course completion to the court. 
The court may waive this requirement, on its own motion 
or on the motion of one of the parties, if it determines 
course attendance and completion are not necessary, 
appropriate, feasible, or in the best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held 
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by 
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The 
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter 
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree 
after default of the defendant, upon the plaintiff's affida-
vit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by 
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed 
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order 
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or 
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office 
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied 
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full 
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to 
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 1995 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 1990 
30-3-5. Disposi t ion of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Divi-
sion of debts — Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — De-
termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious pe-
tition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respec-
tive creditors or obligees, regarding the court's divi-
sion of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding 
the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modi-
fied on or after January 1,1994, that are subject to income 
withholding, an order assessing against the obligor an 
additional $7 per month check processing fee to be in-
cluded in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Ser-
vices for the purposes of income withholding in accor-
dance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order 
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subse-
quent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and 
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grand-
parents, and other members of the immediate family, the 
court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an 
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision, 
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under 
this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visita-
tion provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court 
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court 
determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member 
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where 
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the 
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following fac-
tors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipi-
ent spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the 
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base ali-
mony on the standard of living that existed at the time of 
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, 
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change 
shall be considered in dividing the marital property and 
in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the 
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
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Section 
30-3-17.1. Proceedings deemed confidential — Written 
evaluation by counselor. 
30-3-18. Waiting period for hearing after filing for di-
vorce — Exemption — Use of counseling and 
education services not to be construed as 
condonation or promotion. 
30-3-19. 
30-3-20. 
30-3-21. 
30-3-22. 
30-3-23. 
30-3-24. 
30-3-25. 
30-3-26. 
30-3-27. 
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30-3-36. 
30-3-37. 
30-3-38. 
Purpose. 
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When referral to mediation is required. 
Waiver of mandatory mediation requirement. 
Initial mediation session. 
Mediation and compliance with requirement. 
Prohibited issues in mediation. 
Creation of mandatory mediation program — 
Duties of director — Courts. 
Mediator qualifications. 
Mediation proceedings closed — Information 
confidential — Records closed. 
Mediation agreement — Order. 
Appropriation to pilot program to cover costs of 
impecunious parties. 
Review of pilot program. 
Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definitions. 
Advisory guidelines. 
Best interests — Rebuttable presumption. 
Minimum schedule for visitation. 
Special circumstances. 
Relocation. 
Pilot Program for Expedited Visitation En-
30-3-1. Procedure — Res idence — Grounds . 
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as 
provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as 
provided in this chapter. 
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage 
contract between the plaintiff and defendant on the grounds 
specified in Subsection (3) in all cases where the plaintiff or 
defendant has been an actual and bona fide resident of this 
state and of the county where the action is brought, or if 
members of the armed forces of the United States who are not 
legal residents of this state, where the plaintiff has been 
stationed in this state under military orders, for three months 
next prior to the commencement of the action. 
(3) Grounds for divorce: 
(a) impotency of the defendant at the time of marriage; 
(b) adultery committed by the defendant subsequent to 
marriage; 
(c) willful desertion of the plaintiff by the defendant for 
more than one year; 
(d) willful neglect of the defendant to provide for the 
plaintiff the common necessaries of life; 
(e) habitual drunkenness of the defendant; 
(f) conviction of the defendant for a felony; 
(g) cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant to 
the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental dis-
tress to the plaintiff; 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately 
under a decree of separate maintenance of any state for 
three consecutive years without cohabitation. 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does 
not affect the liability of either party under any provision for 
separate maintenance previously granted. 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of 
insanity unless: (i) the defendant has been adjudged 
insane by the appropriate authorities of this or another 
state prior to the commencement of the action; and ui) the 
court finds by the testimony of competent witnesses that 
the insanity of the defendant is incurable. 
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a guard-
ian ad litem, who shall protect the interests of the 
defendant. A copy of the summons and complaint shall be 
served on the defendant in person or by publication, as 
provided by the laws of this state in other actions for 
divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the 
county attorney for the county where the action is pros-
ecuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of 
the case and if the defendant resides out of this state, take 
depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and 
make a defense as is just to protect the rights of the 
defendant and the interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction 
over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, 
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as 
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The plaintiff or .defendant may, if the defendant 
resides in this state, upon notice, have the defendant 
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of 
the defendant by two or more competent physicians, to 
determine the mental condition of the defendant. For this 
purpose either party may have leave from the court to 
enter any asylum or institution where the defendant may 
be confined. The costs of court in this action shall be 
apportioned by the court. 1987 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife 
for the same causes and in the same manner as the wife may 
obtain a divorce from her husband. 1953 
30-3-3. Award of costs , a t t o r n e y and wi tness fees — 
Temporary al imony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and 
in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child 
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, 
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and 
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party 
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The 
order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the 
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no 
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party 
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may 
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the 
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other 
party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of 
the action or in the final order or judgment. 1993 
30-3-4. Pleadings — F i n d i n g s — Decree — Use of affi-
davit — Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the 
plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default 
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the 
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the 
defendant, evidence to support the decree may be submit-
ted upon the affidavit of the plaintiff with the approval of 
the court. 
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30-2-3. Conveyances be tween h u s b a n d a n d wife. 
A conveyance, transfer or lien executed by either husband or 
wife to or in favor of the other shall be valid to the same extent 
as between other persons. 1953 
30-2-4. Wife's r igh t to wages — Actions for p e r s o n a l 
injury. 
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, 
maintain an action therefor in her own name and hold the 
same in her own right, and may prosecute and defend all 
actions for the preservation and protection of her rights and 
property as if unmarried. There shall be no right of recovery 
by the husband on account of personal injury or wrong to his 
wife, or for expenses connected therewith, but the wife may 
recover against a third person for such injury or wrong as if 
unmarried, and such recovery shall include expenses of medi-
cal treatment and other expenses paid or assumed by the 
husband. 1953 
30-2-5. Sepa ra t e debts . 
(1) Neither spouse is personally liable for the separate 
debts, obligations, or liabilities of the other: 
(a) contracted or incurred before marriage; 
(b) contracted or incurred during marriage, except fam-
ily expenses as provided in Section 30-2-9; 
(c) contracted or incurred after divorce or an order for 
separate maintenance under this title, except the spouse 
is personally liable for that portion of the expenses 
incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses, and other similar 
necessities as provided in a court order under Section 
30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15, or an administrative order 
under Section 62A-11-326; or 
(d) ordered by the court to be paid by the other spouse 
under Section 30-3-5 or 30-4-3 and not in conflict with 
Section 15-4-6.5 or 15-4-6.7. 
(2) The wages, earnings, property, rents, or other income of 
one spouse may not be reached by a creditor of the other 
spouse to satisfy a debt, obligation, or liability of the other 
spouse, as described under Subsection (1). 1995 
30-2-6. Actions based on property r i gh t s . 
Should the husband or wife obtain possession or control of 
property belonging to the other before or after marriage, the 
owner of the property may maintain an action therefor, or for 
any right growing out of the same, in the same manner and to 
the same extent as if they were unmarried. 1953 
30-2-7. Husband ' s l iability for wife's torts. 
For civil injuries committed by a married woman damages 
may be recovered from her alone, and her husband shall not be 
liable therefor, except in cases where he would be jointly liable 
with her if the marriage did not exist. 1953 
30-2-8. Agency between husband and wife. 
A husband or wife may constitute the other his or her 
attorney in fact to control and dispose of his or her property for 
their mutual benefit or otherwise, and may revoke the ap-
pointment the same as other persons. 1953 
30-2-9. Family expenses — Joint and several liability. 
The expenses of the family and the education of the children 
are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife or 
of either of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued 
jointly or separately. 1953 
30-2-10. Homes tead rights — Custody of children. 
Neither the husband nor wife can remove the other or their 
children from the homestead without the consent of the other, 
unless the owner of the property shall in good faith provide 
another homestead suitable to the condition in life of the 
family; and if a husband or wife abandons his or her spouse, 
that spouse is entitled to the custody of the minor children 
unless a court of competent jurisdiction shall otherwise direct 
1S77 
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30-3-< 
CHAPTER 3 
DIVORCE 
Procedure — Residence — Grounds. 
Right of husband to divorce. 
Award of costs, attorney and witness fees -^ * 
Temporary alimony. 
Pleadings — Findings 
affidavit — Sealing. 
3-4.4. Repealed. 
Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Divi-
sion of debts — Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — 
Determination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
Provision for income withholding in child sup-
port order. 
Allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse 
— Investigation. 
6. Repealed. 
When decree becomes absolute. 
Remarriage — When unlawful. 
Repealed. 
Custody of children in case of separation or 
divorce — Custody consideration. 
Joint legal custody defined. 
Joint legal custody order — Factors for court 
determination — Public assistance. 
Terms of joint legal custody order. 
Modification or termination of order. 
Payments of support, maintenance, and ali-
mony. 
Payment under child support order — Judg-
ment. 
Repealed. 
Family Court Act — Purpose. 
Appointment of counsel for child. 
Mandatory educational course for divorcing 
parents — Purpose — Curriculum — Excep-
tions. 
Courts to exercise family counseling powers. 
Repealed. 
Establishment of family court division of dis-
trict court. 
Repealed. 
Designation of judges — Terms. 
Repealed. 
Appointment of domestic relations counselors, 
family court commissioner, and assistants 
and clerks. 
Repealed. 
Commissioners — Powers. 
Salaries and expenses. 
Repealed. 
Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers. 
Petition for conciliation. 
Contents of petition. 
Procedure upon filing of petition. 
Fees. 
Information not available to public. 
Effect of petition — Pendency of action. 
Power and jurisdiction of judge. 
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participating jurisdiction and shall be made available for 
review by interested parties. 
ARTICLE IX 
Existing Statutes Not Repealed 
Section 1. All existing statutes prescribing weight and size 
standards and all existing statutes relating to special permits 
shall continue to be of force and effect until amended or 
repealed by law. 
ARTICLE X 
State Government Departments Authorized to Cooperate 
with Cooperating Committee 
Section 1. Within appropriations available therefor, the 
departments, agencies and officers of the government of this 
state shall cooperate with and assist the cooperating commit-
tee within the scope contemplated by article IV, section 1(a) 
and (b) of the agreement. The departments, agencies and 
officers of the government of this state are authorized gener-
ally to cooperate with said cooperating committee. 1981 
CHAPTER 24 
NONRESIDENT VIOLATOR COMPACT 
(Repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 137, § 77.) 
41-24-1 to 41-24-9. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 25 
VICTIM RESTITUTION 
(Repealed by Laws 1987, ch. 119, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 49.) 
41-25-1 to 41-25-8. Repealed. 
TITLE 42 
NAMES 
Chapter 
1. Change of Name. 
2. Conducting Business Under Assumed Name. 
3. Registration of Farm Names. 
CHAPTER 1 
CHANGE OF NAME 
Section 
42-1-1. By petition to district court — Contents. 
42-1-2. Notice of hearing — Order of change. 
42-1-3. Effect of proceedings. 
42-1-1. By petit ion to district court — Contents. 
Any natural person, desiring to change his name, may file a 
petition therefor in the district court of the county where he 
resides, setting forth: 
(1) The cause for which the change of name is sought. 
(2) The name proposed. 
(3) That he has been a bona fide resident of the county 
for the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition. 
1953 
42-1-2. Notice of hearing — Order of change. 
The court shall order what, if any, notice shall be given of 
the hearing, and after the giving of such notice, if any, may 
order the change of name as requested, upon proof in open 
court of the allegations of the petition and that there exists 
proper cause for granting the same. 1953 
42-1-3. Effect of proceedings. 
Such proceedings shall in no manner affect any legal action 
or proceeding then pending, or any right, title or interest 
whatsoever. 1953 
CHAPTER 2 
CONDUCTING BUSINESS UNDER ASSUMED NAME 
Section 
42-2-1 to 42-2-4. Repealed. 
42-2-5. Certificate of assumed and of true name — Con-
tents — Execution — Filing. 
42-2-6. Change in persons transacting business under 
assumed name. 
42-2-6.5. Repealed. 
42-2-6.6. Assumed name. 
42-2-7. Index — Fees — Evidence. 
42-2-8. Expiration of filing* — Notice — Removal from 
active index. 
42-2-9. Corporate names, limited liability company 
names, and trademark, service mark, and 
trade name rights not affected. 
42-2-10. Penalties. 
42-2-11. Persons doing business under assumed name to 
have registered office and registered agent — 
Penalties — Presumption of registered agent. 
42-2-1 to 42-2-4. Repealed. 1963 
42-2-5. Certificate of assumed and of true name — 
Contents — Execut ion — Filing. 
(1) Every person who carries on, conducts, or transacts 
business in this state under an assumed name, whether that 
business is carried on, conducted, or transacted as an indi-
vidual, association, partnership, corporation, or otherwise, 
shall file with the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code a certificate setting forth: 
(a) the name under which the business is, or is to be 
carried on, conducted, or transacted, and the full true 
name, or names, of the person owning, and the person 
carrying on, conducting, or transacting the business; 
(b) the location of the principal place of business, and 
the street address of the person. 
(2) The certificate shall be executed by the person owning, 
and the person carrying on, conducting, or transacting the 
business, and shall be filed not later than &0 days after the 
time of commencing to carry on, conduct, or transact the 
business. 
(3) "Filed" means the Division of Corporations and Com-
mercial Code has received and approved, as to form, a docu-
ment submitted under the provisions of this chapter, and has 
marked on the face of the document a stamp or seal indicating 
the time of day and date of approval, the name of the division, 
the division director's signature and division seal, or facsimi-
les of the signature or seal. 1990 
42-2-6. Change in persons transacting business under 
assumed name. 
An amended certificate shall be filed with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code not later than 30 days 
after any change in the person or persons owning, carrying on, 
conducting, or transacting such business or a change in the 
registered agent or office of the business or in any information 
required to be filed with the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code under this act. 1984 
42-2-6.5. Repealed. 1985 
817 NAMES 42-3-1 
42-2-6.6. Assumed name. 
(1) The assumed name: 
(a) may not contain any word or phrase that indicates 
or implies that the business is organized for any purpose 
other than one or more of the purposes contained in its 
application; 
(b) shall be distinguishable from any registered name 
or trademark of record in the offices of the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code, as defined in Subsec-
tion 16-10a-401(5), except as authorized by the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code pursuant to Subsec-
tion (2); and 
(c) may not, without the written consent of the United 
States Olympic Committee, contain the words "Olympic," 
"Olympiad," or "Citius Altius Fortius." 
(2) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code 
shall authorize the use of the name applied for if the name is 
distinguishable from one or more of the names and trade-
marks that are on the division's records, or if the applicant 
delivers to the division a certified copy of the final judgment of 
a court of competent jurisdiction establishing the applicant's 
right to use the name applied for in this state. 
(3) The assumed name, for purposes of recordation, shall be 
either translated into English or transliterated into letters of 
the English alphabet if it is not in English. 
(4) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code may 
not approve an application for an assumed name to any person 
violating the provisions of this section. 
(5) The director of the Division of Corporations and Com-
mercial Code shall have the power and authority reasonably 
necessary to interpret and efficiently administer this section 
and to perform the duties herein imposed upon the division by 
this section. 
(6) A name which implies by any word in the name that it 
is an agency of the state or of any of its political subdivisions, 
if it is not actually such a legally established agency, may not 
be approved for filing by the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code. 
(7) The provisions of Section 16-10a-403 apply to this chap-
ter. 1992 
42-2-7. Index — Fees — Evidence . 
(1) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code 
shall: 
(a) keep an active alphabetical index of all persons 
filing the certificates provided for in this chapter; and 
(b) collect the required indexing and filing fees. 
(2) A copy of any such certificate certified by the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code shall be presumptive 
evidence of the facts contained in the certificate. 1988 
42-2-8. Exp i ra t ion of filing — Notice — Removal from 
act ive index. 
A filing under this chapter shall be effective for a period of 
three years from the date of filing. At the expiration of that 
period, if no new filing is made by or on behalf of the person 
who made the original filing, the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code shall send a notice by regular mail, postage 
prepaid, to the address shown in the filing indicating that it 
has expired. If no new filing is made within 30 days after the 
date of mailing the notice, the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code shall remove the name from the active 
alphabetical index, and place it on a permanent inactive 
alphabetical index. 1987 
42-2-9. Corpora te names , l imited liability company 
names , a n d trademark, service mark, and 
t r a d e n a m e r igh t s not affected. 
(1) This chapter does not affect or apply to any corporation 
organized under the laws of any state if it does business under 
its true corporate name. 
(2) This chapter does not affect the statutory or common 
law trademark, service mark, or trade name rights granted by 
state or federal statute. 
(3) This chapter does not affect or apply to any limited 
liability company.doing business in this state under its true 
name. 1992 
42-2-10. Pena l t i es . 
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business 
under an assumed name without having complied with the 
provisions of this chapter, and until the provisions of this 
chapter are complied with: 
(1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, 
suit, counterclaim, cross complaint, or proceeding in any 
of the courts of this state; and 
(2) may be subject to a penalty in the form of a late 
filing fee determined by the division director in an amount 
not to exceed three times the fees charged under Section 
42-2-7 and established under Section 63-38-3.2. 1994 
42-2-11. P e r s o n s do ing bus iness u n d e r a s s u m e d n a m e 
to have r eg i s t e r ed office a n d r eg i s t e r ed a g e n t 
— Pena l t i es — P r e s u m p t i o n of r eg i s t e r ed 
agent . 
(1) (a) Any person conducting or transacting business in 
this state under an assumed name under this chapter 
shall, for service of process purposes, comply with and be 
subject to Sections 16-10a-501 through 16-10a-504, as 
though he were a corporation. 
(b) If the person conducting business or transacting 
business in this state under an assumed name under this 
chapter is a foreign corporation, it must be qualified to 
conduct or transact business under the provisions of 
Sections 16-10a-1501 through 16-10a-1511. 
(2) If a person fails to maintain a registered office or 
registered agent as required by Sections 16-10a-501 and 
16-10a-502, the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code shall mail a notice to him that the filing will be canceled 
if a registered office and registered agent are not designated. 
If the registered office and registered agent are not designated 
within 30 days after the date of mailing the notice, the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall remove 
the name from the alphabetical index, place it on a permanent 
inactive alphabetical index, and mail a notice to the applicant 
that the fifing has been canceled. 
(3) The person filing a certificate under Section 42-2-5 shall 
be presumed to be the registered agent if the person is a 
resident of this state, and the person's Utah address shall be 
presumed to be the registered office for purposes of this 
chapter. * 1992 
CHAPTER 3 
REGISTRATION OF FARM NAMES 
Section 
42-3-1. Commissioner of agriculture to register names. 
42-3-2. Recording fee. 
42-3-3. Transfer of name. 
42-3-4. Cancellation by owner — Fee. 
42-3-5. Use of name by another — Penalty. 
42-3-1. Commissioner of agriculture to register names . 
Any owner of a farm in this state may have the name of his 
farm, together with a brief description of his lands to which 
such name applies, recorded in a register kept for the purpose 
in the office of the commissioner of agriculture, and the 
commissioner of agriculture shall furnish to such landowner a 
proper certificate setting forth such name and a brief descrip-
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action, to prove permanence of injuries and to or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
ALR-3d 1 7 ° - Construction of statutes or rules making 
'propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro- mandatory the use of pattern or uniform^ap-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land- P^Tved J ^ instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
 4 Necessity and propriety of mstmctmg on al-
A T R 3d 1081 ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
h J--X •' -4— *• • -i warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case , , :Jf . , . , . , . , . , „ 0 ^ c0 
' . , ? ?..., , . _^
 r in tort is given in products liability case, 52 
stressing desirability and importance of agree- A L R 3d 101 
xnent, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construe-
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case tion and effect of provision in Rule 51, and Sim-
commenting on weight of majority view or au- iiar gtate rules, that counsel be given opportu-
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. nity to make objections to instructions out of 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad- hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence Key Numbers. — Trial *=» 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district cqurt an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Child custody. 
. —Credibility of witnesses. 
Adoption. —Denial of motion. 
—Abandonment of contract. —Divorce decree modifications. 
—Advisory verdict. —Easement. 
—Breach of contract. —Evidentiary disputes. 
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—Juvenile action. 
—Material issues. 
Harmless error. 
—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Amendment. 
—Motion. 
Caption. 
Conformance with original findings. 
New trial. 
Notice of appeal. 
Time. 
Tolling of appeal period. 
When made. 
—Overruling or vacation. 
Another district judge. 
Lack of notice. 
Child custody awards. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal contempt. 
Effect. 
—Preclusion of summary judgment. 
—Relation to pleadings. 
Failure to object to findings. 
How findings entered. 
Judgments upon multiple claims or parties. 
Judicial review. 
—Equity cases. 
—Standard of review. 
Conclusions of law. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal trials. 
-—Findings of facts by jury. 
Intent. 
Juvenile proceedings. 
Purpose of rule. 
Stipulations. 
Sufficiency. 
—Allegations of pleadings. 
—Burden on appeal. 
—Found insufficient. 
Vacation of judgment. 
—Found sufficient. 
—Opinion or memorandum of decision. 
—Recitals of procedures. 
—Technical error. 
—Ultimate facts. 
Summary judgment. 
—Statement of grounds. 
Waiver. 
—Failure of court. 
When filed. 
—Tardy filing. 
Cited. 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
In a contract action by a real estate broker 
for his commission, where the defendant raises 
the issue of abandonment of the contract by his 
answer, the court should make findings on the 
issue of abandonment. Failure of the trial court 
to make findings of fact on all material issues 
is reversible error where it is prejudicial. 
Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 
P.2d 284 (1954). 
—Advisory verdict 
The trial court has the responsibility to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
notwithstanding the advisory verdict of a jury. 
Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 
392 (Utah 1980). 
—Breach of contract. 
Where p\aintiffB, in attio^ far breach o£ con-
tract, requested finding by court on material 
issue as to whether the foundation of their 
house had been located in accordance with zon-
ing ordinances and restrictive covenants, it 
was the duty of the court to make such a find-
ing. Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Bldrs., Inc., 
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975). 
—Child custody. 
The trial court must enter specific findings 
on the factors relied upon in awarding or modi-
fying the custody of a child. Hutchison v. 
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982). 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
Credibility itself is not a factual issue that is 
appropriately the- subject of the trial court's 
findings; rather, the findings of the ultimate 
facts implicitly reflect consideration of the be-
lievability of the witnesses' testimony. Adop-
tion of McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 
1286 (Utah 1981). 
—Denial of motion. 
Subdivision (a) does not require that the de-
nial of a motion be accompanied by specific 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. State v. 
Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984). 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
Where the modification of a divorce decree is 
granted, the trial court should make findings 
to indicate the reasons why modification was 
found to be appropriate. Christensen v. 
Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981). 
Court action on a request to modify a divorce 
decree is not included in those "decisions on 
motions" referred to in Subdivision (a), and 
therefore the trial court is not exempt from the 
requirements of Subdivision (a). Stoddard v. 
Stoddard, 642 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982); Montoya 
v. Montoya, 696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1985). 
—Easement 
In a suit to establish right of way for an irri-
gation ditch by prescriptive, easement, where 
the pleadings made an issue of whether ease-
ment had been acquired and it was clear that 
the ditch had been used for more than twenty 
years to irrigate lands of plaintiffs, trial court 
was required to make a direct finding on that 
issue. Harmon v. Rasmussen, 13 Utah 2d 422, 
375 P.2d 762 (1962). 
—Evidentiary disputes. 
Although findings should be made on all ma-
terial subordinate and ultimate factual issues, 
it is not necessary that a court resolve all con-
flicting evidentiary issues. Sorenson v. Beers, 
614 P.2d 159 (Utah 1980). 
—Juvenile action. 
In juvenile action, court must not only make 
findings to support the proof of every fact nec-
essary to constitute the offense charged, but 
also make findings to support the preliminary 
adjudication that the child is within the juris-
diction of the juvenile court. In re R.N., 527 
P.2d 1356 (Utah 1974). 
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—Material issues. 
Failure to find upon all material issues 
raised by the pleadings is reversible error. 
LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 
2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966). 
It is the duty of the trial judge in contested 
cases to find facts upon all material issues sub-
mitted for decision unless findings are waived. 
Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 
1977). 
Although findings should be made on all ma-
terial subordinate and ultimate factual issues, 
it is not necessary that a court resolve all con-
flicting evidentiary issues. In re Estate of 
Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238 (Ct. App. 1989), cert, 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Harmless error. 
Trial court's failure to make findings on a 
material issue was harmless error where the 
evidence was clear, uncontroverted, and only 
capable of supporting a finding in favor of the 
judgment. Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 
(Utah 1983). 
—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
It is in the discretion of the trial court to 
adopt the findings as submitted to that court 
by the prevailing party, as long as the findings 
are not clearly contrary to the evidence. Boyer 
Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Where a court adopts findings by a state en-
gineer which adequately define the rights of all 
parties involved in a water dispute, it is not 
necessary for the trial court to make its own, 
independent findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. In re Use of Water, 12 Utah 2d 102, 363 
P.2d 199 (1961). 
Amendment 
—Motion. 
Caption. 
A document entitled ''Plaintiffs' Objections 
and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" filed after entry of judg-
ment against plaintiffs was properly construed 
by the trial court as a motion pursuant to Sub-
division (b) because, regardless of how it is cap-
tioned, a motion filed within 10 days of the 
entry of judgment that questions the correct-
ness of the court's findings and conclusions is 
properly treated as a post-judgment motion; 
the substance of a motion, not its caption, is 
controlling. DeBry v. Fidelity Natl Title Ins. 
Co., 828 P.2d 520 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
——Conformance with original findings. 
Where court on its own initiative amended 
jury's finding but within 10 days the defendant 
filed a motion to amend the judgment back to 
conform to the original findings, court had 
power, under this rule, to grant the motion. 
National Fanners' Union Property & Cas. Co. 
v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249, 61 
A.L.R.2d 635 (1955). 
New trial. 
Motion for amendment of findings, timely 
made and served upon all parties, invokes the 
continuing jurisdiction of the court and sus-
pends the finality of the judgment until the 
motion is ruled upon; if the interests of justice 
require setting aside the findings and judg-
ment, the appropriate procedure is to grant a 
new trial as to all parties. Valley Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1974). 
Notice of appeal. 
A quick filing of a notice of appeal by one 
party cannot defeat the adverse party's right to 
have the district court consider the merits of a 
motion under Subdivision (b) filed within ten 
days after entry of the judgment. Whiting v. 
Clayton, 617 P".2d 362 (Utah 1980). 
Utah R. App. P. 4(b) requires the filing of a 
new notice of appeal within the prescribed time 
after entry of the trial court's order disposing 
of a Subdivision (b) post-judgment motion. 
DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 
520 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 
P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
Time. 
Rule 60(b) may not be used to extend the 
time in which a motion may be filed pursuant 
to Subdivision (b). Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 
299, 241 P.2d 462 (1952). 
Defendants' motion under this rule, filed 
more than 10 days after entry of judgment, was 
not timely and trial court could not extend 
time for appeal from denial of such motion by 
invoking Rule 60(b)(1) based on inadvertence, 
mistake, or excusable neglect of their attorney 
since trial court may only extend time for tak-
ing action under these rules under conditions 
in Rule 6(b). Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 
120, 466 P.2d 843 (1970). 
Tolling of appeal period. 
If a motion is made, pursuant to Subdivision 
(b), before judgment and presents a substantial 
question, and the motion is not disposed of, ei-
ther expressly or by necessary implication, by 
the judgment, the running of the time for tak-
ing an appeal is suspended until the court dis-
poses of the motion. Zions First Natl Bank v. 
C'est Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980). 
When made. 
The motion to amend or make additional 
findings of fact under Subdivision (b) need not 
await the entry of judgment, but may be made 
prior thereto. Zions First Natfl Bank v. C'est 
Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980). 
Because the motion to amend findings of fact 
was made orally more than four years after 
entry of the judgment on remand, and was 
granted in the same hearing, without notice, it 
was an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial court to entertain the motion. Cornish 
Town v. Roller, 798 P.2d 753 (Utah 1990). 
—Overruling or vacation. 
Another district judge. 
Order for hearing on the merits of a final 
amended account of an estate entered by one 
district judge and not appealed or objected to 
could not be vacated or overruled by another 
district judge. Tanner v. Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 
(Utah 1975). 
Lack of notice. 
Ex parte order approving the amended ac-
count of an administrator was properly vacated 
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by the court upon timely filing of objection on 
grounds of lack of notice to objectors. Tanner v. 
Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (Utah 1975). 
Child custody awards. 
Oral findings made by the trial judge at the 
close of the evidence were sufficient to support 
a custody award and demonstrate that the de-
termination was based on factors relevant to 
the best interests of the child. Hansen v. 
Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
Child custody award must be firmly an-
chored on findings of fact that (1) are suffi-
ciently detailed, (2) include enough facts to dis-
close the process through which the ultimate 
conclusion is reached, (3) indicate the process 
is logical and properly supported, and (4) are 
not clearly erroneous. Mar chant v. Marchant, 
743 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Case was remanded to trial court for entry of 
appropriate findings, where the mother sought 
modification of custody of the children on a 
theory of changed circumstances, and, other 
than an unsigned statement by the trial court 
that the father was still the primary caretaker, 
the court's order neither discussed the mother's 
evidence in support of her affidavit nor com-
pared that evidence with the factors underly-
ing the original award. Jensen v. Jensen, 775 
P.2d 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Criminal cases. 
Subdivision (a) of this rule applies in crimi-
nal cases by virtue of U.R.Crim.P. 26(7). State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
The Supreme Court has abandoned the pre-
Rule 52(a) position that the standard of review 
in crirninal cases must be the same for both 
jury and bench verdicts. State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
Utah R.Civ.P. 52 applies to criminal actions 
under U.R.Crim.P. 26(7) and U.R.Civ.P. 81(e). 
State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). 
Criminal contempt 
In a proceeding for criminal contempt, there 
was no need to remand for written findings, 
because the trial court articulated in the tran-
script, as well as in the "Findings and Conclu-
sions" section of the "Minutes, Findings and 
Order" document, explicit findings addressing 
the three elements of contempt. State v. Hurst, 
821 P.2d 467 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Effect 
—Preclusion of summary judgment 
While findings of fact are unnecessary to 
support granting of summary judgment, the 
grant of summary judgment is precluded 
where trial judge did make and enter findings 
and conclusions, the content of which evidence 
material issues of fact. Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 
681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
—Relation to pleadings. 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law will 
support a judgment, even though they are gen-
eral, if they follow the allegations of well-for-
mulated pleadings in most respects. In re Es-
tate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Failure to object to findings. 
The failure to object to the findings offset, in 
the form of a motion for a new trial or amend-
ment of judgment, was not fatal to the defen-
dants' appeal from a proceeding in equity. 
Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955 (Utah 1986). 
How findings entered. 
In assessing the sufficiency of the findings, 
the appellate court is not confined to the con-
tents of a particular document entitled "Find-
ings"; rather, the findings may be expressed 
orally from the bench or contained in other 
documents. Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
This rule does not mandate the entry of 
signed, written findings and conclusions. On 
the contrary, the court may even state its find-
ings orally if it chooses. Martindale v. Adams, 
777 P.2d 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Judgments upon multiple claims or par-
ties. 
Pursuant to the requirement of Subdivision 
(a) that the trial court "find the facts spe-
cially," in order to facilitate appellate review of 
judgments certified as final under Rule 54(b), 
the trial court should enter findings supporting 
the conclusion that such orders are final and 
the findings should explain the lack of factual 
overlap between the certified and remaining 
claims. Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137 
(Utah 1992). 
Judicial review. 
On review, the appellate court is not limited 
to written findings, and may properly examine 
findings expressed solely from the bench or 
contained in other court documents, such as 
court memoranda. Merriam v. Merriam, 799 
P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Equity cases. 
The "clearly erroneous" standard of review 
stated in Subdivision (a) is applicable in equity 
cases. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 
1991). 
—Standard of review. 
In reviewing an interlocutory order permit-
ting discovery where issues offset are involved 
and there are no findings of fact, the court does 
not review the facts but assumes that the trier 
of facts found them in accord with its decision, 
and will affirm the decision if from the evi-
dence it would be reasonable to find facts to 
support it. Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 
245 P.2d 224 (1952). 
A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against 
the great weight of the evidence or if the court 
is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced 
that a mistake has been made. State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jack-
son Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); Ste-
vens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 
906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State, In re N.H.B., 
777 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 789 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1989); Bountiful v. Riley, 784 
P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989); State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 
880 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 
P,2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
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The "clearly erroneous" standard applies 
whether the case is one in equity or one at law. 
Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 
P.2d 896 (Utah 1989); Bountiful v. Riley, 784 
P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989); Grahn v. Gregory, 800 
P.2d 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 
843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1991). 
If there is a reasonable basis in evidence, a 
trial court's award of damages will be affirmed 
on appeal. Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1278 (Utah 1988). 
Application of the "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard in Subdivision (a) does not eliminate the 
deference traditionally accorded the fact finder 
to determine the credibility of witnesses. State 
v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
The "clearly erroneous" standard in Subdivi-
sion (a) applies to review of competency pro-
ceedings because they are civil rather than 
criminal in nature. State v. LafFerty, 749 P.2d 
1239 (Utah 1988), afFd, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 
1989), conviction vacated on ground that com-
petency not properly established, 949 F.2d 
1546 (10th Cir. 1991). 
On appeal of a judgment from the bench af-
ter trial, the appellate court defers to the trial 
court's factual assessment unless there is clear 
error. Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Ap-
pliance & Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988); 
Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 
1991). 
When reviewing trial court's finding based 
solely on written materials and involving no 
assessment of witness credibility or compe-
tency, the Court of Appeals is in as good a posi-
tion as the trial court to examine the evidence 
de novo and determine the facts, rather than 
review the determination under the standard 
set forth in Subdivision (a), which would defer 
to the trial judge's ability to assess the credibil-
ity of witnesses and set aside the finding only if 
clearly erroneous. In re Infant Anonymous, 
760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
When reviewing a bench trial in a criminal 
action for sufficiency of the evidence, the appel-
late court must sustain the trial court's judg-
ment unless it is against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court other-
wise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made. State v. Good-
man, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). 
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the 
appellant can show that they are without ade-
quate evidentiary foundation or if they are in-
duced by an erroneous view of the law. West-
ern Capital & Sees., Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 
989 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 
(Utah 1989). 
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if it 
can be shown that they are against the clear 
weight of evidence or that they induce a defi-
nite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 
156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Monroe, Inc. v. 
Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
A finding attacked as iacking adequate evi-
dentiary support is deemed "clearly erroneous" 
only if the appellate court concludes that the 
finding is against the ctear weight of the evi-
dence. Reid v. Mutual or Omaha Ins. Co., 776 
P.2d 896 (Utah 1989); In re Estate of Grimm, 
784 P.2d 1238 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, de-
nied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
The decision of the trial court to terminate 
parental rights will be disturbed only if the 
findings are clearly erroneous. Bingham v. Mc-
Arthur, 808 P.2d 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Conclusions of Jaw. 
While findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous, conclusions 
of law are simply reviewed for correctness 
without any special deference. Western Kane 
County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); General 
Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 766 P.2d 429 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Bountiful v. Riley, 784 
P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith, 793 
P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Eskelsen v. 
Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). 
Where the pivotal question is a question of 
law, the Court of Appeals applies a correction-
of-error standard with no particular deference 
accorded the trial court's construction. T.R.F. 
v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
A trial court's conclusions of law are re-
viewed under a correction of error standard. 
Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
Criminal cases. 
While the trial court's conclusions should be 
respected, a conviction may not oppose the 
weight of the evidence. State v. Strieby, 790 
P.2d 98 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 
1138 (Utah 1990). 
In reviewing the trial court's decision to ad-
mit evidence of an identification of the accused, 
the appellate court will defer to the trial 
court's fact-finding role by viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to the trial court's de-
cision to admit and by reversing its factual 
findings only if they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence. State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
Criminal trials. 
The clear weight of the evidence standard 
does not require that the defendant in a crimi-
nal action present the more compelling evi-
dence at trial. Instead, this standard requires 
that the clear weight of the evidence presented 
at trial not be contrary to the verdict. A defen-
dant's conviction must still be based on evi-
dence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but, on appeal, the standard of review 
aids the defendant in his effort to obtain a re-
versal. State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 
1988). 
Findings of facts by jury. 
The standard that to successfully attack a 
verdict, an appellant must marshall all the evi-
dence supporting the verdict and then demon-
strate that, even viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to that verdict, the evi-
dence is insufficient to support it, is also appli-
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cable to a jury's factual findings. Cambelt Int'] 
Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987). 
Intent. 
Questions of intent as determined by extrin-
sic evidence are questions of fact to be decided 
by the trier of fact and are subject to the 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review. 
Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Juvenile proceedings. 
The standard set forth in Subdivision (a) of 
this rule is appropriate and applicable in non-
jury juvenile court cases involving criminal vi-
olations. In re R.L.I., 771 P.2d 1068 (Utah 
1989). 
Purpose of rule. 
The right to resort to the courts for the adju-
dication of grievances and the settlement of 
disputes is a fundamental and important one, 
and an indispensable requisite to fulfilling 
that responsibility is the determination of 
questions of fact upon which there is disagree-
ment; it is for that reason that the rules impose 
the duty of making filings on all material is-
sues. LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 
Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966). 
Stipulations. 
Trial court's failure to file findings of fact 
and conclusions of law did not require reversal, 
where the facts were stipulated and therefore 
undisputed, and the Court of Appeals was able 
to scrutinize the stipulated facts and make its 
own determination as to the proper conclusions 
of law the facts dictated. Dover Elevator Co. v. 
Hill Mangum Invs., 766 P.2d 424 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
When a trial court relies on stipulated facts 
to decide a case, the appellate court does not 
apply the clearly erroneous standard, but will 
sustain the lower court's decision only if con-
vinced of its correctness. This principle also ob-
tains when stipulated facts are supplemented 
by proffers by counsel. Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d 
542 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Sufficiency. 
—Allegations of pleadings. 
Substantial compliance with this rule does 
not require that the trial court negative every 
allegation contained in the pleadings; rather, 
the rule is satisfied if, from the findings the 
trial court makes, there can be no reasonable 
inference other than that it must have found 
against such allegations. Parks v. Zions First 
Natl Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983). 
—Burden on appeal. 
It is appellant's burden to cite the appellate 
court to all the evidence in the record that 
would support the determination reached and 
then demonstrate why, even when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the court below, it is 
insufficient to support the finding under at-
tack. Harker v. Condominiums Forest Glen, 
Inc., 740 P.2d 1361 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Reid 
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 
(1989); Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
The appellant assailed the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the trial judge's findings of 
fact. His brief contained a heading "FACTS," 
under which he set forth both parties' 'Ver-
sions" of the facts. This did not constitute a 
sufficient marshalling of the evidence in sup-
port of the findings made by the court below, 
which was required before he could have dem-
onstrated that even viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the court below, the evidence 
was insufficient to support the findings. Fitz-
gerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
To mount a successful challenge to trial 
court findings under Subdivision (a) of this 
rule, an appellant must marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings. Only then 
can the appellate court determine whether 
those findings are clearly erroneous. Cornish 
Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988). 
The challenging party must marshal all rele-
vant evidence presented at trial that tends to 
support the findings and demonstrate why the 
findings are clearly erroneous. West Valley 
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
The way to attack findings that appear to be 
complete and that are sufficiently detailed is to 
marshal the supporting evidence and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is inadequate to 
sustain such findings. But where the findings 
are not of that caliber, appellant need not go 
through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather, 
appellant can simply argue the legal insuffi-
ciency of the court's findings as framed. Wood-
ward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
—Found insufficient. 
Divorce case was remanded for adequate 
findings on the issues of alimony and fees, 
where no findings had been made regarding 
the wife's financial condition and needs, and, 
although the record contained substantial evi-
dence regarding the parties' financial situation 
and the reasonableness of the fees, the findings 
were deficient because they failed to evaluate 
these factors. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In divorce action, where trial court record 
did not reveal whether order regarding assign-
ment of retirement benefits was intended as an 
enforcement or a modification of a previous or-
der, appellate court remanded the issue for the 
court below to make findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d 
741 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Vacation of judgment 
The failure of a trial court to enter adequate 
findings requires that the judgment be va-
cated. Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979). 
—Found sufficient 
Finding that "claim of plaintiff of the rela-
tionship of attorney client is not supported by 
the weight of credible evidence and the court 
finds said issue in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiff" was sufficient in action in 
which plaintiff claimed the attorney had estab-
lished a professional relationship with her and 
was to purchase property at foreclosure sale for 
her; although more detailed factual findings 
would have been appropriate, such additional 
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findings in this case were not mandatory. 
Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 159 (Utah 1980). 
Sufficient evidence to support the finding as 
to division of marital property. See Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Findings of fact, based on expert testimony, 
and not "clearly erroneous," accepted on ap-
peal. See O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
In divorce action, value of retirement bene-
fits, as found by trial court, substantiated by 
record. See Canning v. Canning, 744 P.2d 325 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In a fraud action, because there was substan-
tial competent evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that no false representations 
were knowingly made, and because the appel-
late court was convinced that the factfinder 
made no mistake, the finding was not dis-
turbed on appeal. Brown v. Harry Heathman, 
Inc., 744 P.2d 1016 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Evidence found sufficient in a bench trial to 
support the trial court's judgment convicting 
defendant of second-degree murder. State v. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). 
Findings of fact, though not model of clarity, 
were sufficiently detailed to reveal trial court's 
reasoning processes. See Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). 
—Opinion or memorandum of decision. 
An opinion or memorandum of decision filed 
by a court sitting as trier of the fact may be 
consulted where the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law are inadequate; and, if that 
opinion or memorandum contains the findings 
of fact, that is sufficient compliance with Sub-
division (a). Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling 
Co., 4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 (1956). 
A trial judge's memorandum decision can be 
regarded as findings of fact but only as to those 
findings recited therein. Thomas v. Thomas, 
569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977). 
—Recitals of procedures. 
"Findings of fact" must be more than simply 
recitals of the procedures involved in the devel-
opment of the case. Anderson v. Utah County 
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 
1979). 
—Technical error. 
Trial court's mere clerical oversight in fail-
ing to sign its findings and conclusions did not 
require disturbing the judgment. Martindale v. 
Adams, 777 P.2d 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Ultimate facts. 
Findings should be limited to the ultimate 
facts and if they ascertain ultimate facts, and 
sufficiently conform to the pleadings and the 
evidence to support the judgment, they will be 
regarded as sufficient. Pearson v. Pearson, 561 
P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977). 
Summary judgment 
Findings of fact are unnecessary in connec-
tion with summary judgment decisions. Taylor 
v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
—Statement of grounds. 
For an appellate court, a statement of 
grounds found by the trial court to justify sum-
mary judgment would be of great assistance, 
and in an appropriate case, failure to do so may 
justify remand to the trial court. Masters v. 
Worsley, 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Under Subdivision (a) the trial court is re-
quired to make a brief written statement to 
explain which alternative theory it accepted in 
granting summary judgment. However, failure 
to object or to move the trial court to correct 
this oversight under Subdivision (b) precludes 
the Court of Appeals from considering the 
error on appeal. Alford v. Utah League of Cit-
ies & Towns, 791 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Inasmuch as summary judgment is only ap-
propriate when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law, the inclusion of 
the requirement in Subdivision (a) that the 
court issue a statement of the grounds for its 
decision cannot bear upon the undisputed fac-
tual basis for the decision. Hence, it can only 
bear upon alternative theories of law that may 
apply to the facts. Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 
817 P.2d 320 (1991). 
An important reason for inclusion of the re-
quirement that the trial court state the ground 
for its decision in summary judgment cases is 
administrative in nature: to provide a ready 
basis for review on appeal. However, also from 
the administrative point of view, failure to 
state the grounds for its decision is not revers-
ible error. Rather, in an appropriate case, fail-
ure to do so may only justify remand to the 
trial court. Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 
P.2d 320 (1991). 
Subdivision (a) requires that the court state 
its grounds for granting a motion for summary 
judgment when the motion was based on more 
than one ground. The statement serves to in-
form the parties and to provide a ready basis 
for review on appeal. Neiderhauser Bldrs. & 
Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
A trial judge's failure to comply with the last 
sentence of Subdivision (a), requiring the court 
to 'Issue a brief written statement of the 
ground for its decision on all motions [for sum-
mary judgment] granted ... when the motion is 
based on more than one ground," alone is not 
reversible error unless there are unusual cir-
cumstances. Allen v. Prudential Property and 
Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992). 
The trial court's blanket statement granting 
defendant's motion for summary judgment pro-
vided no guidance as to the court's reasoning 
and therefore did not comply with Subdivision 
(a) of this rule, which requires trial judges to 
issue brief written statements of their reasons 
for granting summary judgment when multi-
ple grounds are presented. Although failure to 
issue a statement of grounds is not reversible 
error absent unusual circumstances, the pre-
sumption of correctness ordinarily afforded 
trial court rulings has little operative effect 
when members of the appellate court cannot 
divine the trial court's reasoning. Retherford v. 
AT & T Communications of the Mt. States, 
Inc., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). 
The trial court's blanket statement granting 
defendant's motion for summary judgment pro-
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vided no guidance as to the court's reasoning 
and therefore did not comply with Subdivision 
(a) of this rule, which requires trial judges to 
issue brief written statements of their reasons 
for granting summary judgment when multi-
ple grounds are presented. Although failure to 
issue a statement of grounds is not reversible 
error absent unusual circumstances, the pre-
sumption of correctness ordinarily afforded 
trial court rulings has little operative effect 
when members of the appellate court cannot 
divine the trial court's reasoning. Retherford v. 
AT & T Communications of the Mt. States, 
Inc., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). 
Where defendant's motion for summary 
judgment was baaed on one ground, namely 
that there was not a genuine issue of material 
fact, the trial court complied with the require-
ments of Subdivision (a) when it issued a brief 
written statement granting defendant's motion 
and indicating that there were no genuine is-
sues of material fact. Thayne v. Beneficial 
Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). 
Waiver. 
—Failure of court 
Although this rule has not contained provi-
sions allowing a waiver of findings of facts by 
the court since 1965, where a party waives 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, he can-
not take advantage of failure of the court in 
that regard on appeal. Farrell v. Turner, 25 
Utah 2d 351, 482 P.2d 117 (1971). 
When filed. 
—Tardy filing. 
Failure of lower court to file its finding of 
fact and conclusions of law until nineteen days 
after entry of judgment was not reversible 
error where complaining party failed to show 
that judgment would have been different had 
rule been complied with. Ellison v. Johnson, 18 
Utah 2d 374, 423 P.2d 657 (1967). 
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P.2d 732 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Wagetaff v. 1991); State v. Ford, 818 P.2d 1052 (Utah Ct. 
Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); App. 1991); Peterson v. Peterson, 818 R2d 
Ashton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Buford, 820 
1990); Mont Trucking, Inc. v. Entrada Indus., p.2d 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Inc., 802 P.2d 779 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
 A l l r e d v j y ^ 335 p 2d 974 (Utah Ct. App. 
State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028^(Uteh 1991);
 1 9 9 2 ) . p o t t e r v P o t t e r > M5 R 2 d 272 (Utah Ct. 
State ex wW.C. v. Cruz, 808 P.2d 1131 (Utah
 A i g 9 3 ) B a u m g a r t v. U t a h F a r m Bureau 
£ AuP .^ A9 1); ?3I?? c*H.agan^"2 S ! In8« Co" 851 P'2d ™ <Utah C t APP' 1993)> 
? ? m r i & / K *>bb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322 (Utah Ct. P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) btate v. Drobel, 815 r.la
 1ftnox v 1 ou \ one DOJ con 
724 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Clark v. Booth, 821 Jpp.^JM); York v Shutaen, 875 P 2dI 590 
P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991); Greenwood v. City of <Utah C t App. 1994); Interiors Contracting 
N. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991); Inc- v- S m i t h ' Halander & Smith Assoc., 881 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah Ct. App. P-2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Ron Shepherd 
1991); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial of findings prepared by prevailing party, 54 
§ 1967 et. seq. A.L.R.3d 868. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 236; 88 Application of "clearly erroneous" test by 
C.J.S. Trial §§ 609 to 657.
 R u l e 52(a) 0f the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
A.L.R. - Power of tnal court, on remand for
 d u r e to ^ ^ , f m d i o f fact b a 8 e d o n 
further proceedings, to change prior fact find- , . . , -n A T r> i?^ 010 
ings as to matter not passed upon by appellate documentary evidence 11 A.L.R • Fed.212. 
court, without receiving further evidence, 19 K e y Numbers. — Judgment *» 297; Trial *» 
A.L.R.3d 502. , 388 to 405. 
Propriety and effect of trial court's adoption 
Rule 53. Masters. 
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all of the issues in an action 
may be referred by the court to a master upon the written consent of the 
parties, or the court may appoint a master in an action, in accordance with the 
provisions of Subdivision (b) of this rule. As used in these rules the word 
"master" includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner. The compensation 
to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by the court, and shall be charged 
upon such of the parties or paid out of any fond or subject matter of the action, 
which is in the custody and control of the court as the court may direct. The 
master shall not retain his report as security for his compensation; but when 
the party ordered to pay the compensation allowed by the court does not pay it 
after notice and within the time prescribed by the court, the master is entitled 
to a writ of execution against the delinquent party. 
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the 
rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the 
issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of 
account, a reference shall, in the absence of the written consent of the parties, 
be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it. 
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master may specify or limit his 
powers and may direct him to report only upon particular issues or to do or 
perform particular acts or to receive and report evidence only and may fix the 
time and place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of the 
master's report. Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the 
order, the master has and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings 
in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary 
or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the order. He may 
require the production before him of evidence upon all matters embraced in 
the reference, including the production of all books, papers, vouchers, docu-
ments, and writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the admissibility of 
evidence unless otherwise directed by the order of reference and has the au-
thority to put witnesses on oath and may himself examine them and may call 
the parties to the action and examine them upon oath. When a party so 
requests, the master shall make a record of the evidence offered and excluded 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple 
Jury Formats and Civil Litigation: Arnold v. 
Eastern Airlines, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1005. 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions § 110 
et seq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 115 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 109,117 to 122; 
88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 6 to 10. 
A.L.R. — Propriety of separate trials of is-
sues of tort liability and of validity and effect of 
release, 4 A.L.R.3d 456. 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to li-
ability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in actions involv-
ing personal injury, death, or property damage, 
78 A.L.R. Fed. 890. 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to li-
ability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in civil rights 
actions, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 220. 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to li-
ability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in actions involv-
ing patents and copyrights, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 532. 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to li-
ability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in contract ac-
tions, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 812. 
Propriety of ordering consolidation under 
Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in civil rights actions, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 732. 
Propriety of ordering consolidation under 
Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in actions involving patents, copyrights, or 
trademarks, 82 A.L.R. Fed. 719. 
Propriety of ordering consolidation under 
Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in actions involving securities, 83 A.L.R. Fed. 
367. 
Key Numbers. — Action «=» 56, 60; Trial ** 
2 to 4. 
Rule 43. Evidence* 
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in 
open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules, the Utah Rules of Evi-
dence, or a statute of this state. All evidence shall be admitted which is 
admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court. 
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts not appearing 
of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respec-
tive parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or 
partly on oral testimony or depositions. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 43(a) and (e), F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Evidence generally, 
§ 78-25-2 et seq. 
Relevancy and its limits, UH.E. 401 to 411. 
Witnesses, U.R.E. 601 to 615. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Form. 
—Open court. 
Judge's request for investigation. 
Motions. 
—Evidentiary hearing. 
Witnesses. 
Cited. 
Form. 
—Open court 
Judge's request for investigation. 
Failure of judge in divorce action to notify 
counsel of his asking juvenile authorities to in-
vestigate the homes of both parties and make a 
report thereon did not violate the requirement 
of Subdivision (a), that all testimony be in open 
court, to such a degree as to warrant a retrial. 
Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284 
(1954). 
Motions. 
—Evidentiary hearing. 
Although a court can grant or deny a motion 
on the sole or combined bases of affidavits, de-
positions or oral testimony, when no deposi-
tions have been taken and disputed material 
facts are alleged in opposing affidavits, there 
should be an evidentiary hearing to aid in the 
resolution of those facts. Stan Katz Real Es-
tate, Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142 (Utah 
1977). 
Witnesses. 
Since plaintiffs untimely designation of her 
new expert witness violated the district court's 
instruction as to the deadline for designating 
witnesses, the court's action in granting defen-
dant's motion in limine to exclude the witness 
clearly was not an abuse of discretion, and it 
did not matter that the parties agreed between 
themselves to allow plaintiff further time to 
designate her new expert witness. Hill v. 
Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Cited in Midgley v. Denhalter, 121 Utah 
385, 242 P.2d 566 (1952); Best v. Huber, 3 
Utah 2d 177, 281 P.2d 208 (1955). 
1049 DISTRICT COURT OPERATIONS Rule 6-401 
(7) The panel shall develop necessary procedures for its operation and shall 
publish such procedures as an appendix to this Code. 
(Added effective April 15, 1991.) 
ARTICLE 4. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS. 
Rule 6-401. Domestic relations commissioners. 
Intent: 
To identify the types of cases and matters which commissioners are autho-
rized to hear, to identify the types of relief which commissioners may recom-
mend and to identify the types of final orders which may be issued by commis-
sioners. 
To establish a procedure for judicial review of commissioners* decisions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern all domestic relations court commissioners serving in 
the District Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Types of cases and matters. All domestic relations matters filed in 
the district court in counties where court commissioners are appointed and 
serving, including all divorce, annulment, paternity and spouse abuse mat-
ters, orders to show cause, scheduling and settlement conferences, petitions to 
modify divorce decrees, scheduling conferences, and all other applications for 
relief, shall be referred to the commissioner upon filing with the clerk of the 
court unless otherwise ordered by the Presiding Judge of the District. 
(2) Authority of Court Commissioner. Court commissioners shall have 
the following authority: 
(A) Upon notice, require the personal appearance of parties and their 
counsel; 
(B) Require the filing of financial disclosure statements and proposed 
settlement forms by the parties; 
(C) Obtain child custody evaluations from the Division of Family Ser-
vices pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 62A-4-106, or through the 
private sector; 
(D) Make recommendations to the court regarding any issue, including 
a recommendation for entry of final judgment, in domestic relations or 
spouse abuse cases at any stage of the proceedings; 
(E) Require counsel to file with the initial or responsive pleading, a 
certificate based upon the facts available at that time, stating whether 
there is a legal action pending or previously adjudicated in a district or 
juvenile court of any state regarding the minor child(ren) in the current 
case; 
(F) At the commissioner's discretion, and after notice to all parties or 
their counsel, conduct evidentiary hearings consistent with paragraph 
(3)(C) below; 
(G) Impose sanctions against any party who fails to comply with the 
commissioner's requirements of attendance or production of discovery; 
(H) Impose sanctions against any person who acts contemptuously un-
der Utah Code Ann. Section 78-32-10; 
(I) Issue temporary or ex parte orders; 
(J) Conduct settlement conferences with the parties and their counsel 
for the purpose of facilitating settlement of any or all issues in a domestic 
relations case. Issues which cannot be agreed upon by the parties at the 
settlement conference shall be certified to the district court for trial; and 
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(K) Conduct pretrial conferences with the parties and their counsel on 
all domestic relations matters unless otherwise ordered by the presiding 
judge. The commissioner shall make recommendations on all issues under 
consideration at the pretrial and submit those recommendations to the 
district court. 
(3) Duties of Court Commissioner. Under the general supervision of the 
presiding judge, the court commissioner has the following duties prior to any 
domestic matter being heard by the district court: 
(A) Review all pleadings in each case; 
(B) Certify those cases directly to the district court that appear to re-
quire a hearing before the district court judge; 
(C) Except in cases previously certified to the district court, conduct 
hearings with parties and their counsel for the purpose of submitting 
recommendations to the parties and the court; 
(D) Coordinate information with the juvenile court regarding previous 
or pending proceedings involving children of the parties; and 
(E) Refer appropriate cases to mediation programs if available. 
(4) Objections. With the exception of pre-trial orders," the commissioner's 
recommendation is the order of the court until modified by the court. Any 
party objecting to the recommended order shall file a written objection to the 
recommendation with the clerk of the court and serve copies on the commis-
sioner's office and opposing counsel. Objections shall be filed within ten days 
of the date the recommendation was made in open court or if taken under 
advisement, ten days after the date of the subsequent written recommenda-
tion made by the commissioner. Objections shall be to specific recommenda-
tions and shall set forth reasons for each objection. 
(5) Judicial review. Cases not resolved at the settlement or pretrial con-
ference shall be set for trial on all issues not resolved. All other matters shall 
be reviewed in accordance with Rule 4-501. 
(6) Prohibitions. 
(A) Commissioners shall not make final adjudications of domestic rela-
tions matters. 
(B) Commissioners shall not serve as pro tempore judges in any matter, 
except as provided by Rule of the Supreme Court. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 15, 1995.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- modifications; deleted ''Enter a default judg-
ment inserted "including a recommendation ment" from the beginning of present Subdivi-
for entry of final judgment" in Subdivision sion (2)(G); deleted "other than default or un-
(2)(D); deleted former Subdivision (2)(G), au- contested divorces and modifications" from the 
thorizing commissioners to adjudicate default end of Subdivision (6)(A); and, made related 
and uncontested divorces and uncontested stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Scope of authority. 
Ten-day objection period. 
Scope of authority. 
Domestic relations commissioner's order en-
forcing an out-of-state custody decree and 
denying an in-state mother's request for a 
hearing to challenge the foreign decree was an 
unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. 
Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Ten-day objection period 
The ten-day period under Subdivision (4) for 
filing an objection to a commissioner's recom-
mended order does not make the order provi-
sional nor limit the judge's authority to act on 
the order within the objection period. An order 
that was signed within the ten-day objection 
period was a judgment from which statutory 
interest accrued. Hoagland v. Hoagland, 852 
P.2d 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
1051 DISTRICT COURT OPERATIONS Rule 6-404 
Rule 6-402. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Rule 6-402, relating to the 
names of parties in divorce complaints, was re-
pealed in 1989. 
Rule 6-403. Shortening 90-day waiting period in domestic 
matters. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for shortening or waiving the 90-day waiting pe-
riod in domestic cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Proceedings on the merits of a divorce action.shall not be heard by the 
district courts unless 90 days have elapsed from the time the complaint was 
filed or unless the Court finds that there is good cause for shortening or 
eliminating the waiting period and enters a formal order to that effect prior to 
the hearing date. 
(2) Application for a hearing less than 90 days from the date the complaint 
was filed shall be made by motion and accompanied by an affidavit setting 
forth the factual matters constituting good cause. The motion and supporting 
affidavit(s) shall be served on the opposing party at least five days prior to the 
scheduled hearing unless the party is in default. 
(3) In the event the Court finds that there is good cause for hearing in less 
than 90 days from the filing of the complaint, the facts constituting such cause 
shall be included in the findings of fact and presented to the Court for signa-
ture. 
Rule 6-404. Modification of divorce decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish procedures for modification of existing divorce decrees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all district courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced by the filing 
of a petition to modify in the original divorce action. Service of the petition 
and summons upon the opposing party shall be in accordance with the re-
quirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. No request for a 
modification of an existing decree shall be raised by way of an order to show 
cause. 
(2) The responding party shall serve the reply within twenty days after 
service of the petition. Either party may file a certificate of readiness for trial. 
Upon filing of the certificate, the matter shall be referred to the domestic 
relations commissioner prior to trial, or in those districts where there is not a 
domestic relations commissioner, placed on the trial calendar. 
(3) No petition for modification shall be placed on a law and motion or order 
to show cause calendar without the consent of the commissioner or the district 
judge. 
